In search of an appropriate analogy for sports entitites incorporated under associations incorporation legislation in Australia and New Zealand using broadly conceived corporate law organic theory by Huntly, Colin Thomas
 
 
 
THIS THESIS IS PRESENTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LAW 
 
2005 
Volume I  
(Introduction – Chapter 4) 
 
“In search of an appropriate analogy for  
sports entities incorporated under  
associations incorporation legislation  
in Australia and New Zealand  
using broadly conceived  
corporate law organic theory.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colin Huntly  
B.Bus, PGradDipBus, M.Com (Curtin) 
  
 
 
THIS THESIS IS PRESENTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN LAW 
 
2005 
Volume II  
(Chapter 5 – Annexure B) 
 
“In search of an appropriate analogy for  
sports entities incorporated under  
associations incorporation legislation  
in Australia and New Zealand  
using broadly conceived  
corporate law organic theory.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Colin Huntly  
B.Bus, PGradDipBus, M.Com (Curtin) 
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth 
knowledge increaseth sorrow.
1
 
Reading for the PhD is an essentially selfish process.  As with all selfishness, there is 
an abundance of what the economists euphemistically refer to as “externalities” (ie: 
costs borne by others).  In this regard, the important task of honouring each of those 
individuals whose combined support got me to the finish-line must commence with 
the reflection that “it takes a village”.  The village that has contributed to the 
completion of this thesis is as erudite as it is diverse.  If only I could name all of 
them at once rather than piecemeal!  That would be my clear preference, for each one 
in turn is foremost in my thoughts as I tap away at the keyboard to complete this final 
salutary task. 
 
In 1999, Foundation Dean of Law at Murdoch University, Professor Ralph 
Simmonds took a considerable risk and accepted my proposal to read for the PhD in 
Law.  Until his elevation to the Supreme Court of Western Australia in January 2004 
his Honour provided exemplary supervision and mentoring to me in this research.  I 
am still uncertain if I am more in awe of his mastery of business associations law, or 
of his personal and professional kindness.  The former provided the intellectual 
capital to enrich, focus and test the quality of my research.  The latter is typified in 
his willingness to proof-read the final thesis and advise on examiner’s reports.   
Simply put, without Professor/Justice Simmonds’ support, there would be no PhD in 
the reader’s hands. 
                                                 
1   Ecclesiastes 1:18.  
i  
The final year of my research was the make-or-break phase.  The greatest lesson in 
personal and professional kindness was provided to me at the start of this time when 
Dr Christopher Kendall, Associate Professor and newly appointed Dean of Murdoch 
Law School, agreed to supervise me through to completion.  Despite a punishing 
schedule, the unrelenting demands of office, and at considerable personal cost, Dean 
Kendall kept me on track and on task with a combination of guidance, inspiration 
and insight.  In my darkest hours he encouraged me on with his scary brilliance and 
quick wit.  Exemplar, mentor and friend.   
 
In financial terms, this research was principally made possible by my employer, 
Curtin University of Technology.  The practical support of Curtin Business School’s 
Staff Development Committee enabled me to devote 18 months of the past 5 years to 
the project on a full-time basis.  In addition, my colleagues in the School of Business 
Law, foremost among those being my longsuffering and ever-supportive Head of 
School Dr Rob Guthrie, have provided all manner of sustenance along the way. 
 
Murdoch University Law School provided the perfect environment for me to develop 
this thesis from its vaguely conceived beginnings through to this hefty narrative.  The 
facility the Law School offered me to withdraw from the hustle and bustle into a 
quiet and creative space with all of the requisite research facilities was essential.  I 
am particularly indebted to Sharon Owens in the School Office for - well, everything 
basically.  Anne Greenshields, the Senior Law Librarian taught me how to do legal 
research properly - several times a semester.  Her amazing knowledge and patience 
are equally appreciated. 
 
ii  
I have had the privilege of staunch colleagues in the School of Business Law at 
Curtin Business School over the past 11 years.  Aside from my Head of School Dr 
Rob Guthrie mentioned above, during the period of my PhD candidacy 4 colleagues 
in particular have stood by me in both light and shade.  Associate Professor Dr Dale 
Pinto never failed to enquire how I was going, provide a consoling or encouraging 
word and show a genuine interest in my progress.  Associate Professor Dr Pauline 
Sadler has been a comrade throughout the process.  In the darkest days her counsel 
and humour kept me engaged with the process and helped me see the bigger picture.  
John Maltas who, at a time of life when many people are retiring into intellectual 
obscurity, is himself in the thick of PhD research, is a constant source of inspiration 
and has been a true friend.  Courage and determination are concepts to most but 
creeds to him – creeds that he has endeavoured to inculcate into me over the years.  
Associate Professor Dr Peter Williams has also been an unflagging fellow-traveller 
throughout the process and has been a valued sounding-board on matters of style and 
expression in particular.  In addition to my Business Law colleagues, Adjunct 
Professor Dr Pat Addison in the School of Accounting at Curtin Business School has 
been a key supporter of my research.  Her conviction that a PhD is not a “real” PhD 
“unless it changes you in terms of the way you think” remains one of the most 
insightful observations I have heard about the process. 
 
In terms of practical support, I am indebted to Jennifer Lalor in the Curtin Learning 
and Scholarship Network and her team for the data entry and preliminary data 
description.  I am likewise indebted to the staff of Curtin’s Document Services and 
Inter-Library Loans Section at the TL Robertson Library.  I doubt that there are staff 
iii  
to match them in terms of professionalism and efficiency in any library in the 
country. 
 
My closest friends, and both sides of our family have shown a genuine interest in my 
work over the years.  It is difficult to explain a process to others that one does not 
fully understand oneself, but they have each nodded sagely, listened to my often 
desperate ramblings and either offered to fill my glass, fix me a nice cup of tea or 
changed the subject at exactly the right times. 
 
One final word of advice to anyone reading this and who is thinking of reading for 
the PhD for themselves.  When I started this process I did not expect to move house 
4 times, renovating one and building another.  I did not expect my supervisor to be 
appointed to the Supreme Court Bench less than 12 months before submission.  I did 
not expect that I would become a father, develop grey hair, get promoted, or move 
out beyond the suburbs.  It is a long and uncharted journey.  Sometimes you lose 
your way and wonder why the hell you ever started in the first place.  Indeed, I am 
told that many who start never finish.  So make sure you choose a supervisor who is 
both brilliant and kind.  Make sure you keep your friends and family close to hand.  
Keep taking the medication!  And above all, make sure you have a strong, honest, 
courageous, and loving partner with a critical eye and a soft heart. 
 
I dedicate this thesis to my partner Marion and my son Dylan. 
My heart and my hope, my anchor and my sextant, my cause and my reward. 
 
Colin Huntly          May, 2005 
iv  
ABSTRACT 
 
Common lawyers are notoriously suspicious of legal theory.  This is exemplified by 
the dearth of theoretical content in Australian corporate law debate.  If the first sin of 
legal theory is “to presume that it can offer a blueprint for actual decision-making 
and be a substitute for judicial and lawyerly wisdom”, then surely it is an equal 
transgression to profess that judicial and lawyerly wisdom can for long elude 
criticism without a sound theoretical basis. 
 
Reasoning by analogy is commonplace.  This is as true in legal reasoning as in any 
other discipline.  Indeed, it has been suggested that in the Australian legal context 
analogical reasoning is the very same “judicial and lawyerly wisdom” referred to 
above.  In order to determine whether there is a true analogy, a number of legal 
scholars have suggested that a variety of potential known source analogues should be 
carefully analysed for their potential relevance to a less familiar target analogue lest 
an inapt analogy should lead one into error.   
 
The modern trading company is widely regarded as an apt source analogue for 
resolving jurisprudential issues involving incorporated associations and societies.   
However the basis upon which this assertion is made has never been adequately 
elucidated.  This thesis tests the hypothesis that the modern trading company is the 
most apt source analogue for developing a jurisprudence of incorporated associations 
and societies.  This is achieved using a theoretical approach drawn from corporate 
realist theory that is informed by an epidemiological investigation of incorporated 
sporting associations and societies in Australia and New Zealand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In a public discussion paper detailing proposed amendments to the Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA), the regulator of incorporated associations in Western 
Australia stated that: 
It is clear that members of the committee of an association are acting in a fiduciary capacity 
and are in an analogous position to directors of a company, as such, they are likely to be 
subject to similar common law and equitable duties.
2
 
The regulator does not go on to elucidate the basis on which this proposition has 
been formulated in this discussion paper.  It is, however, clear that the view 
expressed by the regulator reflects accepted orthodoxy on the subject in the limited 
scholarly literature on the point.  As to whether or not committee members do indeed 
stand in a fiduciary relationship with their incorporated association, Dr Fletcher has 
written: “No case law establishes this proposition but several States have clarified the 
position by detailing officers' duties in their legislation.”
3  Sievers, has observed that 
“there is little if any direct authority on this point.”
4  Sievers has further stated: 
                                                 
2   MFT(WA), The Associations Incorporation Act 1987:  Proposals for Amendment, Ministry of 
Fair Trading (Western Australia), Perth, May, 1998 at 22. 
3   Fletcher, K, "Developing Appropriate Organisational Structures for Non-Profit Associations" 
in McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, LBC 
Information Services, North Ryde, 1996 at 12. 
1
4   Sievers, AS, "What Is the Future for Honorary Directors and Committee Members? - Their 
Duties and Liabilities" in McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit 
Associations, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, 1996 at 30. 
 
 
  
 
 
It is not clear to what extent the committee members and office bearers of either 
unincorporated or incorporated associations will be subject to other common law or equitable 
duties imposed on them as agents or fiduciaries, for the [sic] members as a whole in the 
situation of unincorporated associations and the members of the association itself in the case of 
incorporated associations.
5
 
In addition, it appears that the only dicta considering the suitability of resorting to the 
company law analogy in determining the nature of legal relationships within 
incorporated associations,
6 is to be found in New Zealand cases.  In New Zealand, 
the equivalent of the incorporated association is the "incorporated society".
7  A s  
Professor Stevens has observed “much ink has been spilt over whether the standard 
of diligence and the standard of skill are higher or lower than those that apply to 
trustees or those that apply to directors of for-profits.”
8
 
2
                                                 
5   Ford,  HAJ,  Halsbury's Laws of Australia, "435 Voluntary Associations", looseleaf, North 
Ryde, 1998,  at [435-205] 
6   The sporting entities that will be examined in this thesis are incorporated in Australia under the 
following measures; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT); Associations Incorporation 
Act (NT); Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA).  The 
equivalent measure in New Zealand, is the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ.  The 
nomenclature adopted in the relevant Australian legislation is “incorporated association” while 
in New Zealand it is “incorporated societies”.  As reported in chapter 4, Australia has by far the 
greatest number of incorporated sporting entities and for this reason the nomenclature adopted 
throughout the thesis is “incorporated associations”.  Unless otherwise indicated, this noun 
should be taken to be inclusive of incorporated societies formed in New Zealand. 
7   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, Law 
Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 207-341; Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs Law in 
Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 84-157. 
8   Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State 
and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, 
Montreal, Canada, 2001 at 578. 
 
 
  
 
 
As I observe
9 in chapter 2, it is possible to develop a jurisprudence of incorporated 
associations by means of analogy with established legal forms.  Nevertheless, such 
analogy-based jurisprudential development is not without its difficulties.  For 
example, each of the New Zealand High Court Justices in the 1991 decision of 
Walker v Mt Victoria Residents Association Inc [1991] 2 NZLR 520  expressed 
varying degrees of uncertainty about the applicability and utility of principles 
derived from company law cases in resolving the legal problems faced by 
incorporated associations.  Richardson J obiter, referring to the comments of Cooke J 
in the earlier case of Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 
NZLR 159,
10 stated: 
I have been content to approach these questions on the assumption that the traditional rigid 
rules which apply to consideration of the vires acts of companies are of equal application to 
incorporated societies.  The Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) itself does not provide clear 
guidance … [whether it] ... may require or allow a broader approach historically and in the 
wider public interest.
11  
 
Hardie Boys J was of the opinion that principles of agency were universally 
applicable regardless of the nature of the entity in question.  His Honour did, 
however indicate that the special nature of an incorporated association was of 
importance when deciding a matter of law in relation to such a body: 
3
                                                 
9   It is acknowledged that academic writing has traditionally adopted the impersonal omnipresent 
third person voice with its attendant pronoun utilisation.  However, the modern trend 
(including in higher research theses) is towards the active voice favouring a more direct and 
judicious use of the personal first person and its requisite pronoun utilisation.  I have adopted 
the latter of these stylistic alternatives in this thesis.  The significance of this stylistic choice 
will naturally be more evident in later chapters. (See Meehan, M & Tulloch, G, Grammar for 
Lawyers, Butterworths, Chatswood, 2001 at 49-55). 
10    At 178 Per Cooke J “The law or practice relating to limited liability companies is not 
necessarily a helpful analogy in approaching these cases.” 
11 At  523. 
 
 
  
 
 
The rules of an incorporated society, which by definition does not exist for profit, but normally 
for purposes of mutual interest and concern of its members, and so is likely to function 
informally rather than formally, must in my view be construed sensibly and realistically so as 
to give them practical and workaday effect.
12
 
Perhaps delineating the common ground between these two views, Doogue J 
observed that: 
Regardless of the appropriate inter-relationship between incorporated societies ... and 
companies ... it seems to me to be clear the ordinary rules relating to ratification of an agent's 
acts must apply to the affairs of incorporated societies as much as to the affairs of incorporated 
companies.
13
 
However, developing novel areas of law by analogy is potentially fraught with 
pitfalls.  This is particularly so where due cognisance is not taken of significant 
differences between the known source analogue, and the unfamiliar target analogue 
in question.   
 
If analogy is a flawed basis for jurisprudential development, it could be argued that a 
theoretical approach to the problem at issue might be considered to either 
compensate for, or suggest an alternative to, this methodology.  Such alternative 
approaches, while significantly different, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.   
Indeed, it has been suggested that such dualistic dialogue is essential in order to 
achieve any intellectual development in law, whether with regard to a “settled” area 
or a more novel juristic phenomena.  Professor Dan-Cohen expresses the necessity 
for this tension most clearly as follows: 
4
                                                 
12 At  524. 
 
 
  
 
 
This increased commitment to rigor and precision permits legal theory to play a critical, 
explanatory and constructive role within the general legal enterprise.  It is critical when it 
exposes the latent presuppositions (factural [sic] and normative) implicit in existing legal 
practices.  It is explanatory when it unites various practices and relates them to a social or to a 
normative theory, which lends them coherence and meaning.  It is constructive when it 
suggests new institutional arrangements and legal devices for the achievement of some ends.  
But legal theory can serve these goals only at the price of immediate relevance.  It can offer 
only a partial view of the legal problem with which it deals.  It cannot be more complete and 
truer to the richness of social reality than is the body of knowledge contained in the various 
disciplines on which it draws.  The conclusions and recommendations of legal theory must 
therefore remain partial and tentative.  To be applicable to the solution of problems, they must 
be filtered through or supplemented by the common sense and good judgement of a wise 
practitioner fully cognizant of the details of the specific legal issue.  The first sin of legal 
theory is accordingly to presume that it can offer a blueprint for actual decisionmaking and be 
a substitute for judicial and lawyerly wisdom.
14
 
Modern common law corporate theory has, in many respects been greatly influenced 
by an often unspoken acceptance of the application of the “organic theory”.
15  This is 
particularly apparent when tracing the development of juridical commentary 
regarding the inter-relationships pertaining between directors, shareholders and the 
company itself.  It follows, therefore, that any application of corporate law principles 
by analogy from the law relating to companies assumes the direct applicability of the 
corporate law organic theory.  It therefore becomes important to define and test the 
corporate law organic theory in connection with incorporated associations in order to 
5
                                                                                                                                          
13   At 526. 
14   Dan-Cohen, M, Rights, Persons and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society, 
University of California, Berkeley, USA, 1986 at 3. 
15   Baxt, R, et al, Corporations and Associations: Cases and Materials, 9th ed, Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2003 at 210-22, & Chapter 7; and Culley, JH, "People's Capitalism and Corporate 
 
 
  
 
 
determine if the company law model is an appropriate source analogue when 
analogising with respect to the item under consideration.  In order to test the 
suitability of such a theoretical approach and introduce some of the creative tension 
to which Professor Dan-Cohen refers, it is also appropriate to examine a number of 
potential known legal source analogues that might be considered by both 
practitioners and scholars alike.  
 
The importance of considering a variety of analogical alternatives in such an 
investigation has been stressed by Professors Tomasic, Bottomley, and McQueen in 
the following terms: 
Understanding the diversity of corporate structures is an important prerequisite to appreciating 
the impact of corporate law principles on corporate life.  An important question for future 
corporate regulation is whether greater attention should be paid to these differences, so that 
different principles and regulatory regimes might apply to different types of [corporations].
16   
 
The wisdom of basing an analogical examination of incorporated associations solely 
on the trading company model has, as has been mentioned above, already been 
questioned.  The extent to which reasoning by analogy between companies (which 
are essentially commercial in nature) and incorporated associations (which are 
voluntary, non-profit and usually altruistic in nature) might hold true must be 
vigorously interrogated before postulating its correctness as a basis for 
jurisprudential development.  Research into this question is necessary to bring the 
light of legal reasoning into a dark juridical place.  Such research must be 
6
                                                                                                                                          
Democracy: An Intellectual History of the Corporation", PhD thesis, History, University of 
California, Santa Barbara, 1986. 
16   Tomasic, R, et al, Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 
at 167.  “Companies” in this quote has been changed to “corporations” without taking liberties 
 
 
  
 
 
independent of untested supposition and inappropriate analogy between one 
corporate form and another.  The central objective of this thesis is to achieve this 
aim. 
 
An additional aim of this inquiry is to determine the dominant structural model or 
models that exist in incorporated associations by means of epidemiological inquiry.  
Earlier research that I conducted in 1996
17 indicated that, of the total cohort, 
anything up to one in three incorporated associations could be sporting groups.  By 
any measure this indicates that the most significant ascertainable user-group of the 
legislation is sporting entities.  For this reason I have surveyed a randomised 10% 
sample of all incorporates sporting associations and societies in Australia and New 
Zealand to derive the empirical data at the heart of this project.  This will ensure the 
broadest possible application of the principles that emerge from the discussion.   
Once this is accomplished, the thesis will apply both corporate law organic theory 
broadly conceived and analogical reasoning to such models as emerge from the 
epidemiological testing.  This will provide important insights into the true nature of 
incorporated associations and suggest something of the way forward for these 
entities in terms of legislative treatment, juridical consideration and theoretical 
development. 
 
The thesis begins in the first chapter by defining and analysing the corporate law 
organic theory in detail within the broader context of alternative legal theories of 
corporate bodies.  The second chapter explores four potential legal source analogues 
7
                                                                                                                                          
with the emphasis of the authors as they specifically include incorporated associations in the 
scope of their subsequent comments. 
17   Huntly, CT, "A Century of Incorporated Associations in Western Australia: 1896-1996" 
(1996) Working Paper Series 96.05 26. 
 
 
  
 
 
that may provide guidance in developing an appropriate jurisprudence of 
incorporated associations.  Chapter 3 of the thesis examines the broad legislative 
framework in Australia and New Zealand that allows for the incorporation of 
voluntary sporting associations.  The foci of this broad survey will be the eligibility 
criteria in each jurisdiction, the structural internal requirements, the ongoing 
operational requirements and the dissolution requirements laid down in the various 
statutory measures.  In chapter 4, results of an epidemiological inquiry into the actual 
structure and nature of incorporated sporting associations in each of the jurisdictions 
under consideration will be analysed.  By reference to the underlying tenets of 
broadly conceived organic theory, chapter 5 will consider the extent to which the 
current legislative framework can be said to be in step with the actual nature of 
incorporated sporting associations.  The final chapter will consider which of the 
alternative legal analogies identified in chapter 2 offers the richest analogical schema 
for the development of a coherent and appropriate jurisprudence of incorporated 
sporting associations in the jurisdictions under review.  The thesis thereafter 
concludes. 
8 
 
  
CHAPTER 1 
CORPORATE LAW THEORY IN GENERAL AND  
ORGANIC THEORY IN PARTICULAR  
 
“Firms are bundles of unruly phenomena.  They entail not just 
production, but production by groups of people.  Therefore, theories 
designed to contain and regularize the appearance of firms go beyond 
concepts about economic production to articulate concepts about 
communities.  These concepts variously distinguish the individual and 
the group, usually according to the interests of one or the other greater 
moment.  No single comprehensive, objective theory of the firm has 
taken hold.  Firms still represent different things to different observers.”
1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis will analyse incorporated sporting 
associations in Australia and New Zealand from the corporate law organic theoretical 
perspective.  It is intended that this analysis will provide insight into the development of 
an appropriate jurisprudence of these peculiar legal forms.  In particular, the suitability 
of such jurisprudential development on the basis of analogy from the corporate law 
applicable to the modern trading company will be evaluated.  This chapter establishes 
that part of the theoretical framework relating to corporate law organic theory.  The 
chapter commences with a summary of legal scholarship dealing with legal personality 
generally and corporate legal personality in particular.  The chapter then moves on to 
consider the role of theory in common law specifically in the context of legal theories of 
the corporation. 
                                                 
1   Bratton, WW, "The 'Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal" (1989) 74 Cornell 
Law Review 407 at 407.  
9  
 
Following this, the major theoretical schools of the common law with respect to the 
corporation are considered in turn, namely: fiction and concession theories; “realist” 
(organic) theory; aggregate theory; bracket theory; economic (contractual) theories; 
purpose (subjectless property) theory; common fund theories; communitarian theory; 
feminist theory; and, organisational theories.  Some of the influence of corporate law 
theory in the Australian and New Zealand company law statutes is considered below.  
The traditional difficulties of the common law in accounting for groups of persons 
follow from this consideration of corporate law theory, as is the tendency of common 
law reasoning towards anthropomorphism. 
 
Having laid out the theoretical framework, the chapter then settles on a working 
definition of broadly conceived organic theory as it will be applied throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.  This theoretical perspective is adopted because it professes a 
strong belief in the natural existence of corporate groups including voluntary 
associations, and requires respect for the right of such groups to exercise self 
determination on all internal matters.  The chapter concludes by identifying key points 
of theoretical convergence in what currently are the most influential schools of corporate 
law thought. 
 
10  
THE CORPORATION AND LEGAL PERSONALITY 
In general terms, the basic “right and duty bearing unit”
2 recognised by our legal system, 
is the individual person.
3  However, it is true to say that not every person is, or has 
always been equally so recognised at law.  For instance, historically aliens, slaves, 
married women, minors and the mentally ill have all suffered legal “dis-ability” to some 
extent.
4  Conversely, idols
5 and deceased saints
6 have been recognised at common law as 
enjoying legal rights and bearing legal duties.
7  It follows, therefore, that the notions of 
enjoying legal rights and bearing legal duties are not necessarily inherent to human 
                                                 
2   This term was coined by Maitland and has come to be regarded as the leading expression of the 
essence of legal personality. Maitland, FW, "Moral Personality and Legal Personality" in Fisher, 
HAL, (Ed) Maitland, Fw: Collected Papers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1911 
at 307. However, it was perhaps Kelsen who took this notion most to heart (Kelsen, H, Pure 
Theory of Law, Translation from the 2nd ed, University of California Press, Berkeley, USA, 
1970 at 168-192). See also Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 
283; and, Bonham, DH & Soberman, DA, "The Nature of Corporate Personality" in Ziegel, JS, 
(Ed) Studies in Canadian Company Law, Butterworths, Toronto, Canada, 1967 at 4. 
3   Raymond, RL, "The Genesis of the Corporation" (1905) 19 Harvard Law Review 350 at 350; 
Deiser, GF, "The Juristic Person - II" (1908) 57/48 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register 216; “The individual  person is the atom in the social structure.” 
Cardozo, BN, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Columbia University Press, New York, USA, 
1928 at 86; Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 287. Any 
similarity of these comments to Hofeldian dogma is purely co-incidental; see Radin, M, "A 
Restatement of Hofeld" (1938) 51(7) Harvard Law Review 1141 (Cf Timberg, S, "Corporate 
Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" (1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 533 at 
544); and Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 295. 
4   Hogg, JE, "Companies with Enemy Shareholders" (1915) 31 Law Quarterly Review 170; Hogg, 
JE, "The Personal Character of a Corporation" (1917) 33 Law Quarterly Review 76; Pound, R, 
Jurisprudence: Volume IV, West Publishing, St Paul, USA, 1959 at 278; Pollock, F & Maitland, 
FW, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd ed, Gryphon Editions, New 
York, USA, 1982 at 407-526; "What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The 
Language of a Legal Fiction" (2001) 114(6) Harvard Law Review 1745; and, Foxton, D, 
"Corporate Personality in the Great War" (2002) 118 Law Quarterly Review 428. 
5   Pramatha Nath Mullick v Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) LR 52 Ind App 245; Duff, PW, 
"The Personality of an Idol" (1927) 3 Cambridge Law Journal 42; Vesey-FitzGerald, SG, 
"Idolon Fori" (1925) 164 Law Quarterly Review 419; & Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 
37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 285. 
6   Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 360; 
and, Pollock, F & Maitland, FW, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd 
ed, Gryphon Editions, New York, USA, 1982 at 499. 
11  
existence.
8  This gives rise to the vexed question of determining who are “juristic 
persons”, or put another way, legal actors.
9 
 
One concept which may assist in dealing intelligently with this apparent dichotomy is 
the Greek concept of “persona”.
10  This was the name given to the masks used by 
performers in plays, to project the role being played.
11  Our word “personality” is 
derived from this Greek root.
12  The term “personality” has, of course many different 
meanings and applications.  In corporate law, it is often the noun used to denote the 
                                                                                                                                                
7   Holdsworth, WS, A History of English Law, Methuen & Co Ltd, London, UK, 1908, Vol III, 
Chapter IV “Status”. 
8    Bonham, DH & Soberman, DA, "The Nature of Corporate Personality" in Ziegel, JS, (Ed) 
Studies in Canadian Company Law, Butterworths, Toronto, Canada, 1967 at 4; Stoljar, SJ, 
Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1973 at 2; Macpherson, CB, "Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property" in 
Kamenka, E & Neale, RS, (Ed) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond, Edward Arnold (Publishers) 
Ltd, London, UK, 1975; Acquaah-Gaise, G, Corporate Crimes: Criminal Intent, and Just 
Restitution, Faculty of Business & Law, Victoria University , Melbourne, 2001; and "What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction" (2001) 114(6) 
Harvard Law Review 1745 at 1745. 
9   Sohm, R, The Institutes - a Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law, 3rd ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1907 at 187-203; Vinogradoff, P, "Juridical Persons" 
(1924) 24 Columbia Law Review 594; and Wolff, M, "On the Nature of Legal Persons" (1938) 
54 Law Quarterly Review 494. 
10   As in “dramatis persona”.  Barker, E, Translator's Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of 
Society 1500 to 1800 by Otto Gierke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1934 at lxx-
lxxiv; and Stoljar, SJ, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1973 at 1-9. 
11   Dias, RWM, Jurisprudence, 4th ed, Butterworths, London, UK, 1976 at 337. This somewhat 
facile reduction of a vastly complex conception is used for limited definitional purposes only. 
See Duff, PW, Personality in Roman Private Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 
1938 for an exhaustive account of the origins of this concept. 
12   Radin, M, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643 
at 644-7 (Cf Timberg, S, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" 
(1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 533at 544). 
12  
“right and duty bearing” quality referred to above.
13  It is this usage, and not the notion 
of “human-ness” per se with which this work is concerned. 
 
The word “corporation” originates from a Latin word, corpus  (a group, or body of 
people).
14  The orthodox common law view is that an association of persons achieves 
legal existence or recognition by a process known as incorporation, from the Latin term 
incorporatus (clothed in one body).
15  This conception is not dramatically different from 
the Greek notion of “persona”.  In a sense, therefore, when one speaks of legal “right 
and duty bearing” one is speaking at the same time, of “visibility” in the eyes of the law.  
An individual can be the “bearer” of legal rights and duties just as a group can be the 
“bearer” of legal rights and duties.
16 
                                                 
13    Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 283; Kelsen, H, Pure 
Theory of Law, Translation from the 2nd ed, University of California Press, Berkeley, USA, 
1970 at 168-92; and Lloyd, D, The Idea of Law, 7th ed, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 
1976 Chapter 13 “Some Leading Legal Concepts”. 
14  Raymond, RL, "The Genesis of the Corporation" (1905) 19 Harvard Law Review 350; Glare, 
PGW, (Ed) Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1982 at 449, point 
15. “A legal institution is the happening over and over again of the same kind of [human] 
behaviour.” (Moore, U, "Rational Basis of Legal Institutions" (1923) 23(7) Columbia Law 
Review 609). 
15  Glare, PGW, (Ed) Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1982 447-448 
& 858, point 36. Ford, HAJ, et al, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, 11th ed, Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2003 para 1.050 states: 
“A corporation (or body corporate) in the common law sense is a legal device by which 
legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities and disabilities may be 
attributed to a fictional entity equated for many purposes to a natural person.” 
16   Deiser, GF, "The Juristic Person - III" (1908) 57/48 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and 
American Law Register 300 at 313; Machen, AW, "Corporate Personality" (1911) 24(4) Harvard 
Law Review 253 & 347; Canfield, GF, "Corporate Responsibility for Crime" (1914) 14(6) 
Columbia Law Review 469; Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 
Harvard Law Review 358 at 300; Dewey, J, "The Historical Background of Corporate Legal 
Personality" (1926) 35(6) Yale Law Journal 655 at 656; Radin, M, "The Endless Problem of 
Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643 at 645 (Cf Timberg, S, "Corporate 
Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" (1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 533 at 
544); Barker, E, Translator's Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 
1800 by Otto Gierke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1934 at lxiv; Kelsen, H, 
Pure Theory of Law, Translation from the 2nd ed, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
13  
 
THE CORPORATION, COMMON LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
As observed by Professor Bottomley, corporate law theory seeks to provide a rationale 
and framework within which legal reasoning and legislation can develop relating to 
incorporated entities.
17  The perspectives and assumptions of different theoretical bases 
(whether acknowledged or not) are influential in the development of a body of law.
18  
The common law attitude towards the individual person over centuries has been 
considered by many scholars, as has the common law attitude towards groups.  Often, 
authors bring both together under the banner of “persons”.  On the one hand, this 
classification is a simple reference to the ancient persona.  On the other hand however, 
this label suggests a reductionist view within common law whereby the individual 
human actor is regarded as the fundamental social, legal, political and moral unit.
19 
 
When surveying the common law, it is definitely possible to identify points and periods 
where particular theories of the corporation have been persuasive.
20  There is, however, 
                                                                                                                                                
USA, 1970 at 174-90; Millon, D, "The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood" 
(2001) 1(2) Stanford Agora 39 at 39. But see Wellman, C, Real Rights, Oxford University Press, 
New York, USA, 1995 at 157. 
17   Bottomley, S, "Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate Regulation" 
(1990) 19(3) Federal Law Review 203 at 204. 
18   Hall, KH, "The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory Is Vital to the Development of 
Corporate Law in Australia" (1996) 7(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1 at 3; Wishart, 
DA, "Resucitating Popper: Critical Theory and Corporate Law" (1996) 3(1) Canberra Law 
Review 99; and Wymeersch, E, "Some Recent Trends and Developments in Company Law" 
(2001) Working Paper No 2001-07 Financial Law Institute Working Paper Series . 
19   See Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 287; and, Hemphill, PC, 
"The Corporation Sole and Theories of Legal Personality", PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 
Sydney, 1988 at 68. 
20   Bratton, WW, "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives  from History" in 
Wheeler, S, (Ed) A Reader on the Law of the Business Enterprise: Selected Essays, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1994; Hall, KH, "The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why 
14  
considerable doubt as to the existence of a common law theory of the corporation.
21  
This of course is hardly surprising.  Given the documented descriptive and pragmatic 
nature of common law, practitioners, legal academics and jurists display a large degree 
of scepticism (even hostility) to theoretical inquiry generally.
22  According to this 
orthodox doctrinal view “law is found in books”.
23  In response, some legal theorists 
have, perhaps uncharitably, suggested that the paucity of theory based corporate legal 
scholarship is more suggestive of a lack of intellectual rigor in the area.
24  In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                
Theory Is Vital to the Development of Corporate Law in Australia" (1996) 7(1) Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 1 at 4-6. 
21    Observe the comments of Wolff; “It has often been said that English law has never taken 
dogmatic theories of any kind much to heart and does not adopt any speculative opinion.” Wolff, 
M, "On the Nature of Legal Persons" (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 494 at 521. "What We 
Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction" (2001) 114(6) 
Harvard Law Review 1745 at 1747; Andrews, N, Is Corporate Law Really Thick?  The Return of 
Culture in Corporate Law Studies and Its Effect on the Economic, Comparative  and Historical 
Analysis of Corporate Law with Some Chinese Examples, Faculty of Business & Law, Victoria 
University , Melbourne, 2001 at 25. That theory is impacting upon common law in many 
jurisdictions, see Cheffins, BR, "Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law Perspective" 
(1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197. 
22   Pickering, MA, "The Company as a Separate Legal Entity" (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 
481 at 508; Edwards, HT, "The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession" (1992) 91 Michigan Law Review 34; Whincop, MJ, "Overcoming Corporate Law: 
Instrumentalism, Pragmatism and the Separate Legal Entity Concept" (1997) 15(7) Company & 
Securities Law Journal 411; Cheffins, BR, "Using Theory to Study Law: A Company Law 
Perspective" (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197; Simmonds, NE, "Protestant 
Jurisprudence and Modern Doctrinal Scholarship" (2001) 60(2) Cambridge Law Journal 271 at 
285. But see Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313; and Maitland, FW, "Trust 
and Corporation" in Fisher, HAL, (Ed) Fw Maitland, Collected Works, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK, 1911, 321 at 362 “On juristic elegance we do not pride ourselves, but we 
know how to keep the roof weather-tight.” 
23    A view which achieved its current prominence in the Anglo-American legal world largely 
through the efforts of Christopher Langdell, Dean of Law at Harvard in the late 19
th century 
(Radin, M, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 
643 (Cf Timberg, S, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" (1946) 
46 Columbia Law Review 533 at 544)). See also Simmonds, NE, "Protestant Jurisprudence and 
Modern Doctrinal Scholarship" (2001) 60(2) Cambridge Law Journal 271. 
24   Stokes, M, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Twining, W, (Ed) Legal Theory and Common 
Law, Basil Blackwell Inc, New York, USA, 1986. See Cheffins, BR, "Using Theory to Study 
Law: A Company Law Perspective" (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197 at 208 where the 
views of Romano and Stokes are summarized, and at 213. See also Corbett, A, "Critical 
Theorising and Corporate Law Research" (1996) 3(1) Canberra Law Review 104; and Hall, KH, 
"The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory Is Vital to the Development of Corporate 
15  
that which “is commonly known as ‘corporate personality’ raises difficult questions 
which have been among the most controversial in law and legal theory.”
25  Nevertheless, 
corporate law scholarship has developed a variety of theoretical frameworks.  Perhaps 
too many.  As Professor Stevens has observed, corporate law is “incremental and 
unsystematic in its process and external and consequentialist (rather than internal and 
coherentist) in its normativity.”
26  As Professors Arlen et al have observed; “Company 
law has always been a somewhat contested policy landscape.”
27  A brief survey of the 
major schools of thought is therefore apposite as a starting point in the current 
investigation.
28 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Law in Australia" (1996) 7(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1 arguing the utility of 
theory based critique of corporate law. 
25   Young, EH, "The Legal Personality of a Foreign Corporation" (1906) 86 Law Quarterly Review 
178; Young, EH, "The Status of Foreign Corporations and the Legislature I" (1907) 23 Law 
Quarterly Review 151; Young, EH, "The Status of Foreign Corporations and the Legislature II" 
(1907) 23 Law Quarterly Review 290; Salmond, J, Jurisprudence, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, UK, 1924 at 341-2; Smith, B, "Legal Personality" (1928) 37(3) Yale Law Journal 283 at 
292; Radin, M, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia Law 
Review 643 (Cf Timberg, S, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" 
(1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 533 at 544); Lubasz, H, "The Corporate Borough in the 
Common Law of the Late Year-Book Period" (1964) 80 Law Quarterly Review 228; Pickering, 
MA, "The Company as a Separate Legal Entity" (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 481 at 508; 
Stoljar, SJ, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1973 at the Preface; Neyers, JW, "Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-
Piercing, and the Private Law Model Corporation" (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 
173 at 174; and Blair, MM, "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law" (2001) Research 
Paper No 281818 GU Law Centre 2001 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and 
Regulatory Law and Public Law and Legal Theory  at 1-4. 
26   Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State and 
Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, 
Montreal, Canada, 2001 at 553. 
27   Arlen, J, et al, "Endowment Effects, Other-Regarding Preferences, and Corporate Law" (2000) 
Olin Working Paper No 00-2 USC Law School Working Paper Series  at 54. 
28   For an excellent survey of various theories of legal personality in the context of the corporation 
sole, see Hemphill, PC, "The Corporation Sole and Theories of Legal Personality", PhD thesis, 
University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988 Ch 1. This chapter has been significantly influenced by the 
work of Dr Hemphill. 
16  
THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION 
Fiction and Concession Theories 
These theories, while not entirely contiguous, are so closely related that they are usually 
considered at the same time.
29  Fiction theory claims that a corporation is a legal fiction 
whereby a legal status (or persona) equivalent to that of a competent individual human is 
granted to a group of persons.
30  Concession theory regards the corporate group as the 
recipient of a gift of legal personality from the state.
31  This gift (or “grant”) is the mask 
of legal persona, which in turn is a recognition that the group can now claim legal rights 
                                                 
29    See for example, Macmillan-Patfield, F, "1. Challenges for Company Law" in Macmillan-
Patfield, F, (Ed) Perspectives  on Company Law: 1, Kluwer Law International, London, UK, 
1995 at 7; and Tomasic, R, et al, Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, 
Annandale, 2002 at 53. 
30   Canfield, GF, "Corporate Responsibility for Crime" (1914) 14(6) Columbia Law Review 469; 
Salmond, J, Jurisprudence, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1924 at 329; Vinogradoff, P, 
"Juridical Persons" (1924) 24 Columbia Law Review 594 at 600; Dewey, J, "The Historical 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality" (1926) 35(6) Yale Law Journal 655 at 655 (footnote 
1) and 665; Wolff, M, "On the Nature of Legal Persons" (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 494” 
at 496; Jones, JW, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, UK, 1940 Chapter VI, 164-86; Wang, HKC, "The Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction 
Theory) in the Year Book Period (I)" (1942) 58 Law Quarterly Review 498; Wang, HKC, "The 
Corporate Entity Concept (or Fiction Theory) in the Year Book Period (II)" (1943) 59 Law 
Quarterly Review 72; Timberg, S, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International 
Implications" (1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 533 at 540; Pound, R, Jurisprudence: Volume IV, 
West Publishing, St Paul, USA, 1959 at 226; Bonham, DH & Soberman, DA, "The Nature of 
Corporate Personality" in Ziegel, JS, (Ed) Studies in Canadian Company Law, Butterworths, 
Toronto, Canada, 1967 at 5; and "What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The 
Language of a Legal Fiction" (2001) 114(6) Harvard Law Review 1745 at 1750 and at 1766 
where fictionalist concern with attaching a “status” to corporations is placed in an historical 
context by reference to Sir Henry Maine’s oft quoted dictum that “the movement of the 
Progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract.” Hofeld wrote 
virulently against the fiction theory but, rather than side with the realists, propounded that there 
is no separate legal entity in the corporate structure (Kocourek, A, "Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, by Wesley Newcomb 
Hofeld (Book Review)" (1923) 18 Illinois Law Review 281). 
31   Salmond, J, Jurisprudence, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1924 at 351; Dewey, J, "The 
Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality" (1926) 35(6) Yale Law Journal 655 at 
666; Cardozo, BN, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, Columbia University Press, New York, 
USA, 1928 at 90; Pound, R, Jurisprudence: Volume IV, West Publishing, St Paul, USA, 1959at 
222; Hall, KH, "The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory Is Vital to the Development 
of Corporate Law in Australia" (1996) 7(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1 at 7; and 
17  
and owe legal duties in a group name.
32  The fictionalist view therefore suggests an 
underlying assumption about the nature of a corporation while the concessionalist view 
suggests the source from which incorporated status is obtained.
33  As with the 
communitarian theory discussed below, the concessionalist theory is strongly supportive 
of corporate regulation given the central role played by the State in granting legal 
personality to corporations.
34  This theory was highly influential during the period prior 
to general incorporation statutes in the second half of the nineteenth century and reflects 
the common law suspicion of entities other than the state or the individual.
35  Prior to 
this time entities were mainly incorporated by “charters” granted by special petition to 
the Crown or State.  Following the introduction of general incorporation statutes in the 
United Kingdom in 1844 and then in 1856, there was a massive numerical growth of 
trading companies incorporated by registration which in turn saw the decline of the 
concessionalist theory in corporate law.
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“Realist” Theory
37 
Realist theory essentially views corporations as naturally occurring or “organic” 
bodies.
38  As with any theoretical proposition, it is expressed by a variety of adherents in 
varying degrees of orthodoxy.  At one end of the organicist’s spectrum, the theory is 
expressed as pure anthropomorphism.
39  That is to say, groups are strongly analogised 
with human beings.
40  This version of the theory has been extremely influential in 
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common law articulations of criminal and tort liability as they apply to corporations.
41  
For example, in Lennards' Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 
Viscount Haldane LC recognised that if a corporation (in this case, a company) was to 
be found to be directly liable in tort, then the person acting for the corporation must be 
found to be the ‘embodiment of the company’ 
[H]e hears and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, 
and his mind is the mind of the company.   
If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.  It must be a question of law 
whether, once the facts have been ascertained, a person in doing particular things is to be 
regarded as the company or merely as the company's servant or agent.  In that case any 
liability of the company can only be a statutory or vicarious liability. 
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At the other, less doctrinaire end of the realist theory spectrum, is the soft edge of 
corporate realism which holds that groups, including corporations, are a peculiar type of 
social organism, existing somewhere between the existence of the individual and the 
state.
42 
 
Broadly, however, most adherents of the realist theory hold that the individual 
corporators, by coming together and joining for the furtherance of common aims and 
objectives, create a unique entity separate from themselves, and functioning in a 
mutually agreed manner.
43  This creation is entirely irrespective of any grant or 
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concession from the state.
44  Each individual becomes subsumed in a sense into to the 
“life” or “existence” of the group in so far as their actions occur within the framework of 
the group.
45  In essence, the corporation as a peculiar mask or persona causes the human 
actors behind it to perform within the construct of the overall corporate character in 
ways which are not entirely consonant with their natural individual characters.
46  This 
theory, by implication, requires corporate law to facilitate the private internal decisions 
and activities of the group rather than as providing a purely regulatory construct.
47  That 
is to say, the realist theory as defined here, perceives corporate law to have an essentially 
facilitative and descriptive, rather than prescriptive, function.
48 
 
                                                                                                                                                
P,  Company Law and Governance: An Australian Perspective, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1998). 
44   See Taff Vale Railways v ASRS [1901] AC 426. 
45   Barker, E, Translator's Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 by 
Otto Gierke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1934 at lxi. 
46   Laski, HJ, "The Personality of Associations" (1915) 29 Harvard Law Review 404 at 416-23; and, 
Barker, E, Translator's Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 by 
Otto Gierke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1934 at lxvi-lxx. 
47   Cohen, FS, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (1935) 35(6) Columbia 
Law Review 809; Bottomley, S, "Taking Corporations Seriously: Some Considerations for 
Corporate Regulation" (1990) 19(3) Federal Law Review 203 at 211; and Stevens, D, "Framing 
an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State and Market: Essays on 
Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Canada, 2001 
at 547. 
48   Warren, EH, "Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Undertakings" (1926) 2 Cambridge Law 
Journal 180; and Kelsen, H, Pure Theory of Law, Translation from the 2nd ed, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, USA, 1970 at 178-191. See also Reform of the Canada Corporations 
Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency 
Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 2 “The overriding 
principle is to make the Act flexible and permisive rather than unduly regulatory.” 
22  
Aggregate Theory 
Aggregate theory (closely related to “bracket theory”
49) focuses on the right of 
individuals to associate for common purposes.
50  Aggregate theory focuses on the 
individual’s roles and rights within the corporation as matters for corporate regulation.
51  
Hence, aggregate theory places strong emphasis on the role of contract law in corporate 
law.
52  In addition, the aggregacist sees no need for specialist regulation of the 
corporation when operating in the community.
53  An aggregacist requires a simple legal 
structure which treats all legal actors equally, in a sense reducing all such actors to the 
same legal unit.  In addition, the aggregacist makes no allowance for the phenomena of 
individuals adopting different cognitive approaches when engaged in collective 
enterprise as opposed to individual enterprise. 
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Bracket Theory 
It is believed that bracket theory was originally developed in Germany by Jhering.
54  
This theory holds that the notion of a corporation is simply a convenient linguistic 
technique for replacing the names of the individuals constituting a corporation with a 
single identifier.
55  That is to say, the corporation is a device used to simplify legal 
discourse concerning groups.  Essentially, bracket theory is centred on the fundamental 
proposition that the only true legal actors are individual people.
56  In a sense, therefore, 
this theory is one in which the concept of the corporation is even more heavily 
discounted than even the fiction theory in that the “corporation” is almost totally 
irrelevant.
57 
 
                                                 
54   Pound, R, Jurisprudence: Volume IV, West Publishing, St Paul, USA, 1959 at 250. 
55   Barker, E, Translator's Introduction to Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 by 
Otto Gierke, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1934 at lxv; Pound, R, 
Jurisprudence: Volume IV, West Publishing, St Paul, USA, 1959 at 250; and Bonham, DH & 
Soberman, DA, "The Nature of Corporate Personality" in Ziegel, JS, (Ed) Studies in Canadian 
Company Law, Butterworths, Toronto, Canada, 1967 at 6. 
56   Radin, M, "A Restatement of Hohfeld" (1938) 51(7) Harvard Law Review 1141 (Cf Timberg, S, 
"Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications" (1946) 46 Columbia Law 
Review 533 at 544). 
57   Hemphill, PC, "The Corporation Sole and Theories of Legal Personality", PhD thesis, University 
of Sydney, Sydney, 1988 at 64-71. 
24  
Economic (“Contractual”) Theories
58 
This school of thought is often referred to as the “law and economics” school.
59  The 
architects of this theoretical framework examine law from a predominantly classical 
liberal economic perspective.
60  According to adherents of this theoretical framework, all 
law can be analysed an understood in economic terms.  The typical underlying 
assumptions that are relied upon in this conceptual framework are: separation of 
ownership and control within “firms”; zero transaction costs; perfect knowledge; 
efficient markets; rational and self-interested human actors; and the primacy of profit or 
wealth maximisation as a motivator.
61 
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It has been suggested that there are two broad perspectives in law-and-economics theory 
applicable to corporate law, namely transaction-cost theory
62 and agency theory.
63  
Corporate law agency theory adopts the traditional economic view of the “firm”
64 as a 
“nexus of contracts” between the individuals involved in a corporation.
65  The centrality 
of an economic conception of contracts
66 in this school of thought is an important point 
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of connection with the aggregate theory.
67  Given the traditional separation of ownership 
and control that is suggested exists in large business corporations,
68 a corporation is the 
lowest cost
69 vehicle whereby managers are bound to the economic wellbeing of the 
enterprise, and the investment of the “owners”
70 is protected through the appropriate 
“monitoring” of managers.
71 
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Transaction-cost theory uses economic theory to analyse all relevant interrelationships at 
work within the “firm” in an attempt to identify the most efficient structure for the 
enterprise in question.
72  The nature of the contracts operating between the economic 
actors that constitute a corporation are also a primary focus of transaction-cost theorists.  
Transaction-cost theory differs from agency theory, however, mainly in that the 
relationships which its adherents are concerned with are not limited to those between 
investors and managers.  This theoretical approach also does not automatically assume 
that the modern business corporation is the most efficient structure for all “firms”.  The 
interrelatedness of all significant “stakeholders” can be considered, as can the relative 
costs borne by these parties in the course of maintaining transactional relationships.  The 
structure in any given situation which results in the lowest average cost as between all 
stakeholders is the structure that will lead to long term economic efficiency.
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Law and economics analysis has strongly (and perhaps rightly) been criticised as being 
either ethically bankrupt
74 or so abstract and divorced from the real world as to be 
characterised as a poor metaphor rather than a reliable predictive model,
75 or both.
76  It 
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has also been criticised for labelling all corporate law as being “anticontractarian” 
without regard to the nuances in contract law theory.
77  However, it should be noted that 
a number of law and economics scholars have sought to address these criticisms while 
trying to remain true to the underlying economic theory.
78  Indeed there is a respectable 
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emerging school known as “behavioral law and economics” that seeks to enrich 
neoclassical law and economics theory through the fusion of psychology, law and 
economics.
79 
 
Purpose (“Subjectless” Property) Theory
80 
Some corporations, such as charities, have no shareholder class.  In addition, since at 
least the development of double-entry bookkeeping,
81 the assets of a corporation as a 
going concern have not been viewed, either legally or practically, as directly attributable 
to such shareholders as there may be.
82  There is a theory of the corporation which 
attempts to deal with such difficulties by stating that a corporation is an association of 
persons for the pursuit of certain shared purposes.
83  Indeed, this theoretical school 
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claims that the very existence of a corporation is only explicable by reference to the 
purposes for which it was formed and those for which it is being operated.
84 
 
“Common-Fund” Theories 
This is a term that is used here to describe two similar but not identical theories of the 
corporation.  The theories are respectively those of Professors Maitland and Stoljar.  It 
has been observed elsewhere that Maitland’s views had great sympathy for the realist 
perspective,
85 however, there is a case which argues that Maitland held a view of 
corporations that was grounded in the device of the trust.
86  In Maitland’s own words, 
the “trust has given us a liberal substitute for a law about personified institutions.  The 
trust has given us a liberal supplement to a necessarily meagre law of corporations.”
87  In 
essence, according to Maitland, the existence of property, representatively administered 
by trustees for the benefit of individuals or for a public purpose is at the heart of the 
corporation. 
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Stoljar likewise resorted to the trust, in a particularised form,
88 as the core of his own 
theory of the corporation as a legally recognised group.  To Stoljar, the existence of a 
“common kitty”
89 or “common fund”
90 was a prerequisite without which there can be no 
separate legal entity.  As he put it: 
Now the outstanding feature shared by all corporate bodies is that each has a separate estate or fund 
of property, controlled by private members or public managers, but used for the pursuit of declared 
or designated purposes as well as for the discharge of the costs of these pursuits, including debts 
and liabilities.
91 
 
This premise is perhaps Stoljar’s major contribution to corporate legal theory.  His 
identification of the indicia of a separate legal persona in unincorporated associations is 
one of the earliest and clearest articulations of something approaching a coherent 
common law theory of the corporation.  Consider the following passage: 
… with its internal features of private government and majority rule, with the members’ joint 
interests in their common fund or property, together with the fact that each member’s interest is, by 
his expulsion, defeasible by majority decision, with the principle of a member’s limited liability, 
and his immunity from suit, with the resulting focus on the committee functioning as an “organ” 
and, especially, on the common fund reachable by a representative action, the voluntary association 
emerges as a corporate body in all but name.
92 
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This approach does sidestep the issue of corporate personality, however it does use a 
familiar legal model to explain the nature of the corporation.  In addition, the simplicity 
and pragmatism of Stoljar’s summary are difficult to conjure with. 
 
“Communitarian” Theory 
This theory of corporate law views the corporation as “a community of interdependence, 
mutual trust, and reciprocal benefit”.
93  The scholarly origins of this school of thought 
can be traced back to an influential article by Professor Dodd in 1932.
94  Dodd’s article 
(which was in response to a more economically orthodox piece by Berle the year 
before)
95 argued that the corporation served more constituencies than simply 
shareholders,
96 such as employees, creditors, consumers and the general community.
97  
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“Furthermore, these interests could conflict with those of shareholders.”
98  The central 
thesis of communitarian discourse is therefore a challenge to the primacy of the 
shareholder as a corporate constituent over all others.
99 
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It is probably more correct to speak of the communitarian perspective rather than use the 
term theory.
100  This perspective is vitally concerned with the nature of the complex web 
of relationships which bind the corporation to the broader community.
101  In essence, the 
theory tries to place the legal concept of the corporation within a social, moral and 
political framework.  It is argued within this perspective that purely legal analysis fails 
to adequately account for the roles played by a corporation within the community.
102  
One of the major affective consequences of this theory is the emergence of the notion of 
the “good corporate citizen”.
103  Indeed, the social responsibility imperative that 
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characterises a dominant school of communitarian theory provides a rationale for its 
“favourable disposition towards regulation.”
104 
 
Feminist Theory 
Feminist theory is a relatively new phenomenon in mainstream legal scholarship 
generally, and in corporate legal theory in particular.
105  Essentially, this school of 
thought is concerned with decoding the gender bias operating in the subtext of legal 
structures.
106  Strictly speaking it is probably facile to refer blankly to “feminist theory” 
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Economic and Environmental Capital: Corporate Citizenship in a New Economy" (2002) 27(1) 
Alternative Law Journal 3; Kinley, D & Joseph, S, "Multinational Corporations and Human 
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"Globalisation and Corporate Responsibility" (2002) 27(1) Alternative Law Journal 3; and 
Redmond, P, "Sanctioning Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights" (2002) 27(1) Alternative 
Law Journal 3. 
105   Hall, KH, "Starting from Silence: The Future of Feminist Analysis of Corporate Law" (1994) 7 
Corporate & Business Law Journal 149 at 150; Cheffins, BR, "Using Theory to Study Law: A 
Company Law Perspective" (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197 at 211; Tomasic, R, et al, 
Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 at 61. Note also 
Hall’s assertion at 155 about the relative dearth of feminist critique of corporate law: 
“Our lack of response to the feminist challenge is also testament, I believe, to the extent 
to which we as corporate law scholars have been (and still are) submerged in the 
traditional ideology and methodology of corporate law. Many women academics, just 
as women generally, have internalised the values of capitalism, patriarchy and 
domination which are reflected by the corporation.” 
Note also Wheeler, S, "An Alternative Voice in and around Corporate Governance" (2002) 25(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 556 at 556 “There is an emerging literature that 
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of Corporate Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1414-5; Hall, KH, 
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Company Law Perspective" (1999) 58(1) Cambridge Law Journal 197 at 211. 
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either generally within the study of law, or with respect to corporate law in particular.
107  
Feminist legal scholarship represents a very broad spectrum of theoretical critique from 
“liberal” to “radical”, and from “reconstructive” to “Marxist”.
108  At one end of this 
theoretical spectrum there are liberal feminist scholars who advocate the advancement of 
women within corporations through processes of education and the reform of informal 
structures within corporations.
109  This liberal feminist vision may also extend to re-
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CA, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
USA, 1987 at 119-20; MacKinnon, CA, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1989 at 1-80; and, Gabaldon, TA, "The Lemonade Stand: 
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Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1417-24. It has to be accepted that socialist and Marxist theory 
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Henning, M & Jardim, A, The Managerial Woman, Pocket Books, New York, USA, 1978; 
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"The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate 
Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1418-9; and McKenzie, BC, Friends 
in High Places: How to Achieve Your Ambitions, Goals and Potential with the Help of a Mentor: 
The Executive Woman's Guide, Business & Professional Publishing, Chatswood, 1995. See also 
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Silence: The Future of Feminist Analysis of Corporate Law" (1994) 7 Corporate & Business 
Law Journal 149 at 157-8. 
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focussing corporate engagement in civil society through “targeted interventions”.
110  At 
the other end of this spectrum are those feminist legal scholars who use radical critique 
of capitalism and large bureaucratic enterprises to question the validity of the economic 
and social status quo.
111  In the context of corporate law, radical feminist legal theory 
challenges the notion that social utility is maximised by the perpetuation of self-interest 
as expressed in enforcement oriented, profit maximizing, hierarchically structured, non-
regulated bureaucratic entities servicing a masculist constructed capitalist society.
112  The 
theory to some extent builds on notions of communitarian theory,
113 gender equality and 
the perceived dignity of the individual human being by questioning the way in which 
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in and around Corporate Governance" (2002) 25(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
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corporations are interpreted, and their impact on society evaluated.
114  Central to feminist 
legal theory in this field is its critique of modern capitalism as a potent expression of the 
patriarchal tendency to fragment and control communities and individuals.
115  The role 
that corporate law fulfils therefore in legitimising and enforcing what is argued to be a 
masculist economic structure is of prime concern to feminist legal scholars.
116  The aim 
of radical feminist critique “should try to debunk and demystify the claims of the 
dominant discourse, not perpetuate them by collaborating in their pretentions.”
117 
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Feminist corporate law theory is, however, more than merely a contradictory amalgam 
of subversive compliance and utopian opposition.  Scholars in this field present coherent 
alternatives to traditional corporate law schemas that eloquently expose the patriarchal 
foundations of accepted models of the corporation.
118  Alternative scenarios that strike at 
the heart of the corporation as it is currently perceived include the suggested abolition of 
limited liability for shareholders
119 and its replacement with a concept of “limited risk”
120 
(which would in turn be managed through insurance contracts),
121 and the abolition of 
the separate legal entity doctrine as it applies to directors.
122  The special disadvantage of 
disenfranchised women directors of small closely held corporations has also prompted 
feminist scholars to question the gender specific impact of apparently “objective” legal 
rules such as the duty of care.
123  As has been observed by Professor MacKinnon: 
                                                                                                                                                
117   Ferguson, KE, The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
USA, 1984 at 196. 
118   Gabaldon, TA, "The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability 
of Corporate Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1427-56; Hall, KH, 
"The Interior Design of Corporate Law: Why Theory Is Vital to the Development of Corporate 
Law in Australia" (1996) 7(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1 at 2; and Tomasic, R, et al, 
Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 at 62. 
119   Kanter, RM, Men and Women of the Corporation, Basic Books, New York, USA, 1977 at 266 & 
285; Gabaldon, TA, "The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited 
Liability of Corporate Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1424-54 & in 
particular at 1434 where the large corporation is specifically targeted; Freedman, J, "Limited 
Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms" (2000) 63(3) Modern Law Review 317 for a 
thoughtful work at the fringes of feminist corporate law theory highlighting the problems of 
applying limited liability to small closely held corporations. 
120   Gabaldon, TA, "The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability 
of Corporate Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt Law Review 1387 at 1428-32. 
121   Ibid at 1449. The use of insurance as an Alternative to limited liability is not an exclusively 
feminist proposal, indeed it was most famously raised by Easterbrook, FH & Fischel, DR, 
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Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things.  Under the 
sameness rubric, women are measured according to correspondence with man, their equality judged 
by proximity to his measure.  Under the difference rubric, women are measured according to their 
lack of correspondence from man, their womanhood judged by their distance from his measure.  
Gender neutrality is the male standard.
124 
Liberal legalism is thus a medium for making male dominance both invisible and legitimate by 
adopting the male point of view in law at the same time as it enforces that view on society.
125 
 
These oppositional critiques are deliberately confronting and they provide a unique 
opportunity to reflect on the assumptions underlying received wisdom in corporate law.  
The world may be constructed thus, but why should it not be deconstructed and 
reconstructed after a different fashion?
126  As one feminist corporate law scholar has 
observed the “more accurate, and more just, conception of the corporation is that it is a 
site where participants express both competitiveness and cooperation in their relations 
with other stakeholders.”
127 
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Organisational Theory 
Organisational theory as developed and articulated by “political scientists, sociologists 
and communications theorists suggests that corporations, especially large corporations, 
must be understood as complex organisational environments.”
128  The models used by 
these scholars are far more complex and, it is submitted, more true to the nature of 
corporations than anything produced by traditional legal theorists.
129  This body of theory 
suggests that while the relational and decision-making processes within bureaucratic 
organisations are rational, they are not necessarily logical.  Organisational theory 
therefore poses some significant problems for a number of alternative schools of 
corporate thought.
130 
 
Applying Broadly Concieved Organic Theory 
It can be seen that adherence to a theoretical perspective will be crucial to the way in 
which corporations are perceived and corporate regulation and corporate activity 
interpreted.  The summary of “Realist” theory I have provided above, concluded by 
stating that corporate law should have an essentially facilitative and descriptive, rather 
than prescriptive, function.  This thesis will apply realist organic theory, broadly 
conceived, to the problem of identifying the most suitable source of analogy from which 
to develop a jurisprudence of incorporated associations.  This in turn requires that I first 
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consider the role of analogy in legal reasoning.  As will be discussed in the following 
chapter, I intend to do this by reaching into cognitive science literature to develop a 
robust model of analogical problem solving that can be applied to the task of identifying 
the richest source analogue for the purpose.  Having done this I will then use the 
principles of broadly conceived organic theory to test whether or not the legislative 
framework for incorporated associations is reflective and facilitative of the observed 
reality of those incorporated associations.  Chapter three contributes to this enterprise by 
summarising the legislative framework for incorporated associations in Australia and 
New Zealand using a typology with international application.  In chapter four an 
empirical analysis of incorporated sporting associations in all jurisdictions will be 
summarised.  By comparing the legislative framework of incorporated associations from 
chapter three with the empirical data summarised in chapter four, chapter five will 
demonstrate how broadly conceived organic theory can be applied to highlight any lack 
of fit between that legislative framework and empirical reality.  This will enable a 
meaningful and theoretically sound critique of the legislation to emerge.  Only then can 
a theoretically defensible assessment be made as to the potential utility of the alternative 
source analogue schemas presented in chapter two.  This will be outlined in chapter six 
below. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF THEORY ON CORPORATE LAW IN  
AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND 
Evidence of the influence exerted by various juristic corporate theories upon the 
common law can be found when considering briefly the aspects of corporate law at the 
heart of this investigation.
131  The Australian corporate law legislative framework 
includes aspects closely associated to the aggregate approach.  For example, a corporate 
constitution will be determined by the corporators, and subsequently, by members in 
general meeting.
132  To varying degrees, the contents of the constitution will need to 
conform to a statutory formula,
133 but in only one jurisdiction is this restrictively 
mandated.
134  Companies wishing to minimise their drafting burden may opt to leave a 
wide range of constitutional issues to optional clauses of the Corporations Act 2001 
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Sch; & Associations Incorporations Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch.  
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(Cth) known as “replaceable rules”.
135  Incorporated associations do not face such a 
regime.  These, essentially domestic arrangements relating to corporate constitutions, 
can be seen as indicative of the organic approach to internal corporate self-
determination.
136  On the other hand, however, corporate law also mandates certain 
matters of internal corporate governance,
137 indicating an acceptance of some of the 
tenets of the aggregate approach. 
 
Perhaps the most significant instance of the acceptance of the organic theory in 
Australian corporate law is the broad acceptance of the modern commercial principle of 
a division of powers between a typical company's board of directors and its members in 
general meeting.
138  This principle may not be applicable to incorporated associations, a 
point at the heart of the current investigation.  This “separation of powers” principle is 
enshrined in the optional constitutional clause at Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s198A (a 
replaceable rule) and in turn, is based on the former optional rule in Table A Article 66.  
In an oft-quoted passage, Greer LJ elucidated the effect of this “division of powers” in 
the following terms: 
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A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors.  Some of its powers 
may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors, certain other powers may be reserved for 
the shareholders in general meeting.  If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and 
they alone can exercise these powers.  The only way in which the general body of shareholders can 
control the exercise of powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their articles, or, 
if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they 
disapprove.  They cannot themselves usurp the powers which by the articles are vested in the 
directors any more than the directors can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general 
body of shareholders.
139 
 
This delegation of management authority to directors has been considered in a line of 
case law stretching back into the 19
th century.
140  In perhaps the most influential 
judgment as to its effect, Denning LJ stated: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body.  It has a brain and nerve centre which 
controls what it does.  It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions 
from the centre.  Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing 
more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will of the company, 
and control what it does.  Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and 
will of the company, and control what it does.
141 
                                                 
139   John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 at 134. 
140   See Redmond, P, Companies and Securities Law: Commentary and Materials, 3rd ed, LBC 
Information Systems, Pyrmont, 2000 Ch 5. 
141   HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 at 172. See also 
Acquaah-Gaise, G, Corporate Crimes: Criminal Intent, and Just Restitution, Faculty of Business 
& Law, Victoria University , Melbourne, 2001 at 3. This type of anthropomorphic group/person 
analogy is far from new, however, see for example Romans 6:4-5. Other United Kingdom cases 
of interest on this point involving the issue of corporate state of mind near in time to the Bolton 
decision include; Betty’s Cafes Ltd v Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd [1956] 1 WLR 678; Reohorn 
v Barry Corporation [1956] 1 WLR 845; and, Fleet Electrics Ltd v Jacey Investments Ltd [1956] 
1 WLR 1027. These cases appear to require formality of procedure before corporate intention 
could be proved. The effect of this would have been to focus on questions of traditional agency 
where a corporation acts through individual s. On this point, the HL Bolton Case can be seen as a 
watershed decision in that it eschews traditional agency issues and a focus on formality. See 
47  
 
As a result of Denning LJ's speech in the HL Bolton Case, the board of directors and 
members general meeting have come to be referred to as corporate “organs”, each in 
their various capacities exercising the powers of the company, not as mere agents, but as 
the principal (i.e. the corporation) itself.
142  In this respect, the term “organic theory” has 
become, to some extent, synonymous with both the realist or “internal self-
determination” school of corporate law theory,
143 and the idea that a company is 
personified by its various “organs” as derived by the application of agency theory.
144 
 
Obviously, where a company determines that it is appropriate to be governed by a board 
of directors vested with independent management powers and a members' meeting with 
specific residual power, it is possible to use the term “organic theory” in its two senses 
contiguously.  That is to say, in terms of a self-determined governance model, and in 
terms of agency concepts.  However where a corporation chooses not to adopt the 
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(1990) 19(3) Federal Law Review 203 from 211; & Tomasic, R, et al, Corporations Law in 
Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 from 53. 
144    Lipton, P & Herzberg, A, Understanding Company Law, 11th ed, Thompson Lawbook Co, 
Sydney, 2003 at 220-233. 
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equivalent of the replaceable rule at Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)  s 198A,
145 or 
alternatively, where the corporation is an incorporated association and its constitution 
does not contain an equivalent of this replaceable rule, the term “organic theory” must 
be restricted in its application to the broad principle of internal self-determination as 
propounded by the less anthropomorphically doctrinaire corporate realists. 
 
A number of important issues therefore present themselves for consideration in the case 
where a corporation chooses not to delegate broad management power to a “board of 
directors” or an equivalent body in incorporated associations.  For instance, what are the 
implications for corporate law theory and regulation of a board of directors who are at 
best mere agents of the corporation?  Would the membership generally of such a body 
be in the same fiduciary position as directors in the delegated management model?   
What actual and apparent authority can be ascribed to corporate officers where they 
cannot be said to represent the “directing mind-and-will” of the corporation?  What 
implications are there for the application or otherwise of the doctrines of ultra vires and 
constructive notice to the non-delegating model corporation? 
 
Internal Control of Corporations 
To enable a corporation to function, and to ensure that there are controllers upon whom 
the performance of duties can be imposed, legislation generally provides that a 
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corporation should always have a minimum number of directors and members.
146  More 
broadly, however, common law has long held that the majority of the members of a 
corporation can act for it, their acts being held to be the acts of the corporation.  This 
position was later refined to refer to the majority of members present and voting at a 
general meeting, or voting by proxy under the terms of the corporate constitution.
147 
It cannot be disputed that wherever a certain number are incorporated a major part of them 
may do any corporate act; so if all are summoned, and part appear, a major part of those that 
appear may do a corporate act.
148   
In general terms, Australian corporate law does not disturb this principle, which is also 
at the root of the historical principle in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189 
relating to majority rule.
149  However, as indicated above, the constitutions of modern 
companies invariably vest the company's management powers in the directors by 
adopting the equivalent of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) replaceable rule s 198A.  Where 
this is the case, the members in general meeting may not interfere in management 
decisions of the board of directors. 
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In some respects one can observe the influence of the law and economics school in 
general, and aggregate theory in particular in company law, relating to this question of 
demarcation between corporate “organs”.  As indicated in the introduction, the 
contractualist views the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” between corporate 
participants to facilitate the achievement of economic outcomes.  Aggregate theory 
requires a set of “default” contract terms to be provided for to govern the internal 
relationships within a corporation.  The constitutional demarcation between directors 
and members referred to above is reinforced by Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140, 
which provides that the constitution of a company has the effect of a “contract between 
the company and each member; between the company and each director and company 
secretary; and, between a member and each other member”.  In Australia there is 
considerable uncertainty as to the contractual effect of the constitution of an 
incorporated association due to the High Court judgment in Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 
CLR 358.  This case related to an unincorporated political association which failed to 
comply with its constitution in the expulsion of one of its members.  The unanimous 
view of the full bench of the High Court was that such a constitution was consensual and 
not contractual.  The invariable practice of courts since Cameron v Hogan, has been to 
avoid any interpretation of the constitutions of voluntary unincorporated groups as being 
contractual.  Although this view is not shared by English courts,
150 it has been persuasive 
in New Zealand.
151   
 
                                                 
150   Conservative  and Unionist Central Office v Burrell [1982] 2 All ER 1. 
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There have been occasions where courts have extended this consensual rationale of 
constitutions developed in the context of unincorporated groups to incorporated sporting 
associations.
152  At the very least, there is uncertainty as to whether Australian common 
law views the constitution of incorporated sporting associations as being contractual or 
consensual.
153  This lack of certainty has lead to a number of Australian jurisdictions 
clarifying the issue in legislation.
154 
 
External Relations of Corporations 
One of the most influential consequences of the grant (or concession) theory of 
corporate law over time has been in the dual effect of two doctrines.  These doctrines are 
the common law doctrine of ultra vires as it pertains to corporate objects clauses, and the 
equitable doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
Ultra vires has now been largely eliminated as a feature of Australian corporate law.
155  
The abolition of ultra vires occurred largely due to the harsh manner in which it operated 
for so long to the detriment of corporate creditors who dealt in good faith with company 
officers acting outside the terms of company objects clauses.  This was problematic for a 
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variety of reasons.  Grant theory, at its most doctrinaire, stipulates that a corporate 
charter, or letters patent, or a certificate of incorporation was granted to allow a 
corporation to pursue specified objects.  Acting outside of this charter left the 
corporation open (and in some jurisdictions, such as Western Australia, theoretically still 
may leave it open) to prosecution by the Attorney General via an information in Quo 
Warranto, with the possibility of the cancellation of its incorporation.
156 
 
A corporation always had the option of disavowing any contract which was executed by 
officers on its behalf, where the subject matter of the contract was without the scope of 
the objects clause.
157  In certain situations where the contracting parties had actual 
knowledge that the objects clause was being overridden, they could not complain of 
such alleged breach of contract.
158  Similarly, where the contracting parties had a 
particularly close relationship, courts often took the view that the plaintiff party should 
have been on inquiry to determine the veracity of the contracting officers’ claim to be 
representing the company in a matter.
159  This cause of commercial difficulties in the 
area of ultra vires arose mainly due to the equitable doctrine of constructive notice.   
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Constructive notice essentially places an onus on a contracting party to make all the 
usual and reasonable inquiries prior to executing an agreement.
160  Any matter forming 
part of the public record was considered to be reasonably discoverable in such situations, 
and the contracting parties were regarded as having constructive notice of the matter.  
Corporate law regulation has always required the lodging of documents (commonly 
including or, in the case of “replaceable rules”, assuming the constitutions of companies) 
as a precondition of incorporation.
161  As this information forms part of the public record, 
contracting parties were deemed as a consequence of the doctrine of constructive notice, 
inter alia to be aware of constitutional limitations to corporate power.  When combined 
with the doctrine of ultra vires, the doctrine of constructive notice sometimes left 
contracting parties who faced cancelled contracts by parties acting outside of their 
constitutions, without legal remedy, due to their having deemed notice of the lack of 
corporate capacity of the defaulting party.
162  The doctrine of constructive notice is now 
something of a non issue as regards corporations,
163 except in limited circumstances.
164 
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One of the consequences of the devaluation of the doctrines of ultra vires and 
constructive notice in Australian corporate law is that it is now rather more difficult for 
members to fetter the actions of the directors or their equivalents.  In addition, 
Australian corporations have the full legal capacity of a natural person and of a body 
corporate.
165  To the extent that the board is vested with management power, this could 
be viewed as weakening the significance of the “member-organ” and the elevation of the 
“director-organ”.  The measures which have created this situation could be viewed as 
having an aggregacist or contractualist origin, in that they simplify the contractual basis 
of the internal corporate relations.  Likewise, as the legislation mandates such a state of 
affairs, it could be viewed as hard-edged concession or grant theory inspired.  From here 
it is but a short step to adopt the functional viewpoint of fictionalist corporate theory.  
For such scholars, inquiry or reflective thought as to the actual nature of corporate 
bodies is meaningless.  A corporation, in the world-view of the fictionalist, is whatever 
the legal system declares it to be, nothing more and nothing less.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, realist theory does not suggest that a prescribed corporate structure is superior 
to a corporate structure mediated by group decision-making processes.  Reference to the 
discussion of organic theory above suggests that the corporate law realist/organicist 
would view interrelationships between corporate “organs” as not being a matter for 
legislation. 
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One aspect of Australian corporate law that can be argued at least to be reflective of 
propositions advocated by radical feminist theory is the introduction of specific 
insolvent trading provisions.
166  These provisions make directors personally liable for the 
debts of a relevant corporation where these are incurred while the corporation trades 
while insolvent.
167  Given that such a measure is now accepted as a valid aspect of 
mainstream Australian corporate law, the possibility for future feminist influence on 
corporate law reform is very much alive. 
 
Corporate Regulation 
The differing perspectives held by adherents of the different corporate theories must lead 
the development of corporate law in different directions.  In addition, the very process 
by which corporate law is developed also impacts upon the ensuing regulation.  As 
outlined in the introduction, no single corporate theory has dominated Australian or New 
Zealand company law.  It must, however, be acknowledged that the influence of 
contractarianist corporate law theory has been profound in both jurisdictions.  The actual 
process of “reform” of corporate law in both countries has been unashamedly 
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economically driven for most of the past two decades.
168  That being said, no corporate 
law theory has dominated the way in which corporate law has been drafted, interpreted 
or applied. Rather, both legislative development and common law case decisions appear 
to have been informed by a wide range of corporate theory viewed (perhaps darkly) as is 
all legal theory, through the looking glass of pragmatism.   
 
The benefit of the realist/organic theory in the development of corporate regulation is 
that it recognizes the existence of the corporations as something unique in the legal 
world.  It encourages consideration and analysis of the nature of corporations as they 
are, not merely from the perspective of an assumed reality.  The regulatory framework 
can provide a space within which corporate bodies can exist and operate without doing 
violence to their peculiar internal structures.  In the alternative, indifferent regulation can 
have an opposite effect by requiring the corporate entity to modify its internal 
arrangements to suit the regulator.
169  
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CORPORATE LAW, ANTHROPOMORPHISM & BROADLY CONCIEVED 
ORGANIC THEORY IN CONTEXT 
As indicated above, corporations have been described as being “artificial” or 
“fictional”.
170  Such descriptions are used in the anthropomorphic sense as meaning 
devoid of human life.  A number of authors have taken issue with this terminology by 
pointing out that books, sculptures and music are equally devoid of human life but are 
not described as “artificial” or “fictional”.
171  As discussed previously, this school of 
thought is usually collectively referred to as the “realist” school.
172  In essence, corporate 
realists assert that it is in the nature of civilised society for individuals to associate 
together for common purposes.  The realist argument is such that the role of corporate 
law is to recognise such groups rather than to create and regulate them.
173 
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Debate over the extent to which a group mirrors the qualities and behaviour of an 
individual has raged in the distant past and continues at a somewhat more sedate pace in 
recent times.
174  Such questions are, however, peripheral to the investigation at hand.
175  
This inquiry will consider how incorporated nonprofit sporting groups are constructed, 
and how they operate in two common law jurisdictions.  It will attempt to ascertain: how 
these groups view their own corporate identity; the circumstances surrounding their 
formal incorporation; the way in which they have structured themselves; and the extent 
to which, and the way in which, these factors are respected, or have been otherwise 
impacted upon, by corporate law.  In addition, by means of a broad-form organic 
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approach, some indication will be derived as to the suitability to the entities under 
consideration of the various influential theories of the corporation.  What will emerge is 
a picture of how well the groups in question, and the corporate law in their jurisdictions, 
fit together.  A lack of fit may indicate the need for debate on the nature of corporate law 
as it is conceptualised in the jurisdictions in question. 
 
It is apparent, however, that there are a number of different ways in which a corporation 
may be perceived.  Several writers have observed that the way in which a corporation is 
perceived is essentially a reflection of an individual's world view.
176  Such an hypothesis 
may be helpful in surveying the development of common law corporate law theory.
177  
For instance, European renaissance theological and scientific philosophy placed the 
person at the centre of the universe.  It is unsurprising, therefore, to observe the same 
pre-eminence of the liberal tradition’s view of the individual at the heart of the common 
law.
178  Thus, when searching for an appropriate analogy from which to develop 
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corporate law theory, the natural inclination of Newtonian oriented legal scholars from 
the classical liberal tradition was toward a reduction of the group dynamic to the 
individual and personal.
179  Gierke, the “modern” father of corporate realist theory 
reached his professional zenith at the post-romantic nineteenth century when the German 
states were moving toward unification.
180  It has been suggested that this movement of 
social cohesion greatly influenced his championing of what he termed “organic” 
corporate theory.
181  The demonstrable influence of world view on the development of 
corporate law theory can also provide a useful explanation for the diversity of judicial 
opinion on the subject of corporate law both over time, and at fixed moments in time.
182  
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182    Bonham, DH & Soberman, DA, "The Nature of Corporate Personality" in Ziegel, JS, (Ed) 
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For instance, current legal debate relating to corporations centres on the trading 
corporation.
183  However, over time, this debate has variously centred on universities, 
charitable bodies, towns and boroughs, chartered and statutory authorities.
184 
 
While the concept of the individual person remained simplistic and unsophisticated, the 
implications of such analogy presented few problems.  However, as psychological and 
sociological theories of the person, and the notion of “personality”, have become more 
complex, the anthropomorphic “corporation-as-a-person” analogy has become more and 
more subject to criticism.
185  In addition, in a post-Newtonian and post-modern era, old 
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Press, Manchester, UK, 1950. 
183    Note the primacy of this analogical preference in both White, DJ, "The Law Relating to 
Associations Registered under 'the Incorporated Societies Act 1908'", Master of Laws Honours 
thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, NZ, 1972 and Riddle, MJ, "Incorporated 
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notions of a universe centred on the individual are no longer counted among dominant 
world views.  Nevertheless, the notion that the corporation is a legal “person” has 
persisted into the twenty-first century.
186 
 
It is the organic theory broadly conceived with its origins in realist theory that will be 
applied throughout the current investigation as it professes a strong belief in the natural 
existence of corporate groups, including voluntary associations, and requires respect for 
the internal autonomy of such groups in the area of self-determination.
187  T o  som e 
extent, the view adopted was first suggested by Professor Geldhart in 1911 in the 
following terms: 
If, as I have tried to show, none of these conceptions are really adequate to the facts, there seems to 
be at least a prima facie case for holding that our legal theory ought to admit the reality of a 
                                                                                                                                                
“[Corporations] cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they 
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On the intersection of history, emerging notions of precedent and world-view during the 
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Century" in Goldstein, L, (Ed) Precedent in Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987. 
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personality in permanent associated bodies, or at least of something so like personality that we may 
provisionally call it by that name for want of a better.
188 
 
Such an approach appears to at least reflect the pragmatism of corporate law practice.
189 
 
 
THEORETICAL CONVERGENCE AND CORPORATE PERSONA
190 
As indicated above, Professors Stoljar, Dan-Cohen, Hansmann & Kraakman, Blair & 
Stout, and Lahey & Salter are scholars with dramatically different perspectives 
regarding the nature of “corporateness” in terms of legal theory.  Professor Stoljar 
argues that our modern legal conception of the corporation can be adequately explained 
in terms of a model he describes as a sort of streamlined trust.
191  Professor Dan-Cohen 
on the other hand urges a reconstructed jurisprudence of corporations largely from the 
perspective of organisational theory.  At an earlier stage, Professor Hansmann applied an 
ingeniously conceived transaction-cost approach from the law and economics school to 
the task of explaining the empirical diversity of corporate structures.
192  More recently 
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188   Geldhart, WM, "Legal Personality" (1911) 27(Jan) Law Quarterly Review 90 at 102. See also 
Brown, WJ, "The Personality of the Corporation and the State" (1905) 21 Law Quarterly Review 
365. 
189   Machen, AW, "Corporate Personality" (1911) 24(4) Harvard Law Review 253 at 347 & 363-5. 
190   Attempts to mediate between competing corporate law theories have been attempted elsewhere 
of course, but the perspective of the reviewer plays an important mediating role, as is discussed 
more fully in the following chapter. For an Alternative perspective, see Macmillan-Patfield, F, 
"1. Challenges for Company Law" in Macmillan-Patfield, F, (Ed) Perspectives  on Company 
Law: 1, Kluwer Law International, London, UK, 1995 at 11. 
191   Stoljar,  SJ,  Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1973 especially at Chapter 12. 
192   Hansmann, H, The Ownership of Enterprise, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, USA, 1996; and Fligstein, N, "Book Review: The Ownership of Enterprise by Henry 
64  
however, Hansman, writing in collaboration with Professor Kraakman, appears to have 
revised his views somewhat, such that they are now much more in line with those of 
Stoljar.
193  Professor Blair has refined economic “team production theory” (an insight 
articulated in collaboration with Professor Stout) to highlight the relevance of the 
communitarian perspective in corporate law and corporate governance.
194  I t  i s  
significant that Blair has recently expressed support for the central role of Hansmann’s 
“asset partitioning” in the proliferation of the modern trading corporation.
195  Professors 
Lahey and Salter wrote the leading work in feminist corporate law theory almost twenty 
years ago
196 and it is still so regarded.
197  Lahey and Salter together with other feminist 
corporate law scholars identify the element of “fragmentation” as a masculist 
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193   Hansmann, H & Kraakman, R, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law" (2000) 110(3) Yale 
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tendency.
198  Feminist corporate law scholars also stress the importance of alternative 
corporate forms and internal structures to that in evidence in the modern trading 
corporation.  Each of these influential theorists in their own way, make invaluable 
contributions to the development and evaluation of corporate entity theory that are 
highly relevant to what is here classified as a broad form organic theory approach to 
corporate groups. 
 
Stoljar, by using the dynamic of the trust relationship as his basic model, contributes 
greatly to the task at hand.  In essence, he asserts that the most significant aspect of 
corporateness is what passes between corporate members and not on the members 
themselves.  According to Stoljar the emptiness of anthropomorphic analogy and debate 
is avoided by looking beyond the individual and pondering the nature of the group.
199  
His choice of the trust as a relationship of comparison is felicitous for at least two 
reasons.  Firstly, to some extent, it provides much needed ballast with which to deal 
robustly with the overwhelming current of law-and-economics based literature based on 
“contract” considerations.  Secondly, there is, as will be seen in the following chapter, a 
great deal of common ground between incorporated associations and charitable trusts.  
For this reason alone, Stoljar’s treatment is worthy of note. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders" (1992) 45(6) Vanderbilt 
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198   Brown, W, "Challenging Bureaucracy" (1984) 2 Women's Review of Books 16;  
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University Press, Canberra, 1973 Chapter 1. 
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Dan-Cohen has suggested a theory of bureaucratic organisations based on organisational 
sociology and moral and political theory.
200  The most important caveat on the work of 
Dan-Cohen is that it expressly deals with “large bureaucratic organisations”.
201  Implicit 
in this limitation is that there are important differences between large and small (closely 
held) corporations, of which any body of theory must take account.
202  There is also a 
strong emphasis in the Dan-Cohen theory on the centrality of organisational goal 
orientation.
203  In addition, Dan-Cohen’s analogy of an “intelligent-machine” as a type 
for corporate groups serves to encourage thinking about such groups beyond their 
constituent individual members.
204  In so doing, we are provided with a powerful contra-
metaphor to aid in the difficult task of resisting the distraction of unhelpful 
anthropomorphic reductionism. 
 
Hansmann uses his background in economic theory in a unique way by asking why 
“ownership” of certain enterprises is structured in particular ways as between different 
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industries.
205  The most refreshing aspect of Hansmann’s analysis is in his consideration 
of optimisational behaviours by individuals in broader terms than merely the generation 
of wealth or other forms of pecuniary utility.
206  The transaction-cost analysis in which 
he engages is also singular in its scope, given that he ventures beyond the monoculture 
of commercial trading corporations into the multitude of corporate forms as they exist in 
reality.  Divergent enterprise structures, according to Hansmann are utilised to facilitate 
the attainment of a variety of purposes.
207  One of the key reasons why a particular 
enterprise structure will be favoured above another is which class of the organisation’s 
patrons has the greatest incidence of “homogeneity of interests” in order to reduce the 
overall costs of contracting within the “firm”.
208  In other words, there needs to be shared 
conceptions as to the purpose(s) of the enterprise between the owners.  A second key 
factor is the existence of “asymmetrical information” such as where the potential owners 
of the enterprise possess imperfect information about the ultimate provision of goods 
and services to the end user.
209  Both of these requirements are in harmony with the 
notion of a corporation as a form of purpose-driven trust relationship. 
 
It is also of interest to note that Hansmann, in conjunction with Kraakman, has recently 
expressed the view that a corporation can be viewed as a contractual device for 
separating a class of assets from the assets of organisational owners for the purpose of 
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limiting the claims of creditors.  This aspect is viewed from both the perspective of 
“defensive” and “affirmative” asset partitioning.
210  Hansmann previously brought this 
insight to a consideration of trusts.
211  The similarity of this view to the “kitty” theory of 
Stoljar is very striking. 
 
Blair has, in collaboration with Stout, refined a version of “team production theory” 
borrowed from economics into a sophisticated form of communitarian corporate law 
theory.
212  She argues that large corporations are hierarchically structured problem 
solving entities, with each “team member” contributing to the ongoing problem solving 
process for which the corporation was formed.
213  Of particular interest to this paper, 
Blair has expressed the view that there is an internal dialogue at work within large 
corporate entities that is unique in its complexity.
214  This perspective has much in 
common with Dan-Cohen’s view of the organisation as “intelligent machine”.  In 
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addition, Blair also acknowledges Hansmann’s view of the centrality of “asset 
partitioning” as a corporate characteristic.
215 
 
Radical feminism is not favourably disposed towards the typical large modern trading 
corporation.
216  On the basis of opposition to the masculist tendency to fragment and 
control, feminist scholars are highly critical of the separate legal entity concept and its 
close relation, limited liability.
217  Similarly there is strong feminist opposition to the 
hierarchical structure of the typical large modern trading corporation being an 
expression of the masculist tendency to control and dehumanize.
218  This critique bears 
favourable comparison with communitarian theory in that both seek to emphasise the 
importance of connection and mutual dependence in corporate activity.  One of the calls 
of feminist corporate law scholars is for alternative corporate forms and structures based 
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on feminist principles.  Uniformity is argued to be another key masculist trait, and so 
diversity is to be fostered and encouraged.
219 
 
These seemingly disparate theoretical frameworks have at least three important aspects 
in common.  The first of these is the prime role played by the underlying purposes of a 
group in the development of a legal theory of the corporation.  Second, the complexity 
of relationships at work in the organisation and the need for appropriate structures to 
effectively manage these relationships.  Third, it is also interesting to note that all of the 
authors referred to limit the full import of their observations to “large” organisations.  
The implications of this convergence are significant.  Briefly, these are as follows: 
 
  If the trading corporation in its context of liberal capitalism is a creature of an 
essentially masculist world view, it is conceivable that non-trading corporate 
entities might, to some extent, express alternative world views in their 
presumably non-capitalist contexts.  This could mean for instance, that non-profit 
corporations might display unorthodox internal operational structures. 
 
  Just as there are different types of trusts, it would be appropriate to find the 
corporate form expressed in different ways reflecting particular attributes.  Any 
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particular corporate expression can therefore be argued to be rationally 
defensible due to the specific circumstances surrounding the group in question.   
 
  Corporate size appears to be a significant factor in the application of corporate 
law theory.
220  This is a commonly identified issue that is raised in different ways 
by most theorists. 
 
  The centrality of corporate purposes and the “partitioning” of corporate funds in 
favour of those purposes, even to the disenfranchisement of “owner/ shareholder/ 
member” patrons is a defining attribute of the corporation.  Feminist scholars are 
highly critical of this point, however they recognise the importance of 
“fragmentation” as a key pillar of the masculist capitalist economy. 
 
  The accountability of corporate “managers” in terms of the purposes of the group 
rather than as agents of the “owner/ shareholder/ member” patrons is also a 
determinative aspect of the corporation. 
 
It can be appreciated that these points of convergence in corporate law theory are all 
consonant with broadly conceived organic theory as defined in this chapter.  
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SUMMARY 
This chapter commenced with a definition of key terms and a brief discussion of the role 
of legal theory generally.  I then surveyed the major schools of corporate law theory in 
particular.  This survey revealed that corporate law theory is a well stocked treasury 
from which to draw when surveying the terrain of novel corporate forms.  It is however 
apparent from the theoretical survey that the vast majority of corporate law theory is 
drawn from, and aimed at, the modern trading corporation.  Given the primacy of the 
modern trading corporation in corporate law theory, I then proceeded to highlight some 
examples of the influence that corporate law theory has had on the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) and the Corporations Act 1993 (NZ).  Following this, I restated the preferred 
theoretical approach to be applied in the remainder of this thesis, namely broadly 
conceived organic theory.  Finally in this chapter, I have sought to map out points of 
convergence that are currently evident in the major schools of corporate law theory.  The 
relevant schools featuring in the discussion of theoretical convergence were; common 
fund theories; organisational theories; contractarian theories; communitarian theories; 
and feminist theories.  I have also indicated that none of these emergent points of 
convergence are inconsistent with the broadly conceived organic theory that forms the 
lens through which incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand will 
be examined.  First, however, it is important to consider how the status of the modern 
trading corporation as the “benchmark” in corporate law
221 might influence the 
application of corporate law theory in the investigation of incorporated associations.  Is 
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the modern trading corporation an appropriate analogy to use when applying corporate 
law theory of any school to such novel corporate forms?  If not, what analogy might 
suitably be used in its place? 
 
The following chapter addresses the role of analogy in legal reasoning from a theoretical 
perspective.  It then canvasses a number of alternative analogies, including the modern 
trading corporation.  The purpose of this comparative analysis will be to test whether the 
current orthodox view that the modern trading corporation is the most apt source 
analogue for incorporated associations can be supported. 
 
74 CHAPTER 2 
ANALOGICAL REASONING AND POTENTIAL LEGAL 
ANALOGIES FOR INCORPORATED SPORTING ENTITIES 
 
“Twinkle, twinkle little star, 
How I wonder what you are? 
Up above the world so high, 
Like a diamond in the sky. 
Twinkle, twinkle little star, 
How I wonder what you are?1
 
 
Above all, it is imperative that the jurist should not submit to be dragged  
weakly submissive at the chain of metaphor.2
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the challenge of broadly conceived organic 
theory is to consider the intrinsic reality of organizations and associations in their 
social context.  In terms of corporate law, this challenge extends to the development 
of a jurisprudence which facilitates such corporate structures rather than restricting 
and controlling them in an inappropriate manner.  This chapter outlines the 
significance of analogy in the development of theory generally, and corporate law in 
particular.  The investigation will then present four well documented alternative legal 
forms that may provide guidance in the analogical development of an appropriate 
                                                 
1   Child’s nursery rhyme. 
75 jurisprudence for incorporated associations.  The following chapter will survey the 
legislative framework currently in place in Australia and New Zealand, allowing 
voluntary sporting associations to become incorporated bodies.  That survey will 
consider in broad terms what the eligibility criteria are in each jurisdiction, the 
internal structural requirements, the operational requirements and the dissolution 
requirements as laid down in the various statutory measures.  The next chapter 
summarises an epidemiological investigation of actual incorporated associations in 
the relevant jurisdictions.  Research indicates that anything up to one in three 
incorporated associations could be sporting groups.3  This constitutes the largest 
definable user-group of the relevant legislation.  In order to ensure the greatest utility 
from the findings of the thesis, the survey will focus on this most significant subset 
of incorporates associations.  The remaining chapters will consider the extent to 
which the current legislative framework could be said to reflect broad form organic 
theory and also suggest a basis upon which a coherent jurisprudence of incorporated 
sporting associations could emerge. 
 
THE PLACE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL REASONING 
If, as is suggested by this research, incorporated associations can be accurately 
categorised as a novel corporate form with a peculiar legal identity, the question 
ought to be asked, how do we deduce an appropriate jurisprudence from which to 
develop an appropriate body of law?  In the absence of specific guidance, one is left 
to construct an appropriate legal theory by such imperfect means as analogy and 
                                                                                                                                          
2   Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 
375. 
3   Huntly, CT, "A Century of Incorporated Associations in Western Australia: 1896-1996" 
(1996) Working Paper Series 96.05 26. 
76 metaphor.4  Imperfect though such means may be they are nonetheless pervasive.5  
As Gick and Holyoak have observed: “To make the novel seem familiar by relating it 
to prior knowledge, to make the familiar seem strange by viewing it from a new 
perspective – these are fundamental aspects of human intelligence that depend on the 
ability to reason by analogy.”6
 
This type of problem solving imperative is as familiar in law as it is in any other 
field.7  Common law reasoning as it is presently understood8 can be crudely 
characterised as involving an inductive process where individual cases of a similar 
nature that have already been resolved are examined in order to extract some “rule” 
or “schema” that will explain the outcome in each case.9  Common law goes one step 
                                                 
4    “The method of reasoning by analogy has recently come under considerable attack.”   
Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 767; 
Sherwin, E, "A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law" (1999) 66 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1179 at 1183; Coleman, CH, "Rationalising Risk Assessment in Human Subject 
Research" (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 1 at 38.  See also Dan-Cohen, M, Rights, Persons 
and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society, University of California, 
Berkeley, USA, 1986 Chapter III: The Story of Personless Corporation. 
5   Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 14; Gentner, D, et al, 
"Metaphor Is Like Analogy" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives 
from Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001 at 199; and Hofstadter, DR, 
"Epilogue: Analogy as the Core of Cognition" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical 
Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001. 
6   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 1; & Green, DW, "How We Solve Problems" in Green, DW, (Ed) Cognitive 
Science: An Introduction, Blackwell, Cambridge, USA, 1996 at 320. 
7   “Analogy and precedent play a central role in legal reasoning.”  Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too 
Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 at 1202 & 
at 1230.  Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 
at 790; & Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 355. 
8   As to the way in which this has emerged over time, see Evans, J, "Change in the Doctrine of 
Precedent During the Nineteenth Century" in Goldstein, L, (Ed) Precedent in Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987. 
9   See Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298 at 305 per Spigelman CJ for a 
more elegant consideration of this proposition.  Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy 
and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197at 1207-1209.  Note that the 
clearest instance of purely inductive reasoning in the common law context is the application 
77 further than pure inductive reasoning however, in that the inductively derived 
schema is then applied to a given novel situation to determine the outcome.10  This 
technique is at the heart of the doctrine of precedent, one of the distinguishing 
features of the common law system.11   
 
Common law legal reasoning is of course only one methodology.  Civilian legal 
reasoning on the other hand could perhaps be crudely characterised as a methodology 
where the inquirer refers to a body of precepts and deductively divines general 
principles that are applied to a given novel problem to generate a conclusion.12  As 
                                                                                                                                          
of the ejusdem generis principle of statutory interpretation (Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: 
Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 at 1208). 
10    Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, UK, 1990 at 87; Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" 
(2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197at 1202; Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in 
Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 847; & “(R)easoning by analogy is 
properly understood as a patterned sequence of distinct reasoning processes, including 
abduction and either induction or deduction.  I also explain that this process is not ‘disparate’ 
but coherent; that although it is admittedly far from determinate, is nevertheless not quite 
‘unstable’ either; and that its processes do have sufficient ‘content,’ when well executed and 
properly understood, to give it serious rational force.” Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: 
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 
109(5)  Harvard Law Review 923 at 954; and Sherwin, E, "A Defense of Analogical 
Reasoning in Law" (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 1179 at 1179. 
11   Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 at 961.  “English case law 
thus is the product of practical reasoning emerging from decision-making, and combining the 
attributes of reasoning by analogy with those of reasoning by rules.”  Farrar, JH & Dugdale, 
AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1990 at 89-90; 
and, Coleman, CH, "Rationalising Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research" (2004) 46 
Arizona Law Review 1 at 28.  See also Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 322 per 
Brennan J; “The classic example is to be found in Lord Atkin’s speech in Donoghue v 
Stevenson … where, perceiving the theme common to earlier cases, he reasoned to a unifying 
principle which, once articulated, governed a host of cases that followed.  Inductive 
reasoning leads to the expression of a normative principle which prescribes with some 
particularity the character of the facts to which the principle applies.  The principle must be 
more precise than a value or concept, else its content is left for contention in later cases.” 
12   Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 749-
750.  This type of legal reasoning is not totally foreign to common law.  “Case law also 
involves reasoning by rules …  Again, as the law develops, broad statements of principle are 
made which are pitched at a higher level of generality and these often epitomise basic values 
or traditions of the legal system.”  Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 
3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1990 at 88. 
78 valid as this alternative methodology for legal reasoning may be, given that it is not 
pervasive in Australia or New Zealand, it is not considered here in any further detail. 
 
The above characterisations of the major legal systems are for the purposes of 
illustration and are somewhat arch and oversimplified, but are nevertheless sufficient 
for our purposes.  The inductive process of legal reasoning that was articulated above 
in the context of common law is most accurately characterised as “analogy”.13  Given 
Mill’s view that there “is no word which is used more loosely, or in a greater variety 
of senses, than Analogy”,14 it is necessary at this point to more carefully define the 
term “analogy” as it will be used in this investigation.   
 
Analogy Defined 
For the purposes of clarity, the term “analogy” will be used from this point forward 
to refer to the type of logic process identified above with common law legal 
reasoning.  That is to say, it is a kind of inductive, instance-to-instance comparison-
based, problem solving methodology.  An analogy typically involves comparing 
                                                 
13   Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 741 
“Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form of legal reasoning.”  “Analogy is a vital tool 
in legal reasoning.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA 
Law Review 833 at 833; and at 837 “induction or analogy, which are the two forms of 
argument commonly utilised in legal reasoning.”; and Coleman, CH, "Rationalising Risk 
Assessment in Human Subject Research" (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 1at 28. 
14   Mill, JS, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 8th ed, Harper and Bros, New York, 
USA, 1882 at 393.  “The pertinence of semantic flexibility to analogy is highlighted by the 
academic quandary regarding the relation of analogy to metaphor” Hoffman, RR, "Monster 
Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 18; & “(L)egal commentators have caused 
enormous problems by failing to explain how analogy differs from the related inference 
processes of induction and metaphor.  This has lead to sloppy thinking and poor analysis.” 
Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1206. 
79 attributes of a known “source analogue” with those of an unknown “target analogue” 
for the purpose of either prediction or insight.15   
 
Metaphor Defined 
The term “metaphor” will be used from this point to refer to the comparison of a 
familiar concept in a semantically disparate context, with a novel concept in the 
present context.  This bears close resemblance to the way in which the term 
“metaphor” is used linguistically.  In that environment, a metaphor is a device 
whereby one abstract phenomenon is so closely and favourably compared with 
another, semantically distant,16 phenomenon that the two are indistinguishable.17  
Thus defined, metaphor is in some respects a similar concept to analogy in that a 
source is compared to a target.  However, for our purposes it will be helpful to place 
both terms at either end of an allegorical continuum with “analogy” favouring the 
concrete and “metaphor” favouring the symbolic.  This will be explained more fully 
below. 
 
                                                 
15   “In its simplest form, an analogy (more precisely, an analogical assertion) is a comparison of 
two or more items.”  Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" 
(2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197at 1206.  Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: 
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 
109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 at 964 & 963; Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to 
Legal Method, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1990at 87; and, Gentner, D, et al, 
"Metaphor Is Like Analogy" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives 
from Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001. 
16   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Analogical Problem Solving" (1980) 12 Cognitive Psychology 
306 at 307. 
17   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197at 1209-1211.  “Most of us could perhaps come up with some 
interpretation, often a far fetched one, of any metaphor, no mater how arbitrary the 
metaphor.” Tourangeu, R & Sternberg, RJ, "Understanding and Appreciating Metaphors" 
(1982) 11 Cognition 203 at 208. 
80 Mapping 
In cognitive science the nature of the interplay between a “source analogue” and a 
“target analogue” is analysed (at an appropriate level of abstraction) with a view to 
utilising the known (source) as a means of understanding the unknown (target).18  
This process is almost universally referred to as “mapping”.19  Mapping is 
considered to be central to reasoning by analogy.20  Mapping theory also assists in 
the development of artificial intelligence programming and in the treatment of 
pathological cognitive disorders.21
 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of analogical reasoning, there is little doubt that it is 
central to cognitive processing.22  Cognitive scientists postulate that in order to make 
meaningful comparisons, individuals develop a simplified, abstract portrait of both 
                                                 
18   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1206; Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Analogical Problem Solving" (1980) 
12  Cognitive Psychology 306 at 350; & Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, 
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard 
Law Review 923 at 966; Fauconnier, G, "Conceptual Blending and Analogy" in Gentner, D, 
et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, USA, 2001 at 255. 
19   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1211-1214; Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Analogical Problem Solving" 
(1980) 12 Cognitive Psychology 306 at 350; Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction 
and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive Psychology 1 at 2; Holyoak, KJ & Thagard, P, 
"Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction" (1989) 13 Cognitive Science 295 at 295-6; 
& Joo, TW, "Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law" (2001) 
Research Paper 01-10 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum  at 6. 
20    Holyoak, KJ & Thagard, P, "Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction" (1989) 13 
Cognitive Science 295 at 295. 
21   Green, DW, (Ed) Introduction, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK, 1996 at 5-9. 
22   “Analogy pervades thought.” Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical 
Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive Psychology 1 at 1; & “Analogy is a vital tool in legal 
reasoning.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law 
Review 833 at 833; and “structure-mapping is inherent in all of our thought processes, and 
especially in the permanent construction of meaning that we engage in effortlessly as we 
conceive the world around us, act upon it, talk about it, and stray beyond it in wild leaps of 
imagination, fantasy, and creativity.”  Fauconnier, G, "Conceptual Blending and Analogy" in 
Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001 at 255. 
81 source and target.23  It is at this point that a critical element is introduced into the 
process which will lead to the success or ultimate failure of the analogy in question.  
The simplification process is purpose driven in that the investigator, for some 
subjective purpose, choses to ignore characteristics of either the source or the target 
which are deemed not relevant to the problem in question.24  It is argued that this 
elimination may lead to self-fulfilling hypotheses or pre-determined outcomes and is 
therefore “unscientific” and misleading.25  The consequence of such purpose-driven 
analogical thinking, so it is argued, is that it can negatively alter or even “cloud over” 
the way both source and target are perceived. 
 
There is however an alternative view of purpose-driven mapping.  This view points 
out the infinite range of possible outcomes to any given problem.  Rather than seeing 
the purpose constraint as a weakness, this view considers that it acts as a type of 
filter, narrowing the field of inquiry and eliminating wasteful effort.26  However, the 
purpose constraint is only one of the constraints that operate in the mapping process.  
                                                 
23    Joo, TW, "Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law" (2001) 
Research Paper 01-10 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum  at 8; Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers 
Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) 
Journal of Legal Education 313tiv. 
24   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 5; & “(T)he goal structures of a stored source problem may influence the 
mapping process indirectly by affecting the degree of structural consistency between the 
source and the target.  There are reasons to suspect, however, that pragmatic considerations – 
the analogist’s judgements about which elements of the analog [sic] are most crucial to 
achieve a useful mapping – may also have a more direct influence on the mapping process.”  
Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 744. 
25   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 6 & 8; & Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard 
Law Review 741 at 755-757. 
26    Holyoak, KJ & Thagard, P, "Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction" (1989) 13 
Cognitive Science 295 at 302-304; Joo, TW, "Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in 
Corporations Law" (2001) Research Paper 01-10 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum  at 8; 
Markman, AB & Moreau, CP, "Analogy and Analogical Comparison in Choice" in Gentner, 
D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, USA, 2001. 
82 Professor Hunter, applying advanced cognitive science theory to the legal problem-
solving context, suggests a “multiple constraint” model of analogical mapping.27  
This model suggests that there are at least three constraints at work in the analogical 
mapping process.   
 
Hunter’s first constraint is termed “surface-level” and concerns the extent to which 
source and target have similar “surface-level” elements or attributes.  There is 
empirical evidence that suggests experienced decision-makers (including legal 
decision-makers) are strongly influenced by surface level similarity when seeking 
and applying appropriate analogies.28   
 
Of additional interest is the extent to which perceived structural similarity can be 
manipulated by context variables such as “contrast effects” and “relational effects”.29   
 Hunter’s second constraint is the “structural” constraint and requires consideration 
of the internal relational patterns (structures) within and between attributes of either 
source or target.  This constraint limits the use of analogies by requiring observable 
structures within the source analogue to be capable of being mapped onto the target 
analogue.  The preferred structural comparisons are those “higher-order” relational 
patterns capable of explanatory or predictive utility.  “We should therefore expect to 
see certain analogies preferred if they operate at a higher, causative level than the 
                                                 
27   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1214-1227. 
28   “These two studies in law, together with the many other cognitive psychological studies, give 
strong initial indications that surface-level mapping is almost certainly undertaken in 
precedential reasoning and legal analogy-making generally.”  Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too 
Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 at 1216. 
29    Ibid at 1217-1220.  Context effects include the existence of strong contrasts between 
alternative analogues and presenting alternatives as a continuum. 
83 alternatives.”30  This is what is meant by an analogy being described as more “apt”, 
or “relevant”.  The final constraint identified by Hunter is the “purpose” constraint 
that was first mentioned above.  This constraint “is consistent with the legal realist 
tradition.”31  That is, the purpose constraint is concerned with those personal 
exigencies that serve to direct the decision-maker to resolve the problem at hand. 
 
Hunter suggests that each of these three constraints operate together to restrict the 
way in which analogical reasoning operates in practice.32  It follows that an analogy 
should be recognised as being relatively poor by a decision-maker if it is made on the 
basis of purely attributional similarity.33  The “optimal level of representation will be 
that which maximises the degree of correspondence between causally relevant 
features of the analogues.”34  This is another way of stating that a better analogy is 
one which has relevance to the situation under investigation.35
 
The “Allegorical Continuum” 
According to cognitive science then, the most basic type of comparison, in terms of 
its concreteness, operates by mapping surface level attributes in both source and 
                                                 
30   Ibid at 1223-1224. 
31   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1226; & Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 3rd 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1990 at 87-88. 
32   Ibid at 1228. 
33   “Aristotle notes that a metaphor (sic) can go awry in at least two ways – it can be dull or it 
can be obscure – and that too much similarity contributes to the one problems, whereas too 
little contributes to the other.” Tourangeu, R & Sternberg, RJ, "Understanding and 
Appreciating Metaphors" (1982) 11 Cognition 203 at 208; & Holyoak, KJ & Thagard, P, 
"Analogical Mapping by Constraint Satisfaction" (1989) 13 Cognitive Science 295 at 302.   
34   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 6; and Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 
18 & 27 
84 target analogues.36  This type of comparison has been defined above as an analogy.  
Given that this comparison would be essentially cosmetic, it would probably also be 
relatively unsophisticated and therefore less predictively useful.37   
 
The second type of comparison maps similarities in the relational structures within 
the source and the target analogues.  These internal relational-similarities then form 
the basis of a somewhat more sophisticated analogical investigation than can be 
achieved by the purely attributional assessment.  As a simple example, consider the 
comparison of the human body to a machine.38  A machine can be said to comprise a 
system whereby inputs are processed to deliver an outcome.  The human body also 
processes inputs to deliver an outcome.  Note the comparative processing of input 
and the delivery of outcome in both models.  The human/machine analogy is capable 
of further refinement, but the analogy is based on internal relational similarities 
rather than mere attributional similarities. 
 
The third type of comparison is closest to the literary use of the term “metaphor” that 
I have chosen to equate to the use of the term metaphor for present purposes.  This 
type of metaphor is more figurative and more truly allegorical than the types of 
comparisons previously mentioned.  As such, it is potentially more didactic in terms 
                                                                                                                                          
35    Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, UK, 1990 at 87. 
36   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Analogical Problem Solving" (1980) 12 Cognitive Psychology 
306 at 350; and, Gentner, D, et al, "Metaphor Is Like Analogy" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The 
Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 
2001. 
37   Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 207-8.  This can be 
compared to the so-called “representativeness heuristic” which is “a characteristic judgement 
process in which small samples are often wrongly taken to be representative.” (Eisenberg, 
MA, "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461 at 1465). 
85 of conveying complex, multi-layered and even contradictory insights into both 
source and target.39  Consider for example Shakespeare’s exchange between Lord 
and Lady Macbeth following the murder of Duncan.40  In this scene the blood on 
their hands is metaphorically compared to the act of regicide itself.  So closely are 
the physical blood and the “bloody deed” allied in the conversation, that Lady 
Macbeth ends the exchange by making the well known metaphorical statement “A 
little water clears us of this deed”.41  Both the communicative strength within this 
elegant literary metaphor, and the cognitive constraints arising from it, are 
graphically illustrated later in the play when we see the now psychotic Lady Macbeth 
trying desperately to lift the stain of the deed from her hands long after the blood has 
gone.  Her frantic plea is: “What, will these hands ne’er be clean?”42  It is only at the 
most abstract level that such semantically distant notions can be compared in any 
meaningful sense.  And yet no-one would question the power of the metaphor to 
convey meaning. 
 
Of course, when taken too far the process of abstraction renders the metaphor 
deductively meaningless.  Consider the example of comparing a stray feral cat 
(target) with one’s pet dog (source).  If a metaphor (schema) is developed that can 
expressively accommodate both source and target, one might reduce the schema to 
“four-legged animals with a tail”.  The outcome of such an “investigation” would be 
                                                                                                                                          
38   Apologies to Descartes and de Condillac (Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) 
AI Magazine 11 at 13). 
39   Gentner, D, et al, "Metaphor Is Like Analogy" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical 
Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science, The MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001. 
40   See also the discussion of Shakespeare’s reference to the world as a stage in As You Like It 
(Joo, TW, "Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law" (2001) 
Research Paper 01-10 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum  at 5). 
41   Shakespeare, W Macbeth Act II, Scene II Line 83. 
86 that the target is a dog.  Within the confines of the schema as constructed and 
articulated, the outcome is totally accurate in theory but absolutely erroneous in 
reality.43  In order to counter the devaluing effect of logical fallacy which permeates 
the more abstract metaphorical comparisons, a schema must be constructed that 
adequately observes the tension between accurate identification of surface attributes 
and an abstraction of internal relational structures, so as to accommodate both the 
source and the target while at the same time retaining the capacity for insight. 
 
Cognitive science chooses to see past the literal absurdity of metaphors to explore 
the allegorical truth (or lack thereof) of the comparison being made.44  In this way 
the metaphor is viewed as a useful didactic, forcing the investigator to view both 
source and target analogues from a fresh perspective.  By a process of abstraction, 
the metaphor is reduced to more generalised terms allowing the development of a 
schema that will accommodate both source and target.    Such metaphorical 
comparisons are typically utilised for the purpose of insight rather than prediction.45   
 
For the purposes of the present investigation, the term analogy will be used where 
source and target enjoy a close semantic relationship and a predictive outcome is 
desired.  Metaphor on the other hand, will be used to designate a schema based 
                                                                                                                                          
42   Ibid Act V, Scene I Line 17. 
43    Tourangeu, R & Sternberg, RJ, "Understanding and Appreciating Metaphors" (1982) 11 
Cognition 203 at 208. 
44   Reference is often made in this context to the great insights gained through disparate, though 
inspirational metaphorical thinking such as “the heart is a pump” (Harvey); and “sound 
moves in waves, like water” (Vitruvius) (Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI 
Magazine 11 at 13); & Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the 
Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 at 
954. 
45   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1210. 
87 comparison between contextually disparate sources and targets for the purposes of 
insight rather than for predictive purposes.  The conception of schema46 can be 
diagrammatically expressed as follows: 
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Figure 1 
 
As is suggested by these diagrams, the richer or more apt the schema, the greater the 
utility of the analogy or metaphor.47  Where a posited solution to a novel problem is 
based on metaphorical comparison, the predictive value must be open to serious 
                                                 
46    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 336-8. 
47   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology  1 at 8.  “A ‘deep’ [metaphor] the sort that captures our admiration, is [a 
metaphor] between disparate situations in which the essential causal relations are 
maintained.”  Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 207. 
88 question given the necessary degree of abstraction required.48  Such a schema can be 
said to be relatively poor.  An apt analogy, on the other hand, should enjoy a higher 
predictive value due to its stronger contextual alignment with the novel analogue.49  
Unfortunately, as articulated above, the more abstract a schema becomes and the 
greater generality with which it is expressed, the less insight it may give the 
investigator trying to interpret novel phenomena due to its lower predictive utility.50
 
THE ROLE OF ANALOGY AND METAPHOR IN PROBLEM SOLVING 
Discovery and Justification  
One of the central debates concerning analogical legal reasoning is which part of the 
process is most analogy dependent.51  Cognitive scientists and legal logicians alike 
postulate that analogy plays an important function in the early (discovery) stages of 
the problem-solving process.52  On the other hand it is also postulated that analogy is 
principally of import when “justifying”, or giving reasons for reaching a decision.53  
                                                 
48   “(T)he basic problem in using an analogy between remote domains is to connect two bodies 
of information from disparate semantic contexts.” Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Analogical 
Problem Solving" (1980) 12 Cognitive Psychology 306 at 349. 
49   “There is an art to making apt, instructive, compelling analogies – as there is to making apt, 
instructive, compelling metaphors.” Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, 
Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard 
Law Review 923 at 964. 
50   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology  1 at 9; Tourangeu, R & Sternberg, RJ, "Understanding and Appreciating 
Metaphors" (1982) 11 Cognition 203 at 208. 
51   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 5. 
52    “(T)he logic of discovery roughly corresponds to that part of the legal decision-making 
process that can include judicial hunches, emotions, and personalities, as well as judicial 
knowledge of the law.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 
UCLA Law Review 833 at 839. 
53   “(T)he written opinion is a justification, a report of the justificatory procedure employed by 
the judge” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law 
Review 833 at 851 & 839.  See also the discussion of analogy in Kamm, FM, "Theory and 
Analogy in Law" (1996) 29 Arizona State Law Journal 405 at 412-8. 
89 Given that “(o)ne of the goals of reasoning is giving good reasons,”54 this debate 
could be argued to be peripheral to the current investigation.55
 
The significance of this issue for present purposes is that if experienced legal 
problem-solvers have a stored bank of “analogy schemas” in long-term memory, it 
will be these which direct (and therefore limit) the entire problem-solving process 
from the moment of initial thinking.56  As a result, the process would in a sense, be 
short-circuited in that a plausible outcome is deductively inferred based on 
preconceptions.  Justification in such a scenario is with reference to hardwired, 
experience-generated analogues.57  If, on the other hand, the legal problem-solver is 
more passively receptive to data without preordained analogy schemas, analogy will 
be of vital importance at all stages of the more heuristic problem-solving process.58  
                                                 
54    Farrar, JH & Dugdale, AM, Introduction to Legal Method, 3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, UK, 1990 at 88; & Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 
29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 834. 
55   “The role of analogy is both to aid in the selection from the possible outcomes and to justify 
the choice in the form of acceptable legal argument.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in 
Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 844; &  “(A)nalogical argument, both 
legal and nonlegal, is best explicated as – that is, analysed into – a sequence of reasoning 
steps, involving a stage of abductive discovery, a stage of confirmation or disconfirmation, 
and a stage of application.” Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and 
the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 
at 961.  See also Kamm, FM, "Theory and Analogy in Law" (1996) 29 Arizona State Law 
Journal 405 at 413-4. 
56    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 338; Golding, MP, 
"A Note on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law" in Aarino, A & MacCormick, 
DN, (Ed) Legal Reasoning, Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK, 1992 at 111. 
57    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 336-338; Golding, 
MP, "A Note on Discovery and Justification in Science and Law" in Aarino, A & 
MacCormick, DN, (Ed) Legal Reasoning, Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK, 1992 at 119.  As 
expressed in Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) 
Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, Montreal, Canada, 2001 at 582; “I suggest that this is a task that (probably) 
only lawyers with great experience in the sector can do well, but that even they are 
handicapped by the old, familiar models of corporate law.” 
58    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 344-345. 
90 The reality of course is that analogy is important at all levels of the legal problem-
solving process.59   
 
Empirical research strongly suggests that more experienced practitioners have a 
greater “schema-bank”60 on which to draw, and can rapidly access a plausible 
analogue based on familiar semantic retrieval cues.61  However, there is also clear 
empirical evidence that experienced practitioners, when faced with a novel problem 
situation, are quick to apply preconceived analogical schemas without necessarily 
considering their aptness to the new situation, or the potential richness of alternative 
analogues.62  The same empirical evidence indicates that less experienced 
practitioners are less inclined to refer to inapt analogues to novel problems, probably 
                                                 
59   “The role of analogy is both to aid in the selection from the possible outcomes and to justify 
the choice in the form of acceptable legal argument.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in 
Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 844; &  Golding, MP, "A Note on 
Discovery and Justification in Science and Law" in Aarino, A & MacCormick, DN, (Ed) 
Legal Reasoning, Dartmouth, Aldershot, UK, 1992.  Hunter’s consideration of this issue and 
its significance to pure deductive reasoning versus analogical reasoning in academic legal 
debate is highly recommended (Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in 
Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 1238-1250). 
60   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1; & Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, 
and the Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 353. 
61   “Analogy and precedent are the stuff of the law because they are the only form of reasoning 
left to the law when general philosophical structures and deductive reasoning give out, 
overwhelmed by the number of particular details.  Analogy is the application of a trained, 
disciplined intuition where the manifold of particulars is too extensive to allow our minds to 
work on it deductively.”  Fried, C, "The Artificial Reason of the Law Or: What Lawyers 
Know" (1981) 60 Texas Law Review 35 at 57 (italics added).  See also Kamm, FM, "Theory 
and Analogy in Law" (1996) 29 Arizona State Law Journal 405 at 417 “Mine is not an 
argument against employing theory and for merely relying on cases.  It is an argument for 
doing theory well, so that we do not generate overly-broad theory which carries with it 
incorrect implications.” 
62   “Research into the retrieval of analogues indicates that humans find retrieval of structural 
analogs [sic] very difficult and that they find analogs based on surface level features much 
easier to recall.”  Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 
50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197.  Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, 
Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 
313tiv at 344-345, 347-348 & 351-354; & Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 
106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 767-769. 
91 due to the lack of analogy-schema hardwiring.63  In order to maintain flexibility in 
legal analogical reasoning one therefore “must analyse competing analogies if one is 
seeking the best plausible justification.”64   
 
Prediction and Insight 
Why do we compare the novel with the familiar?  One reason is the search for a 
didactic that will shed new light onto the nature of both source and target analogue.  
Another reason is a desire to provide an hypothesis about a novel target analogue 
based upon what is known about a familiar source analogue.  As indicated above, a 
key issue in both situations is the quality or strength of the points of comparison.65  
This separate weighing of the “aptness” of the points which are mapped in any 
process of analogical problem solving is a crucial aspect of the process.66
 
                                                 
63    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 344-345. 
64   Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 
845 (emphasis added).  It should be conceded though that even a seemingly disinterested 
consideration of the most appropriate alternative hypotheses is itself open to unintentional 
biases and influences such as so called “compromise effects” and “contrast effects” (Kelman, 
M, et al, "Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making" (1996) 25(2) The Journal of Legal 
Studies 287 at 288-289. 
65   “The effectiveness of analogy is based on the relevance of the similarities, not the quantity of 
similarities.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law 
Review 833 at 853; & “Perhaps the single most important feature of argument by analogy is 
this: in order for an argument by analogy to be compelling – to have what I have called 
rational force – there must be sufficient warrant to believe that the presence of an 
‘analogised’ item of some particular characteristic or characteristics allows one to infer that 
presence in that item of some particular other characteristic.” Brewer, S, "Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy" 
(1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 at 965. 
66   “For example, the number of similarities between two situations is not necessarily relevant to 
that value of the analogy.  Two analogues can be similar in many respects, and yet one 
difference between them may destroy the value of the analogy …  Obviously, it is the 
relevance and significance, not just the quantity, of the similarities between two analogies 
that determine the worth of the analogy.” Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal 
Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 852; & Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical 
Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 743-746 & 773-781. 
92 As explained, models of comparison can often only survive rigorous empirical 
scrutiny if they are either sufficiently bare (or “analogical”), in which case their 
predictive value is highly questionable, or highly sophisticated (“metaphorical”), in 
which case they risk becoming abstracted into irrelevance.  A comparison which is 
more highly structured than a bare analogy based upon mere attributional analysis, 
but which avoids purely figurative metaphorical abstraction, is that which is most 
compelling.67  In other words, where possible, the most instructive analogy in 
developing theory to suit a novel problem is one which takes account of attributional 
similarities but also considers internal-relational similarities between source and 
target.68  As Joo has aptly stated: 
A structured analogy can be a useful heuristic.  It can generate hypotheses in an orderly 
fashion: a number of structured correspondences suggest a structured schema from which we 
can extrapolate further correspondences.  Figurative metaphors, however, lack a structure to 
guide the process of schema formation and exploitation.69
 
ANALOGY & METAPHOR IN LEGAL REASONING 
As already indicated, analogical and metaphorical thought are both widely evident in 
the context of problem-solving.70  In the words of one scholar, “the core activity of 
                                                 
67   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 6-8. 
68   Brewer, S, "Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
Argument by Analogy" (1996) 109(5) Harvard Law Review 923 at 965. 
69    Joo, TW, "Contract, Property and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law" (2001) 
Research Paper 01-10 Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum  at 15. 
70   Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 
844; and Lennie, I, "Managing without Management", PhD thesis, University of New South 
Wales, Sydney, 1997 at Chapter IV “Managing Metaphorically”.  In the broad context of 
legal reasoning, see Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" 
(2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 at 1229-1238. 
93 lawyers entails problem-solving and the making of decisions.”71  Legal problem-
solving is no exception, indeed it has been stated that; “Reasoning by analogy is the 
most prevalent form of legal reasoning.”72  Analogy is central to the doctrine of 
precedent as it is applied in the common law system when resolving case disputes,73 
resolving broad questions of jurisprudence,74 and in statutory interpretation.75
 
In a fairly recent Australian High Court negligence judgment, McHugh J made the 
following observations about the utility of developing law by analogy: 
Analogical reasoning therefore reduces the cost of decision-making and the chance of error. 
Where the background of legal decision-making is relatively fixed, the range of evidentiary 
materials is narrower than is usual where a case is to be decided by vague standards or 
relatively indeterminate principles. This reduces the cost of litigation and the cost per case of 
providing public courts. It also makes it easier for professional advisers to predict the outcome 
of litigation with the result that costly litigation can be avoided or, at worst, settled at an early 
stage when the relative strengths of the opposing cases become apparent. Where the 
                                                 
71    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 318. 
72   Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 
847.  See also Sherwin, E, "A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law" (1999) 66 
University of Chicago Law Review 1179; Coleman, CH, "Rationalising Risk Assessment in 
Human Subject Research" (2004) 46 Arizona Law Review 1 at 28. 
73   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1230; Fried, C, "The Artificial Reason of the Law Or: What Lawyers 
Know" (1981) 60 Texas Law Review 35 at 57; Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in Legal 
Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 847; and Sherwin, E, "A Defense of 
Analogical Reasoning in Law" (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 1179.  See also 
Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575 at 619 92 per Kirby J; “The genius of the 
common law derives from its capacity to adapt the principles of past decisions, by analogical 
reasoning, to the resolution of entirely new and unforeseen problems.” 
74   “Analogical reasoning is, of course, explicitly at the heart of much of legal reasoning about 
matters of doctrine and is the subject of significant jurisprudential debate.” Blasi, GL, "What 
Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory" 
(1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 356; Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: 
Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory Law Journal 1197 at 1231 and 
Coleman, CH, "Rationalising Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research" (2004) 46 
Arizona Law Review 1 at 28-40. 
94 background is relatively fixed, there is also less chance that appellate courts will take a 
different view of the material facts from that of the trial court, thus discouraging appeals and 
preventing the defeat of the expectations of the successful party at the trial.76
 
Relevant areas of settled jurisprudence could therefore provide a rich source of 
guidance in the exegesis of the jurisprudence of incorporated associations.  As 
alluded to by McHugh J in the above passage, this possibility gives hope both to the 
student of legal theory searching for certainty, and the legal practitioner seeking 
guidance and economy in the process of administering the law.   
 
So far as the current investigation is concerned, it is as well to note that in his 
cautionary paper Professor Greenfield observes that “metaphor drives much of the 
debate within corporate law jurisprudence and corporate law scholarship.”77  As has 
been indicated above metaphor can be a flawed basis upon which to generate sound 
legal theory if followed too slavishly.  Justice Benjamin Cardozo warned in the third 
decade of the last century that; “Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for 
starting as devices to liberate thought, they often end by enslaving it.”78  Brennan J 
(as he then was) of the Australian High Court was more expansive when stating that: 
                                                                                                                                          
75   Hunter, D, "Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law" (2001) 50(Fall) Emory 
Law Journal 1197 at 1233. 
76   Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 74 ALJR 1 at 15.  See also 
Sherwin, E, "A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law" (1999) 66 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1179 at 1186. 
77   Greenfield, K, "From Metaphor to Reality in Corporate Law" (2000) 2(1) Stanford Agora 59 
at 59. 
78   Berkey v Third Avenue Pty 244 NY 84 (1926) at 94-5 quoted in (1999) 11 BLR 259 at 259.  
DeMott has also observed that while “(r)easoning by analogy on the basis of observed 
similarities is, of course, a conventional source of insight … passing too quickly over 
dissimilarities leads to confusion, not insight.” (DeMott, DA, "Shareholders as Principals" in 
Ramsay, IM, (Ed) Key Developments in Corporate Law and Trust Law: Essays in Honour of 
Professor Harold Ford, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2002).  See also Greenfield, 
K, "From Metaphor to Reality in Corporate Law" (2000) 2(1) Stanford Agora 59 at 61;  
95 Analogical reasoning is the handmaid of strict logic in developing the common law …  When a 
legal rule or result is attached to certain relationships or phenomena, the perception of similar 
characteristics in another relationship or phenomenon leads to the attachment of a similar legal 
rule or result.  Unless the analogy is close, the applicability of the legal rule or analogy to the 
supposedly analogous relationship or phenomenon is doubtful.  It is fallacious to apply the 
same legal rule or to attribute the same legal result to relationships or phenomena merely 
because they have some common factors; the differences may be significant and may call for a 
different legal rule or result.  Judicial technique must determine whether there is a true 
analogy.79
 
This cautionary advice is echoed by Professor Dan-Cohen who suggests that 
simultaneously investigating multiple (as opposed to mixed) metaphors or analogies 
may be a way of overcoming some of the cognitive constraints and enlarge legal 
thought: 
Given the dubious status of metaphors as intellectual tools, even readers who agree that the 
person metaphor is inadequate and leads all too easily to unthinking anthropomorphism may 
doubt that legal thinking about organizations will be helped by instituting another metaphor in 
its place. 80
 
Expressing similar views, Professor Sunstein observes that: 
Analogical reasoning can go wrong when one case is said to be analogous to another on the 
basis of a unifying principle that is accepted without having been tested against other 
possibilities, or when some similarities between two cases are deemed decisive with 
insufficient investigation of relevant differences …  When these problems occur, the right 
response is to say that the court has not properly engaged in analogical reasoning.  It is a part of 
                                                 
79   Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 322. 
80   Dan-Cohen,  M,  Rights, Persons and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic 
Society, University of California, Berkeley, USA, 1986 at 41; and  “Although we have seen 
that every stage of a [sic] analogical argument need not be explicit or methodical to be useful, 
the role of analogy as justification is legitimate only if all the relevant analogies can be 
examined within the constraints of a legal opinion.” (Murray, JR, "The Role of Analogy in 
Legal Reasoning" (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 833 at 859); Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers 
Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) 
Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 358; and Markman, AB & Moreau, CP, "Analogy and 
Analogical Comparison in Choice" in Gentner, D, et al, (Ed) The Analogical Mind: 
Perspectives from Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 2001.  See also Lewis, 
CS, "Bluspels and Flalansferes" in Black, M, (Ed) The Importance of Language, Prentice 
96 the analogical method, as I understand it here, that judges must identify and test the possible 
available principles, and evaluate them against one another.81
 
As noted elsewhere, much scholarship has sought to chart a sure course through the 
terra incognita of incorporated associations based upon long experience of the 
familiar territory of company law.82  However, given that in ancient times terra 
incognita was usually identified with phrases such as “Here there be dragons”,83 it is 
well to proceed with caution.  On the specific question of the validity of analogising 
from company law into the incorporated associations context, Cooke J of the New 
Zealand High Court84 observed: 
The law or practice relating to limited liability companies is not necessarily a helpful analogy 
in approaching [incorporated society] cases.  The doctrine of ultra vires in company law was 
evolved mainly to protect investors and creditors.  The same considerations are not easily 
                                                                                                                                          
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, USA, 1962 at 46 “To have a choice of metaphors … is to know more 
than we know when we are the slaves of a unique metaphor.” 
81   Sunstein, CR, "On Analogical Reasoning" (1993) 106(3) Harvard Law Review 741 at 757.  
Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 381. 
82    See for example:  MFT(WA), The Associations Incorporation Act 1987:  Proposals for 
Amendment, Ministry of Fair Trading (Western Australia), Perth, May, 1998 at 22;  Fletcher, 
K, "Developing Appropriate Organisational Structures for Non-Profit Associations" in 
McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, LBC 
Information Services, North Ryde, 1996 at 12;  Sievers, AS, "What Is the Future for 
Honorary Directors and Committee Members? - Their Duties and Liabilities" in McGregor-
Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, LBC Information Services, 
North Ryde, 1996at 30;  Ford, HAJ, Halsbury's Laws of Australia, "435 Voluntary 
Associations", looseleaf, North Ryde, 1998, ; McAloon, PJ, "The Ultra Vires Rule with 
Regard to Companies Incorporated under the Companies Act 1955", Master of Laws thesis, 
Canterbury University, Christchurch, NZ, 1961 at Chapter VI “Ultra Vires In Other Bodies”; 
Riddle, MJ, "Incorporated Nonprofit Organizations in Alberta", Master of Laws thesis, 
University of Alberta, Edmonton, CA, 1988 at 190-3; and  Walker v Mt Victoria Residents 
Association Inc [1991] 2 NZLR 520 at 523, 524 & 526. 
83    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 316. 
84    Delivering judgment on behalf of the full bench, the other justices being Richardson, 
McMullin and Somers JJ and Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. 
97 transportable to cases where the raison d'être of an organization is not to make profits but to 
promote a certain activity.85  
 
It is clear that the trading company corporate form is a source analogue that can be 
readily applied to incorporated associations.  It is also clear that this source analogue 
is familiar to experienced legal problem solvers engaged in the analogical process 
with respect to the incorporated association as a novel corporate form.  The research 
considered above strongly suggests that such experienced practitioners may be 
disadvantaged by their very expertise.86  The consideration of a variety of alternative 
source analogues offers the potential to bring fresh insights and offer alternative 
hypothetical premises to the task of understanding incorporated associations in new 
and more meaningful ways.87
 
Given this background of learned commentary, it is both valid and indeed necessary 
to consider more than one possible analogy in the development of a jurisprudence of 
incorporated associations.  As noted above, the most orthodox analogy is the modern 
                                                 
85  Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159 at 178; see also 
McAloon, PJ, "The Ultra Vires Rule with Regard to Companies Incorporated under the 
Companies Act 1955", Master of Laws thesis, Canterbury University, Christchurch, NZ, 
1961.  On the utility of a multi-function Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), see Boland, P, 
"Enforcement of the Principles of Mutuality under the Corporations Act: Is It Possible 
without Legislative Intervention? (Part 2)" (2002) 54(5) Keeping Good Companies Journal of 
Chartered Secretaries Australia Ltd 277tiv.  On the practical difficulties arising from 
transplanting corporate law into the incorporated associations setting, see; McGregor-
Lowndes, M, National Scheme for Incorporated Associations, Canberra, 1993; and, Huntly, 
C, "Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for Officers of Incorporated 
Associations" (2000) 18(4) Company & Securities Law Journal 262 especially at 268-9. 
86    Blasi, GL, "What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the 
Functions of Theory" (1995) 45(3) Journal of Legal Education 313tiv at 347-8. 
87   Tomasic, R, et al, Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 
at 167. 
98 trading corporation, that is to say the company.88  This analogy will be explored in 
detail below.  However, I will also introduce and give critical consideration to three 
alternative analogies which are reasonably settled in our law, these being the 
charitable trust, the eleemosynary corporation and the closely held trading 
company.89  In providing a variety of alternative source analogies, it is hoped that 
enough evidence will be provided to either confirm or refute the primacy of the 
modern trading company as the preferred source analoge for incorporated 
associations.90
 
The Trading Company Paradigm 
Perhaps the most familiar and therefore most immediately compelling source of 
analogy for incorporated associations is the modern trading company.  Numerically, 
the vast majority of company incorporations involve small closely held corporations.  
For this reason, special consideration is given below to the closely held trading 
company.  However it must be stressed that the great bulk of corporate law 
scholarship is focussed on the large, publicly listed modern trading corporation.  It is 
therefore important to consider the nature of the large modern trading company as 
the most common scholarly articulation of the corporation.  It has been suggested 
that the law relating to the trading company has been refined close to the point of 
                                                 
88   For example, Sievers observes that “It has always been assumed that committee members of 
incorporated associations are in a similar position to company directors and owe similar 
fiduciary duties to the association although there is very little authority on this point.” 
(Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation 
Press, Annandale, 1996 at 121).  See also White, DJ, "The Law Relating to Associations 
Registered under 'the Incorporated Societies Act 1908'", Master of Laws Honours thesis, 
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, NZ, 1972 at 11. 
89   As I am concerned to make the findings of this thesis equally applicable to both Australia and 
New Zealand, the company limited by guarantee will not be resorted to as a potential source 
analogue. 
99 completion at the dawn of the third millennium.91  Whether this is indeed the case or 
not, the current dominant conception of the trading company’s most significant legal 
features has been conveniently summarised by Professor Hansmann in the following 
terms:92
1.  Full legal personality, including well-defined authority to bind the firm to contracts 
and to bond those contracts with assets that are the property of the firm as distinct 
from the firm’s owners, 
2.  Limited liability for owners and managers,  
3.  Shared “ownership” by investors of capital, 
4.  Delegated management under a board structure, and  
5.  Transferable shares. 
 
This summary of the characteristics of the modern trading company is a useful 
structure upon which to base a more detailed consideration.  To this list, I would add 
“raison d'être” on the basis that it has been judicially identified as a possible 
delineating feature as between incorporated associations and trading companies.   
Such a consideration of the trading company will then assist in evaluating the 
usefulness of the trading company as a legal analogy for the student of incorporated 
associations.  
                                                                                                                                          
90   Wishart,  DA,  "Resucitating  Popper: Critical Theory and Corporate Law" (1996) 3(1) 
Canberra Law Review 99. 
91   Hansmann, H & Kraakman, R, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000) Yale Law 
School Working Paper No 235; and NYU Law and Economics Working Paper No 013 Yale 
Law School Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper 
Series; and New York University Centre for Law and Business Working Paper Series. .  But 
note the thought provoking critique of this proposition in Cheffins, BR, "Corporate Law and 
Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link?" (2002) 25(2) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal  346; and the civil law informed insight provided by Stevens, D, "Framing an 
Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State and Market: Essays on 
Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Canada, 
2001 at 552-60. 
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Series; and New York University Centre for Law and Business Working Paper Series. at 1.  
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100  
Raison D'être 
It is generally accepted that the raison d'être of the modern trading company is 
something akin to the rather vague notion of “maximising shareholder wealth”.93  
The sufficiency of such an objective is of course debatable both normatively,94 and in 
terms of its particularity.95  However, leaving such questions to one side, given the 
abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires as it applies to trading companies,96 and the 
limited opportunity for shareholder involvement in company management, further 
consideration of the objectives of trading companies is probably not profitable.  The 
only exception to this proposition would presumably be the “No-Liability” 
company.97    
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97   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 112, but see ss 1311(1A), and 1324.  In practice, the sanctions 
for non-compliance are probably nominal (Ford, HAJ, et al, Ford's Principles of 
Corporations Law, 11th ed, Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at para 12.190-12.200). 
101 Full (and Separate) Legal Personality 
The current meaning attached to this characteristic of trading corporations is 
radically different from that which it originally connoted.98  As indicated in the 
previous chapter, this concept originally amounted to little more than legal 
“visibility” in the sense of the actor’s “personae”.99  Incorporation granted a group of 
individuals the ability to acquire, hold, enforce and dispose of legal rights and 
interests, and have legal claims enforced against it, all in the group name rather than 
the names of all the group members.  Nevertheless, the notion of the corporation 
being a legal entity that was entirely “separate” from the individual members took a 
long time to take root in the common law tradition.100
 
The development of concepts such as the trust101 and double entry bookkeeping102 
served to provide a logical basis for separating the legal and financial affairs of the 
commercial trading enterprise from those if its constituent members.  Such a 
conceptual framework also assisted in the articulation of what such separateness 
might mean to, and require of, the various participants in the group enterprise.  The 
modern trading company, with its origins in the joint stock companies of the 
                                                 
98   Lubasz, H, "The Corporate Borough in the Common Law of the Late Year-Book Period" 
(1964) 80 Law Quarterly Review 228; Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of 
Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62(1) Modern Law Review 32 at 42-5. 
99   See chapter 1 under the heading “Fiction/Concession” Theories. 
100   Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62(1) Modern 
Law Review 32 at 41-4. 
101   Cooke,  CA,  Corporation Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, UK, 1950 at 69-79 & 84-88; & Maitland, FW, "Trust and 
Corporation" in Fisher, HAL, (Ed) Fw Maitland, Collected Works, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK, 1911, 321 
102   Cooke,  CA,  Corporation Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, UK, 1950 at 46, 48 & 185. 
102 eighteenth century, can be traced directly back to the partnership business form.103  It 
was not until 1897 and the case of Salomon’s boot-making business104 that limited 
liability as a corporate characteristic took on its modern form. 
 
The most recent development with respect to this characteristic of the trading 
corporation has been the abolition of the so-called doctrine of ultra vires and the 
statutory imbuing of trading companies with the full legal personality of a natural 
person.105  The effect of this development has been to allow the unhindered 
management of trading corporations by those to whom the constituent documents 
grant management power.  Important exceptions to such full and free legal 
personality include the Australian No-Liability company innovation which is 
permitted only to operate as a mining company;106 the company “Limited by 
Guarantee” which, in certain circumstances is not permitted to issue dividends to 
shareholders;107 and, “Proprietary Limited” companies which are limited to 50 non-
employee shareholders.108
 
The consequences of this corporate attribute are profound.109  All corporate property 
and income is legally and (subject to any trusts), equitably owned by the company 
                                                 
103   Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62(1) Modern 
Law Review 32 at 38-41. 
104   Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
105   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 124. 
106   Ibid s 112. 
107   Ibid s 150(1). 
108   Ibid s 113(1). 
109   Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62(1) Modern 
Law Review 32 at 42. 
103 itself and not by any of its corporate constituents.110  The corporation per se111 will 
bear sole direct liability for all of its legal actions including the liability for taxation. 
 
Limited Liability for “Owners” and Managers 
Limited liability is one of the most prized attributes of a trading company.  However, 
in Australia it is probably more correct to speak of a liability continuum.  Provision 
is made under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)112 for the incorporation of companies 
where shareholders have no liability,113 limited liability or unlimited liability114 for 
the debts of the trading company.  The New Zealand Companies Act 1993 (NZ)115 
allows for the incorporation of limited and unlimited liability companies only.  The 
notion of an incorporated trading enterprise offering limited liability to its constituent 
members has been influenced greatly by two pre-existing legally recognised 
relational forms.  As indicated above, one of these is the trust, with its separation of 
legal and beneficial ownership, discretionary trustee supervision and enforceable 
fiduciary obligations owed to beneficiaries.  The other relational form that proved 
influential in the development of the modern trading corporation was the 
partnership.116  This in turn is a creature of both agency and contract law. 
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Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403 at 423. 
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104 While the legal affairs of members of a corporation have always been treated as 
being separate from those of the corporation in the first instance, this separation did 
not always extend to a limitation of personal liability.  Where a corporation could not 
satisfy the claims of its creditors from available corporate property, any outstanding 
corporate debts could be satisfied by means of an enforced levy on corporate 
members.117  This several liability was limited only to the extent of the members’ 
own property.  Thus can be seen the influence of partnership law on the corporate 
form.   
 
Law and economics theorists postulate that the application of limited liability to 
shareholders was necessary for the development of modern securities markets.   
Without limited and definable levels of risk exposure, each individual shareholder’s 
personal risk from investing in a given corporation would be a factor of their 
personal wealth, as in the case of partnerships.  This would make shares less readily 
transferable in practical terms and discourage securities trading.118
 
Additional evidence of the influence of partnership law can be seen in that corporate 
controllers such as directors were bound to follow the corporation’s constituent 
documents in the same way that partners are required to comply with the terms of the 
partnership agreement.  Where directors acted within the terms of the constituent 
documents, their actions effectively bound the corporation and not themselves 
personally in the first instance.  This is directly analogous to the situation where the 
properly authorised acts of a partner will bind the partnership generally, except of 
                                                 
117   Salmon v The Hamborough Company (1671) 1 Ch Cas 204; 22 ER 763.  
105 course, that the directors unlike the partner in this example are not usually personally 
liable. 
 
Principles of trust law have also been influential in the development of the trading 
corporation with respect to limited liability.  For instance, the beneficiaries of a trust 
who have a mere expectation of future entitlements and who also have no trustee role 
will not be personally liable for any of the liabilities of the trust.119  This is somewhat 
analogous to the position of modern investor-shareholders who do not participate in 
corporate management.   
 
Shared “Ownership” by Investors of Capital 
There can be no doubt that shareholders are owners of shares.120  Try to build from 
this bald assertion, however, and investigate what a “share” might be,121 or how 
exactly shareholders relate to a typical large public trading company, and one is soon 
caught in an intellectual quagmire.122  It is difficult to find support for the notion that 
corporate members might “own” a corporation in the way one “owns” other forms of 
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Chatswood, 2003 at 502-21.  (But note the Trustee’s right of indemnity in the complicating 
situation of deficient trust assetsDal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in 
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106 real or personal property.123  There was at one time a dominant theory of corporate 
structure that viewed the shareholders in general meeting as constituting the 
company, and that this body engaged a board of directors to do the bidding of the 
general meeting under a principal-agent type relationship.124  While this partnership-
type agency theory held sway, it could be said that shareholders were equitably 
possessed of a share in the company in the same way as partners in a firm.125 This 
theory lost most of its support in the common law world in the first half of the 
twentieth century.126   
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39; Black, BS, "Corporate Law and Residual Claimants" (2001) Stanford Law School John 
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permission of Professor Black); Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the 
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403; Blair, MM, "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law" (2001) Research Paper No 
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107 What I have in the previous chapter termed “narrow form organic theory” came to 
replace the agency-based theory.127  To recap, this form of organic theory stipulates 
that the board of directors and members in general meeting represent two separate 
“organs” of the trading corporation.  The board of directors are typically delegated 
full management powers amounting to complete control over corporate assets.128  
Once this arrangement is established, shareholders cannot, without amending the 
corporate constitution, interfere with the management of the company or otherwise 
assert actual control over corporate assets.129  This means that the key indicium of 
“ownership”, namely the element of control or the ability to freely deal with property 
without impediment, resides not with the shareholders of trading corporations, but 
with directors.130  Shareholders have therefore come to be characterised in more 
recent times as “functionless investors”131 or mere “rentiers of capital”.132  As one 
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108 author has observed; “As their ‘ownership’ rights were steadily eroded, shareholders 
‘surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations’.”133
 
In addition, where directors do not comply with the constituent documents of the 
trading corporation, there was a time when such activity could result in the 
corporation being wound up, or at the very least have the actions declared ultra vires 
and set aside.134  The combined abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires (discussed in 
the previous chapter) and the statutory modification of so-called “derivative actions” 
by shareholders has even watered down the rights of shareholders to enforce the 
terms of their statutory contract with the company.135  At the same time the 
emergence of the so-called “indoor management rule” has resulted in the residual 
supervisory powers of shareholders being further eroded.136
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109  
Nevertheless, shareholders (or at least the majority of them) do collectively retain 
certain unique powers in the nature of “ownership rights”.  Generally speaking, these 
ownership rights cannot be exercised individually but need to be exercised through 
meetings and votes of the shareholding cohort.137  This “sharing” of ownership rights 
is an important characteristic of the modern trading corporation.138  In most cases, 
majority decisions will bind the group.  However, at common law the members of a 
corporation can only by unanimous consent effect particular decisions139 such as to 
wind the entity up, as in the case of the beneficiaries of a trust.140  Statute has 
modified this position to reflect the majority-rule perspective.141  In the event of a 
winding up, any surplus on liquidation is returned to the shareholders in a type of 
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110 final capital “dividend”.  This ultimate entitlement is very much in the nature of an 
ownership right.142   
 
Residual property rights are stressed as a major indicium of ownership by 
contractarian corporate theorists.  These rights are given as the justification for the 
unique residual power which is exercised by shareholders over trading 
corporations.143  Should a corporation become insolvent many of the ownership 
rights attributed to shareholders including the power to wind the company up, are 
lost to the shareholders, and are exercised instead by creditors.144  That creditors and 
other corporate “stakeholders” have a basis on which to assert moral and legal rights 
with respect to corporations is now widely accepted.  Why preference should be 
given to shareholders over other corporate constituents by the existing legal 
framework is far less unanimously agreed.  Indeed, the fractured nature of corporate 
ownership rights has caused one communitarian scholar to observe that; “When 
property rights have been broken up in this way, trying to identify one party as the 
‘owner’ is neither meaningful nor useful”.145  The notion of shareholders as the sole 
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111 repository of “residual property interests” has even been criticised from within the 
contractarian paradigm.146
 
A persuasive reason propounded by legal historicists for the identification of 
shareholders as the legitimate repository of residual ownership rights is the influence 
of the ancient usury laws, which delineated between capital (productive) financing 
and money (unproductive) financing.147  This has a strong resonance with the 
predominant culture of English common law.  As indicated in the previous chapter, 
communitarian theory strenuously denies that shareholders possess unique and 
exclusive claims to “ownership” of corporations and any special status which might 
follow. 
 
Delegated Management Under a Board Structure 
The application of this purported corporate characteristic can only be said with any 
certainty to apply to the large bureaucratic organisations such as the larger 
proprietary companies, listed and unlisted public companies.148  Smaller proprietary 
companies are more likely to be owned and managed by more patently homogenous 
groups of individuals.  The extent to which the idea of management being in any 
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112 sense “delegated” in such situations must therefore be discounted.  Interestingly, it is 
in precisely such situations that the shareholders could be said to be the “owners” of 
the corporation.  This will be discussed further with respect to closely held 
corporations below. 
 
As I have already observed, the recognition of the board of directors as an 
independent “organ” of the corporation is one of the most significant modern 
developments in our corporate law.149  At the same time the indoor management rule 
has become pre-eminent, while the ultra vires and constructive notice doctrines have 
receded into the background.150  One highly significant outcome of this trend has 
been that the status of shareholders has been transformed from being ultimate 
corporate controllers, to being mere “investors” with an expectancy as to future 
returns.  Concomitantly, directors can perhaps best be described as “autonomous 
fiduciaries” rather than as “agents.151  Such legal or equitable duties as are required 
of directors are not owed to corporate constituents, but to the corporate entity 
                                                 
149    Blair, MM, "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law" (2001) Research Paper No 
281818 GU Law Centre 2001 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory 
Law and Public Law and Legal Theory at 8-10; and Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director 
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington 
University Law Quarterly 403 at 424.. 
150    Blair, MM, "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law" (2001) Research Paper No 
281818 GU Law Centre 2001 Working Paper Series in Business, Economics, and Regulatory 
Law and Public Law and Legal Theory  at 8-9. 
151   Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403 at 423; DeMott, DA, 
"Shareholders as Principals" in Ramsay, IM, (Ed) Key Developments in Corporate Law and 
Trust Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Harold Ford, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2002 at 34; Blair, MM, "Directors Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language 
Matters" (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 885 at 897-8. 
113 itself.152  The influence of the trust in the development of corporate law theory can 
readily be identified in this trend.153
 
The influence of the trust can also be observed in the readiness of the courts to hold 
directors to similar fiduciary duties as trustees in the discharge of their office.154  
Nevertheless this is also an important point of differentiation between corporation 
and trust.  Implicit in the fiduciary position of the company director is the tension 
between conservative fidelity on the one hand, and the more highly valued 
entrepreneurial risk taking and profit maximising business judgement on the other.155  
                                                 
152   Hence the so-called “Proper-Plaintiff Rule” (Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 
189); Nicoll, G, "The Changing Face of the 'Company as a Whole' and Directors' 
Responsibilities to Members in the Exercise of Management Powers" (1994) 4 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 287 at 288; Keay, A, "The Directors' Duty to Take into Account 
the Interests of Company Creditors: When Is It Triggered?" (2001) 25(2) Melbourne 
University Law Review 315 at 315; Valentine, R, "The Director-Shareholder Fiduciary 
Relationship: Issues and Implications" (2001) 19 Company & Securities Law Journal 92 at 
107-11; and Sarra, J, "Shareholders as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada 
Business Corporations Act" (2003) 39 Canadian Business Law Journal 52. 
153    Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at Chapter 23 “Duties, Powers and Rights of Trustees; and, Evans, M, Equity 
and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at Chapter 18 “The Duties and 
Powers of Trustees”. 
154   See Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at 617-48; Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2003 at 473-499; Blair, MM, "Team Production Theory and Corporate Law" 
(2001) Research Paper No 281818 GU Law Centre 2001 Working Paper Series in Business, 
Economics, and Regulatory Law and Public Law and Legal Theory at 9; and Blair, MM & 
Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board" (2001) 
79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403 at 424.  The extent to which this proposition 
can be supported has been questioned by Ireland, P, "Company Law and the Myth of 
Shareholder Ownership" (1999) 62(1) Modern Law Review 32 at 47-52. 
155   Eisenberg, MA, "An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance" (1993) 48 The 
Business Lawyer 1271 at 1280-4; Black, BS, "The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside 
Directors" (2001) Working Paper No 219 Stanford Law School John M Olin Program in Law 
and Economics  especially at 14-8; and Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and 
the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law 
Quarterly  403 at 428; Valentine, R, "The Director-Shareholder Fiduciary Relationship: 
Issues and Implications" (2001) 19 Company & Securities Law Journal 92; Blair, MM, 
"Directors Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters" (2003) 38 Wake Forest 
Law Review 885 at 900-1.  Business judgement as an important qualifier to the duties owed 
by directors is of course a relatively recent innovation in Australia.  The development of 
directors duties prior to this innovation is summarized excellently in Sievers, AS, "Farewell 
to the Sleeping Director - the Modern Judicial and Legislative Approach to Directors' Duties 
of Care, Skill and Diligence" (1993) 21 Australian Business Law Review 111tiv. 
114 As is discussed below in connection with charitable trusts, such a tension is not a 
characteristic of a trustee.   
 
The influence of partnership law can be observed in that (while ultra vires is no 
longer an issue of significance in our law of trading corporations) members can 
theoretically bring an action against the company where directors fail to comply with 
the terms of the “statutory contract” which, in part, takes the form of the corporate 
constitution.156  This is (imperfectly) analogous to the situation where partners are 
contractually bound by the terms of the partnership agreement. 
 
The importance of realistic accountability mechanisms over the conduct of directors 
as corporate controllers is stressed by most scholars in the interests of efficiency.157  
The nature and extent of such accountability mechanisms and the identity of those 
parties with responsibility for their maintenance and implementation is at the heart of 
modern corporate governance scholarship.158  While opinions may vary on the best 
mix of governance mechanisms, few would argue with the premise that managers 
                                                 
156   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140.  See also Pt 2F.1A especially ss 236-237.  Note also the 
importance of the appearance of ultimate control over management indicated in the 
requirement for shareholders to meet.  Simmonds, RL, "Why Must We Meet?  Thinking 
About Why Shareholder Meetings Are Required" (2001) 19(8) Company & Securities Law 
Journal 506 at 515; and Nicoll, G, "The Changing Face of the 'Company as a Whole' and 
Directors' Responsibilities to Members in the Exercise of Management Powers" (1994) 4 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 287. 
157   Eisenberg, MA, "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461 
at 1471-4; Black, BS, "Shareholder Passivity Reexamined" (1990) 89 Michigan Law Review 
520 at 526-30; Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of 
the Corporate Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403; Simmonds, 
RL, "Why Must We Meet?  Thinking About Why Shareholder Meetings Are Required" 
(2001) 19(8) Company & Securities Law Journal 506 at 514-6. 
158   Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403; and Farrar, JH, Corporate 
Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2001 
at 165-202.  On the governance implications of corporate debt see Simmonds, RL, Corporate 
115 “should be held accountable precisely because they are managing assets that are not 
their own and because they do not personally bear all of the costs of their 
decisions.”159  However, there is a pronounced circularity in corporate law given that 
the corporation for whom directors manage is itself managed by the directors.  This 
circularity is underscored by the so-called “proper plaintiff rule”.160
 
The issue of management supervision is one of, if not the most researched in 
corporate law.  As indicated in the previous chapter, an entire school of contractarian 
corporate law theory has developed to deal with the particular problems associated 
with the so-called “separation of ownership and control”.161  A number of scholars 
have suggested that the principal reason why corporate regulation of managerial 
conduct has been singularly ineffective over the past two decades is its loss of focus 
on the fiduciary principles borrowed from trust law.162
 
Transferable Shares 
This is an aspect of trading corporations with origins in partnership law.  Subject to 
the terms of the partnership agreement, a partner is usually permitted to transfer their 
                                                                                                                                          
Debt and Corporate Governance: A (Preliminary) Framework for Analysis, Prospect Media 
Pty Ltd, Australian National University, 1999 generally. 
159   Blair, MM, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First 
Century, The Brookings Institution, Washington, USA, 1995 at 227. 
160   This highlights the need for “mandatory rules” dealing with directors being a matter for 
corporate law (Eisenberg, MA, "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1461). 
161   See the discussion of “agency theory” under the heading “Contractarian Theories” in chapter 
1. 
162    Smith, TA, "The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of 
Fiduciary Duty" (1999) 98(1) Michigan Law Review 214; Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director 
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington 
University Law Quarterly 403 at 438-44; Valentine, R, "The Director-Shareholder Fiduciary 
Relationship: Issues and Implications" (2001) 19 Company & Securities Law Journal 92; 
116 economic interest in the partnership to another individual.  Constitutional restrictions 
on the transferability of shares in proprietary companies and some public companies 
are commonplace.  However, the proposition holds true that shares in trading 
corporations have traditionally been transferable.  Indeed this is a prerequisite to 
eligibility for listing on the stock exchange.163   
 
The Closely Held Company 
As identified above, the law relating to the large modern trading corporation is based 
on key structural characteristics that have been said to have been refined close to 
perfection.164  However, it is generally accepted that most company incorporations 
involve small closely-held companies.165  There is also a considerable body of 
                                                                                                                                          
Blair, MM, "Directors Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters" (2003) 38 
Wake Forest Law Review 885 at 905-8. 
163   ASX Listing Rule 8.10. 
164   Hansmann, H & Kraakman, R, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000) Yale Law 
School Working Paper No 235; and NYU Law and Economics Working Paper No 013 Yale 
Law School Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper 
Series; and New York University Centre for Law and Business Working Paper Series. .  As 
most of the scholarship in this area originates in the United States, a number of scholars 
question the extent to which it is capable of translation into other national settings (For an 
excellent summary, see Cheffins, BR, "Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A 
Darwinian Link?" (2002) 25(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 346). 
165   Tomasic, R, et al, Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 
at 171; and Lipton, P & Herzberg, A, Understanding Company Law, 11th ed, Thompson 
Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2003 at 74 (“Proprietary companies are by far the most popular type 
of company. They outnumber public companies by a ratio of approximately 50 to 1.”)   
Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and Close Corporation Appraisal" (2001) 12 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 165 at 176, “It is well documented that the proportion of closely-
held corporations to all companies is very high. For example, the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry has recently stated that, in the United Kingdom, “over 70% of companies have 
only one or two shareholders. Some 90% have fewer than five shareholders.” Based on a 
small-scale survey, the DTI found that a significant proportion of those companies would 
have “complete identity of directives and shareholders”.” Dugan, R, et al, Closely Held 
Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, NZ, 2000 at 22 “It is 
estimated that over 90% of the companies registered under the 1955 [New Zealand] Act were 
private companies.”; and at 3 “Closely-held companies are different from other corporate 
entities. First, the sheer number of closely-held companies gives them an economic and 
social significance. A sample of 100 companies registered under the 1993 Act indicates that 
86% of the 200,000 registered companies in New Zealand have only one or two members, 
and 95% have fewer than five members.”  It appears also that closely-held companies 
“comprise the vast majority of corporations in the United States.” (Hochstetler, WS & 
117 literature that indicates that small closely-held companies, while exhibiting the same 
structural qualities as large modern trading corporations, do present certain specific 
theoretical problems and issues.166  Firstly however, I must define what I mean by a 
“small closely-held company” in this context.  Opinions on this matter differ.167  In 
Australia, under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 112 & 113 a “proprietary 
company” structure is an incorporation option for a company which is limited by 
shares, or unlimited, with a share capital having no more than 50 non-employee 
shareholders (s 113).  In addition, proprietary companies are not permitted to engage 
in any activity that would require the preparation of a prospectus.  That is to say, 
there are limitations on the company’s ability to issue securities on the primary 
market. 
 
In New Zealand, the current Companies Act 1993 (NZ) does not provide for 
differentiated classes of company.  However, its predecessor in time, the Companies 
Act 1955 (NZ) (“1955 Act”), did so provide.  Under New Zealand’s 1955 Act 
                                                                                                                                          
Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical Study: Special Close 
Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 10 Journal of 
Corporation Law 849 at 853; and the situation is the same in Canada (Sarra, J, "Shareholders 
as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada Business Corporations Act" (2003) 39 
Canadian Business Law Journal 52 at 55 “Canadian corporations are primarily closely held, 
even when publicly traded.”).  See also Henning, J, "Company Law for the New Millennium: 
"Think Small First" (Editorial)" (2003) 24(12) Company Lawyer 353 at 353. 
166    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10  Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 852 & 865; Eisenberg, MA, "The Structure of 
Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461; Ribstein, LE, "The Closely Held 
Firm: A View from the United States" (1994) 19(4) Melbourne University Law Review 950; 
Freedman, J, "Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms" (2000) 63(3) 
Modern Law Review 317; Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and Close Corporation 
Appraisal" (2001) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 165; Henning, J, "Company Law 
for the New Millennium: "Think Small First" (Editorial)" (2003) 24(12) Company Lawyer 
353 and Gray, WD, "Corporations as Winners under Cbca Reform" (2003) 39 Canadian 
Business Law Journal 4. 
167    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10  Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 852, 867 & 877-85; Eisenberg, MA, (Ed) 
118 provision existed for the formation of so-called “private companies”.  This allowed 
for a company consisting of at least two, but not more than 25, members to be able to 
form a private company.  Both the 1955 Act in New Zealand, and the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) in Australia, contained and contain respectively special provision for 
small closely held companies.  In the United States, the Model Statutory Close 
Corporations Supplement to the Model Business Corporations Act allows168 for 
specific incorporation of closely-held companies by 50 or fewer shareholders.169  
This restriction on the numbers of shareholders is widely regarded as the most 
significant defining feature of the closely-held company.170
 
The consequence of the small shareholder cohort which is evident in small closely-
held corporations is that there is often a strong positive correlation between the 
membership of the board of directors and the shareholders’ register.  Indeed this 
could be said to be a defining quality of truly closely-held corporations or 
companies.171  Taking each of the characteristics of the trading company that were 
identified above in turn, I will now consider how each applies, or fails to apply, with 
regard to closely-held companies. 
                                                                                                                                          
Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Cases and Materials, 8th ed, Foundation 
Press, New York, USA, 2000 at 338. 
168   At s 3. 
169   Eisenberg,  MA,  (Ed)  Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Statutes, Rules, 
Materials and Forms, 2003 ed, Foundation Press, New York, USA, 2003 at 983. 
170    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 879-81. 
171   Professor Eisenberg has defined the closely held corporation as “corporations that have a 
small number of shareholders, most of whom either participate in or directly monitor 
corporate management.”  (Eisenberg, MA, "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 
Columbia Law Review 1461 at 1463).  See also Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory 
Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or 
Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 852 & 
865. 
119  
Raison D'être 
As indicated above the raison d'être of a large public trading corporation is to 
maximise shareholder value (wealth). This is a very broad and general corporate 
purpose and is very much in line with the proposition that modern trading 
corporations have the full legal personality of a natural person.  As I have already 
indicated, this is also consonant with the trend of modern company law, which has 
seen the abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires172 and a decline in the amount of 
direct influence that may be exercised on directors by shareholders. 
 
Whether or not the same can be said to be true of small closely-held companies is a 
point of some conjecture.173  As noted above, directors of large trading companies 
look to the corporate constitution and the relevant statute for justification of the very 
wide discretionary powers of management that are concentrated in their hands.174  
However, as discussed below175 the literature indicates that these may not be the only 
sources of legitimacy for the authority (and any restrictions on authority) of directors 
of closely-held companies.176
 
                                                 
172   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 2B; and Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 16.   
173    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 855 & 901-4. 
174   Blair, MM & Stout, LA, "Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate 
Board" (2001) 79(2) Washington University Law Quarterly 403 at 424; Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) s 198A; and, Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 128.  Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter 
Syndicate Ltd v Cuninghame [1902] 2 Ch 34; and, John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw 
[1935] 2 KB 113. 
175   See the discussion at the heading “Delegated Management” below. 
176    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 856-9. 
120 Full Legal (and Separate) Personality  
As already mentioned, all companies in Australia and New Zealand have the full 
natural legal personality of a natural person.177  In addition, since at least 1897 all 
companies (whether large or closely-held) have as a matter of law been held to be 
legal entities separate from their shareholders or directors.178  This, however, has to 
be read in light of the fact that, in the case of a small closely-held company, a 
specific shareholder agreement may exist, having contractual effect between 
shareholders in their capacity as shareholders and also in their capacity as 
directors.179  An established line of authority180 indicates that shareholders can sue to 
enforce their rights as shareholders under the “statutory contract” provided at 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140.181  However courts are reluctant to enforce 
purely personal rights in the hands of shareholders on the basis of a corporate 
constitution.182  Courts have instead allowed shareholders to enforce such generic 
rights as, for instance, the right to vote,183 the right to participate in regularly 
                                                 
177   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 2B; and Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 16. 
178   Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; and Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 
12. 
179    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10  Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 865.  But see Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, 
"Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation 
Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 10 Journal of Corporation Law 
849 at 856-9. 
180   See Lipton, P & Herzberg, A, Understanding Company Law, 11th ed, Thompson Lawbook 
Co, Sydney, 2003 at 96-9; and Ford, HAJ, et al, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, 11th 
ed, Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 572-6. 
181   The Companies Act 1993 (NZ) eschews the statutory contract model but does leave room for 
extensive shareholder agreements as separate binding contracts (Dugan, R, et al, Closely 
Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, NZ, 2000 at 
Chapter 9). 
182   E.g.: Eley v Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co (1875) 1 Ex D 20; and Bailey v 
NSW Medical Defence Union Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 1698.  But see Milfull v Terranora Lakes 
Country Club Ltd [2002] FCA 178. 
183   Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70.   
121 constituted and properly conducted meetings184 etc. 
 
As a consequence, in most countries185 the practice has grown up whereby 
shareholders of closely-held corporations often execute a separate shareholder 
agreement which binds shareholders and directors in an enforceable contract under 
general contract law principles to observe certain forms of conduct in the discharge 
of their various duties and functions.186
 
This shareholder agreement is very much in the nature of a partnership agreement.187  
This is one point at which one must accept the close correlation between the structure 
and conduct of closely-held corporations and the structure and conduct of 
partnerships.  Of course, this is not without its problems given the fact that a 
partnership is not viewed as a separate legal entity.  For example, the similarity 
between closely-held corporations and partnerships has led to occasional lifting of 
the corporate veil in order to ascertain whether or not personal liability for various 
                                                 
184   Efstathis v Greek Orthodox Community of St George (1988) 6 ACLC 706. 
185   Dugan, R, et al, Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd, 
Auckland, NZ, 2000 at Chapter 9; and Eisenberg, MA, The Structure of the Corporation: A 
Legal Analysis, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, USA, 1976 at Chapter 2. 
186    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 854, 856-77 & 904-10; and Eisenberg, MA, The 
Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, USA, 
1976 at Chapter 2. 
187    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 905.  See Eisenberg, MA, (Ed) Corporations and 
Other Business Organizations: Cases and Materials, 8th ed, Foundation Press, New York, 
USA, 2000 at 338-40; and Lipton, P & Herzberg, A, Understanding Company Law, 11th ed, 
Thompson Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2003 at 47. 
122 actions should apply to individual directors or shareholders.188  It is well settled that 
personal liability may attach to individual partners of a partnership for unauthorised 
or fraudulent acts or acts that are committed in breach of partnership fiduciary duties.  
This has some similarity to  the situation where the authority delegated to directors of 
a closely-held corporation may be modified, restricted or otherwise circumscribed 
under the terms of both the corporate constitution and any shareholder agreement 
that might be executed outside of the corporate constitution.189  A breach of such 
provisions would open the possibility for recovery from the director in breach by 
either their fellow board members or shareholders depending on the terms of such 
agreements and restrictions. 
 
However, for present purposes it is sufficient to stress the fact that any shareholder 
agreement in addition to the corporate constitution, or replaceable rules, may provide 
for restrictions or limitations on the powers of directors to manage the business of the 
company.190  Such an agreement may also bind all of the shareholders and directors 
to a course of corporate action, or a nature of corporate business which is 
contractually binding on all parties notwithstanding any judicial policy regarding a 
corporate constitution.  This is in sharp contradistinction to the state of affairs 
pertaining to large public companies where restrictions that may be placed on the 
                                                 
188   Re Darby [1911] 1 KB 95; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch 935; Creasey v 
Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 3,052; and Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper 
(1981) 148 CLR 337. 
189    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 904-10. 
190   Dugan, R, et al, Closely Held Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd, 
Auckland, NZ, 2000 at Chapter 9. 
123 discretion of directors are notoriously difficult to enforce.191  This is a strong point of 
similarity between the trading corporation and the trust as they are both juridically 
conceptualised.  There is abhorrence in the common law tradition of permitting the 
fettering of discretion with respect to trust-like powers.192
 
Limited Liability  
It is significant to note that in many cases all or a substantial proportion of the 
personal assets of individual shareholders will have been invested into the small 
closely-held corporation.193  As a consequence, the failure of the company will also 
often entail personal bankruptcy.  This combined with the fact that most lending 
institutions would require personal guarantees from shareholders or directors of 
closely-held companies, allowing recourse to the personal assets of these 
shareholders or directors, compromises the effect of the limited liability status of 
small closely-held corporations in practice.194
 
                                                 
191   See Lipton, P & Herzberg, A, Understanding Company Law, 11th ed, Thompson Lawbook 
Co, Sydney, 2003 at Chapter 17.  Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Ltd v 
Cuninghame; John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw; NMRA v Parker (1986) 4 ACLC 609; 
and, Strong v J Brough & Son (Strathfield) Pty Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 1018.  The subsequent 
potential for judicial discretion to create undesireable uncertainty in this area is addressed in 
Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 856-60. 
192   See Dal Pont GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at 626-7; and, Ford HAJ, et al, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law, 11th 
ed, Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at para 8.290-8.340.  My thanks to Dr Kieth Fletcher for 
kindly reminding me about this important point of comparison. 
193   Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and Close Corporation Appraisal" (2001) 12 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 165. 
194   Simmonds, RL, Corporate Debt and Corporate Governance: A (Preliminary) Framework for 
Analysis, Prospect Media Pty Ltd, Australian National University, 1999 at 86; and Tomasic, 
R, et al, Corporations Law in Australia, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 at 170. 
124 There are also compelling arguments questioning the suitability of this corporate 
attribute for small trading enterprises.195  The potential vulnerability of so-called 
“involuntary creditors” or tort victims of closely-held company activities is 
particularly in issue.  The core question is the possible link between potential 
personal liability and risk-taking on the part of closely held company shareholders 
and managers.196
 
Shared Ownership by Investors  
By definition small closely-held corporations are financed and “owned” (in the 
ambiguous sense of share ownership discussed above) by employees or directors 
rather than by investors.  As indicated in the previous paragraph, this often means 
that all or a significant portion of the personal assets of individual shareholders are 
vested in the small closely-held corporation.197  This creates a number of problems 
which are exacerbated in many cases by the provisions of the corporate law in a 
particular jurisdiction and also by the existence of any shareholder agreement. 
 
Given the restrictions which may exist on the entry and exit of capital investors in 
small closely held companies (both constitutionally and in terms of a separate 
shareholder agreement) there is a pronounced lack of liquidity of share ownership in 
                                                 
195   Freedman, J, "Limited Liability: Large Company Theory and Small Firms" (2000) 63(3) 
Modern Law Review 317.  See especially at 326-331 for a summary of criticism of this 
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to closely held corporations.  See also Simpson, MA, "The Tort Liability of Corporate 
Participants", Master of Laws thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, NZ, 1996. 
196    Ribstein, LE, "The Closely Held Firm: A View from the United States" (1994) 19(4) 
Melbourne University Law Review 950 at 963-7; and Freedman, J, "Limited Liability: Large 
Company Theory and Small Firms" (2000) 63(3) Modern Law Review 317. 
197    Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical 
Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
125 these corporations.  This is understood to be amongst the most significant theoretical 
and practical issues facing small closely-held corporations in contradistinction to 
large public trading companies.198  Both the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)199 and the 
Companies Act 1993 (NZ)200 provide that small closely-held corporations can restrict 
the transfer of shares as part of the corporate constitution.  As already indicated, such 
restrictions are designed along similar lines to the kinds of restrictions one would 
observe in standard partnership agreements.201  These agreements commonly 
stipulate that either the company or the remaining shareholders should have the first 
right of refusal on the sale of a share of the business.202  Certain clauses may even 
stipulate that the price of such a sale will be determined by the remaining 
shareholders.  It is also conceivable that in situations of deadlock or freeze-out by 
remaining shareholders, a serious oppression of the exiting shareholder may occur.203  
Given that unlike a partnership, a company has perpetual succession, intractable 
                                                                                                                                          
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 864; and, Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and 
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Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 865; and, Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and 
Close Corporation Appraisal" (2001) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 165 at 178. 
199   At s 1072G. 
200   At ss 84-87. 
201   Marlow, CG, "The Extent of Directors' Control of Share Transfers", PGradDipLaw thesis, 
School of Law, University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ, 1976 at Chapter IV. 
202   Eisenberg, MA, (Ed) Corporations and Other Business Organizations: Cases and Materials, 
8th ed, Foundation Press, New York, USA, 2000 at 338; and Dugan, R, et al, Closely Held 
Companies: Legal and Tax Issues, CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, NZ, 2000 at 189. 
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Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 
10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 854 & 865.  The current position in Australia is 
ameliorated to some extent by the so-called statutory oppression remedy at Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) Pt 2F.1 (see: Hogg v Dymock (1993) 11 ACSR 14; & John J Starr (Real Estate) 
Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (A’sia) Pty Ltd (1991) 6 ACSR 63; 9 ACLC 1,372.) 
126 problems such as these will not necessarily be resolved with the mere effluxion of 
time.204
 
This is a problem which has been identified by a variety of scholars.  From a purely 
contractarian position this is a matter for contract before the investor choses to invest 
in the closely-held corporation and it is not a matter for regulation of any kind.205  
However, given the existence of bounded rationality, and the lack of perfect 
knowledge or perfect markets, it has been equally argued that certain default 
mechanisms should be provided in legislation.206  Two mechanisms which have been 
recommended by scholars in this regard are firstly what is known as “appraisal 
rights” and secondly, a statutory fiduciary duty between shareholders of closely-held 
companies.   
 
In the event that a shareholder of a closely-held corporation wishes to liquidate their 
investment in the company, statutory appraisal rights safeguard the right of such 
persons to have an independent valuation placed on their share of the business, with a 
default remedy to the courts.  The courts would then be required to provide fair 
market value in the legislation.207.  This may address instances of oppression by 
                                                 
204   Eisenberg, MA, "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review 1461 
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Journal of Corporate Law 165 at 166-71. 
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849 at 864.  
207   Bonollo, F, "The Nexus of Contracts and Close Corporation Appraisal" (2001) 12 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 165. 
127 remaining shareholders who choose to undervalue the exiting shareholders’ shares 
where such an outcome is permitted under the shareholder agreement.   
 
The second proposed statutory methodology advocated by scholars for the 
prevention of oppression of exiting shareholders is the introduction of a statutory 
fiduciary duty between shareholders of closely held companies.208  It is argued that 
such a qualitative regulation could provide redress for oppressed shareholders by 
means of appeal to a court.  Appeal for redress would be on the basis that they have 
not been dealt with in utmost good faith and that the court should consider whether in 
all of the circumstances it should make appropriate remedial orders.   
 
Delegated Management  
In a partnership, all partners (unless they are operating under a limited partnership) 
have the right to participate in the management of a partnership subject to alternative 
provision in the partnership agreement.209  In other words, the right to participate in 
management and the right to participate in partnership decisions is not based on 
contributions to capital as a default rule, but on a person’s status as a partner. 
 
                                                 
208   Wells-Stevenson, S, "The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close Corporation 
Shareholder Fiduciary Duties" (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 1139 at 1142-54; on the 
potential for judicial legislation in this regard, see Hochstetler, WS & Svejda, MD, "Statutory 
Needs of Close Corporations - an Empirical Study: Special Close Corporation Legislation or 
Flexible General Corporation Law?" (1985) 10 Journal of Corporation Law 849 at 857. 
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128 This per capita voting entitlement does not strictly apply in corporate law.210  Under 
corporate law each shareholder has the right to vote and, where votes are taken on a 
show of hands, each shareholder has an equal say in a vote.  However, a poll can be 
demanded at any time and a poll is decided on the basis of one share one vote.211  
Alternative provisions in the constitutions of small closely-held companies or in 
separate shareholder agreements may operate along the same lines as those 
partnerships.212  However, in their absence, the corporate law default position could 
result in undue hardship on a minority shareholder who is “frozen out” of company 
management.  At the same time such a minority shareholder could face the double 
jeopardy of being unable to freely (and fairly) transfer an investment in the company 
to another party that constitutes all or most of their net wealth.213
 
Whether or not management is delegated to managerial specialists is very much 
decided on a company-by-company basis.214  However Professor Hansmann stresses 
that one of the most significant aspects contributing to the social cohesion of small 
closely-held employee-owned firms is what he refers to as “the homogeneity of 
interest”.  Indeed he suggests that without homogeneity of interest, a closely-held 
firm is more than likely to revert to some form of public ownership either by being 
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129 sold up or by being converted into a public company.215  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e ,  a s  
Hansmann indicates, the cost of collective decision-making can be very high in small 
owner-operated enterprises.216  This is one of the most significant advantages of the 
large modern trading corporation.  A large body of shareholders will have a wide 
range of different views on any collective decision that has to be made, and therefore 
the likelihood of making efficient decisions and cost-free or low cost decisions is 
unlikely.  These costs are eliminated in the large public trading company through the 
use of specialist delegated management.217
 
One of the greatest pressures facing small closely-held corporations is therefore to 
maintain a homogeneity of interest between owners.  Where this homogeneity is 
damaged, or in some way compromised it is more than likely that a closely-held firm 
will fail.  This of course places constitutional clauses such as those stipulating 
corporate objects on the one hand, and any terms concerning the management of the 
enterprise in any shareholder agreement on the other in a central position in the case 
of a small closely-held corporation.218  The assumption that in successful closely-
held companies there is a strong homogeneity of interest is the principal reason for 
relaxing many of the regulatory formalities facing large trading companies in the 
context of the small closely-held company.219
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130 As has been stressed by scholars since Berle and Means, the delegated management 
model is essential in large bureaucratic trading companies.  However, from a 
contractarian perspective, this requires the introduction of agency-related 
mechanisms to adequately monitor management.  Conversely, management is not 
typically delegated to such an extent in the case of small closely-held companies.220  
This is felt to be the greatest strength of small closely-held corporations where the 
owners are the managers.  Such owner/managers are in a good position to monitor 
themselves and their owner/manager colleagues to avoid such problems as shirking 
and other inefficiencies.  In the alternative, however, where there is a disagreement 
between owner/managers of a small closely-held corporation the problems of 
deadlock and freeze-out become manifest.221
 
Transferable Shares  
As indicated above, one of the key characteristics of a small closely-held corporation 
is that restrictions are usually placed on the ability of shareholders to transfer their 
shares, somewhat along the same lines as may be found in a partnership agreement.  
However in the case of partnerships (which in any case are always formed for a 
defined term) at will, these can be readily dissolved at the instance of each individual 
partner.222  Given the corporate characteristic of perpetual succession, this is not the 
case with small closely-held corporations subject to separate shareholder agreements 
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131 and constitutional restrictions on transferability of shares.223  The consequences of 
this situation in situations involving deadlock and freeze-out have been identified 
above. 
 
The Charitable Trust224
 
Definition and Status 
In order to define a charitable trust, the first concept which must be determined is 
that of the trust generally.  A trust arises where one or more persons (the 
trustee/trustees) hold property (trust fund/corpus) either for the benefit of another 
person or persons (the beneficiary/beneficiaries) in the case of a private trust, or to 
accomplish some specified “charitable” purpose in the case of a public charitable 
trust.225  This is rendered diagrammatically in figure 2 below: 
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As trusts are a creature of equity they have no common law status.226  However trust 
property is always treated as a separate “corpus”.227  As indicated in the previous 
chapter, this has led a number of scholars to postulate that the trust is in fact the 
progenitor of the corporation.228  A trust places legal ownership, and commonly 
broad discretion regarding the utilisation of trust property, in the hands of the trustee 
or trustees.229  Trustees are thereafter under equitable duties to administer the trust 
property strictly in accordance with the terms of the trust.230   
 
At common law there is very little difference between a trustee and the absolute 
owner of property.  In equity, however, the trustee is personally obliged to deal with 
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133 the trust property for the benefit of the stipulated beneficiaries or for the purposes 
identified in the trust deed.231  These obligations, while unenforceable against the 
trustee at common law, are nevertheless enforceable against the trustee in person in 
equity.232  Among the foremost of the equitable obligations placed upon trustees is 
the fiduciary relationship.  This relationship demands of trustees that they act with 
utmost good faith in the discharge of their duties.  In addition, a trustee owes a duty 
to act gratuitously (that is to say without payment) unless otherwise provided for in 
the trust deed.233
 
One of the problematic aspects of trusts when considering their suitability as an 
appropriate analogy for incorporated associations is the issue of the so called “rule 
against perpetuities”.  This rule stipulates that trusts must “vest” (terminate) no later 
than a life in being plus 21 years.234  While this rule applies to private trusts, it does 
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134 not apply to charitable trusts.  In effect therefore charitable trusts may carry on in 
perpetuity, whereas private trusts have a limited lifespan.235  As equity takes the view 
that “a trust will not fail for want of a trustee”, provision is made in the case of 
charitable trusts for the successive appointment of new trustees when existing 
trustees vacate their office.236  The significance of this issue is that incorporated 
associations as bodies corporate, and charitable trusts whether incorporated or not, 
are endowed with a form of “perpetual succession”.237  The charitable trust therefore 
shares an important structural similarity with incorporated associations (and indeed 
all corporations)238 which is absent in case of the private trust.  This corporate 
characteristic is a key reason why I have discounted the private trust as a potential 
analogy for incorporated associations. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1992 (Tas) s 6; Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1985 
(ACT) s 8; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 62; and Perpetuities Act 1964 (NZ) s 6 & 8. 
235   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 364; and, Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 531. 
236   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 467; Dal Pont, 
GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2004 
at 605;  
237   “But the fact that the government, or the law, purports to establish a new entity, an ‘artificial 
person,’ should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in reality, it does no more than it 
accomplishes when it recognizes a charitable trust.  No more in kind, that is: in degree it 
generally goes considerably farther.”  Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" 
(1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 364. 
238   “When we come to the Trading Corporation we find an entity which in many ways closely 
resembles that unincorporated trust.  If we can imagine a partnership created by trust deed of 
the capital we approach very near the conception of a trading corporation.  The perpetual 
succession which the corporation postulates is supplied in the latter case by the principle that 
“a trust shall never fail for want of a trustee.” Except for small and technical advantages, such 
as the facility of dealing with shares instead of miscellaneous property, and the simplicity of 
litigating with one imaginary person instead of a thousand real ones, the only remarkable 
feature of a trading corporation is the limited liability of its members.”  Baty, T, "The Rights 
of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 368. 
135 Raison D'être 
In contradistinction to the trading company then, a charitable trust is almost entirely 
explicable by reference to its stated purposes as disclosed in the foundation deed.239  
The central question with respect to charitable trusts is therefore to determine what 
purposes can be categorised as “charitable purposes”.240  This is a difficult question 
to answer with much specificity.  The first enunciation in common law of any 
moment was the Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (UK)241 which 
includes the following: 
Relief of aged, impotent and poor people; maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and 
mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities; repairs of bridges, 
ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and highways; education and preferment of 
orphans; relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; 
supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; relief or 
redemption of prisoners or captives; aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments 
of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes. 
 
This non-exhaustive expression of charitable purposes was summarised most 
famously by Lord Macnaghten thus:242
1)  Trusts for the relief of poverty; 
2)  Trusts for the advancement of education; 
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136 3)  Trusts for the advancement of religion; 
4)  Trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the 
preceding heads. 
 
In addition to the categories above, the notion of “charitable purposes” is subject to 
statutory modification.  The most common modification has been the inclusion of 
trusts established for “recreational” purposes, as has occurred in New Zealand, 
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia.243
 
Management of Charitable Trusts  
The nature and enforceability of such equitable obligations as are borne by trustees is 
an important issue when evaluating the validity of charitable trusts as possible 
analogies for incorporated associations.  As stated above, trusts are administered by a 
trustee or trustees.  This management is entirely circumscribed by the terms of the 
trust deed.  The equitable obligations of trustees, particularly with respect to 
charitable trusts, do not extend to purely entrepreneurial ventures.  The duty is much 
more in the nature of preserving and protecting trust funds in the attainment of the 
stated charitable purposes.  Indeed in the event of a trust loss as a result of a risky 
investment of trust corpus, a trustee may well be made to account for the loss out of 
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137 their personal assets. 244  The standard of care owed by trustees has been expressed as 
the standard of the “ordinary prudent business person”.245  In exercising their powers, 
trustees also have the duty to act personally and not to delegate their discretion.246  
These features of trustee powers and obligations are significantly at odds with the 
nature of large modern trading companies outlined above. 
 
The trustee of a private trust stands in a personal fiduciary relationship with the 
beneficiaries of the trust.  Should a trustee fail to observe their equitable obligations, 
the beneficiaries of the trust may personally bring remedial court actions that will 
compel the trustee to observe these obligations and compensate beneficiaries for any 
loss suffered.247  This situation should be contrasted with that of a trustee of a 
charitable trust who does not stand in a fiduciary relationship with persons who 
might benefit from a charitable trust.248
 
It can therefore be observed that the nature of trusteeship, particularly with respect to 
charitable trusts, is in the nature of care and maintenance of trust property.  Indeed 
there is specific remedy available to interested parties in the form of an action against 
                                                 
244   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 476-87; Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 639-47. 
245   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 478; Re Speight 
(1883) 22 ChD 727 at 739.  But note Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1 at 19.  The 
standard required has usually been judicially expressed in subjective rather than purely 
objective terms. 
246   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 491-4. 
247   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at Chapter 20; and 
Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at 614-48. 
248   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 364. 
138 trustees for “wasting” of the trust property.249  This m ust be contrasted with th e 
requirement of directors of trading companies to be entrepreneurial risk takers with 
limited personal liability. 
 
With respect to charitable trusts there are no “beneficiaries” as such who have a 
recognised personal equitable interest in the property of the trust such as would grant 
them standing to sue for enforcement of the trust deed.250  Rather, in a general sense 
the beneficiary of trusts established for charitable purposes is the public interest.  
Given this public nature of charitable trusts, at common law an action can only be 
brought by the Attorney General either in person or on relation where a trustee of a 
charitable trust trustee fails to observe their equitable obligations.251  It is possible, 
however, for any private person to petition the Attorney General to bring an action to 
enforce the charitable trust deed against the trustees.  Alternatively, the Attorney may 
approve of a relator action being brought to the same ends.252  Ensuring against the 
likelihood of such actions, and reducing the possibility of frivolous litigation, is the 
potential liability of the relator to bear the costs of the action.253  In addition, 
                                                 
249   Ibid at 474-87. 
250   Parks, JM, "Registered Charities: A Primer" (2003) 17(4) The Philanthropist 4 at 16. 
251   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 328 & 334; Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 
at 384-5; Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook 
Co, Pyrmont, 2004 at 529;  Attorney General v Brown (1818) 1 Swan 265 at 291; and 
National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31 at 62.  This 
position is subject to statutory modification.  See Charitable Trusts Act 1993 (NSW) ss 5-7; 
Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 106; Trustee Act 1936 (SA) ss 60-9; Supreme Court Civil Procedure 
Act 1932 (Tas) s 57(2); Religious Successory and Charitable Trusts Act 1958 (Vic) s 61; 
Charitable Trusts Act 1962 (WA) s 21; Trustee Act 1925 (ACT) ss 94A-E; and Charitable 
Trusts Act 1957 (NZ) s 60. 
252   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 331-9. 
253   Ibid at 331. 
139 interested parties with a special interest in the affairs of the charity are denied the 
right to bring a relator action where they are also plaintiffs.254
 
The deed of a charitable trust may make provision for the power of appointment in 
connection with the trust, or the power to vary the trust deed, to be exercised by 
named parties (such as trustees) in a stated manner.  Alternatively, these matters may 
be left to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court.255
 
Limited Liability? 
As already indicated charitable trusts are formed for charitable purposes and have no 
ascertainable beneficiaries.  The only person or persons who could conceivably face 
a legal action arising out of trust affairs therefore are trustees.  As previously 
discussed, there is no limitation for personal liability where a trust loss has arisen 
through the breach of duty by a trustee.  Alternatively, where a trust loss has arisen 
and there has been no breach of duty the trustee will still be personally liable in the 
first instance, but they will have a right of indemnity against trust assets.256  Persons 
who are not trustees, but who derive a personal benefit from the operation of a 
charitable trust, bear no potential liability for any trust loss other than the potential 
loss or diminution of such benefits as they may enjoy. 
 
                                                 
254   Ibid at 332. 
255   Evans,  M,  Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 467-70 & 
Chapter 14; and Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, 
Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2004 at 603-8 & 673-82. 
256   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 513; Dal Pont, 
GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2004 
at 660-9.  Always provided that such asstets actually exist (see n 116 above). 
140 Shared Ownership  
As stated above, most of the usual incidents of ownership of property reside with the 
trustee of a charitable trust.  However, the trust property must be applied to the 
nominated charitable purposes rather than for the benefit of the trustees per se.   
Likewise any persons who may benefit from the operation of a charitable trust do so 
only as an incident of the attainment of the trust purposes.257  There is no proprietary 
ownership of trust property by such persons other than that which they may receive 
gratuitously from the hands of the trustees.258  In this sense therefore it is facile to 
speak of there being an “owner of a charitable trust”.  This is underscored by the fact 
that at common law, due to the public nature of charitable trusts, the Attorney 
General is the only individual with standing in their own right to enforce charitable 
trusts, and to bring action against charitable trustees for breach of duty.  There are 
situations where other parties may in fact bring such an action, but with few 
exceptions, standing to do so will be by way of a relator action as previously 
mentioned or as provided by statute. 
 
The final aspect of trust property that remains to be considered relates only to 
charitable trusts.  This is the so called “cy-près doctrine”.259  Cy-près literally means 
                                                 
257   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at Chapter 15; and 
Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at Chapter 20. 
258   Maitland, FW, "Trust and Corporation" in Fisher, HAL, (Ed) Fw Maitland, Collected Works, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1911, 321 at 358; and Baty, T, "The Rights of 
Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 361. 
259   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 386-9; and Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 568-78. 
141 “near to it”.260  The doctrine applies where property has been set aside for charitable 
purposes.  Once this has been done, the property is utterly lost to the donor and must 
always be used for charitable purposes.261  The concept originated in the Mosaic Law 
requirement for religious sacrifice.  This tradition considered that once property had 
been given over to God, it was lost forever to the donor.262  Where a gift is made and 
a general charitable purpose is intended, should the gift be otherwise flawed, the 
court can modify the terms of the gift to ensure that the property is directed so as to 
(as near as possible) meet the donor’s charitable intention.263  In other words, the 
property should be transferred to a charity as similar as possible to that which the 
donor originally identified.  The property does not revert back to the donor in such 
cases, but rather becomes the responsibility of the Crown in the person of the 
Attorney-General who, as parens patriae,  has responsibility for all charitable 
activities and will give effect to the cy-près doctrine.264
 
                                                 
260    Nygh, PE & Butt, P, (Ed) Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Chatswood, 1997 at 316. 
261   Re Producers Development Fund [1954] VLR 246; Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 386; and, Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and 
Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 2004 at 568. 
262   Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 
363.  See Leviticus 27, especially verse 28 “nothing that a man owns and devotes to the Lord 
… may be sold or redeemed; everything so devoted is most holy to the Lord”.   
263   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 386; and, Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 568. 
264   Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, 2003 at 364; and, Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 529; 
142 The Eleemosynary Corporation 
 
Definition and Status 
It is perhaps somewhat misleading to consider this entity separately from charities 
given that the word eleemosynary itself originates in the concept of “alms-giving”.265  
Indeed the traditional treatment of eleemosynary corporations is to include them as a 
particular expression of charities.266  Nevertheless, given that these bodies have 
always been specifically regarded as corporations, they are worthy of separate 
investigation as possible analogies for incorporated associations.  This is particularly 
so given that the eleemosynary corporation boasts a far more impressive pedigree 
than that of the modern trading corporation.267
 
Eleemosynary corporations are “constituted for the perpetual distribution of the free 
alms or bounty of the founder to such persons has he has directed.”268  Traditionally, 
                                                 
265   Delbridge, A, et al, (Ed) The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, 3rd ed, The Macquarie Library 
Pty Ltd, Macquarie University, 1998 at 358. 
266   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 312-60. 
267   Baty, T, "The Rights of Ideas - and of Corporations" (1919) 33 Harvard Law Review 358 at 
360; and Picarda, H, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities, Butterworths, London, UK, 
1977 at 422. See also Blackstone, W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Legal Classics 
Library, New York, USA, 1983 (Reprint) Book I at 459.  Note also Sadler, RJ, "The 
University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure in Australia" (1981) 7 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 2 at 3; “There is no doubt that all Australian universities are 
eleemosynary corporations.”  See the detailed analysis in Panetta, S, "The University Visitor 
in Western Australia: Future Directions", Bachelor of Laws with Honours thesis, School of 
Law, University of Western Australia, Perth, 1996.  
268   Blackstone, W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Legal Classics Library, New York, 
USA, 1983 (Reprint) Vol I at 459; Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1984 at 313; and Kyd, S, A Treatise on the Law of 
Corporations, Garland Publishing Inc, New York, USA, 1978 (Reprint) Vol I at 25. 
143 there are two classes of eleemosynary corporations namely “hospitals” and 
“colleges”.269  These classes are further defined as follows: 
1)  Hospitals for the maintenance of the poor sick and impotent, and 
2)  Colleges of Oxford and Cambridge universities and elsewhere, founded for the 
promotion of piety and learning and the maintenance of members of such colleges.270 
 
Raison D'être 
Eleemosynary corporations are in the common law sense therefore drawn from the 
broader category of charities referred to above, namely, the “hospital”.  This class 
should be understood as referring to a body formed “for the education of 
impecunious scholars or for the relief, whether by way of giving food and shelter or 
by way of medical treatment, of the indigent poor.”271  Seen in this context, it is 
apparent that the traditional class of eleemosynary corporation referred to as colleges 
is but a further particularisation of a sub-class of hospitals.  Given the very particular 
nature of such educationally focussed “hospitals” it is traditionally regarded as 
appropriate to consider them quite separately from other eleemosynary 
corporations.272
 
Properly constituted, eleemosynary corporations require two elements namely 
property,273 and the separate legal persona of incorporated status.274  The property of 
                                                 
269   Blackstone, W, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Legal Classics Library, New York, 
USA, 1983 (Reprint) Vol I at 470. 
270    Ibid Vol I at 470; and Burke, J, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, UK, 1977. 
271   Burke, J, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1977 
Vol I, at 922. 
272   Sadler, RJ, "The University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure in Australia" (1981) 
7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2 at 3. 
273   Also known as the fundatio percipiens. 
144 an eleemosynary corporation is held on charitable trust, the terms of which are 
contained in the corporate constitutional documents.275  One of the features of the 
eleemosynary corporation is the right of visitation which inheres in the “founder” or 
“endower” of the corporation.276  The visitatorial jurisdiction is a form of 
“supervision over the domestic affairs of an institution.”277  This jurisdiction is 
viewed as a type of personal property and is said to arise due to the “power everyone 
has to dispose, direct and regulate his own property; like the case of patronage”.278  
The nature of the founder’s visitatorial power is forum domesticum, that is to say, the 
“private jurisdiction of the founder.”279  While the visitatorial jurisdiction is said to 
be exclusive, there is a limited supervisory role played by the courts in keeping with 
their general supervisory function with respect to charities and trusts.280  T h e  
structure of an eleemosynary corporation has been diagrammatically represented in 
figure 3 below: 
 
                                                                                                                                          
274   Also known as the fundatio incipiens. 
275   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 314. 
276   Whalley, PWF & Evans, GR, "The University Visitor - an Unwanted Legacy of Empire or a 
Model of University Governance for the Future?" (1998) 2 Macarthur Law Review 109; 
Whalley, PWF & Price, DM, "The University Visitor in Western Australia" (1995) 25 
University of Western Australia Law Review 146; Sadler, RJ, "The University Visitor: 
Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure in Australia" (1981) 7 University of Tasmania Law 
Review  2; Panetta, S, "The University Visitor in Western Australia: Future Directions", 
Bachelor of Laws with Honours thesis, School of Law, University of Western Australia, 
Perth, 1996; Burt, F, The University Visitor, UWA Graduates Association, Perth, 1994; 
Robinson, S, "The Office of Visitor of an Eleemosynary Corporation: Some Ancient and 
Modern Principles" (1994) 18 University of Queensland Law Journal 106; Maurice, SG & 
Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 1984 at 312. 
277   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 312. 
278   Ibid at 316. 
279   Green v Rutherforth (1750) 1 Ves Sen 462; 27 ER 1149.  This notion is quaintly captured in 
the Gaelic proverb “Is bean-taighe ‘n luchag air a taigh fhèin.”  (The mouse is mistress in 
her own house.) 
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Eleemosynary Corporation (“Hospitals & Colleges”) 
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Figure 3 
 
Management of Eleemosynary Corporations  
Generally speaking, an eleemosynary corporation consists of the founder/visitor and 
a board of governors281 charged with the administration of the body according to its 
constituting documents.  The final element of such a corporation is the body of 
members, for whose benefit the corporation exists.  It is also true that most 
eleemosynary corporations are “collegially governed”.  That is to say, there is often a 
large degree of consensus based, participatory management within the 
organization282 with ultimate power and responsibility for decisions resting with a 
supervisory board.283  The model is derived from the ecclesiastical origins of 
                                                                                                                                          
280   Sadler, RJ, "The University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure in Australia" (1981) 
7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2 at 15-22. 
281   Sometimes referred to as a council or trustees. 
282   In Oxford for example, since 1
st October 2002 the governing “Council” initiates legislation 
which is proposed to the “Congregation” comprising senior university officials and 
academics.  The Congregation then approves or amends this legislation before it proceeds to 
the Queen in Council.  These are the provisions of the current University of Oxford Statutes 
III and IV.  These statutes and the legislative history of Oxford can be viewed at: 
http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/statutes/  (Accessed 17
th May 2004).  See also Lockley, GL, "The 
Foundation, Development and Influence of Congregationalism in Australia: With Emphasis 
on the Nineteenth Century", PhD thesis, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 1968; and 
Oleck, HL, "Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979" (1979) 10 Toledo Law Review 962. 
283   See Paul, RG, "Consensus, Decision-Making and the Anglican Church: A Case Study of 
Decision-Making in the Anglican Diocese of Canberra and Goulburn", Master of Arts thesis, 
Canberra College of Advanced Education, Canberra, 1988.  Note the 3
rd definition of 
146 universities.284  Monasteries and abbeys operated under the headship of a senior 
cleric, but were otherwise congregationally governed based on principles of fraternal 
equality.285
 
Limited Liability? 
As the eleemosynary corporation is most commonly a statutory innovation, the 
extent to which an eleemosynary corporation offers limited liability for corporate 
administrators will be decided entirely according to the terms of the constituent 
documents.  In this regard the position is much more like the situation facing the 
chartered corporation.286  In the absence of statutory provision, limited liability has 
never been held to be an inherent characteristic of eleemosynary corporations.  This 
situation is vindicated on the basis of the voluntary nature of eleemosynary 
corporations.  If corporate participants are willing to be bound by a corporate 
foundation instrument that withholds limited liability, then they must accept the 
consequences.287  Obviously, this is an important structural dissimilarity between 
eleemosynary corporations and more modern corporate forms. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
“college”, which describes it as “An endowed, self-governing association of scholars 
incorporated within a university” (Delbridge, A, et al, (Ed) The Macquarie Concise 
Dictionary, 3rd ed, The Macquarie Library Pty Ltd, Macquarie University, 1998).  See also  
at 3-4. 
284   Whalley, PWF & Evans, GR, "The University Visitor - an Unwanted Legacy of Empire or a 
Model of University Governance for the Future?" (1998) 2 Macarthur Law Review 109 at 
112-116; and Curry, L, "A Study of Organisational Climates and Patterns of Participative 
Style in Seven Parish Councils", Master of Arts thesis, Massey University, Palmerston North, 
NZ, 1975tiv.  For instance, Oxford grew out of the monastery of St Frideswide, while 
Cambridge was established out of the Benedictine abbey of Ely. 
285   See generally Kyd, S, A Treatise on the Law of Corporations, Garland Publishing Inc, New 
York, USA, 1978 (Reprint) Vol II at 174-290. 
286   Cooke,  CA,  Corporation Trust and Company: An Essay in Legal History, Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, UK, 1950 at 76-9. 
147 Shared Ownership  
“Membership” of an eleemosynary corporation is a matter that will be provided for 
in the founding document of the body.288  As with charities generally, although the 
members do not have either a legal or equitable interest in the property of the 
eleemosynary corporation, they do have the power to petition the supervising 
authority (in this case the Visitor, rather than the Attorney General in the first 
instance) to have the constituent documents enforced.289  This is the major sense in 
which eleemosynary corporations are a unique sub-genus of charitable trusts.   
Interested persons with no direct proprietary interests in the property of the trust are 
nevertheless possessed of enforceable rights with respect to the way in which the 
corporation is administered.  It should be recalled that on dissolution, given the 
application of the cy-près doctrine to eleemosynary corporations, any surplus 
property would be applied to charitable purposes and not the members or the 
founder. 
 
Unlike the situation facing unincorporated charitable trusts, the administration of 
eleemosynary corporations is readily reviewable through actions brought by 
interested persons so long as they are “members” of the corporation or, in certain 
                                                                                                                                          
287   On the common law position facing members of chartered corporations, see Dr Salmon v The 
Hamborough Company (1671) 1 Ch Cas 204. 
288   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 315; Sadler, RJ, "The University Visitor: Visitatorial Precedent and Procedure in 
Australia" (1981) 7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2 at 6; and Patel v University of 
Bradford Senate [1979] 2 All ER 582. 
289   Maurice, SG & Parker, DB, Tudor on Charities, 7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK, 
1984 at 322-3; and Whalley, PWF & Price, DM, "The University Visitor in Western 
Australia" (1995) 25 University of Western Australia Law Review 146 at 158. 
148 limited situations, prospective or former members.290  As already mentioned, review 
is achieved either by means of a petition to the Visitor of the eleemosynary 
corporation or via a prerogative writ (in the event that there is prima facie 
jurisdictional error) from a court of competent jurisdiction.291
 
Given the structure of eleemosynary corporations, a version of the so-called doctrine 
of constitutional ultra vires has application.292  This could alternatively be described 
as an enforceable duty of loyalty to follow the constituent documents of the 
corporation which are in the nature of a trust deed.  However described, it is clear 
that at common law where an eleemosynary corporation purports to act contrary to 
its constitutional documents, any such act is open to a finding of invalidity.293  As 
noted above, the ultra vires doctrine has been abolished by statute in both Australia 
and New Zealand with respect to trading corporations, due in part to its potential 
harshness to innocent third party creditors. 
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(1981) 7 University of Tasmania Law Review 2 at 5.   
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Commentaries on the Laws of England, Legal Classics Library, New York, USA, 1983 
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149 SUMMARY 
This chapter commenced with a detailed discussion of the role of analogy in human 
thought.  That discussion commenced with the linguistic use of the terms “analogy” 
and “metaphor”.  As these terms are capable of widely varying treatment I decided 
that it was best to define them narrowly for the purpose of this thesis.  Further, the 
treatment of cognitive science was adopted and an “allegorical continuum” was 
developed with bare analogy (based on surface level similarities) at one end, and 
highly abstract metaphors at the other.  The weaknesses of both extremes of the 
allegorical continuum were considered.  I also introduced the concept of “mapping” 
from cognitive science, in which attribute schemas from known source analogues are 
mapped onto unknown target analogues for purposes of insight and prediction. 
 
Building from this discussion, I made the proposition that common law legal 
reasoning could be characterised as an inductive process of analogical reasoning.  I 
then analysed this characterisation in considerable detail and found it to be both 
accurate, and widely supported.  Insights borrowed from cognitive science revealed 
that lawyers are trained to be master classifiers, and that this training leads to the 
acquisition of a memory bank of source analogue schemas.  As I then discussed, 
there is evidence that experienced legal practitioners become memory “hard wired” 
to use familiar semantic retrieval cues in restricting the range of analogue schemas to 
be referred to when faced with novel problems.  It has been suggested that one way 
of dealing with the limitations of such cognitive hard wiring is to provide multiple 
analogies of sufficient richness to “short-circuit” this hard wiring. 
 
150 I then demonstrated that the most common choice of analogy for experienced legal 
practitioners dealing with incorporated associations is the large modern trading 
company.  I considered this source analogue from the structural and relational 
perspective recommended by the foregoing discussion.  In order to test whether or 
not this choice of analogue schema is the result of memory-hardwiring, I then 
provided three analogical alternatives known to the law that fit within the theoretical 
framework outlined in the previous chapter.  These alternate analogies were: the 
small closely-held trading company; the charitable trust; and, the eleemosynary 
corporation.  Each of these analogical alternatives was also considered in turn from 
the structural and relational perspective referred to previously. 
 
The following chapter provides a structural and relational analysis of sporting 
associations, being the largest user-group of the relevant legislation, that are 
incorporated in Australia and New Zealand.  As will be seen, it is my assertion that 
the incorporated association is sui generis and is a novel corporate form.  From this 
viewpoint, incorporated associations are, within the framework of this chapter, in the 
position of the “target analogue”.  It would be tempting to jump to an untested 
conclusion and state categorically, at the end of the next chapter, which of the 
alternative source analogues provided in this chapter offers the most apt allegorical 
schema for incorporated associations.294
                                                 
294   I note that the dogmatic assertion of untested hypotheses is not uncommon in legal discourse.  
In particular, this has been the case with respect to incorporated associations (Stevens, D, 
"Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State and Market: 
Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 
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area now lag far behind its business counterpart.”).  For instance, see Levy, KJ, "An 
Historical Analysis of Incorporated "Non-Profit" Entities in the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and Australia with the Purpose of Raising the "Profit/Non-Profit" Debate", Master of 
Laws thesis, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1994 at 109-16 where the abolition of 
associations incorporation legislation is advocated in favour of the company limited by 
151  
However, the purpose of this thesis is to apply organic theory, broadly conceived to 
the problem at hand.  This theoretical commitment requires that I first consider 
whether or not the legislative framework outlined in the next chapter is reflective and 
facilitative of the observed reality of incorporated associations.  If an empirical 
analysis of incorporated sporting associations reveals a lack of fit with the legislative 
framework, then important qualifications must be made on the potential utility of the 
alternative source analogue schemas presented in this chapter.  For this reason, 
chapter 3 will not conclude this thesis, although as I have just indicated, without the 
influence of corporate law theory it just as easily could have done. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of an empirical study of a representative sample of all 
incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand.  Chapter 5 will 
compare the legislative framework with the empirical data and concludes with a 
consideration of the extent to which there is a closeness of fit between the two.  
Chapter 6 will then attempt to explain and justify the analogy schema that emerges as 
the most appropriate for the development of a jurisprudence of incorporated sporting 
associations in Australia and New Zealand.  The thesis thereafter concludes.  
                                                                                                                                          
guarantee.  While some of the limitations of the associations legislation are admirably 
elucidated by that author, I note that the excellent work of Woodward, S, "'Not-for-Profit' 
Motivation in a 'for-Profit' Company Law Regime - National Baseline Data" (2003) 21 
Company & Securities Law Journal 102tiv is the first attempt at a comprehensive empirical 
study of companies limited by guarantee in Australia by a legal scholar.  That work reveals 
that these corporate entities are less than 10% by number of Australian incorporated 
associations (Huntly, C, "Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for 
Officers of Incorporated Associations" (2000) 18(4) Company & Securities Law Journal 
262).  As will be seen in chapter 4 below, the principal user group of associations 
incorporation legislation in Australia and New Zealand has simultaneously expressed general 
satisfaction with that legislation and strong opposition to the possibility of Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) jurisdiction.  On the basis of the empirical data therefore, I respectfully disagree 
with the posited abolition of the associations’ incorporation legislation in favour of 
Corporations Act coverage.  This view appears to be consonant with those of Sievers, AS, 
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"Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in Australia and Other Common 
Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124 at 133-5. 
153 CHAPTER 3 
INCORPORATED SPORTING ASSOCIATIONS: 
ONE ACT WITH TWO SCENES 
“Drafters of legislation face real difficulties of 
communication.  As well as being applicable to 
the general public or at least to a large group 
within it, legislation often deals at length with 
complex matters.  The chance of not foreseeing 
every possible contingency or circumstance that 
might arise is therefore vastly increased.”1
 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in chapter 1, the challenge of what I have there defined as broad form 
organic theory is to consider the contextual reality of corporate entities both 
internally and externally.  This challenge extends to the development of a 
jurisprudence facilitative of such corporate structures rather than one that is overly 
prescriptive or otherwise inappropriate.  Where novel corporate forms are concerned, 
we have already observed in the previous chapter that reasoning by analogy is likely 
to play a central role in the development of such a jurisprudence.  The previous 
chapter of this thesis also examined the characteristics of four alternative legal 
analogies that may provide guidance in the development of an appropriate 
jurisprudence for incorporated associations.   
 
This chapter will survey the legislative framework currently in place in Australia and 
New Zealand allowing voluntary sporting associations to become incorporated 
  154associations.  The survey will consider the eligibility criteria for incorporation in 
each jurisdiction, the internal structural requirements (if any), the operational 
requirements and the dissolution requirements as laid down in the various statutory 
measures.  Having completed that task, the next chapter provides a summary of an 
epidemiological investigation of actual incorporated sporting associations in the 
relevant jurisdictions.   
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis will consider the extent to which the current 
legislative framework could be said to reflect broad form organic theory and then 
suggest a basis upon which a coherent and appropriate jurisprudence of incorporated 
sporting associations may emerge. 
 
WHAT IS AN INCORPORATED ASSOCIATION?2
Dr Fletcher has observed that the incorporated association or society, as a distinct 
corporate form, is an Australian creation.  He states that: 
Legislative development was initiated in South Australia, where Captain Bagot, a member of 
the Legislative Council, provided the impetus for action.  In the First Session of the First 
Parliament, he introduced an Institutions Incorporation Bill intended “to obviate the difficulties 
and lessen the expense attached to the management of associations by means of trust deeds”.3
 
                                                                                                                                          
1    Pearce, DC & Geddes, RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 5th ed, Butterworths, 
Sydney, 2001 at 2. 
2    Sievers, AS, "Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in Australia and 
Other Common Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124. 
3 Fletcher,  KL,  The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 207. 
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trustees, group property would be held by a body corporate.  According to Professor 
Bottomley, this “Act had no direct precedent in any British statutory provision.”4  
However:  
… there was nevertheless an established practice whereby businesses conducted through 
trustees which could demonstrate that they fulfilled a ‘public purpose’ could in certain cases 
obtain statutory incorporation by a private Act ...  In a sense, then, the [Institutions 
Incorporation Bill of Captain Bagot] applied pre-existing procedures.5
 
This early South Australian measure6 was consolidated in the Associations 
Incorporation Act 1890 (SA).  Since that time, all Australian jurisdictions have 
followed the lead taken by South Australia such that there is now an equivalent 
measure in each.7
 
It would be tempting at this distance to surmise that an independent sequence of 
events saw the New Zealand legislature introduce a very similar measure in 1895.8  
However, it should be remembered that New Zealand (like most Australian colonies) 
                                                 
4 Bottomley,  S,  The Corporate Form and Regulation: Associations Incorporation Legislation 
in Australia, Canberra, 1985 at 52.  But see Levy, KJ, "An Historical Analysis of 
Incorporated "Non-Profit" Entities in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia with 
the Purpose of Raising the "Profit/Non-Profit" Debate", Master of Laws thesis, University of 
Melbourne, Melbourne, 1994 at 71 arguing persuasively that the South Australian legislation 
built on the foundations laid by the Religious Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 1856 
(NZ). 
5 Bottomley,  S,  The Corporate Form and Regulation: Associations Incorporation Legislation 
in Australia, Canberra, 1985 at 52. 
6   Associations Incorporation Act 1858 (SA). 
7    The current statutes in each Australian jurisdiction are as follows:  Associations 
Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA);  Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas);  Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic);  Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA);  Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT); and Associations Act (NT). 
8   Unclassified Societies Registration Act 1895 (NZ).   
  156was for a period, a dependency of New South Wales.9  In addition, given the close 
relationship between the Australian colonies and New Zealand in the period leading 
up to the federation of Australia (note in particular New Zealand’s attendance at the 
National Australasian Convention 1891),10 it is of course highly likely that New 
Zealand legislators were aware of the South Australian innovation from an early 
stage.  Indeed, as early as 1884 the South Australian legislation caused the New 
Zealand parliament to amend the Religious Charitable and Educational Trusts Act 
1856 (NZ) to allow for the incorporation of those groups to which that measure 
applied.11  For this reason, although the South Australian legislation is not mentioned 
in New Zealand parliamentary debates on the Unclassified Societies Registration Act 
1895 (NZ), it may be asserted with some confidence that there was some trans-
Tasman legislative copying in its drafting. 
 
The Unclassified Societies Registration Act 1895 (NZ) was designed to address the 
concerns of various voluntary associations which complained to the then New 
Zealand Premier about the “unsatisfactory position in which they were placed 
through having no status.  Some of these associations had acquired very large sums 
of money, which was placed in the hands of trustees”.12  After proving to be deficient 
in a number of respects,13 including the restrictions on generating pecuniary profits, 
                                                 
9   Jose, AW, History of Australasia, 5th ed, Angus and Robertson Ltd, Sydney, 1913 at 260-94. 
10   Blackshield, A & Winterton, G, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and 
Materials, The Federation Press, Annandale, 2002 at 147. 
11   New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Representatives, (1884) Vol. 48, 
September 16 at 351 per Hon. Mr Harper MP.  Note that the original measure was essentially 
copied into the statute books of Queensland under the name Religious Educational and 
Charitable Institutions Act 1861 (Qld). 
12   New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard)  90 (1895) at 553 per Attorney-General.   
13   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 217. 
  157this Act was repealed and replaced by the still current Incorporated Societies Act 
1908 (NZ).14
 
Characteristics of “Incorporated Associations” 
As a matter of first principle, it is perhaps instructive to consider the joint judgment 
in the High Court decision of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358.15  I n  
determining the intended effect of the rules of voluntary associations (in this case an 
unincorporated political party) Rich, Dixon, Evatt & McTiernan JJ observed obiter 
that: 
Such matters are naturally regarded as of domestic concern.  The rules are intended to be 
enforced by the authorities appointed under them.  In adopting them the members ought not to 
be presumed to contemplate the creation of enforceable legal rights and duties so that every 
departure exposes the officer or member concerned to a civil sanction.16
 
The “domestic” nature of incorporated associations can also be demonstrated by 
reference to the common law concept of “mutuality”.17  This refers to the non-
taxable status of members contributions to the funds of a club or association.  The 
                                                 
14   New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Vol. 143, 29 June – 29 July 1908 at 155 
(House of Representatives); and at 440 (Legislative Council).  See generally White, DJ, "The 
Law Relating to Associations Registered under 'the Incorporated Societies Act 1908'", Master 
of Laws Honours thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, NZ, 1972. 
15    This is a common starting point for approaching both incorporated and unincorporated 
voluntary associations.  (See Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in 
Australia and New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 308 and Chapter 13; 
and Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, 
Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 130-3.) 
16  At 376.  As to the theoretical question of the justiciability of some promises to the exclusion 
of others more generally, see Buckley, FH, "Paradox Lost" (1988) 72 Minnesota Law Review 
775. 
17   Bates, A, "Queensland Clubs and the Commissioner of Taxation: What Is Taxable? The 
Principle of Mutuality" (1995) 15 The Queensland Lawyer 241, and Rodman, S & 
McGregor-Lowndes, M, "Income Tax Exemptions for Non-Profit Associations" in 
  158logic of this proposition is enshrined in the dictum that no-one can make a profit 
from themselves.18
 
As incorporated associations are a creation of statute, it is instructive to consider the 
views of legislators when attempting to discern the nature of these entities.19  The 
following comments taken from Hansard records in the various jurisdictions are of 
particular interest.  First, during his Second Reading of the New South Wales 
measure,20 the then Attorney General observed in the Legislative Assembly that: 
… of course, it has always been possible for an association to be incorporated under the 
companies’ legislation, usually as a company limited by guarantee, or under the Co-operative 
Act as a co-operative society. The cost of gaining incorporation under the national Companies 
Code, and the continuing requirements the Code and its predecessor imposed, have always 
operated to deter community groups, and the situation we have today where most small 
organisations have decided to remain unincorporated is evidence of the degree to which this 
deterrent effect has prevailed. It is certainly intended that the new scheme will always be 
simpler, less expensive and more attractive to small non-profit bodies than the Companies 
Code.21
 
… it is clearly the intent of the legislation that it not be used by organisations whose principal 
purpose is trading with the public as these bodies are more appropriately regulated by the 
Companies Code or the Co-operative Act.22
 
The current South Australian Act23 was passed in 1985.  The Second Reading speech 
to that Act was delivered in the Legislative Council by the then Attorney General.24  
                                                                                                                                          
McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, LBC 
Information Systems, North Ryde, 1996 at 122. 
18   Styles v New York Life Insurance (1889) 2 TC 460. 
19   See for example Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 34. 
20   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW). 
21   New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 19 September 
1984, at 1163 per Hon. Mr Landa. 
22   New South Wales, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 16 October 1984, 
at 1923 per Hon. Mr Landa. 
  159Following a lengthy adjournment, debate on the measure was resumed by Hon. KT 
Griffin MLC who was concerned that: 
… the Associations Incorporation Act continues to provide a flexible mechanism for groups of 
people formed together for particular purposes not directed towards profit-making or business, 
but for charitable or other purposes, to gain the benefit of incorporation: and those benefits are 
substantial. 
 
… Although those companies limited by guarantee have not been subject to the same measure 
of regulation as have companies with limited liability, limited by shares or no liability 
companies, they were subject to a greater level of regulation than associations under our 
Associations Incorporation Act.25
 
… an association registered under this Act is not a limited liability company or a trading 
partnership – it is a special kind of organisation which I think we are trying to look after 
without killing the whole idea.26
 
In the Second Reading of the Victorian measure27 in the Legislative Assembly, the 
then Minister for Transport highlighted the unique thrust of the associations 
incorporated legislation in the following terms:28
… some non-profit associations have sought incorporation under the Companies Act or the Co-
operation Act. However, both of these Acts have been framed primarily to deal with profit-
making bodies. As a result they include very detailed and extensive provisions relating to the 
management and control of bodies registered under them. The Companies Act in particular, 
imposes very stringent requirements as to the keeping, auditing and lodging of books and 
accounts. Consequently the vast majority of unincorporated associations have been unwilling 
to seek incorporation under those Acts. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
23   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA). 
24   5 December 1984 per Hon. CJ Sumner. 
25    South Australia, Legislative Council, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard),  19 February 1985 at 2583. 
26    South Australia, Legislative Council, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard),  19 February 1985 at 2584. 
27   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic). 
  160In 1947 the Western Australian Attorney General,29 commenting on the then Western 
Australian Act,30 stated that: 
These associations, which are non-trading and non-profit-earning bodies, and which provide 
for certain activities of their members, are in general not of a kind that fits within the frame-
work of the Companies Act.  A limited liability company is one which is based upon a theory 
in general of trading.  As such it comes under the Companies Act and has to comply with a 
great number of requirements that are necessary to safeguard shareholders, creditors and the 
public interest.  For an association to register as a company would represent an acceptance of a 
constitutional framework that would be alien to the purposes for which an association in 
general is formed.  These associations are usually assemblies of people who wish to proceed in 
a democratic way, but with no great degree of regulation, managing their own affairs on a 
domestic basis ...31
 
I think I can give the Leader of the Opposition a complete assurance that the associations 
which should come under the Companies Act will not be able to come under the Associations 
Incorporation Act32
 
On 3 July 1908 the then Prime Minister of New Zealand33 moved the Second 
Reading of the Incorporated Societies Bill 1908.  He noted that: 
                                                                                                                                          
28   Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 4 December 1981, at 4285 
per Hon. Mr MacLellan 
29   Hon. Robert McDonald. 
30   Associations Incorporation Act 1895 (WA). 
31  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1947 (11 
George VI) at 2772.   
32  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1947 (11 
George VI) Legislative Assembly at 2840.  Support for these views can also be found in 
statements made in the Western Australian Parliament by a cross section of members from 
both Houses, and all political persuasions.  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1987 (36 Elizabeth II) at 2289 and 3700 per Hon. Joseph 
Berinson, at 3275 per Hon Max Evans;  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1987 (36 Elizabeth II) at 4005 per Hon. Peter Dowding, at 
5007 and 5009 per Hon. Andrew Mensaros.  See also the Preamble to the Associations 
  161… the principal section of the present Act defining qualification is that relating to pecuniary 
gain, and it is deemed expedient to extend that definition in order that societies which, broadly 
speaking, are not direct trading concerns may become entitled to the benefits of registration.34
 
It can be seen therefore, that associations incorporated under the various incorporated 
association statutes under consideration here35 may be characterised as being “sui 
generis” in that they do not fit within the framework, structure or operations of the 
law associated with other corporate forms.36   
 
This proposition is further supported by the fact that in many of the relevant statutes 
specific provision is made for the transfer of associations into37 the incorporated 
association statutory regime out of another regime, where the nature of the 
association is compatible with the incorporated association statutory regime.38  The 
comments of the then Victorian Minister for Transport during his Second Reading 
speech to that jurisdiction’s measure are particularly relevant in this regard: 
                                                                                                                                          
Incorporation Act 1858 (SA).  The Western Australian Law Reform Committee was also of 
the same opinion when it reviewed the Associations Incorporation Act 1895 (WA) in 1971. 
33   The Rt. Hon. Sir JG Ward MP. 
34   New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Vol. 143 at 155. 
35  Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA);  Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic);  Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT); 
Associations Act (NT); and, Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ). 
36    Huntly, C, "A Most Useful Enactment: The Legislative History, Function and Legal 
Philosophy of the Associations Incorporation Legislation in Western Australia", M.Com 
thesis, School of Business Law, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, 1999 at 27-8. 
37   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 48-49; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) Pt 11; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 25A-25B; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 10; and Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 6.  
But note that trading companies are prohibited from incorporating as incorporated 
associations in the Northern Territory (Associations Act (NT) s 8(6)). 
38   In various jurisdictions provision is also made for the transfer of non-eligible bodies out of 
the legislative scheme (Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 56-57A; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) Pt 11; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 42; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 34; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) 
Pt VIIA; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 34; Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) Pt 6; and Associations Act (NT) Pt 7). 
  162… the provisions of clauses 10 and 11 are important, as they will permit many bodies, which 
have incorporated or registered under various Acts which were not really intended to cater for 
their requirements, to become incorporated associations. As such they will receive the benefits 
of simplicity and cheapness of administration, management and control bestowed by the bill. 
However I believe I should point out that bodies which are appropriately registered or 
incorporated under other Acts will not be able to effectively transfer their registration.39
 
Consideration should also be given to the following extracts of parliamentary debate 
in connection with the importance of volunteers to incorporated associations.  In the 
Western Australian Upper House the Attorney General observed:  
Some [incorporated associations] are staffed by large staffs and professional assistance.  By far 
the majority are likely to be constituted by modest numbers of members and serviced by 
volunteers.40
… The overwhelming majority are serviced by volunteers, people putting in work in good faith 
and not looking for personal advantage.41
 
The Hon. Max Evans MLC also stated in the same place that: 
Some associations have a very large professional staff, and others have no staff at all and the 
work is done by a lot of do-gooders ...  [S]ome of these community-minded people are very 
capable, but others are not; they do not carry out their responsibilities in the manner in which 
they should be carried out, not due to any malice or lack of intent, but because they are not 
qualified to do the job.42
 
                                                 
39   Victoria, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 4 December 1981, at 4291 
per Hon. Mr MacLellan. 
40  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1987 (36 
Elizabeth II) at 2289 per Hon. Joseph Berinson. 
41  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1987 (36 
Elizabeth II) at 2289 per Hon. Joseph Berinson at 3700. 
42  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard),  1987 (36 
Elizabeth II) at 2289 per Hon. Max Evans at 3275. 
  163In a similar vein, the Hon. Andrew Mensaros MLA, speaking in the Western 
Australian Lower House observed that: 
These bodies are numerous and cover all sorts of groups in the community, many without 
much business skill whose members are not only entirely composed of volunteers but are also 
fairly simple people; they are not trading bodies.43
 
So much for Australia and New Zealand, but what of the broader international 
context?  Is the characterisation of incorporated sporting associations proposed by 
this thesis justified by reference to relevant international conceptions?  Professor 
Salamon has suggested that, on an international basis, voluntary nonprofit 
associations can be identified for ease of comparison and analysis on the basis of five 
common and distinctive characteristics.44  These characteristics are that such entities 
are: 
1.  Organised, that is institutionalized to some extent 
2.  Private, that is, institutionally separate from government, even if they receive 
governmental support 
3.  Nonprofit-distributing, that is, not returning any profits they may generate to their 
owners or directors 
4.  Self-governing, that is, controlled according to their own internal procedures and not 
operated from outside 
5.  Voluntary, that is, non-compulsory and involving some meaningful degree of 
voluntary participation 
 
                                                 
43  Western Australia, Legislative Assembly, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1987 (36 
Elizabeth II) at 5009. 
44   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 4. 
  164Salamon’s work, referred to above, was inclusive of a panoply of organisational 
types.45  The present thesis, however, is restricted in its investigation to incorporated 
associations in two common law countries only.  As the focus of this work is 
sporting entities incorporated by a legislative scheme of registration, they are very 
much a creature of the parliaments of their domestic jurisdiction.  It is therefore 
necessary to add to the list of characteristics generated by Professor Salamon in order 
to account for the particularity of the current project.  The first addition that I 
propose to make to Salamon’s list is that of eligibility for incorporation.  This 
characteristic will be considered first.  Following on will be a consideration of those 
defining characteristics identified by Professor Salamon as enumerated above.46  
Finally the special taxation treatment of eligible sporting associations as a sub-genus 
of incorporated associations will be considered.  As will be seen, this treatment 
directly questions the suitability of the modern trading corporation as a legal analogy 
for incorporated associations and provides important insight in selecting an 
alternative analogy. 
 
                                                 
45   In Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New 
York, USA, 1997 Chapter 4 “Australia” (country rapporteur Dr Mark Lyons UTS) the 
treatment is inclusive of unincorporated and incorporated associations, trusts, companies, 
cooperatives, friendly societies, Aboriginal corporations and industrial organisations as well 
as a number of others.  The treatment adopted in this thesis applies the more general 
framework proposed by Professor Salamon in the introductory chapters of his text. 
46   There are several aspects of Salamon’s research in this area that make it problematic for 
translation into this thesis.  Of particular significance in this regard are firstly the breadth of 
Salamon’s treatment, and secondly the exclusion of New Zealand from particular 
investigation.  By taking a broad approach to the non-profit sector, Salamon has, of necessity, 
had to resort to abstraction and generalisation to a degree that is not appropriate for present 
purposes.  The breadth of the research in an Australian context in particular has already been 
referred to above.  The implications of such schema generation were outlined in some detail 
in the previous chapter of this thesis.  In addition, I am interested in determining to what 
extent the situation in Australian jurisdictions corresponds with, and converges from, that 
pertaining in New Zealand.  Unfortunately, Salamon’s research does not allow for such 
comparison based insight. 
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To be eligible to incorporate in the jurisdictions under present consideration, a 
sporting association must comply with two types of statutory eligibility requirements.  
The first of these is as to the purposes for which the association was formed.  The 
second requirement is as to minimum membership.  There is a further issue relating 
to eligibility for incorporation which is not raised in any of the legislation but which 
is nonetheless relevant to incorporated associations from a policy perspective.  That 
is the question of whether the association is formed primarily for the benefit of 
members, or for the benefit of the community in general.  Where this issue is of 
particular significance is with respect to possible exempt taxation status that will be 
dealt with separately below.48  Each of these eligibility considerations will now be 
addressed in turn. 
 
Eligible Purposes 
In general there are two ways of articulating the purpose constraint as an eligibility 
criterion for incorporated associations.49  One of these is a positive expression and 
the other a negative expression.  The first is the requirement to comply with a 
statutory list of eligible purposes for which an incorporated association can be 
formed.  This list is usually non-exhaustive with the inclusion of a term of the 
                                                 
47   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 13; Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs 
Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 84-93; and 
CO(NZ),  Registering an Incorporated Society, New Zealand Companies Office, 
Christchurch, NZ, 2001. 
48   See Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New 
York, USA, 1997 at 14 & 28;  
49   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 13; Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs 
Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 84-7. 
  166ejusdem generis type phrased in terms such as “and any other purpose”.50  The other 
approach that is adopted with regard to eligibility for incorporation by reference to 
purposes is to state that all associations of persons are eligible to incorporate 
provided that they are not formed primarily for the purpose of trading or generating a 
pecuniary profit.  New Zealand,51 New South Wales,52 Queensland,53 Victoria54 and 
the Australian Capital Territory55 all allow for an association to incorporate where it 
is formed for a non-profit purpose and not primarily for trading purposes, or for 
making a pecuniary profit to be distributed to the members.56  In contrast in South 
Australia,57 Tasmania,58 Western Australia59 and the Northern Territory60 a list of the 
purposes for which an eligible association is formed is included in the legislation.   
 
Of significance to this thesis is that, regardless of the eligibility criteria that are 
mandated, the key determinant as to whether or not a group of people are eligible to 
incorporate is the nature of group purposes.61  In some jurisdictions this requirement 
is put positively, that is to say there are an agreed range of association purposes for 
                                                 
50   See for example Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4(1)(f). 
51   Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) at s 4 
52   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 7. 
53   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 5(1) (curiously phrased in the negative). 
54   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 3(1). 
55   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 14. 
56   Oleck, HL, "Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979" (1979) 10 Toledo Law Review 962. 
57   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 18(1). 
58   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 2(1). 
59   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4(1). 
60   Associations Act (NT) s 4. 
61   See Lyons, M, Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at 22. 
  167which an eligible association may be formed.62  In the remaining jurisdictions the 
eligibility requirement is expressed negatively.  That is to say, a group of persons can 
incorporate as an incorporated association in these jurisdictions provided that they do 
not pursue trading purposes or are not formed for the purpose of distributing 
pecuniary profits to members.63  It is extremely significant that the purposes for 
which an association is formed are the paramount determining eligibility criteria for 
incorporation in all jurisdictions, whether in Australia or New Zealand.  For instance 
New South Wales,64 Victoria65 and the Australian Capital Territory66 all require a 
separate statement of purposes to be included with an application for incorporation.  
This statement of purposes then forms part of the constitution or rules of 
incorporated associations in those jurisdictions.67  The remaining jurisdictions also 
require that the purposes for which the group is formed and operates are to be stated 
clearly in the rules of the association.68  To further emphasize the prime import of the 
purposes of incorporated associations, from the point in time at which an association 
is incorporated, any amendment to the purposes of the association or the rules of the 
association must meet statutory requirements.  These are stated in all jurisdictions.69  
                                                 
62   South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. 
63   New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory, and New Zealand.  
See White, DJ, "The Definition of "Gain" for the Purposes of Incorporation" (1970) 5 
Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 536. 
64   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 8 & 19(1). 
65   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 5(1)(b) & 21(1). 
66   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 16(b) &29. 
67   The term “rules” will be used throughout to refer to both “constitutions” and “rules” for ease 
of reference. 
68   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 25-25A; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 
(SA) s 23; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 17; Associations Incorporation Act 
1987 (WA) s 16; Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations (NT) Reg 2(2) & Sch Pt 1 
Cl 2; & Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6. 
69   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
ss 26A-26D; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 24; Associations Incorporation Act 
  168The centrality of association purposes has also been stressed by scholars outside of 
legal discourse who have examined not-for-profit associations.70
 
The purposes which are prescribed in South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia 
and the Northern Territory, are of further interest for present purposes.  As will be 
seen, there is a close approximation between this list of acceptable purposes and the 
range of charitable purposes at common law.  That is to say, the statutorily 
prescribed purposes closely correlate to those contained in the Preamble to the 
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (UK).71  It will be recalled from chapter 2, that this 
statute designated the following as charitable purposes: 
Relief of aged, impotent and poor people; maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and 
mariners, schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities; repairs of bridges, 
ports, havens, causeways, churches, seabanks and highways; education and preferment of 
orphans; relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; 
supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed; relief or 
redemption of prisoners or captives; aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments 
of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes. 
 
It will also be noted from the previous chapter that sport and recreation has been 
brought within the definition of charitable purposes in a number of jurisdictions.  The 
statutory list of eligible purposes provided for at s 4(1) of the Associations 
                                                                                                                                          
1964  (Tas) ss 18-19; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 22; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 17 & 19; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 30 
& 33; Associations Act (NT) ss 23(1)(a) (5) (6) & (8) & 25; and Incorporated Societies Act 
1908 (NZ) s 21.  Consider Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, 
J, et al, (Ed) Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, 
McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, Canada, 2001 generally. 
70   See for example Fiedler, MRG, "The Economics of the Church-Firm: A Case Study of the 
Churches of Christ in New South Wales: A Non Profit Organisation", PhD thesis, University 
of Queensland, Brisbane, 1985 Vol 1; and Lewis, BE, "The Development of a Financial 
Reporting Model for Not for Profit Trade and Professional Associations", DBA thesis, 
School of Government and Business Administration, George Washington University, 1980 
Chapter 2. 
71   43 Elizabeth I c4.  (The “Statute of Elizabeth”) 
  169Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) is fairly typical of the list used in other jurisdictions.  
That list is as follows: 
(a)  for a religious, educational, charitable or benevolent purpose;  
(b)  for the purpose of promoting or encouraging literature, science or the arts;  
(c)  for the purpose of sport, recreation or amusement;  
(d)  for the purpose of establishing, carrying on, or improving a community, social or 
cultural centre, or promoting the interests of a local community;  
(e)  for political purposes; or  
(f)  for any other purpose approved by the Commissioner. 72 
                                                 
72   In South Australia the prescribed eligible purposes are as follows: 
(a)  for a religious, educational, charitable or benevolent purpose; or  
(b)  for the purpose of promoting or encouraging literature, science or the arts; 
or  
(c)  for the purpose of providing medical treatment or attention, or promoting 
the interests of persons who suffer from a particular physical, mental or 
intellectual disability; or  
(d)  for the purpose of sport, recreation or amusement; or  
(e)  for the purpose of establishing, carrying on, or improving a community 
centre, or promoting the interests of a local community or a particular 
section of a local community; or  
(f)  for conserving resources or preserving any part of the environmental, 
historical or cultural heritage of the State; or  
(g)  for the purpose of promoting the interests of students or staff of an 
educational institution; or  
(h)  for political purposes; or  
(i)  for the purpose of administering any scheme or fund for the payment of 
superannuation or retiring benefits to the members of any organisation or 
the employees of any body corporate, firm or person; or  
(j)  for the purpose of promoting the common interests of persons who are 
engaged in, or interested in, a particular business, trade or industry; or  
(k)  for any purpose approved by the Minister, … 
In Tasmania, the list of eligible purposes is as follows: 
(i)  for a religious, educational, benevolent, or charitable purpose;  
(ii)  for the purpose of providing medical treatment or attention;  
(iii)  for the purpose of promoting or encouraging literature, science, or art;  
(iv)  for the purpose of recreation or amusement;  
(v)  for the purpose of establishing, managing, carrying on, or beautifying a 
community centre;  
(vi)  for the purpose of administering (whether as trustee or otherwise) any 
scheme or fund for the payment of superannuation or retiring benefits to 
the members of any organization or undertaking or the employees of any 
person or body of persons (whether incorporated or unincorporated); or  
(vii)  for promoting any of the foregoing purposes or any like purpose; and … 
  170 
While this surmise can be criticised with respect to a number of specific listed 
purposes such as “amusement” or “political” purposes, the relevance of the apparent 
connection between common law charitable purposes and eligible purposes for 
incorporated associations should not be discounted.  Indeed, the more generalised 
formulation of charitable purposes propounded by Macnaghten LJ that was 
mentioned in the preceding chapter can be closely aligned to the eligible purposes 
listed above.73
 
The consequence of this is that a number of the incorporated associations that are the 
subject of this thesis could also qualify as charitable organisations under the common 
law principles of charitable trusts.  Such a close connection between incorporated 
sporting associations and charitable trusts is further highlighted when considering the 
dissolution of incorporated associations. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
It is also important to stress that eligibility for incorporation under the relevant 
statutes will be mutually exclusive of the kind of broad trading thrust that is assumed 
                                                                                                                                          
In the Northern Territory the list of eligible purposes is as follows: 
a)  an association, society, institution or body formed or carried on for – 
(i)  a religious, educational, benevolent or charitable purpose; 
(ii)  the purpose of providing medical treatment or attention; 
(iii)  the purpose of promoting or encouraging literature, science, art or a 
cultural activity; 
(iv)  the purpose of recreation or amusement; 
(v)  the purpose of beautifying or improving a community centre,  
being an association, society, institution or body the activities of which are 
carried on in whole or in part in the Territory … 
  171to be the case with respect to the modern trading corporation, as outlined in the 
previous chapter.  This is so regardless of the exact wording adopted to confer 
eligibility for incorporation in all Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions. 
 
Minimum Size 
An association wishing to incorporate in most of the jurisdictions under present 
consideration must meet an additional eligibility requirement relating to minimum 
membership.74  The minimum eligible membership varies across jurisdictions from 
zero to fifteen.75  However, the majority of jurisdictions require a multiplicity of 
members.  In contrast with partnership law, there is no maximum membership limit 
in any jurisdiction. 
 
Mutual vs. Public Benefit Eligibility 
This eligibility criterion could theoretically be imposed on incorporated associations 
either from the perspective of initial eligibility for incorporation, or from the 
perspective of obtaining special status once incorporated.  It is suggested that there is 
fundamental difference between associations formed for mutual benefit as opposed 
                                                                                                                                          
73   Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 583: 
1.  Trusts for the relief of poverty; 
2.  Trusts for the advancement of education; 
3.  Trusts for the advancement of religion; 
4.  Trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the 
preceding heads. 
74   With the exception of South Australia and Tasmania. 
75   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 7 (5 members); Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) s 7 (7 members); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) (no minimum); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) (no minimum); Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) s 3 (5 members); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4 (6 members); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 14 (5 members); Associations Act (NT) s 26 (5 
members); and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 4 (15 members). 
  172to those formed for public benefit.76  For present purposes, it will be recalled that one 
key aspect of charitable trusts is that such trusts are not formed for the benefit of 
individuals, but to promote charitable purposes with a strong public benefit element.  
This has been referred to as the public benefit requirement of charitable trusts.77  As 
noted above, this is not currently a determining eligibility criterion for incorporated 
associations in any of the Australian or New Zealand jurisdictions.  It is however a 
point of considerable importance to the taxation treatment of these bodies.  This 
point is addressed separately below. 
 
Organised/Institutionalised 
As indicated already, all of the sporting entities which are the subject of this thesis 
are incorporated under relevant statutes in each state of Australia and in New 
Zealand.  The very process of incorporation therefore suggests a degree of 
organisation and institutionalisation.  For instance in each of the Australian states and 
territories and in New Zealand, incorporated associations are given a formal statutory 
definition, and various statutory requirements are laid down with respect to eligibility 
for incorporation.78  For example, only South Australia and Tasmania do not 
                                                 
76   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 14 and 28. 
77    Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at 535, and Evans, M, Equity and Trusts, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Chatswood, 2003 at 368. 
78   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 3; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
s 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 3; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
(Tas) s 2; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 3; Associations Incorporation Act 
1987 (WA) s 3; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 3; Associations Act (NT) s 4; 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 3 (definition); Associations Incorporation Act 1984 
(NSW) s 7; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 7; Associations Incorporation Act 
1985 (SA) s 18; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 2; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) s 3; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 14; Associations Act (NT) s 8; and Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908 (NZ) s 4 (eligibility). 
  173stipulate a minimum membership requirement for incorporated associations.  In each 
of the other jurisdictions the membership requirements are for more than one 
person.79  In New Zealand, which has the highest number of prerequisite members, 
the minimum number of members is 15 persons.80
 
In addition, there are stipulations as to the use of association names and these are 
found in all of the relevant statutes.81  Each jurisdiction has specific requirements 
relating to the rules of incorporated associations.82  With the sole exception of 
Western Australia, in each jurisdiction there is a requirement for an incorporated 
association to have a public officer, secretary, or registered office.83 All but two 
jurisdictions84 provide for the identification or appointment of a committee with 
                                                 
79  Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) 5 members (s 7(1)); Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) 7 members (s 5(1)(a)); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) 5 members 
(s 3); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) 6 members (s 4(1)); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) 5 members (s 14(1)); and  Associations Act (NT) 5 members 
(s 26). 
80   Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 4(1).  Each corporate member equates to 3 natural 
person members (s 31). 
81   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 12-14; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) Pt 4; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) ss 20(1)(c), 60 & 65; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 9-10; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) Pt III & s 
52; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 8, 10(b) & 18; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 3 Div 3.5; Associations Act (NT) ss 15-19; and Incorporated Societies Act 
1908 (NZ) ss 11-11A. 
82   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 11, 19-20 & Sch 1; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) Pt 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) Pt 3 Div 3; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 7, 16, 18-19; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) ss 5(1)(c), 6 & 21-22A; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) Pt IV & Sch 
1; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 16 & Pt 3 Div 3.4; Associations Act (NT) ss 
21-25; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) ss 6 & 21. 
83   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 22-25; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) Pt 2 Div 3, & ss 65-69; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 56; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 14-15; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 24-28; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 4 & s 121; Associations Act (NT) ss 27 & 28; 
and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 18. 
84   Exceptions being New Zealand and the Northern Territory. 
  174respect to an incorporated association.85 All jurisdictions with the exception of the 
Northern Territory and New Zealand provide for the holding of meetings in an 
incorporated association in a reasonably formal manner.86   
 
Western Australia alone does not require the lodgement of periodic returns with the 
regulator.87  This coupled with the fact that Western Australia does not require 
notification of any public officer, secretary or registered office to the government 
regulator means that the reliability of the Western Australian register of incorporated 
associations is currently very much a matter of conjecture.  However, even in 
Western Australia there is a formalised requirement for incorporated associations to 
report to members the nature of their financial dealings on an annual basis.88  With 
respect to the remaining Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions there are 
formalised requirements for account preparation, audit and the periodic filing of 
                                                 
85   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 21-21A; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) Pt 7; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) Pt 4 Div 1; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) Pt V; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 20-22 & 29; and 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 60-66. 
86   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 5, 26 & 28; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) ss 3,  55-57 & 60-69; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) ss 3, 39, 40 & 
51; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 2 & 22A-23; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) ss 29 & 30(1)-(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 23-24; and 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 68-70. 
87   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 27; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
s 59(4); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 36 (“prescribed” associations only); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 24B; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) 
s 30(4); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 79-80; Associations Act (NT) ss 41-
45; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 23.  See also reform proposals in Canada in 
Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit 
Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, 
Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 13. 
88   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 25-26 & 39.  Most other jurisdictions, except 
Tasmania and New Zealand, have a similar requirement (Associations Incorporation Act 
1984 (NSW) s 26; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 59(1); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 35 (“prescribed” associations only); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 30(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 72-73; 
and Associations Act (NT) ss 43 & 44.  See also Sadhu, MA, A Framework for Financial 
  175official returns with the regulator.89  Finally, in matters related to the dissolution of 
incorporated associations, each of the various jurisdictions has specific requirements 
relating to the disposition of surplus assets on dissolution.90   
 
All incorporated associations are required to have a document which serves as the 
rules of the association.91  In all jurisdictions the minimum requirements that have to 
be provided for in the rules of incorporated associations are laid down.92  With the 
exception of New South Wales,93 Queensland94 and Tasmania95 the wording of the 
rules of incorporated associations is entirely a matter for incorporated associations to 
determine for themselves.  The rules of an incorporated association must be lodged 
                                                                                                                                          
Reporting by Incorporated Associations, Legislative Policy Discussion Paper No4, 
Australian Accounting Research Foundation, Caulfield, 1994. 
89   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 26-28; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) Pt 6 Div 2; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) Pt 4 Div 2 & 3B, Reg 9; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 23A-24 & 24B; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) ss 30-30B; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 5; Associations Act 
(NT) ss 41-45; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 23. 
90   This will be discussed in more detail below.  Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) Pt 
8; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) Pt 10; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 
(SA) Pt 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 32-34A; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) Pt IIIV; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) Pt VI; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) Pt 7; Associations Act (NT) Pts 8 & 9; & Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 (NZ) ss 23A-28. 
91   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11; 19(2); Associations Incorporation Act 
1981  (Qld) s Pt 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) ss 23-23A; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 16; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 6, 21(2)-(4) 
& Sch; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
(ACT) ss 16(c) & 31; Associations Act (NT) ss 21, 119(1)(d), & Associations (Model 
Constitution) Regulations (NT) Reg 3; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6. 
92   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) s 47 & Reg 7; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23A; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 17(2) & Sch; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 6 
& Sch; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1991 (ACT) s 32 & Sch 1; Associations Act (NT) s 119(1)(d), & Associations (Model 
Constitution) Regulations (NT) Sch; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6. 
93   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 19, Reg 9 & Sch 1. 
94   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 25A & Reg 8. 
95   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 16, (Model Rules) Reg 3 & Sch 1. 
  176with the application for incorporation.96  Thereafter, with the exception of South 
Australia,97 Northern Territory98 and New Zealand,99 any alterations made to the 
association’s rules require the passing of a “special” resolution.100  Clearly as a result 
of the foregoing and in line with the assertion of Professor Salamon above, it can be 
seen that there is a high degree of statutory organisation and institutionalisation of 
incorporated associations. 
 
Private 
A key element of all incorporated associations (whether sporting or otherwise) is 
their essentially domestic (as opposed to commercial) nature.101  Sometimes referred 
to as “third sector” entities, they generally operate autonomously from both 
government (ie: the “public” sector) and commerce.102  The so-called “domestic” 
                                                 
96   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 9; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
s 9; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 19; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
(Tas) s 7 & Reg 12; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 5; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 18; 
Associations Act (NT) s 119(1)(d), & Associations (Model Constitution) Regulations (NT) 
Reg 3(1)(a); & Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 7. 
97    The special resolution is a default methodology only in South Australia (Associations 
Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 24). 
98   Notice of any change in the rules must be lodged but the methodology for changing the rules 
is a matter for members (Associations Act (NT) ss 21(1)(g) & 23). 
99   Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 21. 
100   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
s 48; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 18; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) s 22; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 17(1); and Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 33.  Compare with the reform proposals in Canada outlined 
in Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit 
Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, 
Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 7. 
101   Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
102   Drucker,  PF,  Managing the Non-Profit Organization: Practices and Principles, 
HarperCollins, New York, USA, 1990; Duca, DJ, Nonprofit Boards: Roles, Responsibilities, 
and Performance, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York, USA, 1996; Anthony, RN & Young, 
DW,  Management Control in Nonprofit Organizations, 6th ed, Irwin/McGraw-Hill, Burr 
Ridge, USA, 1999 Chapter 2; Brooks, N, "The Role of the Voluntary Sector in a Modern 
Welfare State" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State and Market, McGill-Queen's 
  177sphere is one in which both the judiciary and the legislature have traditionally been 
reluctant to interfere.  In this thesis, the term “private” as a characteristic of 
incorporated association should be read to equate with the notion of “domestic”.  As 
Salamon states, “one of the defining features of these organisations is their self-
governing character, their ability to control their own internal operations.”103  As 
observed by a number of authors, the private nature of such domestic entities has 
been the source of concern and suspicion on the part of the judicial and political 
establishment over the centuries in the English common law tradition.104  More lately 
there has been growing scholarly interest in the way in which non-profit entities, 
traditionally viewed as being strictly domestic enterprises, interact with government 
on the achievement of political social agendas.105  Of particular interest is the extent 
to which nonprofit entities rely on government for their legislative framework and 
financial contributions for their continued operation.106  Related to this is the 
favourable taxation status of nonprofit groups.107  This suggests a blurring of the 
“public/private” distinction as it relates to the voluntary non-profit sector generally. 
                                                                                                                                          
University Press, Montreal Canada, 2001, and Lyons, M, Third Sector: The Contribution of 
Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001. 
103   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 19. 
104   See for example the excellent treatment in Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit 
Associations in Australia and New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 10-8 
with particular note of the action for “Contempt of the Prerogative”. 
105    Sievers, AS, "Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in Australia and 
Other Common Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124 at 
125.  For an excellent introductory treatment of this scholarship see Wheeler, S, 
Corporations and the Third Way, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2002.  See 
Lyons, M, Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at Chapters 19-25 more generally for a 
comprehensive treatment of the Australian experience. 
106   Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State 
and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University 
Press, Montreal, Canada, 2001 at 548-52 
107    As this issue has a number of facets worthy of consideration for present purposes, it is 
considered separately below under the heading “Income Tax Status of Incorporated 
Associations”. 
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The issue of funding sources and the uses to which they may be put is both unique 
and at the heart of incorporated associations.  As indicated above, any trade in which 
the association engages can only be incidental to the attainment of the association’s 
core purpose or purposes. 
 
Research reveals that incorporated associations are typically funded by a 
combination of subscriptions, donations, sponsorship and operating activities.  If one 
narrows the consideration of funding to sporting groups (being the most common 
form of incorporated association and the category with which this work is primarily 
concerned), the Australian Bureau of Statistics reports that roughly 24% of funding 
for such groups comes from subscriptions, 39% of all income comes from an 
assortment of donations and sponsorship with the remainder being generated from 
operations.108  Interestingly Commonwealth, State and Local government outlays on 
the broader sector of "recreation"109 account for about 45% of total income to the 
sector.110  Voluntary associations in general, and incorporated associations in 
particular are, therefore, quite unlike trading companies in particular in terms of 
likely funding sources. 
 
NonProfit Distributing / Personal Benefit Restrictions  
In keeping with the eligibility requirements discussed above, incorporated 
associations in all jurisdictions are prohibited from distributing income or capital to 
                                                 
108  Sports Census 1996, Ministry of Sport and Recreation, Perth, 1997 at 37. 
109   Accounting for about one third of all Western Australian incorporated associations. 
110  Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 11 December, 1997. 
  179members.  However, as will be demonstrated, the nature and degree of this 
prohibition is variable across jurisdictions and depends on whether one speaks of an 
association that is operational or one that is being dissolved. 
 
Operational Associations 
As has been stressed above, a nonprofit association is formed to pursue purposes, and 
the income and assets of the association are utilised to achieve those organisational 
purposes to the exclusion of all else.  This is particularly so with respect to the 
prohibition against nonprofit entities distributing any pecuniary profits to members.  
All of the various statutes under consideration in this thesis, with the sole exception 
of the Northern Territory,111 prohibit the formation of an incorporated association for 
the purposes of trade, or to obtain pecuniary profit or gain for members.112  Professor 
Salamon has identified this as a defining characteristic of nonprofit enterprise 
throughout the world.113  This is occasionally referred to as the “non-distribution 
constraint” and it is a key point of departure between trading enterprises and 
nonprofit enterprises.   
 
                                                 
111   See Associations Act (NT) s 4 (“association” definition at (c) & provisions dealing with 
“trading associations”). 
112   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 4, 7 & Reg 9; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981  (Qld) ss 4-5; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 18; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 2 “association” (b); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) ss 3(2), 10(4A) & 51; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4(2)&(4); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 4 & 14; Associations Act (NT) s 4 (definition 
of “association” at (a)); but note s 4 “association” (c); Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) 
ss 4-5. 
113   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 4 & 30-2. 
  180Non-Operational Associations 
The final destination of the assets or funds of an incorporated association on 
dissolution is a question which also raises the issue of distributing the funds of an 
association to members.114  As Dr Fletcher makes very clear, because of the unique 
nature of unincorporated associations there is some controversy (and certainly a great 
deal of confusion) relating to the basis upon which the distribution of surplus assets 
of such groups to their members should proceed.  Fortunately we are saved the 
intellectual exercise of resolving a plethora of contradictory rationes because the area 
of dissolution of incorporated associations has been dealt with as a matter of statute 
in each of the jurisdictions that this thesis is considering.  This statutory resolution of 
an unsatisfactory common law situation was not always the case, but as at the date of 
this thesis the dissolution of surplus assets of incorporated associations is provided 
for very clearly in the relevant legislation.115  The details of these provisions are set 
out below. 
 
In broad terms, an incorporated association can determine either through cancellation 
of incorporation by the government regulator on the one hand, or by a winding-up 
(either voluntary or involuntary) on the other.116   
                                                 
114   The situation with respect to unincorporated associations is somewhat complex and is dealt 
with exhaustively in Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia 
and New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 10. 
115   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 22; and Sievers, AS, Associations and 
Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 148-
150 & 153-155.  
116   Cancellation of incorporation (Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 54 & 55A; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 93 & 105N; Associations Incorporation Act 
1985  (SA) ss 42, 43A-44; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 34-34A; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 31AA-31AB & 36E; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 35; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 83 & 93; 
Associations Act (NT) Pts 6 (voluntary transfer of all property) and 8 (non-trading 
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Cancellation of Incorporation 
In Tasmania and the Northern Territory an incorporated association may suffer 
cancellation of its incorporation compulsorily by administrative decision of the 
registrar117 or voluntarily at its own request.118  Tasmania is silent on the issue of the 
disposition of property of an association following the cancellation of 
incorporation.119  This means that the issue may be decided by members as they see 
fit.  Such a scenario could conceivably result in the distribution of surplus assets to 
members.  There is no statutory direction to the Tasmanian registrar regarding 
surplus assets on cancellation by administrative decision of the registrar.  Common 
law would therefore presumably devolve such property to the crown as bona 
vacantia.120  In the Northern Territory, voluntary cancellation of incorporation 
requires the prior transfer of all association assets to an association formed for 
similar purposes, to charity or to a local government authority.121  In New South 
                                                                                                                                          
associations only); Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 28). Winding-up (Associations 
Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 50-51; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 89-
90; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 41; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 
(Tas) s 32; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 33, 34 & Pt VIII Div 3; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 30 & 31; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
(ACT) ss 88-90; Associations Act (NT) Pt 9 (external administration)(all associations); and 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) ss 24-26). 
117   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 34; and Associations Act (NT) Pts 6 (voluntary 
cancellation) and 8 (compulsory cancellation). 
118   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 34A. 
119    Considerable ambiguity is created by the interaction of ss 7, 16 and Associations 
Incorporation (Model Rules) Regulations 1997 (Tas) Sch cl 6(2).  It is entirely unclear as to 
whether the prohibitions against allowing pecuniary distributions to members that are 
contained in these provisions extend to surplus assets on dissolution by cancellation. 
120   Enever, FA, Bona Vacantia under the Law of England, HM Stationery Office, London, UK, 
1927 at 51-64; Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and 
New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 180-2; Sievers, AS, Associations 
and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 
73-4; and Re Producers’ Defence Fund [1954] VLR 246. 
121   Associations Act (NT) s 54(1). 
  182Wales,122 Queensland,123 Western Australia,124 and the Northern Territory (in the 
case of a compulsory cancellation)125 on cancellation of incorporation the surplus 
property of the association in question vests with the registrar126 in each state.  In 
South Australia the surplus assets of defunct incorporated associations which have 
their incorporated status cancelled vest in the registrar and are then paid into 
consolidated account via the treasurer.127  Similar provisions to those in force in 
South Australia also apply in Victoria,128 and the Australian Capital Territory.129  In 
New Zealand the assets of incorporated associations that have their incorporated 
status cancelled face the same disposition procedures as associations that are wound 
up by the court.130   
 
                                                 
122   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 55.  The ultimate destination of surplus assets 
is decided by members via a special resolution (s 53) with the registrar holding a veto power.  
Under this provision assets must not be transferred to a member unless it is itself an 
association which prohibits distributions to members.  (Section 53(2A)(b) is somewhat 
tautological as it speaks of potential “unincorporated” members – obviously a nonsense).  
Trusts must be respected and government contributions must be returned (s 53(2A)(c) & 
(2B)). 
123   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 92 & 94.  The registrar may vest such property 
in the public trustee or other persons or incorporated associations for specified purposes (s 
94). 
124   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 35 gives the registrar power to cancel an 
association’s incorporation.  Section 36(1) vests any surplus assets on cancellation of 
incorporation in the registrar and gives them discretion to deal with the assets.  This 
discretion is restricted (at s 36(3)) by reference to s 33 which inter alia requires surplus assets 
to be directed to another incorporated association or to charitable purposes (s 33(2)(b))). 
125   Associations Act (NT) ss 66-69.  These funds are ultimately paid into the government account 
(s 68(6)). 
126    The term “registrar” is used for simplicity throughout to denote the statutory officer 
responsible for the administration of the relevant legislation in each jurisdiction 
notwithstanding the official nomenclature. 
127   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 46. 
128   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 36F. 
129   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 95. 
130   Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 27. 
  183Winding-Up 
Once an incorporated association has been wound-up (either voluntarily or 
involuntarily) there may be surplus assets on winding-up requiring distribution.  In 
New Zealand the destination of any surplus funds on winding-up will be a matter to 
be decided by the rules of the association,131 or otherwise132 by the registrar.133  This 
is subject to the rider that where any remaining property is subject to a trust, that trust 
continues to apply.  
 
In Victoria the legislation provides that the Supreme Court has the power to 
determine all matters relating to the winding-up of an incorporated association under 
a compulsory winding-up.134  Where a Victorian incorporated association is to be 
voluntarily wound-up, the members may provide for the subsequent distribution of 
any surplus assets on winding-up.  This may be via a special clause in the rules of the 
association135 or by a special resolution.136  In the event that the rules or any such 
special resolution do not otherwise provide, any surplus property must be divided 
equally amongst the remaining members.137   
 
                                                 
131   This is one of the matters that must be provided for in the rules of an incorporated society in 
New Zealand (Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6(1)(k)).  No further direction is given 
in this matter.  Consequently, distribution between members is entirely possible. 
132   Such a situation may arise for instance where the rules allow for surplus assets to be devolved 
onto a non-existent association or a defunct charity.   
133   Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 27. 
134   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 34.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under the 
modified winding up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 36D. 
135   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) Sch cl 15 provides that an association must 
provide for the destination of funds in the event of a voluntary winding-up of the association. 
136   Ibid s 33A. 
137   Ibid s 33B.  But note the specific restrictions contained at ss 33C (government contributions 
received), 33D (orders of the Supreme Court), and 33E (property subject to trusts). 
  184The Queensland Supreme Court also has the power to determine all matters relating 
to the winding-up of an incorporated association.138  All Queensland incorporated 
associations must provide for the distribution of any surplus assets on winding-up in 
their rules.139  If the model rules have been adopted, or if a distribution clause is not 
included in the association’s rules, then surplus assets must be directed to a similar 
association in a cy-près manner.140  Incorporated associations may, however, 
specifically provide for an alternative distribution methodology.141  Notwithstanding 
anything in the association’s rules, members of associations in Queensland can make 
specific provision for distributing surplus assets by way of a special resolution.  Such 
a resolution is binding on all parties.  This could conceivably include a distribution 
between members.142  As a default position, where there is no rule or special 
resolution, the Queensland registrar may vest such property in the public trustee or 
other persons or incorporated associations for specified purposes.143  This would 
presumably apply where, for example an association is defunct, or the membership 
body has been reduced below quorum levels.144
 
As in other jurisdictions, the Tasmanian Supreme Court has the power to determine 
all matters relating to the winding-up of an incorporated association under a winding-
                                                 
138   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 89-90.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under 
the modified winding-up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 91. 
139   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 47. 
140   Ibid s 47 & Regs 7, 8 & Sch 4 cl 36. 
141   Ibid s 47. 
142   Subject to any trusts (Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 92(1)). 
143   Ibid ss 92 & 94.   
144   Ibid s 47(2). 
  185up.145  In Tasmania a two-thirds majority of the members at a meeting called to 
wind-up an association can approve a resolution for the disposition of any surplus 
assets.146  There is nothing in the legislation to prevent such a resolution directing the 
surplus assets to association members.  Once approved by the Supreme Court,147 this 
resolution becomes an order of the court.148  Where there is no such resolution the 
Supreme Court is required to make sufficient orders to distribute any surplus 
property “having regard to the objects and purposes of the association being wound 
up”.149  This could perhaps be argued to require a cy-près style distribution 
methodology on the part of the court.  
 
The legislation in remaining jurisdictions specifically prohibits the distribution of 
surplus assets of incorporated associations to any of the members or former members 
of the incorporated association.  In New South Wales the Supreme Court has the 
power to determine all matters relating to the winding-up of an incorporated 
association under a winding-up.150  However, any surplus assets of an incorporated 
association on dissolution can only be vested (under the terms of a special resolution 
of members) in another association with similar objects to the association which is 
                                                 
145   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 32-33.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under 
the modified winding-up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 32. 
146   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 33. 
147   The Supreme Court may refuse to approve any resolution it deems to be “unjust” (s 33(2)). 
148   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 33(1). 
149   Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 33(2)(b).  Presumably this would suggest to the 
court that a cy-près scheme should be considered as the first alternative. 
150   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 51.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under 
the modified winding-up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 51(3). 
  186being dissolved.151  In addition, the recipient of the surplus assets so transmitted must 
also prohibit distribution of surplus assets to its members.  It is also interesting to 
note that, under the New South Wales provisions such a recipient association need 
not itself be incorporated.
152. 
 
As with other Australian jurisdictions, in South Australia the Supreme Court has the 
power to determine all matters relating to the winding-up of an incorporated 
association.153  The South Australian provisions relating to the surplus assets of a 
dissolved incorporated association do allow for the distribution of surplus assets to 
be made to a member of the incorporated association.  However, such a recipient 
member must itself be an incorporated association with identical or similar aims and 
objects.154  Other than this, incorporated associations cannot distribute their surplus 
assets on dissolution to a member.
155  Where the distribution of surplus assets on 
winding-up is not provided for in an association’s rules,156 the distribution may be 
directed by a special resolution of members in the first instance,157 or in default of 
this, by the Supreme Court.158  Where the distribution of surplus assets is decided by 
the Supreme Court, the court is required to make sufficient orders to distribute any 
surplus property and in so doing, must “have regard to the objects of the 
                                                 
151   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 53.  Subject to any trust and the return of any 
government contributions. 
152   Ibid s 53(2A)(b).  Note the veto of the registrar (s 53(2A)(a)). 
153   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 41.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under the 
modified winding up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 41(2). 
154   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 43(1a) 
155 Ibid  s  43(1). 
156   Ibid s 43(2)(a). 
157   Ibid s 43(2)(b). 
158   Ibid ss 43(2) & (3). 
  187association”.159  Again this seems to imply that the court must apply any surplus “cy-
près” the purposes of the dissolved association.  The Northern Territory provisions 
are identical to those in South Australia.160
 
The provisions of the Australian Capital Territory legislation are similar to the 
provisions of South Australia. 161  As with South Australia, there is no provision for a 
distribution of surplus assets on winding-up between members.162  In addition in the 
Australian Capital Territory any cy-près distributions of surplus assets on winding-up 
must be nominated by the association that is wound-up (either in its rules163 or by 
way of a special resolution164) otherwise in the alternative, those assets vest in the 
registrar165 for transmission to the Territory.166
 
Once again the Western Australian Supreme Court has the power to determine all 
matters relating to the winding-up of an incorporated association.167  The Western 
Australian provisions relating to any surplus assets on the dissolution of incorporated 
associations are essentially borrowed from Parts II and III of the Charitable Trusts 
                                                 
159   Ibid s 43(4).  Presumably this would suggest to the court that a cy-près scheme should be 
considered as the first alternative. 
160   Associations Act (NT) s 76. 
161   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 88-91.  For example the Australian Capital 
Territory Supreme Court has the power to determine all matters relating to the winding-up of 
an incorporated association under a winding-up and must proceed under the modified 
winding-up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) ss 89-92).  
162   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 92.   
163   Ibid ss 92(1)(a)(i) & (1)(b)(i). 
164   Ibid ss 92(1)(a)(ii) & (1)(b)(ii). 
165   Ibid s 92(1)(c). 
166   Ibid s 95. 
  188Act 1962 (WA) governing statutory cy-près schemes concerning the dissolution of 
charitable trusts.  This indicates the close relationship in Western Australia between 
incorporated associations and charitable trusts.  While not strictly cy-près schemes in 
the sense applicable to charitable trusts, the Western Australian legislation168 requires 
the distribution of surplus assets on dissolution to be made exclusively to another 
incorporated association, or in the alternative to charitable purposes.169  S u c h  
distribution can be provided for in the rules of the dissolved incorporated 
association,170 either by way of a distribution plan produced by members 
generally,171 or the committee,172 otherwise it will be decided by the registrar.173
 
Provisions in the relevant association incorporation statutes174 are not the only 
provisions that must be considered when seeking to determine the true nature of 
incorporated associations.  Cy-près type schemes may be enshrined in the 
constitutions of incorporated associations, or be adopted by members’ resolutions, 
even in jurisdictions where distribution on dissolution to natural person members is a 
                                                                                                                                          
167   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 30-31.  The Supreme Court is to proceed under 
the modified winding-up provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pursuant to the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 30(4) & 31(3). 
168   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 33. 
169   Section 33(2)(b). 
170   Section 33(4).  This is a matter that must be provided for in the rules of associations under 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch 1. 
171   This plan may be produced by members (s 33(3)) or the committee with or without approval 
via ordinary resolution of members.  The plan is then lodged with the registrar for one month 
prior to implementation.  If these steps cannot be taken the registrar has the power to act 
administratively to credit the surplus assets into the state Consolidated Fund.  These funds are 
probably still subject to the cy-près style distribution constraints at s 32(2)(b). 
172   Section 33(5). 
173   Section 33(10). 
174   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA);  Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic);  Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA); 
  189statutory possibility.175  This is because of the income tax treatment of incorporated 
associations, specifically possible entitlement to beneficial taxation status. This will 
be discussed below under the heading of “Income Tax Status of Incorporated 
Associations”. 
 
Internal Governance 
Professor Salamon recognises four key issues relating to internal governance 
namely:176   
1.  The locus of ultimate authority in the organisation, 
2.  The size in terms of office and role of the governing board if any,  
3.  The officers of the organisation if any, and  
4.  The decision-making procedures the organisation will use.  
 
In order to facilitate comparison with the allegorical alternatives identified in the 
previous chapter, it is convenient to consider issues 1, 2 and 3 above together under 
the heading “Delegated Management” while issue 4 will be considered separately. 
 
Delegated Management 
This characteristic raises the question of whether or not the authority to make 
management decisions on behalf of the association rests with the membership 
generally, or with a smaller group of elected representatives.  Professor Salamon has 
recognised the existence of two alternative governance structures with respect to 
                                                                                                                                          
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT);  Associations Act (NT); and Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 (NZ). 
175   Such as Tasmania subsequent to a voluntary cancellation or winding-up; Queensland Victoria 
and, New Zealand following either a cancellation or winding-up,  
176   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at page 21.  See also Lyons, M, Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and 
Cooperative Enterprise in Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at Chapter 3. 
  190nonprofit incorporated associations.  The first of these is what he terms “membership 
organisations” and the second of these he terms “board-managed organisations”.177  
Sometimes membership organisations are referred to by other authors under the 
epithet “collegially” or “congregationally” governed.178
 
Clearly where an incorporated association chooses to be membership-governed, this 
would present problems for the traditional narrowly conceived organic theory as it 
has been applied to trading companies.  As will be recalled from chapter 1 such a 
theoretical construct requires the existence of two corporate organs, one being the 
membership meeting and the other being the board of directors.  Both chapters 1 and 
2 illustrated that this is the dominant paradigm in corporate law scholarship relating 
to the modern trading corporation.  Such a narrow conception would not have ready 
application to membership-governed associations given that in those groups all 
association decisions would be made by the membership as a whole.  Two 
jurisdictions within the scope of this study do not adequately allow for the possibility 
of an incorporated association being a membership organisation as defined by 
Salamon.179
 
                                                 
177   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at page 21. 
178    Lockley, GL, "The Foundation, Development and Influence of Congregationalism in 
Australia: With Emphasis on the Nineteenth Century", PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 1968 at Chapter XII generally, and at 359 & 364 in particular, where the founding 
fathers of the Australian associations incorporation legislation (Charles Bagot in South 
Australia and George Randell in Western Australia) are identified as members of the 
“Congregationalist” Church. 
179    Namely Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory.  The Associations Act (NT) is 
positively gnostic given that it neither adequately defines “committee” nor “management 
committee” but places various statutory responsibilities on this body (e.g. at s 27(6)).  On the 
straight jacketing effect of such proscriptive and inflexible statutory frameworks see Re 
Vassallo [2001] 1 Qd R 91 and the excellent discussion of this case in its broader context in 
  191In most other jurisdictions the relevant measures define the “committee”180 as the 
group that manages the association (or similar wording), which theoretically could 
include all members in a membership-governed association.181  The situation in the 
Northern Territory may allow for both membership and board governance models, 
however, the provisions of both the new Associations Act (NT) and the relevant 
Regulations are too poorly drafted to allow a definitive statement.182  In New 
Zealand there is no mention whatever of a “committee” in the Incorporated Societies 
Act 1908 (NZ), however, provision must be made in the rules of all associations in 
that country for the appointment of “officers”.183
 
In Queensland the traditional narrow form organic theory is most rigidly applied.184  
In this jurisdiction an incorporated association must have a committee185 with at least 
3 members, 2 of whom will always be the president and treasurer of the association 
and the third will be the secretary.186  This committee must meet at least once in 
                                                                                                                                          
Fletcher, K, "Incorporated Associations: Cheap Incorporation - Limited Choices" (2001) 
22(1) The Queensland Lawyer 20. 
180   Throughout this work the term “committee” will be used for ease of reference to include all 
equivalent nomenclatures such as “management committee” and “board” etc. 
181   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 3, Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 
29(1),  Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 2(1), Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) s 3, Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 20. 
182   Associations Act (NT) ss 4 “committee”, 29 (a blank statement of persons not precluded from 
membership) & 30 (persons disqualified from committee membership); and Associations 
(Model Constitution) Regulations (NT). 
183   At s 6(g). 
184   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) Pt 7. 
185   Ibid ss 60-61. 
186   Ibid ss 65-67. 
  192every four months,187 and notice of any changes to the association’s statutory 
officeholders must be lodged with the registrar.188   
 
Likewise in the Australian Capital Territory an incorporated association must have a 
committee of at least 3 members and notice of changes in its composition must be 
lodged with the regulator.189  As indicated above, none of the other jurisdictions 
under present consideration are as mandatory in their stipulations regarding officers 
or committees of incorporated associations. 
 
The structural governance question of an association having a committee raises one 
additional consideration which must be addressed.  As has been highlighted, in most 
jurisdictions the legislation is drafted in such a way as to apply to “membership-
governed” associations without forcing them to adopt a notional organic-style board 
structure.190  In addition, it may be the case that an association does follow the 
“board-managed” model of governance, but has a constitutional provision granting 
management power to the general meeting of members and that this power will be 
exercised between members meetings by the committee.191  The implications of such 
scenarios in the majority of relevant jurisdictions would be that all of the statutory 
duties of committee members would be applicable to those ordinary members present 
at general meetings when exercising management powers.  Indeed, it is probable that 
                                                 
187   Ibid s 63. 
188   Ibid s 68. 
189   Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 60 & 62. See Sievers, AS, Associations and 
Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 120. 
190   All except Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. 
191   Report on the "Associations Incorporation Bill 1987", The Law Society of Western Australia, 
Conveyancing Committee, Perth, 1987 at 14, para 8. 
  193any and all legal duties applicable to committee members in these jurisdictions, 
whether statutory, common law or equitable, would be applicable to such persons in 
such circumstances. 
 
Management powers, whether delegated to a board, or retained by the members in 
general meeting, also raise the issue of statutory duties required of committee 
members where they exist and have powers of management.  For present purposes I 
will characterise these duties as technical, qualitative or fiduciary in nature.192  By 
technical duties I refer to such administrative matters as observing time limits, 
keeping records, lodging documents, holding meetings etc.  Qualitative duties here 
should be taken to refer to the equivalent of the common law duty of skill, care and 
diligence of the reasonable person (with or without the additional inclusion of a 
“business judgement” criterion).  Duties of a fiduciary nature here refer to such 
matters as the duty of loyalty and utmost good faith normally imposed by equity on 
persons standing in a fiduciary relationship. 
 
Technical duties (together with statutory sanctions for their non-observance) are 
placed on members of committees or specifically identified individual members, in 
all jurisdictions.193  In addition, technical duties of a most grave nature apply to such 
                                                 
192   Eisenberg, MA, "Corporate Law and Social Norms" (1999) 99(5) Columbia Law Review 
1221 especially from 1265 concerning fiduciary duties. 
193   By technical duties I should not be taken to be characterising these duties of committee 
members of incorporated associations as trivial.  It is merely an appellation under which I 
choose to assemble like duties of a particular type.  Eg:  Associations Incorporation Act 1984 
(NSW) ss 20, 23(2), 25, 26(7), 27(1), 38(1) & (5), 63(3), 66(2), 67(5) & (6), 68 (specific 
duties of members), & 70 (default of the association creates personal liability for members); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 17, 24, 52-54, 57, 59, 65-66, 68, 70, 83, 87, 93, 
121A, 122 & 124 (specific duties of members); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) ss 
5, 8, 14, 30, 35(7), 37, 39C, 41B, 41D, 41E, 49AB-49AD, 49AF, 49A, 51, 53, 55, 58-59, 62, 
62D-62 (specific duties of members), & 57 (default of the association creates personal 
liability for members); Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) ss 14, 15, 18, 23A, 24, & 
  194individuals by virtue of incorporated associations being caught within the definition 
of a “Part 5.7 Body” at s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).194
 
Only South Australia imposes statutory duties of a qualitative nature on committee 
members of incorporated associations.195  Even in South Australia, however, this 
statutory impost is not universal.  These duties of reasonable care and diligence are 
applied to the committees of “prescribed associations” only.196  The relevant South 
Australian provision reads as follows: 
An officer of a prescribed association must at all times act with reasonable care and diligence 
in the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of the duties of his or her office.197
 
The wording of this provision is borrowed in large part from the wording of the 
former Corporations Law (Cth) s 232(4).  It would seem likely therefore that any 
case law relevant to that provision has application to the South Australian 
                                                                                                                                          
26 (specific duties of members); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 12A, 13A, 30, 
37L, 45A, 49, 49A, & 50A (specific duties of members), and 51(2) & (3) (default of the 
association creates personal liability for members); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 
(WA) ss 33(6) & (7), 39, & 43 (specific duties of members), and s 42 (default of the 
association creates personal liability for members); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
(ACT) ss 59, 62(2), 63, 64(4), 73, 74, 78, (specific duties of members), and 108 & 110 
(default of the association creates personal liability for members); Associations Act (NT) ss 
23, 28, & 45 (specific duties of public officer); ss 27(7), 30, 38(7), 42-44, & 46-48 (personal 
liability for committee members); ss 51, 88-90, 92, & 107 (officers); and, Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 (NZ) ss 18(4), 19(2), 20(3), 23(3), 23B(4) & (5), 34A(10) & (11). 
194   See for example Huntly, C, "Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for 
Officers of Incorporated Associations" (2000) 18(4) Company & Securities Law Journal 262 
for a detailed analysis of the technical consequences of this, particularly in regard to 
“technical insolvency” arising from poor accounting records. 
195   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(4) applies to “prescribed” (large) 
incorporated associations only.  Note the more radical position advocated in recent law 
reform proposals in Canada in Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework 
for a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy 
Directorate, Policy Sector, Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 33. 
196   Being those associations that have “gross receipts in that association's previous financial year 
in excess of $200,000” (Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 3). 
197   Ibid s 39A(4). 
  195equivalent.198  However, as I have already discussed in the previous chapter, the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) now contains a caveat on the directorial duty of care in 
the form of the business judgement rule.  No such modification has been made to the 
South Australian provision.199   
 
As to the existence or nature of any qualitative duties that may be owed by 
committees of incorporated associations at common law, we are left to conjecture 
and surmise.  Given the centrality of analogy in legal reasoning, it is unsurprising to 
note in the writings of leading scholars in this area a consistent reference back to the 
duties of directors of trading companies when seeking to expound a coherent 
jurisprudence.200  As painstakingly expressed in the previous chapter of this thesis, 
such analogical reasoning is based on the unquestioned proposition that the trading 
corporation is either the best or the only valid source analogue when mapping legal 
                                                 
198   See Sievers, AS, "What Is the Future for Honorary Directors and Committee Members? - 
Their Duties and Liabilities" in McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-
Profit Associations, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, 1996 generally and at 33-8 in 
particular. 
199   That this may present problems in resorting to company law as an analogy for incorporated 
associations, see Fisher, AF, "Duties of Company Directors and Committee Members of 
Incorporated Associations: Have the Paths Divided?" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 143. 
200   “Although case law has not established the principle, it is probable that committee members 
in all jurisdictions owe in the same measure, the common law and equitable duties which law 
and equity have imposed on company directors.” (Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-
Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 
289); “It also appears likely, although once again there is no supporting Australian authority, 
that the members of the committee of an incorporated association would be seen as being in 
the same position as a company director and subject to a similar duty of care, skill and 
diligence.” (Sievers, AS, "What Is the Future for Honorary Directors and Committee 
Members? - Their Duties and Liabilities" in McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues 
for Non-Profit Associations, LBC Information Services, North Ryde, 1996 at 33); “The 
position of the members of the committee of an incorporated association varies considerably 
…  It appears probable that they would be regarded as being in an analogous position to 
company directors.” (Halsbury’s Laws of Australia ¶435-205); “The relation of committee 
members to an incorporated association is identical to that of directors to a company.” (The 
Laws of Australia Topic 4.8 “Non-Corporate Organisations” Chapter 3 ¶135); and “The 
accepted wisdom is that the duties of company directors arising under the common law and 
equity also apply to those involved in the governance of incorporated associations.” (Fisher, 
  196duties in the incorporated association environment.  To date, while there has been 
some tentative recognition that such an analogical approach may not be entirely 
appropriate,201 it is yet to be carefully analysed or seriously questioned.  For present 
purposes, however, it is important to note that the committee members of the vast 
majority of incorporated associations, whether sporting or not, are unencumbered by 
statutory duties of a qualitative nature.  Whether or not the general law will (or 
should) follow that applicable to trading companies is currently very much a moot 
point.202
 
In contradistinction to the general legislative silence concerning qualitative duties of 
committees of incorporated associations, there is more widespread inclusion of duties 
of a fiduciary nature in the relevant legislation.  These duties are: 
•  To act honestly in the discharge of their office.203 
•  Not to make improper use of information gained by virtue of their position 
(such as to benefit themselves or cause detriment to the association).204 
                                                                                                                                          
AF, "Duties of Company Directors and Committee Members of Incorporated Associations: 
Have the Paths Divided?" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 143 at 147). 
201   See the discussion in the previous chapter; Fisher, AF, "Duties of Company Directors and 
Committee Members of Incorporated Associations: Have the Paths Divided?" (2001) 13(2) 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 143; Huntly, C, "A Most Useful Enactment: The 
Legislative History, Function and Legal Philosophy of the Associations Incorporation 
Legislation in Western Australia", M.Com thesis, School of Business Law, Curtin University 
of Technology, Perth, 1999 at 164-8. 
202   See Fisher, AF, "Duties of Company Directors and Committee Members of Incorporated 
Associations: Have the Paths Divided?" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
143 generally, and at 155-7 in particular. 
203   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) ss 38 (trading while insolvent or fraudulently 
obtaining credit) & 68 (false and misleading statements); Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) ss 62 (management committee members deemed agents for the associations), 
121A (False and misleading statements), 122 (fraud and misappropriation), & 123 (officers 
deemed servants for the purposes of the Criminal Code); Associations Incorporation Act 
1985 (SA) s 39A(1) (curiously expressed in the negative); and Associations Act (NT) ss 
33(1), 88 & 92 (fraud and misappropriation). 
204   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(2); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) s 29A(1); and Associations Act (NT) s 33(2). 
  197•  Not to make improper use of their position.205 
•  To disclose any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a contract with the 
association.  (There may be additional restrictions pertaining to participating 
in deliberations or voting on the contract).206 
 
If one were to attempt a general characterisation of the statutory duties of committee 
members of incorporated associations based on the summary above, it would perhaps 
be along the following lines: there are various technical requirements laid out by the 
legislature in each jurisdiction binding on committee members, (most jurisdictions 
demand high fiduciary standards of such persons) but little concern has been 
expressed on the part of legislatures about the care, skill or diligence that these 
persons may possess or exercise.  Indeed it would appear from the foregoing 
discussion that the legislatures of jurisdictions relevant to this thesis are content to 
leave the resolution of questions concerning the qualitative and (to a lesser extent) 
fiduciary duties of committee members of incorporated associations to the judiciary.  
The central premise of this thesis is to question the dominant paradigm that is likely 
to be relied upon when these questions are judicially considered. 
 
As will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the nature of internal 
governance mechanisms within incorporated sporting associations is not a matter 
about which one can, on the basis of current scholarship, be dogmatic.  Careful 
empirical analysis is required in order to determine the extent to which a model of 
                                                 
205   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39A(3); Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) s 29A(2); and Associations Act (NT) s 33(3). 
  198governance can be said to be dominant (if indeed there is a dominant model).  This is 
the challenge of corporate law organic theory, broadly conceived.  Such insight is of 
course irrelevant to adherents of narrow form organic theory, as defined in chapter 1.  
However as identified in chapter 2, any jurisprudential inference based on such an 
impoverished theoretical foundation together with a lack of regard for the observed 
reality of incorporated sporting associations must be open to scholarly criticism.   
While it is of course possible to resort to narrow form organic theory as a 
jurisprudential metaphor for incorporated associations, without empirical study, such 
a source analogue will always lack the persuasive force of highly structured analogy. 
 
Decision-Making Procedures 
This aspect of the structure of incorporated associations is potentially relevant in two 
settings, namely a propos the committee (if there is one) on the one hand, and with 
respect to the general meeting of members on the other.207  Firstly one must 
determine whether such procedures are mandated by statute, or are left for internal 
decision within the broader context of the general law.  As will be appreciated from 
chapter 1, broad form organic theory would require the minimum legislative 
interference in such matters, and would leave them to be decided by members.  With 
respect to any decision-making procedures applicable to the committee of an 
association the key question is whether the association in question actually has a 
management committee and, if so, what is the nature of the powers of such a body?   
 
                                                                                                                                          
206   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) ss 31-32; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) ss 29B-29C; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 21-22; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 65; and Associations Act (NT) ss 33-32. 
  199Member Governed Associations 
Where there is no committee of an association as distinct from the membership 
generally, or if the rules of the association provide that the association will be 
managed by members in general meeting and between members’ meetings by the 
committee, then any statutory decision making requirements logically fall to be 
borne by the members’ meeting. 
 
With a single exception,208 every Australian and New Zealand jurisdiction requires 
the holding of an annual general meeting of members.209  In most jurisdictions there 
is specific statutory requirement for provision to be made in the rules of incorporated 
associations in relation to the holding of meetings.  These requirements vary 
considerably but include such matters as registers of members, votes and polls, 
voting qualifications, notice, quorum, ordinary and special voting majorities, 
elections, proxies, appointment, removal, powers and duties of chairs, disclosures, 
reserved powers of members, disciplinary proceedings etc.210  It is clear that th e 
general law will apply where there is statutory and constitutional silence on a 
                                                                                                                                          
207   Lyons,  M,  Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at Chapter 16. 
208   Namely, Tasmania. 
209   See  Sievers,  AS,  Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, 
Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 124-5.  Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 
26; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 28, 29 & 29A; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Vic) s 30; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 23; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 68 & 69; Associations Act (NT) s 36; and Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 23. In South Australia prescribed associations are required to have 
an annual general meeting pursuant to Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 39. 
210   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) s 68C(c) & Reg; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23A; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 17 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 6 & 
Sch; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1991 (ACT) s 32 & Sch;  Associations Act (NT) s 33(1), Associations (Model 
Constitution) Regulations (NT) Sch; and  Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6. 
  200particular issue.211  Where general law norms are not observed in such cases, 
subsequent conduct may result in access to the supervisory and appellate jurisdiction 
of courts over incorporated associations.212
 
Delegate Managed Associations 
As far as decision-making procedures of committees are concerned, other than any 
general requirements concerning meeting procedures that have already been 
mentioned,213 a number of jurisdictions do have specific statutory requirements.  In 
Queensland there is a statutory requirement for committees of incorporated 
associations to meet on at least 3 occasions during the year either in person or 
electronically.  The quorum for such meetings must be provided for in the rules of an 
association in that state.214  In South Australia minutes of all meetings (whether of 
members or the committee) must be kept as prescribed.  There is no other statutory 
requirement specifically relating to meetings of a committee in that state.215  In 
Western Australia the sole statutory requirement is expressed in broad terms.  In that 
state, provision must be made in the rules of every association for the “quorum and 
                                                 
211   Lang, AD, Horsley's Meetings: Procedure, Law and Practice, Butterworths, Sydney, 1998 at 
5-7. 
212   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 302; and Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs Law 
in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 125.  See 
Efstathis v Greek Orthodox Community of St George (1988) 6 ACLC 760.  But note the 
judicial interpretation of Cameron v Hogan  (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
213   I.e.: Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) s 68C(c) & Reg; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23A; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 17 & Sch 1; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) s 6 & Sch; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch 1; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 32 & Sch; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 6.  
Note also the requirements of statutory duties of a qualitative or fiduciary nature pertaining to 
decision making by committees as discussed above. 
214   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 63. 
215   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 51. 
  201procedure at meetings of the committee.”216  Care should also be taken to ensure that 
the meeting procedure adopted does not result in personal liability under the 
insolvent trading provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).217
 
Voluntary Association 
The voluntary nature of incorporated associations as an essential characteristic has 
been considered by a variety of authors.218  Likewise, the importance of volunteering 
in the sport and recreation sector generally is well documented.219  A study 
conducted in 2000 indicated that in New Zealand 77% of “workers in the sector were 
unpaid (voluntary)”.220  The estimated economic value of this work, based on an 
average rate of pay for these volunteers of $17.25 per hour,221 was in the region of 
$NZD1.9 billion.222  In Australia the available statistics are more current, having 
                                                 
216   Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 16 & Sch 1 cl 6(e). 
217   Section 588G.  This provision would require regular inquiry into the financial affairs of the 
association at committee meetings as a matter of course. 
218  Michael, A, "Volunteering and Community Action - Building the Future Together" (1998) 
4(2) RSA Journal 60; and, Opie, H, "Sports Associations and Their Legal Environment" in 
McGregor-Lowndes, M, et al, (Ed) Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, LBC 
Information Systems, North Ryde, 1996;  See also s 13 of the Associations Incorporation Act 
1987 (WA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 61, Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 39; 
Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 47; Wrongs Act 1958 
(Vic) s 37; Volunteers (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) s 9; and Personal Injuries (Liabilities And Damages) Act 2003 (NT) s 7. 
219   Sports Census 1996, Ministry of Sport and Recreation, Perth, 1997; Sport and Recreation - a 
Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Adelaide, 11 
December, 1997; Goodchild, M, et al, The Growing Business of Sport and Leisure: The 
Impact of the Physical Leisure Industry in New Zealand, 4008, BERL for The Hillary 
Commission, Wellington, NZ, September, 2000; Abs Directions and Data Collections in the 
Area of Sport and Recreation, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Adelaide, September, 2002; 
and, Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 14 November, 2003. 
220   Goodchild, M, et al, The Growing Business of Sport and Leisure: The Impact of the Physical 
Leisure Industry in New Zealand, 4008, BERL for The Hillary Commission, Wellington, NZ, 
September, 2000 at 27. 
221   Id. 
222   Ibid at 28. 
  202been published in 2003.223  These indicate that in the Australian not-for-profit sport 
and physical recreation sector 78% of workers in the sector were unpaid 
(voluntary).224  In total these volunteers worked for an estimated 130 million 
hours.225  Assuming an average rate of pay for these volunteers of $17.19 per hour,226 
the economic value of this voluntary work was in the region of $AU2.235 billion.  
Despite this empirical evidence, all of the governing statutes fail to refer to the issue 
of volunteerism in any respect. 
 
The above research indicates that incorporated sporting associations are typically 
funded by a combination of subscriptions, donations, sponsorship and operating 
activities.  If one narrows the consideration of funding to sporting groups (being the 
most common form of incorporated association and the category with which this 
work is primarily concerned), based on a Western Australian study227 roughly 24% 
of funding for such groups comes from subscriptions, 39% of all non-government 
sourced income comes from an assortment of donations and sponsorship228 with the 
remainder being generated from operations.  In Australia Commonwealth, state and 
local government funding for sports and physical recreation totalled $AU2.1 billion 
                                                 
223   Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 14 November, 2003 
224   Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 14 November, 2003 at 48, Table 5.5. 
225   Ibid at 52, Table 5.9. 
226   Being the average weekly ordinary time earnings for full-time workers in the sector ($687.60 
p/wk) divided by 40 hours (Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Adelaide, 14 November, 2003 at 47, Table 5.4) 
227  Sports Census 1996, Ministry of Sport and Recreation, Perth, 1997 at 37. 
228    Business contributions to these sports and recreation funding sources totalled $AU628 
million in 2000-1 (Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Adelaide, 14 November, 2003 at 62). 
  203in 2000-1.229  This accounts for about 45% of total income to this sector.230  As can 
be seen, the voluntary nature of associations in general, and incorporated associations 
in particular, leads to a unique and complex funding formula that is quite unlike that 
which is in evidence in the modern trading company context.231
 
Most commentators accept that the existence of such bodies is to be fostered and 
encouraged.  The voluntary nature of incorporated associations should therefore be 
recognised when considering the legislative framework.  It is also suggested that the 
term volunteer should be defined in a broad sense to include individuals who may 
receive some form of honorarium or gratuity.  Of further interest is that a common 
theme in the governing legislation is the primacy of fiduciary considerations as 
opposed to qualitative considerations as benchmarks of acceptable conduct 
applicable to committee members of such bodies.232
 
Taxation Status of Incorporated Associations 
In Australia the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Pt 2-15 Div 50 deals with 
specific exemptions from income tax that apply to clubs and associations.  The 
equivalent provisions in New Zealand are at section CB 4 of the Income Tax Act 
1994 (NZ).233  Of particular interest to this research is the fact that the legislation in 
                                                 
229   Commonwealth 9.4%, states and territories 41.2%, and local governments 49.4% (Sport and 
Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Adelaide, 14 November, 2003 at 60) 
230  Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 11 December, 1997. 
231   Lyons,  M,  Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in 
Australia, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at Chapters 17 and 18. 
232   See under the heading “Delegated Management” above. 
233   Note that from the 2005-6 financial year, identical provisions will apply in New Zealand 
pursuant to the Income Tax Act 2004 (NZ) ss CW 34-40. 
  204both jurisdictions provides for the exemption from income tax of clubs formed for 
the encouragement or promotion of animal races, a game or sport.234   
 
In Australia, the Federal Commissioner of Taxation has determined how the taxation 
exemption for sporting entities will be administratively applied.235  The core 
eligibility requirements for exemption from income tax from a financial perspective 
are the “mutuality” of receipts from members, and the prohibition of pecuniary 
distributions to members.  The issue of mutuality was discussed above under the 
“private” status of incorporated sporting associations.  The requirement for 
prohibitions on pecuniary distributions to members is expressed by the 
Commissioner of Taxation as follows: 
Non-profit requirement 
9.  A club must not be carried on for the purposes of profit or gain to its individual 
members. 
10.  A club's Memorandum and/or Articles of Association or other constituent documents 
should contain a prohibition against a distribution of profits and assets among members 
while the club is functional and on its winding-up. Alternatively, a club satisfies the test 
if the law governing its activities prevents the club from making distributions to 
members. The club's activities should conform to the prohibition.236 
 
                                                 
234   Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 50-45 at item 9.1(c) of the table; and Income Tax 
Act 1994 (NZ) ss CW 39-40. 
235   Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Ruling Income Tax: Exempt Sporting Clubs, TR 97/22, 
3 December  1997. 
236   Ibid at 2.  See also page 5, paragraph 22 the model clauses for inclusion in an association’s 
rules or constitution to evince the requisite non-profit character: 
Non-profit clause 
The assets and income of the organisation shall be applied solely in furtherance of 
its above mentioned objects and no portion shall be distributed directly or indirectly 
to the members of the organisation except as bona fide compensation for services 
rendered or expenses incurred on behalf of the organisation. 
Dissolution clause 
In the event of the organisation being dissolved, the amount that remains after such 
dissolution and the satisfaction of all debts and liabilities shall be transferred to any 
  205The Commissioner of Taxation requires that these prohibitions attach to distributions 
to members both while associations are operational and on winding-up.  This 
provides a strong incentive for incorporated sporting associations to adopt the 
equivalent of a cy-près scheme within their rules.237
 
However, the Commissioner of Taxation has additional requirements before ruling in 
favour of an incorporated sporting association that desires exemption from income 
tax.  The most relevant of these requirements from the perspective of this thesis, are a 
close examination of the purposes for which the association exists,238 and 
participation by members in the “management” of the association.239  Once again it is 
instructive to observe the centrality of the purposes of an association in determining 
its eligibility for nonprofit status.  It is also instructive to note that a strict separation 
of membership from control such as exists in the theoretical modern trading 
corporation is considered the exception rather than the rule in nonprofit sporting 
associations. 
                                                                                                                                          
organisation that is carried on predominantly for the encouragement of a game or 
sport and is not carried on for the profit or gain of its individual members. 
237   Australian Taxation Office, Taxation Ruling Income Tax: Exempt Sporting Clubs, TR 97/22, 
3 December 1997 at 5, paragraph 22 “Dissolution Clause”. 
238   Ibid at 3 the Commissioner states: 
Main purpose 
13.  To be exempt, the main purpose of the club must be the encouragement of the 
relevant game or sport. 
14.  A club's main purpose can only be ascertained after objectively weighing all of the 
club's features, including those features described in paragraphs 15 and 16. The 
presence or absence of a feature may not conclusively determine that the club's 
main purpose is or is not the encouragement of a game or sport. 
  This is further stressed at paragraph 15 as a “highly persuasive feature”.  Considerable 
further attention to this determinant is given at 10-15. 
239    Ibid at 4, paragraph 16 the Commissioner states that features that are “relevant but less 
persuasive” are: 
•  the members of the committee, or persons who control the direction, of the club are 
predominantly participants in or concerned with the encouragement of the game or 
sport (as distinct from day to day management of the club). 
  206 
By way of comparison, it is also worth noting that the specific requirements for a 
sports entity to be entitled to an exemption from income tax in New Zealand are as 
follows: 
(a)  the club, society, or association is established mainly to promote an amateur game or 
sport; and 
(b)  the game or sport is conducted for the recreation or entertainment of the general 
public; and 
(c)  no part of the funds of the club, society, or association is used or is available to be 
used for the private pecuniary profit of a member, proprietor, shareholder, or associate 
of any of them.240 
 
The similarity of this legislative provision to that applicable in Australia is 
remarkable.241  Note again the central role played by organisational purposes and the 
prohibitions on distributing pecuniary profit to members.242
 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to inquire into the rationale behind the granting of 
these income tax exemptions to voluntary nonprofit associations.  The issue of 
taxation status is addressed here partly because it is identified by Professor Salamon 
as a key attribute of voluntary nonprofit associations, and partly because it may also 
                                                 
240   Income Tax Act 1994 (NZ) s CW 39. 
241   Even more significant is the fact that the administrative requirements of Inland Revenue New 
Zealand are substantially the same as those enumerated above in connection with the 
Australian Taxation Office.  As advised in “IR Booklet 254: Clubs and Societies”, tax 
exempt associations must have a clause in the constitution in substantially the following 
words: 
If upon the winding up or dissolution of the organization there remains after the 
satisfaction of all its debts and liabilities any property whatsoever the same shall 
not be paid to or distributed among the members of the organization but shall be 
given or transferred to some other organization or body having objects similar to 
the objects of the first organization, or to some other charitable organization or 
purpose, within New Zealand. 
242   It is interesting to note that these issues are addressed in an almost identical manner by recent 
reform proposals in Canada (Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for 
  207explain the inclusion of cy-près style schemes in the constitutions of sporting 
associations in Australia and New Zealand even where these are not required in the 
relevant incorporation statutes.  Whether or not exemption from taxation is actually a 
motivating factor for incorporated associations to adopt particular constitutional 
clauses is a matter for further investigation.  To a limited extent this will be 
addressed in chapter 4 which details the empirical testing carried out in the course of 
this research.  Related questions, including whether or not incorporated associations 
are aware that taxation exemptions exist, are outside of the scope of this thesis. 
 
Given that incorporated associations are prevented from distributing pecuniary 
profits to members it is a matter of conjecture as to the relative significance of 
taxation provisions to incorporated sporting associations.  Three possible reasons 
why an incorporated sporting association might wish to generate profits present 
themselves for consideration.  Firstly, subsidising the cost of providing services and 
facilities to members; secondly, subsidising the provision of facilities and services to 
the general community; and thirdly, generating profits to promote some other 
purpose such as the general promotion of a sport or game, or contributing towards 
some other philanthropic purpose. 
 
Summary 
It is apparent that there is a lack of uniformity in the legislative requirements of each 
jurisdiction at the heart of this investigation.  There have been several calls for a 
more streamlined approach at least within Australia, even to the point of a referral of 
                                                                                                                                          
a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, 
Policy Sector, Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 8 & 18. 
  208power from the states to the Commonwealth.243  Rather than focus on the extent of 
legislative divergence, I have chosen in this chapter to divine the broad themes in the 
governing legislation in order to discern a coherent framework within which a 
jurisprudence might develop.  In doing this, I have sought to apply a recognised 
schema with international application.  All of the above findings are consonant with 
the characteristics identified by Professor Salamon.244  The unique nature of 
incorporated associations identified above suggests that incorporated associations 
manage their affairs on a domestic basis245 often with a minimum of formality,246 and 
in particular:  
i)  Incorporated associations are organisations complying with statutory 
eligibility criteria. 
ii)  Incorporated associations are all, broadly speaking, organised institutions 
exhibiting varying degrees of formality.  Statutory duties are usually imposed 
on “committees” of these associations, in particular, duties of a technical and 
fiduciary nature and, more rarely, duties of a qualitative nature. 
iii)  Incorporated associations are primarily private or domestic organisations 
falling somewhere between the public and commercial sectors. 
                                                 
243    Levy, KJ, "An Historical Analysis of Incorporated "Non-Profit" Entities in the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia with the Purpose of Raising the "Profit/Non-Profit" 
Debate", Master of Laws thesis, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1994 Chapter 5.  A 
more cautionary and reasoned approach is outlined by Sievers (Sievers, AS, "Incorporation of 
Non-Profit Associations: The Way Ahead?" (2000) 18(5) Company & Securities Law 
Journal 311; and Sievers, AS, "Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in 
Australia and Other Common Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 124). 
244   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at Chapter 1. 
245 Ford,  HAJ,  Halsbury's Laws of Australia, "435 Voluntary Associations", looseleaf, North 
Ryde, 1998,  paras 435-165, and 435-170. 
246 Fletcher,  KL,  The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 210. 
  209iv)  Central to the nature of incorporated associations is the non-distribution 
constraint vis-a-vis the association and its members, both as a going concern, 
and in the event of corporate determination. 
v)  Incorporated associations exhibit a range of internal governance structures 
from purely membership-governed to purely board-governed. 
vi)  Incorporated associations are voluntary organisations both in terms of 
freedom of association and in terms of organisational operation.  In other 
words associations depend strongly on the work of volunteers to achieve their 
purposes. 
vii)  The most important funding sources for incorporated associations are 
members, donations, sponsorship and government grants or concessions 
rather than commercial sources. 
viii)  Incorporated sporting associations enjoy beneficial taxation treatment in 
return for adopting distribution constraints, including cy-près style 
constitutional clauses. 
 
The following chapter will investigate the extent to which the legislative framework 
outlined above is understood by, and the extent to which it meets the needs of, user 
groups.  This was achieved by means of a large survey of incorporated sporting 
associations in Australia and New Zealand. 
 
  210CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL DATA: METHODOLOGY AND  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
“The great tragedy of Science –  
the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis  
by an ugly fact.”1
 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in chapter 1, “broad form” organic theory challenges us to consider the 
social and inherent reality of organizations and associations.  In a corporate law 
context, this challenge extends to the development of a jurisprudence which 
facilitates such corporate structures rather than restricting and controlling them in an 
inappropriate manner.  Chapter 2 explored three possible legal analogies or 
metaphors that may provide guidance in the development of an appropriate 
jurisprudence for incorporated associations.  The previous chapter surveyed the 
legislative framework currently in place in Australia and New Zealand allowing 
voluntary sporting associations to become incorporated bodies.  This chapter 
summarises an epidemiological investigation of actual incorporated sporting 
associations in the relevant jurisdictions.  The following chapter considers the 
implications of the findings of the epidemiological investigation in the light of the 
theoretical framework that was developed in the first three chapters.  The final 
chapter will consider the extent to which the current legislative framework could be 
                                                 
1   Huxley, TH Biogenesis and Abiogenesis in “Collected Essays”, London, UK, Macmillan 
1893. 
  211said to reflect broad form organic theory, and also suggest a basis upon which a 
coherent jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations could emerge. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
A questionnaire was prepared which sought to obtain empirical data about 
incorporated sporting associations for the purpose of testing the theoretical 
framework that was developed in preceding chapters.  Practical technical assistance,2 
together with reference texts3 informed the development of a research plan to achieve 
the desired outcome.  This plan required the following steps: 
1.  Decide sampling methodology based on preliminary population investigation. 
2.  Produce a draft budget and secure funding. 
3.  Prepare a draft questionnaire. 
4.  Pre-test the draft questionnaire. 
5.  Produce a 2
nd draft questionnaire based on pre-test feedback. 
6.  Discuss format and coding issues with technical staff. 
7.  Produce a final draft questionnaire. 
8.  Discuss final draft questionnaire, covering letter, respondent inducements and ethics 
clearance with supervisor. 
9.  Apply for ethics clearance. 
10.  Determine survey sample and generate mailing list. 
                                                 
2   The preparatory assistance of Ms Jennifer Lalor of the Learning and Scholarship Network at 
Curtin University was crucial to the success of the final survey. 
3   Fink, A & Kosecoff, J, How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide, 2nd ed, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, USA, 1998, Alreck, PL & Settle, RB, The Survey Research 
Handbook, 2nd ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, USA, 1995, Hannagan, T, Mastering Statistics, 
Palgrave, Houndmills, UK, 1997, Rumsey, D, Statistics for Dummies, Wiley Publishing, 
Indianapolis, USA, 2003, Rowntree, D, Statistics without Tears: An Introduction for Non-
Mathematicians, Penguin Books, London,UK, 2000, Huff, D, How to Lie with Statistics, 
Penguin Books, London, UK, 1991, Salant, P & Dillman, DA, How to Conduct Your Own 
Survey, John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, USA, 1994; and Field, A, Discovering Statistics 
Using Spss for Windows: Advanced Techniques for the Beginner, Sage Publications, London, 
UK, 2003. 
  21211.  Arrange printing and mailing. 
12.  First mail-out. 
13.  Reminder card mail-out. 
14.  Response processing. 
15.  Competition draw. 
16.  Data processing. 
17.  Data analysis and interrogation. 
 
Sampling Methodology 
My previous research suggested that the single largest distinct user-group of the 
associations incorporation legislation in Australia and New Zealand was sporting 
groups.  That research suggested that there could be as many as one in three, or 
around 50,000 incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand.   
This estimate lacked reliability, as a number of jurisdictions had not classified 
incorporated associations in any way that would facilitate the identification of 
sporting associations as a distinct category.  This presented the first significant 
obstacle to performing a stratified sample cohort.  Previous potentially relevant 
published surveys4 have been marked by a lack of sufficient coverage, or a failure to 
distinguish adequately between incorporated and unincorporated sporting groups.5  
In addition, there is no published data available from any of the regulators that may 
have been of assistance in the generation of a stratified sample.  For these reasons it 
was decided to proceed with the research project on the basis of a random 10% 
                                                 
 
4   Sport and Recreation - a Statistical Overview:  Australia, 4156.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, Adelaide, 11 December, 1997; and Ford, HAJ, Halsbury's Laws of Australia, "435 
Voluntary Associations", looseleaf, North Ryde, 1998, . 
5   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at Chapter 4 “Australia” (country rapporteur Dr Mark Lyons); and Lyons, M, 
  213sample of the total incorporated sporting association population.  Initially, a budget 
was prepared based on the basis of a sample size of 5,000 incorporated sporting 
associations. 
 
Budget and Funding 
Indicative quotes, based on the estimated sample size, were obtained for printing and 
mailing envelopes, cover letters, surveys, competition cards and reminder cards.   
Joint funding between Murdoch University and Curtin University of Technology was 
arranged in consultation with the thesis Supervisor and the Head of the School of 
Business Law at Curtin. 
 
Draft questionnaire 
By reference to the theoretical framework, a draft self-administered questionnaire 
was produced in consultation with the thesis Supervisor.  This questionnaire was then 
pre-tested using a small reference group that was representative of a range of 
individuals with an involvement in sporting associations.  The feedback obtained 
from this exercise was invaluable in considering the degree to which the covering 
letter explained the project adequately to a range of potential recipients.  The 
reference group identified ambiguities in draft survey questions and interrogated all 
of the documents with a view to improving and clarifying general readability and 
                                                                                                                                          
Third Sector: The Contribution of Nonprofit and Cooperative Enterprise in Australia, Allen 
& Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001 at Chapters 2 & 10. 
  214stimulating reader interest.6  A second draft self-administered questionnaire was 
thereafter produced, incorporating the feedback derived in the pre-test interviews. 
 
Format and Coding Issues 
I met with staff experienced in survey design and implementation to ensure that the 
design and format of the second draft questionnaire would exhibit maximum user-
friendliness and ease of data entry.  The feedback obtained in this process was 
invaluable in choosing the type and size of font, page layout, paper quality and 
colour, and instructions to respondents.  Likely response rates were discussed, in 
addition to methods of inducing greater participation rates.  It was recommended that 
a competition be used, with participation in the survey exercise being a pre-requisite 
to entry in the competition.  It was also recommended that a follow-up mail-out 
occur shortly after the original contact to encourage participation. 
 
Final Draft Self-administered questionnaire 
After incorporating all of the above feedback into the design of the questionnaire, a 
final draft self-administered questionnaire, covering letter, competition card and 
reminder card were all produced in “mock-up” form.  These were then discussed in 
detail with the thesis Supervisor.  It was agreed that a competition involving a draw 
to win a case of quality wine would be an appropriate inducement to encourage 
recipient participation in the survey.  This was also raised with the Murdoch Division 
of Research and Development Research Ethics Office and an opinion obtained that 
such a competition was permissible under the relevant Murdoch research guidelines.  
                                                 
 
6   My thanks to Mr Gavin Jahn, Ms Jenny Owens and Mr Cameron Yorke for their insight and 
  215Following this, the necessary documents were submitted to the Murdoch University 
Human Research Ethics Committee for approval.  This approval was notified by the 
Murdoch Research Ethics Office in a letter dated 27
th March 2003.7
 
Survey Sample Selection 
The single most significant obstacle in achieving the research objectives was in 
identifying the population, a suitable sample and mailing list.  Research I had 
previously completed in 19988 indicated that there were 114,502 such corporate 
groups in Australia alone.  Earlier research that I had conducted in 19969 indicated 
that, of the total figure, anything up to one in three incorporated associations could 
be sporting groups.  This was the most significant user-group of the associations’ 
incorporation legislation throughout Australia.  My Master of Commerce research, 
completed in 1999, revealed that some classification of associations had taken place 
in New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria.  No classification had ever taken 
place in the other states and territories – together representing 35% of the national 
total.  New Zealand had never classified its approximately 22,000 incorporated 
societies.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
generosity in this process.  The usual caveats apply to the final outcome. 
7   Permit number 2002/294. 
8   Huntly, C, "Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for Officers of 
Incorporated Associations" (2000) 18(4) Company & Securities Law Journal 262. 
9   Huntly, CT, "A Century of Incorporated Associations in Western Australia: 1896-1996" 
(1996) Working Paper Series 96.05 26. 
  216In theory therefore it was possible to identify more than 75% of the Australian 
incorporated sporting associations with some effort.  In order to identify the target 
population it was necessary to: 
1.  Obtain the co-operation of the regulatory authorities in New Zealand and all states and 
territories in Australia. 
2.  Determine what data the regulatory authorities had, in particular the names and mailing 
addresses of incorporated associations in their jurisdiction. 
3.  Find out if the regulatory authorities had the required data in an electronic format. 
4.  Find out if it was possible to extract the required data. 
5.  Resolve any ethical/legal issues connected with the provision of the data. 
6.  Resolve any ethical/legal issues connected with the use of the data. 
7.  Negotiate a price for the provision of that data if necessary. 
8.  Modify the data for use in the project. 
All of these issues had operated together to prevent any research of the kind 
envisaged from being conducted previously.  One of the major problems associated 
with obtaining source data in the research area is that while most jurisdictions allow 
for the taking of extracts of information relating to individual associations, there is 
nothing to allow for research related access.  Outside of an exercise of administrative 
discretion, researchers are faced with utilising the relevant non-uniform freedom of 
information legislation10 in a manner that is consistent with the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth). 
 
                                                 
 
10   Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld); Freedom 
of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of 
  217Jurisdictional Review & Target Sample Selection 
 
New Zealand 
There were 22,156 incorporated societies (the NZ equivalent of incorporated 
associations) in New Zealand as at 30
th June 2002.  These had never been classified.  
An email to the office of the Registrar of Companies in New Zealand readily elicited 
their support for the research project.11  After requiring and obtaining an assurance 
that the data would be used for research purposes only, payment was requested for 
the provision of data.12  This secured an Excel database with the names and mailing 
address (excepting postcodes) of every incorporated society in New Zealand. 
 
The New Zealand database was then classified piecemeal so as to extract only the 
sporting societies.  The address details then had to be reformatted in line with the 
standard used in the project.  Following this, the postcodes had to be manually 
entered.  At this point the SPSS for Windows program was utilised to extract a 
random 10% sample (or 561 societies) for use in the master survey mailing list. 
 
Western Australia 
I had previously collaborated with the Registrar of Incorporated Associations in 
Western Australia in 1999.13  That collaboration, commencing in 1996, had been 
                                                                                                                                          
Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA); Freedom of 
Information Act 1989 (ACT); Information Act (NT); Official Information Act 1982 (NZ). 
11   My thanks to Ms Jacqueline Reynolds, Companies Office, Christchurch, New Zealand. 
12   In the amount of $NZ764.00. 
13   Mr Ray Neal, Manager, Business Names Ministry of Fair Trading, Western Australia. 
  218both close and productive.  After 1999 there was a new Minister, the department 
name and philosophy had been radically altered, the responsible manager had retired, 
and the relevant office had been geographically relocated and restaffed.   
 
Mr Steven Meagher, Manager, Business Names in the Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection granted me unrestricted access to the relevant data at no cost.  
This arrangement was mutually advantageous, as the department retained all 
incorporated associations data on microfiche.  The only data that the department held 
electronically in 1999 was a list of names, file numbers, date of incorporation and 
whether the association had been deregistered.  This was still the case in 2002.  The 
only significant advance that had been made was that such data as the department 
had was now Excel-friendly.  In 1996 when I had earlier classified Western 
Australia’s 14,000 plus incorporated associations, all the department could provide 
me with was a hard copy of their summary register.  This had to be scanned onto disk 
and translated into Excel format.  As a result of this earlier work, I had an Excel 
database that was fully classified up to 30
th June 1998.  This data was very useful for 
the department in 2002.  I agreed to provide an electronic copy of these records and 
update the classification for the department.  I was also able to provide the 
department with a copy of my published research, records of which had been lost in 
the office relocation.  In return, the department opened their files completely for this 
research and cooperated with it to the fullest extent possible. 
 
The Western Australian register is still mainly a microfiche database.  In addition, 
there is no statutory requirement for incorporated associations to lodge a current 
  219mailing address with the department.14  Neither is there any requirement for an 
annual return to be lodged.15  Given that Ngala Inc., the oldest incorporated 
association in Western Australia, has been operational for over a century, 
ascertaining an accurate mailing address for the target sample in Western Australia is 
somewhat problematical.  The SPSS for Windows program was used to extract a 
random 10% sample (or 370 associations) from the list of association names for use 
in the master survey mailing list.  A manual search of the white pages website and, in 
the alternative, “Google” searches were useful in locating the addresses of around 
two thirds of the target sample associations in Western Australia.  For the remaining 
120 selected associations, all that could be done was to access the relevant 
microfiche files manually, one at a time, and find out the most recent notified address 
in the Departmental files. 
 
Australian Capital Territory 
An email to the regulator in the Australian Capital Territory requesting assistance 
was all that was required to receive their cooperation.16  The day after this email 
request, the entire Australian Capital Territory incorporated association database in 
Excel format was emailed in reply with a request not to use it other than for research 
purposes.  No fee was charged for this data.  The database then had to be classified in 
a one-name-at-a-time manner to extract only the sporting societies.  The address 
                                                 
14   Section 40 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) provides that an incorporated 
association “may lodge with the Commissioner notice of an address …”.  (Underlining added 
for emphasis) 
15   Section 26 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) requires only that accounts of 
the association must be submitted to members at the Annual General Meeting. 
  220details had to be reformatted in line with the standard used in the project.  At this 
point the SPSS for Windows program could be utilized to extract a random 10% 
sample (or 48 associations) for use in the master survey mailing list. 
 
Northern Territory 
Within a week of emailing the regulator in the Northern Territory, I was offered a 
database in Excel format of all sporting associations in that jurisdiction.17  A fee was 
charged for the data18 and the regulator requested that the data only be used for 
research purposes.  The database then had to be classified in a one-name-at-a-time 
manner to extract only the sporting societies.  The address details had to be 
reformatted in line with the standard used in the project.  Some 14 associations had 
no recorded mailing addresses.  These were located firstly by manually checking the 
white pages website, and in the alternative, via “Google” searches.  At this point the 
SPSS for Windows program was utilized to extract a random 10% sample (or 49 
associations) for use in the master survey mailing list. 
 
South Australia 
The initial approach to the South Australian regulator was very positive and an 
assurance was given that the data would be provided forthwith.  Assurances were 
made to the regulator that the data would not be used other than for research 
                                                                                                                                          
16   Special thanks to Mr Mick Martinovic, Assistant Office Manager, Business Services Unit, 
Registrar-General's Office, Australian Capital Territory. 
17   Special thanks to Mr Malcolm Bryant, Deputy Registrar (Business Names & Associations) 
Consumer & Business Affairs, Department of Justice, Northern Territory. 
18   In the amount of $13.00. 
  221purposes.  It was made clear that sporting groups could not be extracted, so the entire 
register would need to be provided to enable a manual classification.  The person 
responsible shortly thereafter took leave and was subsequently transferred out of the 
area.  In the event, after much prolonged negotiation, South Australia was the last 
jurisdiction to actually provide the relevant data for a fee,19 in a mixed format, in the 
first week in March 2003.20
 
Two databases were eventually received from the regulator.  One had names and file 
numbers, the other had file numbers and addresses.  The contents of both files were 
non-identical.  Significant time and labour intensive reconstruction of the data into a 
usable format was required before it could be accessed and utilised.  As with other 
jurisdictions, the South Australian database then had to be classified in a one-name-
at-a-time manner to extract only the sporting societies.  Some 45 associations had no 
recorded mailing addresses in either file.  These were located firstly by manually 
checking the white pages website and, in the alternative, via “Google” searches.  The 
address details then had to be reformatted in line with the standard used in the 
project.  At this point the SPSS for Windows program could (finally) be utilized to 
extract a random 10% sample (or 485 associations) for use in the master survey 
mailing list. 
 
                                                 
19   In the amount of $110.00. 
20   This data was provided by Mr Steven Burrows, Customer Services Officer Office of Business 
Affairs, South Australia. 
  222Tasmania 
An initial email approach requesting cooperation from the regulator in Tasmania was 
unsuccessful.  Representations made by Mr Steven Meagher to his counterparts in 
other states to assist with the research opened the door of access to data in Tasmania.  
Eventually a copy of their entire database was provided in a non-Excel format.   
Assurances were given that the data would not be used other than for research 
purposes.21
 
The database then had to be transformed into an Excel worksheet and reconstructed 
into a usable format.  It was then necessary to classify the associations in a one-
name-at-a-time manner to extract only the sporting societies.  The address details had 
to be reformatted in line with the standard used in the project.  At this point the SPSS 
for Windows program was utilized to extract a random 10% sample (or 99 
associations) for use in the survey mailing list. 
 
Victoria 
An initial email approach requesting cooperation from the regulator in Victoria was 
unsuccessful.  Representations made by Mr Steven Meagher to his counterparts in 
other states to assist the research opened the door of access to data in Victoria.   
Although Victoria classified its associations until 1999, it did not classify them after 
that time.  Discussions with the manager in that office made it possible to obtain the 
                                                 
21   Special thanks to Mr Darren Dillon, Senior Clerk, Business Affairs Branch, Consumer 
Affairs & Fair Trading Tasmania. 
  223classified data until 1999 and a copy of all associations incorporated since then.22  
Assurances were provided that the data would not be used other than for research 
purposes.  The data was forthcoming shortly thereafter for a fee.23
 
The database then had to be partially classified where the data required it in a one-
name-at-a-time manner to extract only the sporting groups.  Some 67 associations 
had no recorded mailing addresses.  These were located firstly by manually checking 
the white pages website and, in the alternative, via “Google” searches.  The address 
details had to be reformatted in line with the standard used in the project.  At this 
point the SPSS for Windows program was utilized to extract a random 10% sample 
(or 1,038 associations) for use in the master survey mailing list. 
 
Queensland 
An initial email approach to the Queensland regulator requesting their cooperation 
was unsuccessful.  Representations made by Mr Steven Meagher to his counterparts 
in other states to assist with the research were also unsuccessful.  The Head of the 
School of Business Law at Curtin Business School, Dr Rob Guthrie, agreed to 
request the assistance of the Minister for Consumer and Employment Protection, 
Hon. John Kobelke MLA in contacting his equivalent in Queensland to request their 
assistance with the research.  The Minister was kind enough to write to his then 
equivalent, the Hon. Merri Rose MLA in Queensland requesting her personal support 
                                                 
22   Special thanks to Mr Andrew Levens, Director Business Operations Branch, Department of 
Justice, Victoria. 
23   In the amount of $187.00. 
  224for the project.  Within a week, the relevant department provided an offer of 
assistance.24  Assurances were provided that the data would not be used other than 
for research purposes.  Shortly after this a copy of the entire Queensland database of 
incorporated associations was provided in return for a fee.25
 
This database then had to be classified in a one-name-at-a-time manner to extract 
only the sporting societies.  Some associations had no recorded mailing addresses.  
These were located firstly by manually checking the white pages website and, in the 
alternative, via “Google” searches.  The address details had to be reformatted in line 
with the standard used in the project.  At this point the SPSS for Windows program 
was utilized to extract a random 10% sample for use in the master survey mailing 
list. 
 
New South Wales 
An initial email approach to the New South Wales regulator requesting their 
cooperation was unsuccessful.  An initial email approach to the Queensland regulator 
requesting their cooperation was unsuccessful.  Representations made by Mr Steven 
Meagher to his counterparts in other states to assist with the research were also 
unsuccessful.  The Head of the School of Business Law at Curtin Business School, 
Dr Rob Guthrie, agreed to request the assistance of the Minister for Consumer and 
Employment Protection, Hon. John Kobelke MLA in contacting his equivalent in 
                                                 
24   Special thanks to Special thanks to Mr David Graham, Manager - Non Profit Enterprises 
Branch, Queensland Office of Fair Trading. 
25   In the amount of $14.50. 
  225New South Wales to request their assistance with the research.  The Minister was 
kind enough to write to his then equivalent, the Hon John Acquilina MLA in New 
South Wales requesting, and ultimately securing, his personal support for the project.   
 
Although New South Wales had classified its associations until 1998, it did not 
classify them after that time.  After discussing the matter with the New South Wales 
registrar’s office, assurances were provided that the data would be forthcoming in 
exchange for assurances that the data would not be used other than for research 
purposes.26  While the New South Wales data was among the last to be secured, it 
was provided free of charge and had been completely classified with very little 
manipulation required in order to be used for the research task.  The address details 
had to be reformatted in line with the standard used in the project.  At this point the 
SPSS for Windows program was utilized to extract a random 10% sample (or 595 
associations) for use in the master survey mailing list. 
 
Survey Implementation 
The master mailing list of 3,762 incorporated sporting associations was used to print 
the covering letters, surveys, envelopes and competition cards during the week prior 
to Easter 2003.  These were processed via bulk mail so that they would arrive at their 
destinations during the week following Easter.  The master mailing list was amended 
as responses and returned mail were received.  Four weeks after the original mail-
out, the amended master mailing list was used to print and post a reminder card to the 
                                                 
26   Special thanks to Ms Dinah Traurig, Co-ordinator, Ministerial & Parliamentary Operations, 
Department of Fair Trading, New South Wales. 
  226non-respondents.  This resulted in the receipt of a large number of “second wave” 
responses.  By the time the response period had ended, there were 279 returned mail 
surveys representing an undeliverable proportion of 7% (or 1 in every 14 
associations surveyed).  In addition, the response rate was 822 or 22% of the sample.  
As each survey was received, it was stamped with a consecutive number.  This 
number has since been utilised in the coding and data processing. 
 
By the end of the receiving period, 750 competition cards had been received.  The 
draw was conducted by means of a random SPSS for Windows selection executed by 
Dr Rob Guthrie, Head, School of Business Law, Curtin Business School on Friday 
6
th June 2003.27
 
Once received and stamped, completed respondent surveys were sent to data 
processing staff to be entered in SPSS for Windows format ready for analysis and 
interrogation.  A data consultant28 assisted by supervising and auditing the data entry 
process to ensure the reliability of the data entry.  To ensure the integrity of the data, 
none of the data from the questionnaires was entered into the final SPSS for 
Windows data file by me personally. 
 
                                                 
27   The winning group was the Morawa Golf and Bowls Club Inc [(08) 9971 1213].  The prize 
was delivered to Ms Noelene Fleay, Manager of this group on 28
th June 2003. 
28   Ms Jennifer Lalor, Curtin University of Technology Learning Scholarship Network. 
  227Survey Results 
A detailed frequency report showing responses to the survey is provided in appendix 
B, following an example questionnaire at appendix A.  The major findings of the 
survey are discussed below. 
 
Error Structure 
The potential for coverage error in this project was minimal in that the entire 
population of incorporated sporting associations is registered with a government 
regulator.  This statement, however, should be read with the caveat that the accuracy 
of the master mailing list that was generated was ultimately a factor of the 
completeness (or otherwise) of the regulators’ official register of incorporated 
associations.29  This was most notably a potential problem with respect to Western 
Australia which, as noted above, has never required incorporated associations to 
lodge regular returns to the regulator.30  The full results of the final survey mail-out 
are discussed in detail in appendix B, however the results for all jurisdictions are 
summarised in chart  1 as follows: 
                                                 
29   The fallibility of such databases, particularly in the not-for-profit context has been the subject 
of commentary elsewhere: McGregor-Lowndes, M, "Nonprofit Corporations - Reflections on 
Australia's Largest Nonprofit Insolvency" (1995) 5 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 417 
at 420, and Woodward, S, "'Not-for-Profit' Motivation in a 'for-Profit' Company Law Regime 
- National Baseline Data" (2003) 21 Company & Securities Law Journal 102 at 108. 
30   There was a total rate of returned mail of 11% representing 362 returns out of a 3,201 
addressee mail-out. 
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Chart 1 
 
A stratified random sample of the population was not possible owing to the paucity 
of existing data in this field.  Indeed the present study should be regarded as 
providing baseline data with respect to incorporated sporting associations in 
Australia and New Zealand.  As indicated above, under the circumstances it was 
considered that the most appropriate approach was to survey a random 10% sample 
from the population of incorporated sporting associations on the official registers 
within each jurisdiction.  An overall response rate of 22% can therefore be regarded 
as a strong result.  In addition, it is generally accepted that the central limit theorem 
which underpins statistical sampling as an empirical methodology is valid where 
  229sample size is in excess of 30.31  The overall sample of 822 provides a sound 
empirical basis for this research.  Of the 822 responses, 732 came from Australian 
incorporated sporting associations and 90 responses from New Zealand incorporated 
sporting societies.  Nevertheless, two points of caution should be noted.  First, only 9 
responses were received from incorporated sporting associations in each of the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory.  Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
comparison is therefore problematical with respect to the data from these 
jurisdictions.  In addition, total responses to the survey instrument still only represent 
2.2% of the population, and care must therefore be taken when seeking to generalise 
on the basis of such a relatively small population subset.  In light of this issue, 
standard errors (where provided) are calculated to the 95% degree of confidence 
unless otherwise stated. 
 
Coverage error in an unstratified sample such as that used in this research may be 
indicated where, for example, responses are skewed in favour of a particular target 
category.  In this research it is only possible to categorise the Australian sample in 
terms of home jurisdiction.  Comparisons between jurisdictions on the basis of their 
proportional contributions to both the sample, and their proportional contributions to 
the response group are as per chart  2: 
                                                 
31  Hannagan,  T,  Mastering Statistics, Palgrave, Houndmills, UK, 1997 at 38 and 140-142; 
Rumsey, D, Statistics for Dummies, Wiley Publishing, Indianapolis, USA, 2003 at 166-167. 
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Chart 2 
 
As noted in appendix B the most striking feature of chart 2 is the close 
approximation of both sample and response distributions.  Given the lack of 
significant difference between the comparative jurisdictional figures in chart 2 and 
the adequate size of the response cohort, the central limit theorem is supportive of the 
decision not to weight the raw response data to allow the extrapolation of justifiable 
inferences. 
 
The rigorous preliminary design and pre-testing of the survey instrument attempted 
to minimise the impact of potential measurement error.  Nevertheless, given the 
vagaries of human communication, no survey is free from this weakness.  Specific 
identifiable aspects of the questionnaire that may have resulted in measurement error 
include the requirement for the respondent’s “best estimate” or “opinion” in various 
  231questions.32  There were also two questions that asked respondents to provide 
numerical or frequency data by reference to given fixed alternatives.  In certain cases 
these alternatives may not have been adequately discriminating, or may have failed 
to include other obvious alternatives.33
 
Given the voluntary nature of the questionnaire, the potential for non-response error 
was one of the prime concerns in the design of this survey.  Non-response was 
approached from the perspective of reducing disincentives, introducing self-interest 
based incentives and offering participants an opportunity to influence the regulation 
of incorporated sporting groups in their jurisdictions.34
 
In order to maximise the chances of obtaining responses, reply paid postage was 
arranged by enclosing a pre-printed return mail envelope with the survey and 
covering letter.  This ensured that participants were not faced with bearing the cost of 
participating in a voluntary exercise and also reduced the risk of misdirected returns.  
In addition, the questionnaire was deliberately printed on high quality bright yellow 
paper so as to be clearly visible when placed on a desk with other documents, most 
of which would presumably be printed on white paper.35  The covering letter 
contained a number of features that were also included to encourage participation.  
                                                 
 
32   Questions 1-6, 14, 15 and 20. 
33   Questions 5 & 6. 
34   Fink, A & Kosecoff, J, How to Conduct Surveys: A Step-by-Step Guide, 2nd ed, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, USA, 1998; Alreck, PL & Settle, RB, The Survey Research 
Handbook, 2nd ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, USA, 1995 especially Chapter 7; Rumsey, D, 
Statistics for Dummies, Wiley Publishing, Indianapolis, USA, 2003especially Chapter 20. 
35   This decision is somewhat at odds with the comments of Alreck, PL & Settle, RB, The 
Survey Research Handbook, 2nd ed, McGraw-Hill, New York, USA, 1995 at 185, however, 
  232Specifically, there was an offer to participants to provide feedback relevant to law 
reform concerning incorporated sporting groups in each jurisdiction.36
 
In addition to the usual assurances of confidentiality, participants were advised that 
the project had obtained full Murdoch University Human Research Ethics Committee 
approval.  Participants were able to independently confirm these assurances and 
clarify any additional issues by contacting any one of the thesis Supervisor, the Chair 
of the Human Research Ethics Committee, or me by means of contact telephone 
numbers or email addresses.  Four weeks after the original survey mail-out, a 
reminder card was mailed to all incorporated sporting associations on the mailing list 
with the exception of those for which returned mail had been received and registrants 
in the wine draw.  Together, these measures served to reduce non-response error by 
removing some of the disincentives to participate. 
 
As indicated above, the major self-interest based incentive to participate in the 
survey was entry in a draw for a case of quality wine.  Evidence of the incentive 
effect of this measure is the high number of respondents who chose to enter the draw 
(750 out of 822 representing 91% of respondents).  The fact that almost one-in-ten 
participant groups chose to respond without entering the wine draw addresses some 
of the concerns that competition-based inducements may result in non-response bias.  
The extent to which the results discussed in this research may or may not be 
compromised by such bias is outside of the scope of the research but is nevertheless a 
                                                                                                                                          
the questionnaire in this project was one of a number of documents in the mail-out pack and, 
taken as a whole, this pack addresses the other substantive comments of these authors. 
36   A preliminary report was provided to regulators in each jurisdiction concerning the issue of 
return to sender rates. 
  233consideration that should be taken account of when considering the results.  The 
covering letter to the survey also indicated that the findings of the survey would be 
used to influence reform of the incorporated associations legislation in each 
jurisdiction.  This will be achieved by means of jurisdiction specific reports to be 
produced.  This provided additional motivation for target sample members to 
participate in the survey. 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
Operation Prior To Incorporation 
All of the relevant legislation allows for existing eligible unincorporated associations 
to become incorporated.37  The question therefore arises as to how common such a 
situation is in practice.  A consequent question is how long such unincorporated 
associations operate before becoming incorporated.  These questions were raised in 
question 2 of the questionnaire.  The results for this question were are discussed in 
detail in appendix B and are presented in summary in chart 3: 
                                                 
37   Associations Act (NT) ss 8 & 12; Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 9; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 11; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 
19; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 7; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Vic) s 5; Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 5; Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) s 18; Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 7.  Specific consideration of the 
effect of incorporation on the pre-existing unincorporated association is taken in Associations 
Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 15(3), Sch 2 cl 3; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 
(Qld) s 19A-19B; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 20(3)(c); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 10(c). 
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Chart 3 
 
As can be seen, approximately 1 in every 3 New Zealand respondents incorporated 
sporting societies formed by incorporating, while their Australian equivalents formed 
by incorporating at a rate closer to 1 in every 6.  Or put another way, incorporated 
sporting groups in New Zealand are twice as likely to form by incorporating than 
their Australian equivalents. 
 
Where a group had operated prior to incorporation, the second part of question 2 
asked them to indicate how long this pre-incorporation history had been.  The 
responses to this part of question 2 are shown in table 1:  
  235Years  Australia  Aust % 
New 
Zealand  NZ % 
0-5  102  19.39%  13  27.66% 
6-10  66  12.55%  2  4.26% 
11-15  41  7.79%  4  8.51% 
16-20  56  10.65%  7  14.89% 
21-30  64  12.17%  2  4.26% 
31-40  48  9.13%  4  8.51% 
41-50  38  7.22%  2  4.26% 
51-60  25  4.75%  5  10.64% 
61-70  31  5.89%  1  2.13% 
71-80  20  3.80%  1  2.13% 
81-90  12  2.28%  1  2.13% 
91-100  7  1.33%  3  6.38% 
101+  16  3.04%  2  4.26% 
Table 1 
 
As discussed in detail in appendix B, the combination of skewed results and the 
effect of outlying responses together render the use of an arithmetic mean otiose as a 
measure of central tendency with respect to both the Australian and New Zealand 
responses.  However, the median Australian response to this question was 20 years.  
This was also the modal Australian response (34 groups).  Five groups indicated that 
they had operated prior to incorporation for only 6 months (the least amount of time).  
A single group reported the longest pre-incorporation history of 130 years.   
 
The median response to this question from New Zealand respondents was the same 
as that of Australia, namely 20 years, while 1 year was the modal response (4 
groups).  These 4 groups had been in existence prior to incorporation for the least 
amount of time.  A single group reported the longest pre-incorporation history of 115 
years.   
 
  236These results tend to suggest that most respondent incorporated sporting groups in 
both countries were already well established before becoming incorporated.  This 
must be read with the caveat that, in New Zealand, respondent sporting groups 
sometimes sought incorporated status at an earlier stage in their development than 
those in Australia.  Graphically, the responses from both countries as plotted in chart 
4 bear out this assessment: 
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Chart 4 
 
 
Alternative Incorporation Regimes 
The popularity of the legislative regimes at the heart of this investigation has already 
been referred to above.  The question then arises as to whether the legislative 
framework has been durable as well as popular.  Question 1 asked how long 
  237respondent groups had been incorporated.  The responses to this question according 
to country of incorporation are as described in table 2: 
Years Since 
Incorporation  Australia  % 
NEW 
ZEALAND  % 
0-5  128  18.00%  14  16.47% 
6-10  148  20.82%  9  10.59% 
11-15  177  24.89%  4  4.71% 
16-20  148  20.82%  5  5.88% 
21-30  57  8.02%  17  20.00% 
31-40  24  3.38%  8  9.41% 
41-50  10  1.41%  9  10.59% 
51-60  6  0.84%  3  3.53% 
61-70  2  0.28%  5  5.88% 
71-80  4  0.56%  3  3.53% 
81-90  4  0.56%  2  2.35% 
91-100  2  0.28%  3  3.53% 
101+  1  0.14%  3  3.53% 
Table 2 
 
As discussed in detail in appendix B, the combination of skewed results and the 
effect of outlying responses together render the use of an arithmetic mean irrelevant 
as a measure of central tendency with respect to both the Australian and New 
Zealand responses.  Ordinal data of this type is more appropriately assessed for this 
purpose by reference to median and mode.  The most common response to this 
question for New Zealand respondents was 3 years (4 groups, or 5%) while in 
Australia it was 10 years (77 groups, or 11%).  The median response in New Zealand 
was 29 years, while in Australia it was 13 years.  The life span range reported in New 
Zealand was between 1 and 138 years, while in Australia it was from 6 months to 
120 years.  As can be confirmed visually by reference to chart 5 below, it appears 
that incorporated sporting societies in New Zealand tend to be older than 
incorporated sporting associations in Australia.  
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Chart 5 
 
These figures also clearly indicate the durability of the various legislative measures 
in both countries, given that 61% of all Australian and 73% of all New Zealand 
respondents reported that they had been incorporated for more than 10 years. 
 
As has been noted elsewhere, it is conceivable that a group that is eligible for 
incorporation under the legislative measures at the heart of this enquiry would be 
equally eligible to incorporate under the provisions of the general trading company 
incorporation statutes in Australia38 and New Zealand.39  In Australia this would 
firstly involve deciding upon the choice of “public” or “proprietary” company status.  
Eligibility for incorporation as a proprietary company is restricted to entities which 
                                                 
38   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 
39   Companies Act 1993 (NZ). 
  239have fewer than “50 non-employee shareholders”.40  When this limitor is applied to 
the response data,41 the comparative results are as per table 3: 
  Australia  % 
New 
Zealand  % 
> 50  423  58.83%  62  74.70% 
≤ 50  296  41.17%  21  25.30% 
Table 3 
 
The comparisons are more striking when illustrated graphically as in chart 6: 
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Chart 6 
It appears from this data that respondent groups from both countries would be 
eligible to incorporate as proprietary companies in the minority of cases.  This is 
strongly suggestive of the inference that incorporated sporting associations are not, in 
the majority of cases, small in terms of membership (3 in 4 New Zealand respondent 
                                                 
40   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 45A.  In New Zealand there is no longer any differentiation 
between any type of company incorporated under the Companies Act 1993 (NZ). 
  240groups, and 3 in 5 Australian groups, are relatively large).  However, it is equally 
true to infer from this data that a significant proportion of incorporated sporting 
associations are relatively small in terms of membership.  This raises the significance 
of corporate size as an issue for corporate regulators.  The data relating to the 
numbers of members reported by respondent groups in each country is provided in 
table 4:  
No. of 
Members  Australia  %  New Zealand  % 
0-10  43  5.99%  1  1.19% 
11-20  71  9.89%  8  9.52% 
21-30  72  10.03%  2  2.38% 
31-40  46  6.41%  4  4.76% 
41-50  63  8.77%  6  7.14% 
51-100  137  19.08%  24  28.57% 
101-200  141  19.64%  15  17.86% 
201-300  59  8.22%  6  7.14% 
301-400  16  2.23%  4  4.76% 
401-500  11  1.53%  2  2.38% 
501-1000  27  3.76%  7  8.33% 
1001+  32  4.46%  5  5.95% 
Table 4 
As can be seen from a membership perspective, very small incorporated sporting 
associations are more common in Australia, while those groups with very large 
memberships are not common in either country.  Membership data is analysed in 
detail in appendix B.  The median Australian response to this question was 70 
members and in New Zealand it was 96 members.  In Australia 50 members was the 
modal response while in New Zealand it was 150 members.  The range of 
memberships reported by Australian incorporated sporting associations was from 1 
                                                                                                                                          
41   Survey instrument question 3. 
  241member to 8000 members.  The membership range reported by New Zealand 
incorporated sporting societies was from 2 members42 to 7,000 members. 
 
Chart 7 illustrates how the reported memberships from respondents in both countries 
compare proportionally: 
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Chart 7 
 
Given that the majority of respondents would have more than 5 non-employee 
members, those incorporated sporting groups considering transferring to the trading 
company regulatory framework would be faced with incorporation as a public 
company.  In Australia, the most appropriate option would presumably be the 
                                                 
42   This of course is contrary to the provisions of s 4(1) of the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 
(NZ) which requires a minimum membership of not less than 15 members.  Three responses 
from New Zealand reported memberships lower than the statutory minimum, namely 1 
response at 2 members and 2 responses at 12 members. 
  242company limited by guarantee.43  Question 8 of the questionnaire asked respondents 
if they would consider incorporating under these alternative incorporation measures.  
The comparative responses to this binary question were as per chart 8: 
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Chart 8 
The degree to which this opinion is mirrored in each country is remarkable.  It 
appears that in both countries, only 1 in 6 incorporated sporting associations would 
consider incorporation as a company to be a viable alternative to incorporation under 
the legislative measures at the heart of the present enquiry.  Question 8 then asked 
those respondents who answered in the negative to indicate reasons for their 
preference from a given list of possible alternatives.  The alternatives provided were 
as follows: 
                                                 
43   Woodward, S, "'Not-for-Profit' Motivation in a 'for-Profit' Company Law Regime - National 
Baseline Data" (2003) 21 Company & Securities Law Journal 102; and Sievers, AS, 
Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, 
Annandale, 1996 at 76. 
  2431.  Lack of understanding of the Corporations (Companies) Act. 
2.  Cost of incorporation;  
3.  Increased running costs (accounting, taxation etc). 
4.  Annual reporting requirements. 
5.  The group is a social body, not a commercial enterprise. 
6.  Associations are more appropriately regulated for our purposes. 
7.  Other(s) (please specify). 
 
The results of this part of question 8 are shown in chart 9: 
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Chart 9 
  244The alternatives open to respondents in this part of the question can be broadly 
separated into two types of objection, namely technical44 and philosophical.45  If 
“other” responses are excluded from the comparative data, comparisons can be made 
between responses on the basis of country of incorporation using the technical and 
philosophical classification.  As chart 10 below illustrates, respondent objections are 
reasonably evenly split between the technical and the philosophical in both countries.  
The very small variation from 50%-50% evinced in the Australian results in favour 
of technical objections is not statistically significant. 
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Chart 10 
 
                                                 
44   I.e. Lack of understanding of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or Companies Act 1993 (NZ); 
cost of incorporation; increased running costs (accounting, taxation etc); and, annual 
reporting requirements. 
45   I.e. The group is a social body, not a commercial enterprise; and, associations are more 
appropriately regulated for our purposes. 
  245At this point it is also worth mentioning the results of question 21, which asked 
respondents if there was some way in which the regulatory measure was in some way 
“inappropriate, inadequate or irrelevant”.  The results are illustrated in chart 11: 
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Chart 11 
 
Note the insignificant proportion of respondents in both countries expressing 
positively a serious dissatisfaction with the governing legislation.  This is entirely 
consistent with the results from question 8 above.  Of the remaining respondent 
groups which favour maintaining the legislative status quo in both countries, it is 
interesting that the views of New Zealand respondents are significantly more 
emphatic than those expressed by the (clearly less well informed) Australian 
respondent group. 
 
  246Size As A Corporate Characteristic 
As indicated above, corporate size is highly relevant to the choice of regulatory 
framework for incorporated sporting associations.  In addition to bare membership 
statistics, two further measures of corporate size were used to compare responses 
from both countries, namely the definition of “small proprietary company”46 and the 
definition of “prescribed association”. 47
 
Question 4 of the questionnaire asked respondents to report how many full-time, 
part-time and casual employees their groups employed.  As indicated in appendix B, 
less than 10% of respondents reported that they had any full-time employees.  The 
largest number of employees reported by a single respondent group was 21.   
Approximately 87% of respondents reported that they had no part-time employees.  
A single respondent group reported the largest number of part-time employees, 
namely 17.  Fewer than 15% of respondent groups reported employing any casual 
employees.  A single incorporated sporting association reported the largest number 
of casual employees, namely 52.  The responses to this question are summarised as 
follows in chart 12: 
                                                 
46   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 45A. 
47   Being those associations that have “gross receipts in that association's previous financial year 
in excess of $200,000” (Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 36; & Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 4(1). 
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Chart 12 
The low incidence of employment reported by the respondent group means that the 
utility of the “small proprietary company” classification is restricted.  In fact, even if 
one were to convert all employment classifications into a single binary of employee/ 
no employee status, this together with the asset and revenue parameters applicable to 
the classification all combine to exclude 100% of the respondent groups from 
qualifying as a “large proprietary company”.  That is to say, none of the respondent 
groups satisfied the two out of three criteria required to qualify for classification as a 
large proprietary company.   
 
  248Question 5 asked respondents to report the total assets of the incorporated sporting 
association.  The results for this question are reported in detail in appendix B.  On a 
proportional basis the results from both countries exhibit interesting points of 
difference as per chart 13:  
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Chart 13 
It is clear from this comparison that there are significant differences between the 
typical asset bases of incorporated sporting groups in Australia and New Zealand.  
The asset bases of respondent groups in Australia tend to be significantly smaller 
than those reported in New Zealand.  The median Australian response to this 
question was in the $10K-$50K category while in New Zealand the median response 
was in the $50K-$100K category.  In Australia the $1K-$10K category was the 
modal response while in New Zealand the modal response was the $100K-$500K 
category. 
 
  249Question 6 asked respondents to report the most recent recorded gross annual 
revenue within certain bands on an ordinal scale.  The comparative proportional 
responses as between each country were as per chart 14:  
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Chart 14 
In this instance it is interesting to note the similarity of results rather (as was the case 
with responses to question 5) than significant variation in responses between 
countries.  In this instance the median Australian reported gross revenue was 
identical to that in New Zealand, namely the $10K-$50K category.  Some variation 
is, however, evident when the modal response is considered.  In Australia this was in 
the $1K-$10K category, while in New Zealand the modal response was in the $10K-
$50K category.  Of further interest are the relatively small reported gross revenue 
figures, with more than 80% of groups in both countries earning less than $100,000 
per annum in gross as opposed to net revenue.  The implications of the distinction 
  250between large and small incorporated sporting entities have been the subject of 
limited scholarship to date.48
 
South Australia delineates its incorporated sporting associations by size according to  
a single criterion, namely “gross annual receipts in excess of $200,000”.49  
Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not provide options to question 6 that permit a 
definitive indication of how such a delineator would separate respondent groups in 
this study.50
 
Management Structure 
Question 13 asked respondent groups if they had an elected management committee.  
The results of responses to this question are examined in detail in appendix B.  These 
results are summarised in chart 15:  
                                                 
48   See McConnell, CD, "The Changing Face of Sport Management: A Study of a Provincial 
Rugby Union Facing Professionalization and Corporatization", Master of Business Studies 
thesis, Massey University, Albany, NZ, 1996. 
49   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 36. Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 
36; & Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 4(1). 
50   An independent analysis of the question 6 response data was obtained from Mr Alan Simpson 
with this problem in mind.  Mr Simpson performed 20 repetitions of a standard Monte Carlo 
approximation (see Manly, BFJ, Statistics for Environmental Science and Management, 
Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, USA, 2001) using the $200,000 delineator.  This 
exercise produced very consistent results in the range 80.29%-81.75%.  This suggests that 
less than 20% of all respondent groups would be classified as “prescribed” if they had been 
formed in South Australia or Victoria. 
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Chart 15 
As can be seen there is no significant difference in the proportionate responses to this 
question from both countries.  Only around 1 in 15 incorporated associations in 
either country operates without an elected management committee.51  Of that cohort 
82% have memberships of less than 100.  Interestingly, there was one group in this 
subset with 1,500 members and no elected management committee.  The statutory 
presumptions that operate where there is no formally constituted management 
committee have been highlighted in chapter 3.  The relative infrequency of such a 
phenomena having been reported by this response group serves to set such entities 
apart as a curiosity (or, in the case of the single group of 1,500 members and no 
elected management committee, an enigma).  One can, however infer from this data 
that the groups with the fewest members tend not to have an elected management 
                                                 
51   10% of all respondent groups with no elected management committee were based in New 
Zealand and 47% were based in Victoria. 
  252committee.  There is virtually no significant correlation between the size of the 
management committee and the total assets of respondents from either Australia52 or 
New Zealand.53    While there is a higher negative correlation between the size of the 
management committee and the gross revenue reported by respondents from either 
Australia54 or New Zealand,55 it must be emphasised that the result is still very weak 
and not conducive to parametric inference. 
 
Where groups reported the existence of an elected management committee, the 
average ratio of management committee to total group membership in Australia was 
1 in 3356 while in New Zealand the ratio was 1 in 45.57  There is however a tendency 
of New Zealand respondent groups to report a higher number of management 
committee members.  This together with the skewed distribution and impact of 
extreme outliers are illustrated in detail in appendix B.  The proportionate 
comparisons between the size of reported management committees in each country 
are shown in chart 16: 
                                                 
52   The Spearman rank correlation was computed in this instance due to the ordinal nature of 
both variables.  The 732 Australian respondents returned a coefficient of -0.147. 
53   As for Australian responses, the Spearman rank correlation was used here.  The 90 New 
Zealand respondents returned a coefficient of -0.123. 
54   The Spearman rank correlation for the 732 Australian survey respondents returned a 
coefficient of -0.185. 
55   The Spearman rank correlation for the 90 New Zealand respondents returned a coefficient of 
-0.212. 
56   Average group membership where the group has an elected management committee is 278 
and average management committee size is 8. 
57   Average group membership where the group has an elected management committee is 429 
and average management committee size is 9. 
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Chart 16 
It can be seen that, while management committees in New Zealand respondent 
groups tend to be larger than in Australia, in both countries they are most likely to be 
between 6 and 10 persons in size. 
 
When it comes to paying management committee members for their services it is 
unarguably the case that this is very much an exceptional practice among respondent 
groups.  This is demonstrated in chart 17: 
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Chart 17 
While it is more likely that management committee members in New Zealand 
respondent groups will be paid for their services than is the case in Australia, the 
overwhelming proportion of respondent groups in both countries are managed by 
volunteers.  Given the distorting effect of volunteers in chart 17, the same results are 
recast in chart 18 as follows with the exclusion of volunteers: 
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Chart 18 
It follows that, even where respondent groups in either country pay management 
committee members for their services, in the majority of cases this payment is made 
to only one of their number. 
 
Meetings 
Question 11 asked respondents to indicate how frequently members’ meetings were 
held in each group.58  Responses to this question are detailed in appendix B, however 
reference to chart 19 summarises these responses graphically:  
                                                 
58    As can be seen from the graphic data, it is possible that this question may have been 
misconstrued by some respondents to refer to sporting as opposed to members’ business 
meetings. 
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Chart 19 
It can be seen that the modal meeting frequency in Australia is monthly while in New 
Zealand it is annually.  However the next most common frequency in each country is 
the modal response from the other.  Together the monthly and annual responses in 
both countries accounted for over 70% of total responses.  Those respondent groups 
operating with only annual members’ meetings were in the minority in both 
countries.   
 
Where respondent groups in both countries had elected management committees, 
question 16 asked how often this body meets.  The results of this question are 
summarised in chart 20:  
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Chart 20 
It is clear that most management committees in both countries meet monthly.   
However it is significant that 23%, or almost 1 in every 4 Australian respondent 
groups, have management committee meetings on less than a monthly frequency.  In 
New Zealand respondent groups, this rate is down to 1 in every 5 respondents (or 
20%) but this is a still significant proportion of respondent groups.  Also of interest is 
that members meet as frequently, or more frequently, than management committees 
in 57% (or 382) of the Australian respondent groups and in 49% (or 40) of the New 
Zealand respondent groups. 
 
Management Decisions 
Question 18 asked respondents to indicate what considerations weigh on 
management committees when making decisions.  A variety of alternative responses 
were provided as follows:   
  2581.  Achieving the objects of the group as laid out in the constitution. 
2.  Satisfying the desires of members as expressed from time to time. 
3.  Safeguarding the asset base of the group. 
4.  Justifying the decisions to the members. 
5.  Other (please specify). 
The first part of this question allowed for multiple responses.  The second part of 
question 18 required respondents to indicate the main consideration only.  Chart 21 
below shows the proportional responses to the first part of question 18 from 
respondents in each country.  Chart 22 shows the country-by-country comparisons 
for the second part of the question. 
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Chart 21 
When respondents had to nominate a “main” consideration, these comparisons are as 
follows: 
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Chart 22 
The way in which the data in both charts 21 and 22 is rendered is suggestive of the 
possibility of informal or “donkey” voting.  The only way this possibility can be 
tested is by repeating the exercise and reordering the alternative responses.   
Nevertheless, without such post-hoc testing, the data must be interpreted without 
prejudice to indicate that member expectations, whether expressed constitutionally or 
in some other forum, are the most significant considerations weighing on 
management committee decisions. 
 
The first part of question 19 asked respondents to indicate if management committee 
decisions have ever been overruled by decisions of members meetings.  The 
comparative proportional results of responses to this question are illustrated in chart 
23:  
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Chart 23 
 
Thus, members have overruled management committee decisions in 1 out of every 6 
Australian respondent groups and in 1 out of every 9 New Zealand respondent 
groups.  The second part of question 19 then asked those groups answering the first 
part in the affirmative to indicate whether this has occurred “extremely rarely”, 
“occasionally” or “frequently”.  Comparative responses to this part of question 19 are 
illustrated in chart 24: 
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These responses suggest that while the incidence of membership veto is 
comparatively common in both countries, its frequency is limited in practice. 
 
Management Powers 
Question 17 asked respondents to indicate whether there were any restrictions on the 
management committee to spend the funds of the group. As with all other questions, 
the results to this question are provided in detail in appendix B.  The comparative 
proportional results are summarised in chart 25:  
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Chart 25 
There is no significant difference in the results as between countries and it is clear 
that such restrictions apply to management committees in 1 out of every 3 respondent 
groups. 
 
In addition, question 12 asked respondent groups to indicate how the power to make 
a selection of typical broad management decisions is allocated in each group.  The 
question asks which of the members meeting, management committee or “other” 
group has the final authority to do each of the following: 
1.  Hiring And Firing Employees. 
2.  Taking Out Loans. 
3.  Executing Contracts. 
4.  Initiating Legal Action in The Group Name. 
5.  Grant or Refuse Membership. 
6.  Set Subscription Rates. 
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  Australia %  New Zealand % 
  Members  Management 
Committee 
Other  Members  Management 
Committee 
Other 
Hire & Fire  22.16%  74.64%  3.21%  12.90%  61.29%  25.81% 
Loans  34.46%  61.39%  4.14%  32.47%  61.04%  6.49% 
Contracts  22.37%  75.33%  2.29%  17.11%  75.00%  7.89% 
Suing  31.08%  65.54%  3.37%  29.27%  67.07%  3.66% 
Membership  27.94%  69.41%  2.65%  21.84%  73.56%  4.60% 
Subs  47.95%  49.50%  2.55%  61.80%  38.20%  0.00% 
Table 5 
 
This dense dataset is rendered graphically in chart 26: 
                                                 
59   Refer to annexure B for raw data. 
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  265The most significant feature of these responses is that, regardless of the country, 
important management decisions are not universally regarded as the exclusive 
domain of the management committee.  However, it is equally clear that the 
management committee is the most important decision making body within each 
respondent group. 
 
Winding-Up 
Question 9 asked respondents to indicate where the group constitution directs surplus 
assets on winding-up to be directed.  A range of options were provided from which 
respondents could choose as follows: 
1.  Shared among the members 
2.  Transferred to an association with similar aims 
3.  Donated to charity 
4.  Transferred to state revenue 
5.  Other (please specify) 
The comparative proportional responses to this question are illustrated in chart 27:  
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Question 10 asked respondents to indicate if they believed the constitutional 
provision for directing surplus assets on winding-up was inappropriate.  No 
respondents answered this question.  Presumably this indicates unanimous 
acceptance of these winding-up provisions. 
 
Raison ďêtre 
Question 7 asked respondents to indicate in an abstract sense why they existed.  The 
comparative proportional results are as per chart 28: 
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Once again it is possible that these responses may be compromised by the informal 
voting phenomena.  However, taken at face value they do indicate the clear primacy 
of member satisfaction, which is an essentially internal focus, as the guiding raison 
ďêtre of respondent groups in both countries.  It is also interesting to note the lack of 
significant difference in the results as between country of incorporation. 
 
SUMMARY 
The responses to the research project questionnaire provide an important insight into 
the actual structure and operation of incorporated sporting associations and societies 
in both Australia and New Zealand respectively.  Special note should be taken of the 
findings that in many respects there is no significant difference between groups in 
both countries.  However, it is also true that this research has highlighted some 
important points of difference between respondent groups in both countries.   
  268Appreciating the nature of these differences is necessary when seeking to generalize 
on matters of legal principle.  Such appreciation is also necessary when determining 
whether various legislative measures are appropriate to the needs of user groups.  
The following chapter of this thesis compares the findings of the survey that have 
been discussed above with the legislative framework that was analysed in chapter 3.  
This comparison seeks to determine the extent to which the legislative framework 
can be said to be a good fit with the observed reality of the bodies surveyed.  In the 
final chapter, the theoretical framework that was developed in chapters 1 and 2 of 
this thesis, which has been referred to throughout as broad form organic theory, will 
be applied in order to determine the most appropriate basis upon which a coherent 
and appropriate jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations can be 
developed.  The thesis thereafter concludes. 
 
  269CHAPTER 5 
APPLYING BROADLY CONCIEVED ORGANIC THEORY: 
LEGISLATIVE DRESS SUIT OR STRAITJACKET? 
 “Errors, like straws, upon the surface flow; 
He who would search for pearls must dive below.”1
 
“The strength of our persuasions is no evidence at all of 
their own rectitude: crooked things may be as stiff and 
inflexible as straight: and men may be as positive and 
peremptory in error as in truth.”2
 
INTRODUCTION 
It is tempting to theorise about the nature of incorporated sporting associations 
exclusively by reference to the pattern or pattern that has been laid out in the various 
statutory regimes that have been analysed in this thesis.  However, such analysis 
would be based on the assumption that incorporated sporting associations in practice 
mirror a particular legislative model.  Careful reading of chapters 3 and 4 above will 
have suggested that this form of superficial analysis is inadvisable.  Not only is there 
variability in the legislative schemes adopted in each jurisdiction as documented in 
chapter 3, but there is tremendous variability in the reported nature and functions of 
incorporated sporting associations within each jurisdiction, as was disclosed in 
chapter 4.  This chapter seeks to examine the interplay between legislative models 
and observed reality in order to determine whether, and to what extent, one can 
generalise about incorporated sporting associations.  The extent to which one can 
                                                 
1   Huxley, TH Biogenesis and Abiogenesis in “Collected Essays”, 1893. 
  270make general observations will be singularly important when approaching the task of 
developing an appropriate jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations.   
Given the commitment of this thesis to a broadly conceived organic theory, the 
underlying normative approach that is adopted from this point is that where there is a 
lack of fit between observed reality and statutory framework, the statutory 
framework is open to criticism. 
 
Legislative Framework vs. Observed Reality 
It will be recalled from chapter 3 above that the legislation relating to incorporated 
sporting associations was analysed across 8 defining characteristics based principally 
on the research of Professor Salomon.  To recap, it was suggested in chapter 3 that 
incorporated sporting associations could be understood in terms of their: 
1.  Sui generis nature. 
2.  Eligibility for incorporation. 
3.  Degree of organisation / institutionalisation. 
4.  Private status. 
5.  Binding non-profit distribution / personal benefit restriction constraints. 
6.  Unique internal governance mechanisms. 
7.  Voluntary nature. 
8.  Distinctive taxation status. 
The extent to which these legislative characteristics are reflected in the empirical 
findings discussed in chapter 4 is explored in detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
2    Locke, J “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, Book IV, Chapter XIX ‘Of 
Enthusiasm’ <http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/ctb4c19.htm#3> 
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Sui Generis? 
With respect to this aspect of incorporated associations, it is of course theoretically 
possible for an eligible sporting association to incorporate under the provisions of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  However, chapter 4 reveals that in practice the 
majority of Australian groups (60%) and New Zealand groups (75%) would only be 
eligible to incorporate as a public company.  Presumably this would require 
incorporation as a company limited by guarantee.  Given that less than 40% of 
Australian and 25% of New Zealand respondents report membership of less than 50 
persons, the minority of respondents would in theory, be eligible to incorporate as a 
proprietary limited company.3
 
The significance of the difference of course relates to the reporting and regulatory 
requirements of proprietary limited companies as opposed to public companies.  The 
New Zealand statistics, while not strictly relevant to the propriety/public company 
distinction, are nevertheless of interest as a point of comparison.  As indicated in 
chapter 4 above, responses to question 3 of the questionnaire indicated that some 
three-quarters of incorporated sporting societies in New Zealand would be ineligible 
to incorporate in Australia as a proprietary limited company because their 
membership numbers exceeded 50 persons.  This data is important when considering 
the suitability of the closely-held company as a possible analogy for incorporated 
associations.  Contrary to what might have been thought to be the case, the clear 
majority of incorporated associations have medium to large memberships rather than 
                                                                                                                                          
(Accessed 13, May 2004). 
3   See the discussion of the responses to question 3 of the questionnaire in chapter 4 above. 
  272very small numbers.  Indeed, as reported in chapter 4, responses to question 3 of the 
questionnaire also indicate that the average number of members in incorporated 
sporting associations across both Australia and New Zealand was 277 members.  On 
an Australia-wide basis the average was 261 members while in New Zealand the 
average number of members was 415.   
 
One remaining aspect relating to the theoretical possibility of incorporation as a 
company by reference to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is the issue of how many 
full-time equivalent employees incorporated associations actually employ.  This 
question was asked in question 4 of the questionnaire and, as can be seen from the 
results presented in chapter 4, some 92% of incorporated associations in Australia 
and 83% of incorporated societies in New Zealand report that they have no full-time 
employees.  In addition, it will be recalled that 89% of Australian incorporated 
associations and 70% of New Zealand incorporated societies reported that they 
employed no part-time employees.  Further, as to the number of employees of a 
casual nature employed by incorporated associations, it will be recalled that in 
Australia 85% of respondents and in New Zealand 79% of respondents employ no 
casual employees.   
 
Even where incorporated sporting societies reported employing people, chapter 4 
revealed that the vast majority of such groups reported employing one or two 
employees while very few groups in percentage terms reported employing more than 
three employees.  It is therefore an accurate generalisation to state that the vast 
majority of incorporated sporting associations employ no people.  It follows from 
  273this generalisation that most of the work of incorporated sporting associations is 
performed by volunteers. 
 
Responses to question 5 of the questionnaire presented in chapter 4 revealed that 
more than 90% of all respondents report total assets of less than $500,000.  On a 
country-by-country basis the data revealed that more than 95% of Australian 
respondents have assets of less than $500,000, while New Zealand the figure was 
closer to 78%.  It will be recalled that in Australia the most common response 
category for question 5 was total assets between $1,000 and $10,000.4  The results 
also clearly indicated that New Zealand respondents tended to be wealthier on the 
whole given that the modal response in that country was total assets in the $100,000 
to $500,000 category.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, question 6 of the questionnaire revealed that more than 
95% of respondents reported total income of less than $500,000, and that more than 
50% reported total income of less than $10,000.  Again it is interesting that the 
modal response from Australian respondents was between $1,000 and $10,000 in 
total income, while in New Zealand the modal response was between $10,000 and 
$50,000.  This is consistent with the reported responses from New Zealand relating 
to total assets and indicates that, on average New Zealand respondent groups were 
economically larger than Australian respondents. 
 
Taken in combination, the above discussion reveals that none of the incorporated 
associations in either Australia or New Zealand would satisfy the criteria for a 
                                                 
4   Note the wealthiest Australian respondent group reporting assets in excess of $10 million. 
  274proprietary limited company that is set out in section 45A of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) either “small” or “large”.  The significance of this of course is that small 
proprietary limited companies face less onerous reporting and regulatory 
requirements than large proprietary companies.  Large proprietary companies in fact 
face a very similar regulatory framework to public companies. The only public 
companies that are entitled to any special dispensation under the Australian 
legislation are those companies which are limited by guarantee.  
 
These companies were the subject of a recent investigation by Woodward and by 
Woodward and Marshall.5  It appears therefore that the majority of incorporated 
sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand are indeed theoretically eligible 
to incorporate as a public company (as already mentioned, probably the company 
limited by guarantee).  What does the empirical evidence suggest about the relative 
popularity of incorporation regimes to not-for-profit entities?  The statistics indicate 
very clearly that the favoured method of incorporation for the types of groups that 
are the subject of this study is the associations incorporation regime by a margin in 
excess of 10 to 1.6   
 
                                                 
5   Woodward, S, "'Not-for-Profit' Motivation in a 'for-Profit' Company Law Regime - National 
Baseline Data" (2003) 21 Company & Securities Law Journal 102; and Woodward, S & 
Marshall, S, A Better Framework: Reforming Not-for-Profit Regulation, The University of 
Melbourne, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Melbourne, 2004. 
6   Observe Woodward, S, "'Not-for-Profit' Motivation in a 'for-Profit' Company Law Regime - 
National Baseline Data" (2003) 21 Company & Securities Law Journal 102 at 107 indicating 
population of Guarantee Companies of 9,817 & compare in NZ 22,156 & Australia 114,502 
(per Huntly 2000).  See also Charitable Organisations in Australia, Report No. 45, Industry 
Commission, Canberra, 1995; Sievers, AS, "Incorporation of Non-Profit Associations: The 
Way Ahead?" (2000) 18(5) Company & Securities Law Journal 311; and Sievers, AS, 
"Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in Australia and Other Common 
Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124. 
  275Special note should also be taken of the results of question 8 of the questionnaire 
which asked respondents if they would consider being incorporated as a company 
incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or the Companies Act 1993 
(NZ).  As reported in chapter 4, the response in both countries to this question was 
overwhelmingly in the negative.  In addition, there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of responses for the affirmative and those for the negative regardless of 
country.  On average 17% of respondents were open to the possibility while the 
remaining 83% of respondents were not.  Further, almost 70% of respondents to this 
question indicated that they would not incorporate under the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) or the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) because they viewed the group as a social 
body and not a commercial enterprise.  This philosophical hostility to incorporation 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) was the 
single most significant objection raised by respondents.  However, as discussed in 
chapter 4, there was a fairly even split between respondents who were opposed to the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) when separated 
between technical and philosophical reasons. 
 
It is apparent from the records of parliamentary debate discussed in chapter 3 that 
incorporated associations are viewed by the legislatures as sui generis and do not fit 
within the regime that exists for the regulation of trading companies.  As a 
consequence of the empirical research contained in this thesis, it is now possible to 
generalise as to how incorporated sporting associations view themselves in relation 
to the existing legislative framework and that which exists primarily for trading 
companies.  On the basis of the research presented in chapter 4, incorporated sporting 
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and essentially different to trading corporations. 
 
Eligibility for Incorporation 
It is clear from the empirical data reported in chapter 4 that the majority of 
jurisdictions in Australia and New Zealand choose to express the eligibility for 
incorporation with respect to eligible purposes and the minimum operational size. 
There is no mention in any of the statutes of the issue of “mutual benefit versus 
public benefit”.  As was discussed in chapter 2, this is a significant difference 
between incorporated association statutes and the law relating to charities in a 
general sense. 
 
Eligible Purposes 
As is discussed in chapter 3, New Zealand together with more than two-thirds of the 
Australian jurisdictions all express the eligibility for incorporation with respect to the 
purposes for which an association or society can be formed in a negative sense.  That 
is to say, an association can be incorporated in New Zealand, New South Wales, 
Queensland, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory so long as they are not 
formed for trading purposes, or for the purpose of securing pecuniary profit to the 
members.  In contrast South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia and the 
Northern Territory which together account for less than one-third of the Australian 
incorporated associations choose to express the eligibility for incorporation with 
respect to purposes in a positive sense.  That is to say, a positive list of acceptable 
purposes is provided and incorporation is available so long as the applicant 
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therefore, if the governing legislatures in the relevant jurisdictions wished to 
harmonise the legislation in each jurisdiction on a national or Australasian basis, it 
would be sensible to adopt a negatively phrased purpose constraint in terms of 
eligibility for incorporation. This would involve the least impact on the fewest 
numbers of incorporated associations already in existence.  The centrality of 
association purposes to the operation of incorporated associations is highlighted in 
chapter 4 in the discussion of question 18 of the questionnaire which asked 
respondents to indicate the main consideration made by management committees 
when making decisions.  Interestingly, over 48% of Australian respondents, and over 
55% of New Zealand respondents, indicated that this was; “Achieving the objects of 
the group as laid out in the constitution.”  In each country, this was the single most 
common response and indicates symmetry between the legislation and empirical data 
concerning the primacy of association purposes. 
 
Minimum Size 
As discussed above, one remarkable outcome from the data received in the process 
of the survey is the finding that the majority of incorporated sporting associations 
would fail to satisfy the membership size restrictions to qualify as a proprietary 
limited company (I.e. the majority of incorporated sporting associations have more 
than 50 members).  In Australia the data suggests almost 60% of incorporated 
sporting associations have more than 50 members, while in New Zealand the data 
suggests that almost 75% of incorporated sporting societies have more than 50 
members.  It is also significant to note that the data reveals that in Australia less than 
6% of all incorporated sporting associations have fewer than 10 members, while in 
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members. 
 
At first this may seem puzzling with reference to the New Zealand statistics, given 
the statutory minimum membership in that jurisdiction of 15 members.  However, 
one must remember that the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) does provide that 
where an incorporated society has a member which is a body corporate, that body 
corporate will be equivalent to three natural person members for the purposes of 
minimum membership eligibility requirements.7  It is conceivable therefore, that an 
incorporated society could consist of five body corporate members each of which 
represents the equivalent of three natural persons. 
 
As is indicated in chapter 2, much has been written in corporate law literature 
relating to trading companies about the unique issues surrounding small closely-held 
companies.  Some of this scholarly debate centres around whether or not there should 
be a minimum membership requirement in such companies. These do not appear to 
be live issues with respect to incorporated sporting associations, given that actual 
membership numbers in respondent incorporated sporting societies seem to be 
significant.  As is observed in chapter 3, the most common response on the question 
of size of membership of incorporated sporting associations in Australia was 50 
members while in New Zealand the most common response was 150 members.  It 
follows therefore, that concerns about incorporated associations and societies not 
consisting of sufficient numbers of people to constitute what might be thought of 
ordinarily as an association of persons may not be worth pursuing further in terms of 
                                                 
7   Section 31. 
  279research or scholarship.  Indeed, the data seems to suggest that there would be 
negligible impact even if all jurisdictions were to introduce a minimum membership 
requirement of more than 10 members, given the very small numbers of incorporated 
sporting associations that reported memberships of less than 10.8 
 
Mutual vs. Public Benefit Eligibility 
Question 7 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate why their group 
existed in order to determine the raison  ďêtre of each participating incorporated 
sporting association.  Chart 28 of chapter 3 presents the results of this question 
graphically.  The options that were given to respondents to choose from were:  
1.  The association is formed to serve members. 
2.  To achieve objectives laid down by members. 
3.  To serve the general community. 
4.  To achieve governing body objectives. 
5.  Other reasons. 
The number of respondents indicating that they were formed to provide a service or 
benefit to the general community (option 3) in Australia were 25% of responses, 
while in New Zealand this option accounted for 19% of responses. 
 
In consequence it is fair to say that the majority of incorporated sporting associations 
(at least 75%) are formed for mutual benefit purposes rather than for the sake of 
public benefit.  This is an important delineating feature of incorporated sporting 
associations as compared to charities.  As was outlined in chapter 2, it is a 
                                                 
8   This research could equally be argued as being supportive of the elimination of any minimum 
membership requirement as a prerequisite to incorporation.  See Reform of the Canada 
Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, Corporate 
and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 7. 
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community.  This is of course a matter which will be of significance in chapter 6. 
 
Organised/Institutionalised 
It will be recalled that Professor Salomon has stated that this is a key characteristic of 
voluntary non-profit organisations internationally.9  As was already observed in 
chapter 3, the very fact that an association of persons is in a position to seek 
incorporated status under the various statutes within each jurisdiction is proof that 
the group is in fact organised to some extent.  The first question which arises with 
respect to the degree to which incorporated associations may be characteristically 
organised or institutionalised is that of existence prior to incorporation.  It is 
conceivable both with respect to trading companies and associations incorporation 
legislation that a group of persons may choose to form themselves as an incorporated 
structure from the outset.  However, it has been to some extent an open question 
whether incorporated associations generally operate for some period prior to seeking 
incorporation. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, question 2 of the questionnaire asks respondent groups to 
indicate whether or not they existed as a group before incorporation and, if so, to 
indicate how long they had operated prior to incorporation.  The results in chapter 4 
indicate that approximately 1 in every 3 New Zealand incorporated sporting 
associations formed their association by incorporation.  In other words the majority 
of New Zealand respondents were to some extent institutionalised and organised 
                                                 
9   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 4. 
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percentage (1 in 6 groups) reported that they had formed by incorporation.  In 
Australia therefore, it seems that the vast majority of incorporated sporting 
associations had some form of institutionalisation and organisation prior to 
incorporation.  This empirical data speaks strongly to the correctness of the assertion 
by Salomon that voluntary non-profit associations are to some extent organised and 
institutionalised.10
 
As chapter 4 has already indicated, the modal responses to this question in Australia 
was 20 years, while in New Zealand the modal response was 1 year.  Further, the 
data presented in chapter 4 also indicates that in Australia, just over 50% of 
respondent groups had been in existence for up to 20 years prior to incorporation.  In 
New Zealand the proportion of incorporated sporting societies which reported having 
been in existence for up to 20 years prior to incorporation was closer to 33%.   It is 
possible to state therefore, that in New Zealand incorporated sporting societies tend 
to have a considerably longer life prior to incorporation than their Australian 
equivalents.  It will be recalled that in Australia the longest reported pre-
incorporation history of a respondent incorporated sporting association was 130 
years while in New Zealand the figure was 115 years.   
 
The significance of these findings from a broadly conceived organic perspective, is 
that it may be more important for the governing legislation to be accommodating of 
pre-existing institutional systems and structures within incorporated sporting 
                                                 
10   See also the excellent treatment of this issue in a British Columbian context by Williams, T, 
"Structure and Involvement in a Voluntary Sport Organization", Master of Arts thesis, 
University of Victoria, Vancouver, CA, 1979. 
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might serve to explain why the reported membership of incorporated sporting 
associations in both countries is reasonably substantial.  The data indicates that these 
groups are typically higher than one would expect to see reported by a survey of 
partnerships.  It should be remembered from chapter 4 that the median membership 
of Australian incorporated sporting associations is 70 members, and in New Zealand 
it is 96 members.  It will also be recalled from chapter 4 that the modal number of 
members reported in Australia was 50, and in New Zealand the modal response was 
150 members. 
 
These findings are also significant with respect to one of the issues addressed by the 
questionnaire that has already been considered above, namely question 8; “Would 
your group consider becoming a company?”  The fact that most incorporated 
sporting associations are organised or institutionalised prior to seeking incorporated 
status suggests that the association will have reached some degree of institutional 
maturity.  Such an organisation could be expected to consider the pros and cons of 
particular incorporation regimes prior to selecting that which is most appropriate to 
its needs.  The strikingly similar overwhelmingly negative responses in both 
Australia and New Zealand to the question; “Would you consider becoming a 
company?” (namely 83% in both jurisdictions) is therefore entirely explicable.  In 
addition, this suggests that reported responses to question 8 of the questionnaire 
should be taken to represent an informed response with reference to the individual 
needs of the respondent groups. 
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Responses to a number of different questions asked in the questionnaire give some 
insight into the extent to which incorporated associations should be regarded as 
private entities in the sense used by Salomon.  For instance, it will be recalled that 
the most common response to question 8 as to why would a respondent would not 
choose to become an company under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or the 
Companies Act 1993 (NZ) was that the respondent group is a social body and not a 
commercial enterprise.  Approximately 40% of groups in New Zealand, and just over 
30% of groups in Australia indicated that this was a prime reason why they chose not 
to become a company. 
 
Also relevant to the question of whether or not an organisation is private is the extent 
to which the activities of the association are conducted by volunteers.  In this regard 
it is significant that less than 10% of respondent incorporated sporting associations in 
either country indicated that they employed anyone.  Further, it will be recalled from 
the consideration of question 12 of the questionnaire in chapter 4 that the setting of 
subscriptions in more than 50% of respondent cases was a matter for members 
meetings to decide.  Finally as has already been referred to above, 75% of all 
Australian respondents and more than 80% of New Zealand respondents report that 
they existed for reasons other than providing services to the general community. This 
is all strongly suggestive of a private focus for incorporated associations in both 
jurisdictions.  
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As has already been stressed in chapter 3, incorporated associations are not formed 
with the sole intention of providing pecuniary profits or monetary benefits to 
members.  The question arises therefore what is the purpose for which the 
association operates?  This question is answered in part by two questions asked in the 
questionnaire. The first of these is the second part of question 18 which, it will be 
recalled, asked respondent groups to indicate the main considerations that are taken 
into account when management committees make decisions.  As has already been 
indicated above, the most common responses to this question were firstly, satisfying 
the objectives laid out in the corporate constitutions, and secondly, satisfying the 
wishes of members as expressed from time to time in members’ meetings.  It appears 
that members of incorporated sporting associations look to these entities to meet non-
monetary needs as they have been mutually agreed. 
 
Operational Associations 
The reader will recall that question 7 of the questionnaire asked respondents to 
indicate why they existed.  Again the most common responses were the service of 
members’ needs, to meet objectives laid down by members, or to meet governing 
body objectives.  While a significant proportion of respondents (25% of from 
Australian responses and 19% of New Zealand responses) did indicate that they 
existed to provide a service to the general community, this was still a minority 
position.  It is therefore apparent that the operation of a typical incorporated sporting 
association is essentially inward-focused.  Further, such entities do not operate for 
the purpose of generating pecuniary profit for members. 
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One should also recall the responses to question 8 discussed above which asked why 
a group would choose not to incorporate as a company.  The most common response 
to this question was that respondents felt that group was predominantly a social 
group and not a commercially-focused entity.  This, it would appear, is one of the 
prime reasons why incorporated associations legislation is so popular with 
incorporated sporting associations in that seems to be a very good fit between the 
legislation on the one hand and the perceptions and requirements of the groups using 
it on the other.  Such a closeness of fit is essential for the ongoing operational 
success of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Non-Operational Associations 
It will be recalled from chapter 3 above that there is the possibility of the surplus 
remaining on winding-up or cancellation of an incorporated sporting association.   
Chapter 3 further demonstrated that such a surplus could conceivably be distributed 
amongst remaining members of the association in question with respect to legislation 
as it exists currently in New Zealand, Victoria and Queensland.  In all other 
Australian jurisdictions it was argued in chapter 3 above that some form of cy-près 
scheme does apply or should be applied in all other jurisdictions by virtue of the 
wording of the particular legislation in each state and territory. 
 
It will be recalled from chapter 4 that the questionnaire at question 9 asked 
respondents to indicate where the constitution of the group currently directed the 
surplus assets on winding-up to be distributed in the event of winding-up.   
Consideration of the New Zealand perspective leads one to recall from chapter 3 
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incorporated sporting societies in New Zealand could direct all of the surplus assets 
on winding-up to be distributed to members.  However, as revealed in chapter 4, it is 
interesting to note that this is only provided for in 14% of the response sample from 
New Zealand.  Approximately 58% of respondents from New Zealand allow for what 
I would refer to as cy-près schemes (i.e. to similar incorporated societies) and in 7% 
of cases the ultimate destination is charity.  It will also be recalled that in chapter 4 
the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate whether or not they believed that the 
distribution provisions were inappropriate.  There were no responses to this question 
from any jurisdiction.  This indicates a universal acceptance on the part of response 
groups that these provisions are appropriate.  Given that in New Zealand it is entirely 
possible that 100% of groups could allow for the distribution of surplus assets on 
winding-up to members personally, the very deliberate provision of cy-près schemes 
as the majority method is very significant, as is the 7% allocation to charity.   
 
So far as the responses from Australian jurisdictions are concerned, it is important to 
remember that distributions to remaining members of incorporated associations are 
only possible under the legislation currently in force in Queensland12 and Victoria.13 
Together these jurisdictions represent 48% of the Australian sample of incorporated 
sporting associations.  The remaining 52% of Australian incorporated sporting 
associations that were sampled all require the distribution of surplus assets on 
winding-up either to a similar association, to charity, or to state revenue.   
  
                                                 
11   Section 6(1)(k). 
12   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 47 & 92(1). 
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are analysed one discovers that only 17% of Australian response groups allow for 
distribution of surplus assets on winding-up to members when, in fact this percentage 
could easily be as high as 48%.  This reveals that even in those two very large 
Australian jurisdictions by numbers of incorporated sporting associations (namely 
Victoria and Queensland) where distribution to members is a statutory possibility, 
this possibility has not been adopted by the majority of incorporated associations.  In 
fact, as can be seen from the results to question 9 displayed in chapter 4, the majority 
dissolution provision throughout Australia is for surplus assets on winding-up to be 
distributed to a similar association, or cy-près.  More will be said about this matter 
below under ‘Income Tax Status of Incorporated Associations’. 
 
Internal Governance 
Obtaining some insight into the governance methodology used by respondents was 
one of the key objectives of this research.  As discussed in chapter 4, question 13 of 
the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had an elected 
management committee.  As will be recalled, the response to this question in both 
jurisdictions was very consistent, namely 14 out of every 15 incorporated 
associations in both jurisdictions reported that they do in fact have an elected 
management committee.  It is therefore apparent, on the basis of the empirical data, 
that only around one in every 15 incorporated sporting associations in Australia and 
New Zealand has a method of governance which does not include an elected group 
of delegated managers.  However, is it true to state that the existence of a managing 
group elected from the general membership body is a characteristic of a more 
                                                                                                                                          
13   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 33B. 
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oversimplify the matter given that Professor Salomon has indicated member-
governed internal governance structures are a recognised alternative adopted in 
voluntary non-profit organisations.14
 
Member-Governed Associations 
Turning exclusively to the phenomena of member-governed incorporated 
associations, it will be recalled from chapter 4 that typically (i.e.: more than 4 out of 
every 5 reported cases), such groups are reasonably small (i.e.: memberships of less 
than 100).  This may indicate that there is less need for delegated management as a 
mechanism for reducing the costs of reaching decisions, an important transactional 
cost recognised by Hansmann.15  However this proposition does not necessarily hold 
true in the reverse.  For instance, as has already been demonstrated, in excess of 50% 
of incorporated sporting associations reported having fewer than 100 members.  Also 
noted in chapter 4 was the remarkable respondent group that reported a membership 
of 1,500 members while at the same time reporting that it did not have an elected 
management committee.  Given that Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory 
require that every incorporated association must have at least one or two statutory 
officeholders, one wonders how incorporated associations in these jurisdictions 
manage to fit within the framework of the relevant governing legislation when that 
legislation mandates the existence of a management committee.  This is clearly a 
                                                 
14   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 21. 
15   Hansmann, H, The Ownership of Enterprise, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, USA, 1996 at 39-44. 
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in this thesis.16
 
Delegated Management Associations 
Returning again to the issue of incorporated associations which have a management 
committee, the next most significant question is how large the management 
committee might be.  As is indicated in chapter 4, the results of questions 3 and 14 of 
the questionnaire indicate that in Australia the average ratio of management 
committee to general membership is 1 committee member to every 33 regular 
members, while in New Zealand the average ratio is 1 to every 45 members.  As a 
general proposition, approximately 50% of Australian incorporated sporting 
associations report management committees of between 6 and 10 members, while in 
New Zealand approximately 60% of respondent groups report that their management 
committee was between 6 and 10 members.  This indicates that in both jurisdictions 
it is more likely than not that an incorporated sporting association will have a 
management committee consisting of between 6 and 10 members.  
 
Given that most incorporated sporting associations have management committees, 
the question arises as to whether or not these management committees are voluntary 
or paid.  The results of question 15 of the questionnaire as discussed in chapter 4 
reveal that it is overwhelmingly the case that management committee members are 
volunteers.  In Australia the percentage of all management committee members 
                                                 
16   Compare with recent Canadian reform proposals in Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  
Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law 
Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 25. 
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volunteer proportion is closer to 75%.  Even where incorporated sporting 
associations pay management committee members for their services, in the clear 
majority of cases, only one of these management committee members is paid for 
their services.  Approximately 5% of groups in Australia reporting that they have a 
management committee indicated that one of those management committee members 
was paid for their services, and approximately 14% of incorporated sporting societies 
in New Zealand who reported having a management committee indicate that the 
services of only one of those committee members was paid for.  The questionnaire 
did not ask whether the paid management committee members were paid on an 
economic basis, or some form of honorarium for their services.  This is a significant 
delineation, given the fact that normal economic rates would be more indicative of an 
employment relationship while the payment of honorarium would not necessarily 
indicate that the incorporated association is an employer. 
 
As Professor Salomon indicates, an organised, institutionalised non-profit entity 
would be one that would be characterised as holding regular meetings of both 
members on the one hand, and management committee members on the other.17  It 
will be recalled that question 11 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate 
how frequently members meetings are held.  As indicated in chapter 4, in both 
jurisdictions the most common responses to this question were that members meet 
annually or monthly.  It will be recalled that annual members’ meetings are held in 
approximately 43% of all incorporated sporting societies in New Zealand while just 
over 30% of respondent groups indicate that members met on a monthly basis.   
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incorporated sporting associations while approximately 40% of respondents in 
Australia indicated that members met monthly. 
 
It should be noted, however, that members of a significant number of respondent 
groups in both countries indicated that they meet on a basis ranging from daily 
meetings in extreme cases, to weekly, fortnightly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually 
as well as annually.  This is not the sort of response that one would normally 
associate with trading companies, except perhaps closely-held companies.   
 
As detailed in chapter 4, with respect to the meetings of management committee 
members, question 16 of the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how 
frequently management committees met.  In both countries, the vast majority of 
incorporated sporting associations reported meeting on a monthly basis.  Australian 
respondents with management committees reported that they met on a monthly basis 
in more than 70% of cases, while the New Zealand response rate was in excess of 
80%.  A very small proportion of respondents reported holding management 
committee meetings more frequently than on a monthly basis.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4 and in this chapter under the heading “Eligibility for 
Incorporation”, question 18 of the questionnaire asked respondent groups to indicate 
where management decisions were made, what were the main considerations.  Recall 
that in both Australia and New Zealand the majority of respondent groups indicated 
the primacy of the constitution when management decisions were made.  One can see 
                                                                                                                                          
17   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
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by a respondent’s constitution was of prime importance to both legislators and 
regular members of incorporated associations.  It is equally important to note that 
management committees of incorporated sporting associations look to the 
constitution of the association as the prime source of guidance when making 
management decisions.  This is not the general, open-ended entrepreneurial 
discretion that one would normally associate with directors of trading companies. 
 
Following on from question 18, it will be recalled that question 19 asked if 
management committee decisions had been overruled by members.  There was a 
statistically significant affirmative response to this question in both countries with 
the New Zealand rate (11%) slightly lower than that in Australia (16%).  This is a 
phenomenon that would not be permitted in trading companies given the accepted 
application of narrow form organic theory as defined in chapter 1.  However, the 
significance of this finding remains somewhat ambiguous, given that the results to 
question 19 discussed in chapter 4 also indicate that such situations of members 
vetoing the decisions of management committees is extremely rare. As will be 
recalled, this was the response in more than three-quarters of all respondent groups 
where members have overturned management decisions. 
 
In addition to the question of whether or not members have a power of veto over 
decisions of management committees in incorporated sporting associations, is the 
issue of whether or not there are any restrictions placed on the powers of 
management that are given to management committees by way of the association’s 
                                                                                                                                          
USA, 1997 at 19-23. 
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A question that could have been asked is whether or not management committees 
have the power of management exclusively, or whether this power of management is 
held by the management committee only between members’ meetings.  This point is 
made by Professor Salomon18 and is one that would be an important issue to 
empirically test in the context of Australian and New Zealand incorporated 
associations.  Unfortunately, this question was not included in the questionnaire, and 
is an area in which future research is required in order to put this research into 
greater perspective.   
 
However, it will be remembered that the questionnaire did ask whether or not any 
restrictions were placed on the power of management committees to manage the 
affairs of the incorporated sporting association.  It is interesting to note, as discussed 
in chapter 4, that in approximately one-third of all respondent groups, whether in 
New Zealand or Australia, restrictions are placed on the management committees of 
incorporated sporting associations.  Reference to chart 26 of chapter 4 demonstrates 
the sharing of what would normally be called “management power” between 
management committees and membership bodies in incorporated sporting 
associations that would be unthinkable in a trading company given the application of 
narrow form organic theory as defined in chapter 1. This power-sharing phenomena 
appears to be variable.  As was demonstrated in chapter 4, generally speaking there 
was very little variation between the Australian and New Zealand responses over the 
6 management power areas.  For instance, in nearly all cases somewhere between 
20% and 30% of respondent groups reported that members have the requisite powers, 
                                                 
18   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
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the name of the association, or admitting individuals to membership.  The one case 
where most power is apparently given to members’ meetings was in the setting of 
subscriptions.  Recall that in both countries, more than 50% of respondent groups 
indicated that this power resides with members.   
 
The extent of management power-sharing varies according to the type of 
management power that one is considering.  This suggests that there is a fairly high 
degree of sophistication in the contents of corporate constitutions. 
 
The overall picture that emerges from the empirical investigation summarised in 
chapter 4 is that in most cases incorporated sporting associations exist for 
considerable periods of time prior to incorporation.  These groups are generally 
organised in such a way that their affairs are administered on a day-to-day basis on 
behalf of members by a group of between 6 and 10 mainly volunteer delegates that 
can collectively be referred to as a management committee.  Many such management 
committees are constrained in their activities as delegated managers by restrictions 
contained in corporate constitutions, including in a few cases a power of veto in the 
hands of membership meetings.  Further, in the majority of cases, the constitutional 
arrangements under which members agree collectively to participate in the affairs of 
the association would be negotiated some years prior to incorporation. 
 
It is also important to keep in mind the extent to which management committee 
members themselves feel constrained by the requirements of corporate constitutions.  
                                                                                                                                          
USA, 1997 at 21. 
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not unheard of for a management committee to be overruled by the exercise of a 
power of veto held by members in general meeting.  In addition, as one would 
perhaps expect, management committees tend to meet monthly but, perhaps 
surprisingly, respondents indicated that members’ meetings are much more frequent 
in incorporated sporting associations than one would normally expect in a body that 
has been compared to trading companies in the literature.  Other than closely-held 
companies, the operation of trading companies is characterised by annual members 
meetings.  As was highlighted in chapter 2, this lack of involvement by shareholders 
in the affairs of the company is a key assumption in the separation of ownership and 
control doctrine at the heart of narrow form organic theory and the neo-classical 
economic theory of the firm. 
 
Finally, while it is true to say that incorporated sporting associations can be regarded 
as being economically small enterprises when compared to large public trading 
companies, it would be erroneous to think of them as small enterprises in terms of 
membership numbers. We have already seen when considering the issue of corporate 
size that, by comparison with such entities as proprietary limited companies or 
partnerships, some incorporated sporting associations are possessed of significant 
assets.  On the other hand of course, as discussed in chapter 4, it is the case that the 
overwhelming majority of incorporated sporting associations in both Australia and 
New Zealand have a total asset base of less than $500,000 (indeed in the majority of 
cases the assets held by respondents are less than $10,000) and, at least in Australia, 
a significant proportion have assets of less than $1,000. 
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considerable number of members while at the same time are not necessarily 
possessed of considerable assets, or generators of pecuniary profits.  These groups 
are formed for the pursuit of non-commercial purposes, and are characterised by a 
strong shared commitment by members and committee members alike to the contents 
of the group constitution.  The ongoing success of the incorporated sporting 
association is facilitated through regular meetings of both management committees 
and members generally to maintain what Professor Hansmann has termed the 
homogeneity of interest between members.  The interests of members in incorporated 
sporting associations are always of prime importance, so much so that members 
themselves retain and exercise significant supervisory powers over management 
committees.  Importantly and, one would venture to say characteristically, this 
appears to be the accepted status quo by management committee members. 
 
Voluntary Association 
As has already been noted both in chapter 4 and in this chapter, the most commonly 
reported number of members by respondent incorporated associations in both 
countries ranged between 50 and 200 members.  Further, chapter 4 reveals that less 
than 15% of respondent groups reported having any employees whether full-time, 
part-time or casual.  In addition, despite most groups having an elected management 
committee consisting of between 6 and 10 members, meeting on at least a monthly 
basis, some 92% of respondents in Australia and 77% of respondents in New 
Zealand reported that they had no paid committee members.  As has already been 
discussed above, the questionnaire was not discriminating enough to determine 
whether or not payments to committee members were by way of honoraria, or 
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derived from the available responses is that the operations of incorporated 
associations are only secured by the activities of volunteers. 
 
It will be recalled from chapter 3 that estimates have been placed by official 
statisticians in Australia and New Zealand on the value of voluntary work in the 
sport and recreation sector generally.  It will be recalled that the estimate for New 
Zealand was just under $NZ2 billion for the year 2000, while in Australia the official 
estimate of voluntary work in the sport and recreation sector was in excess of $AU2 
billion.  Remember also that restrictions are commonly placed on the management 
powers of management committees (including spending restrictions in about a third 
of all cases).  Given that such substantial voluntary contributions are made to 
incorporated sporting associations, and that they are predominantly “managed” by 
volunteers who also happen to be members, it is unsurprising that such groups should 
have as their primary raison ďêtre the pursuit of group objects, or the satisfaction of 
members’ objectives as opposed to the satisfaction of needs of the general 
community.  It is clear therefore that Professor Salomon’s hypothesis referred to in 
chapter 3, that not-for-profit entities typically demonstrate a private and voluntary 
nature, corresponds directly to the findings of the empirical research undertaken in 
this thesis. 
 
Taxation Status of Incorporated Associations 
It will be recalled from chapter 3, that in Australia the Commissioner for Taxation 
requires that in order to qualify for an exemption from income tax, an incorporated 
association formed for sporting purposes cannot be carried on for the purposes of 
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distribution of profits and assets among members must be applicable to both when 
the incorporated sporting association is operational and when it ceases to operate.  In 
addition, it will be recalled that the Commissioner for Taxation in Australia places a 
strong emphasis on the requirement that members participate in the management of 
incorporated sporting associations before granting the administrative discretion to 
allow an exemption from income tax to such groups. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the provisions in New Zealand are almost identical to 
those which are required by the Commissioner for Taxation in Australia.  This is 
perhaps the strongest reason why groups that could otherwise lawfully allow for 
distribution of surplus assets on winding-up to members, would voluntarily elect not 
to include such provisions in their constitutions.  As was discussed in chapter 3 this 
is of particular relevance to incorporated sporting associations in New Zealand, 
Victoria and Queensland and goes some way to explain the lack of popularity of such 
a distribution alternative in practice, even though it is lawfully permitted in those 
jurisdictions. 
 
It should be recalled that chapter 4 revealed that responses indicated that 52% of 
Australian incorporated sporting associations, and 58% of New Zealand incorporated 
sporting societies provide that on winding-up any surplus assets remaining should, 
pursuant to constitutional provision, be directed to an association formed for similar 
purposes.  In both countries this is the single most common response.  In addition, as 
already stressed above, question 10 of the questionnaire asked if participants felt that 
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dissatisfaction with these provisions. 
 
On the basis of the questions contained in the questionnaire, it is not statistically 
possible to determine the extent to which the income tax legislation alone is the 
cause of the popularity of the cy-près-style constitutional provisions.  It may of 
course be produced by the mirroring effect of the predominance of cy-près-style 
legislative provisions in the majority of Australian jurisdictions.  An additional 
reason may be that members who are committed to the purposes for which an 
association is formed would, as a natural choice, wish to continue to allow those 
assets that have been set aside for those purposes to be utilised in achieving the same 
purposes though another group.  Further research is necessary in this area to 
determine the specific causal factors that might explain the relative popularity of the 
cy-près provisions in practice across all jurisdictions.  One can however, be definite 
about the fact that the unanimous non-response to question 10 of the questionnaire 
suggests that respondents believed that there is a good fit between the legislation in 
place in each jurisdiction and the way incorporated sporting associations choose to 
order their affairs in practice.  
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter compared the legislative framework outlined in chapter 3 governing 
incorporated sporting associations with the empirical findings of the epidemiological 
investigation discussed in chapter 4.  This was done to determine to what extent the 
governing legislation could be said to embody the requirements of broadly conceived 
organic theory as defined in chapter 2.  In the course of this chapter it emerged that 
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legislatures and incorporators alike.  Further, the majority of the respondent 
incorporated sporting associations replying to the questionnaire would not qualify as 
a small proprietary company for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).  
Incorporation as a limited company would, therefore, mean incorporation as a public 
company for the majority of incorporated sporting associations.  Only a minority of 
respondent groups would be entitled to incorporate as a proprietary limited company, 
and not all of these would be eligible for small proprietary company status.  Finally, 
the results of question 8 of the questionnaire revealed that regulatory framework is 
not accidental but represents a rational choice on the part of incorporated 
associations.  In as much as respondents choose the incorporated association 
legislative regime they can also be said to eschew the trading company regime.  The 
research is therefore strongly supportive of the claim that incorporated associations 
are sui generis. 
 
The legislative requirement for eligibility that was demonstrated to exist in Australia 
and New Zealand incorporated association legislation in chapter 3 was uniformly 
focussed on the purposes for which the association was formed.  Minimum 
membership requirements were not uniform.  There was no requirement for 
incorporated sporting associations to be formed for public benefit.  The empirical 
research is consistent with the legislative framework in this regard given that in 
Australia and New Zealand the vast majority of incorporated sporting associations 
report that they exist to meet objectives laid out in the constitution, or to meet the 
wishes of members as expressed from time to time in members’ meetings.  These 
purposes are also expressed as the main considerations when management committee 
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both countries had more than 10 members, suggesting that minimum membership 
levels are not a significant concern in practice.  The lack of focus on public benefit 
appears to be a feature that the legislation has in common with the empirical data.  In 
keeping with broadly conceived organic theory, it appears then that both the 
governing legislation and incorporated sporting associations are primarily purpose 
driven. 
 
Chapter 3 revealed that there is detailed provision in the governing legislation in all 
jurisdictions for the organisation and institutionalisation of incorporated sporting 
associations.  Chapter 4 revealed that formation by incorporation is a minority 
phenomena in both Australia (18%) and New Zealand (35%).  The legislative 
provision is therefore facilitative in that it provides a basic structure within which the 
new association can begin to operate.  However, as outlined in chapter 3, the 
legislation (particularly that in Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory) can 
be highly restrictive, rather than facilitative, of the requirements of many associations 
that convert to incorporated sporting associations bringing with them organisational 
structures that have developed and evolved over many years.  This is potentially a 
greater problem in New Zealand where incorporated sporting societies tend to have a 
longer pre-incorporation history than those in Australia.  In this regard, the 
legislation does not meet the requirements of broadly conceived organic theory. 
 
The empirical data discussed in chapter 4 reveals that incorporated sporting 
associations in both Australia and New Zealand are run by members for members 
and to meet objects agreed by members.  Importantly, members typically retain a 
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sporting associations even where management committees are elected.  While the 
legislation surveyed in chapter 3 is not in conflict with these characteristics, it fails to 
take adequate note of the valuable contribution of volunteers, particularly with 
respect to sporting groups.  There is no legislative casting of duties and obligations in 
light of the prime role of volunteers.  The significance of volunteerism in 
incorporated sporting associations in both countries can be grasped when one asks 
how many such groups would be affected if such groups were prohibited from 
employing any staff.  Only 15% of respondents to the questionnaire would be 
affected by such a requirement.  This failure to allow for the particular requirements 
of volunteers is an important area where the legislation is not in keeping with broadly 
conceived organic theory.  It is also a further reason why incorporation under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Companies Act 1993 (NZ) is not in keeping 
with the private nature of respondent groups. 
 
Legislative internal governance requirements of associations in both Australia and 
New Zealand were also summarised in chapter 3 and discussed above.  It will be 
seen that this is one of the key areas of asymmetry between the law and the reality.  
None of the legislation adequately allows for member-governed associations.  The 
legislation in Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory is to varying degrees 
positively hostile to this accepted governance structure.  It also appears that the 
extent to which members of the majority of incorporated sporting associations can, 
and do participate in the management of those groups, up to and including the power 
of veto over management committees is not understood by relevant legislatures.   
Indeed, it should be recalled from the empirical data presented in chapter 4 that even 
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committees, such committees are often constrained by general constitutional 
restrictions on the power to manage incorporated sporting associations.  This runs 
contrary to narrow form organic theory as defined in chapter 1 in addition to most 
legislation which seeks to abolish the application of the so-called ultra vires doctrine.  
The empirical evidence calls the premises on which the legislation has been based 
into serious question.  This is the most significant area of disparity between the 
legislative framework and the requirements of incorporated sporting associations in 
practice.  As such it represents a significant affront to broadly conceived organic 
theory. 
 
Finally, an analysis of the taxation status of incorporated sporting association 
revealed that the majority of these groups in Australia and New Zealand adopts a cy-
près approach even when the governing legislation permits distribution of surplus 
assets on dissolution to members personally.  This is strong evidence in support of 
the primacy of purposes within incorporated sporting associations.  It is also a strong 
statement by incorporated sporting associations in both countries that the governing 
legislation, including the taxation laws, facilitate their activities.  This evinces great 
sympathy with broadly conceived organic theory. 
 
Chapter 6, which follows, takes the detailed appreciation of incorporated sporting 
associations developed in this chapter and chapters 3 and 4, and compares it to each 
of the four analogies introduced in chapter 2.  This comparison aims to determine 
which of the four analogies offers the richest analogical schema in the development 
of a jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations. 
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AN APPROPRIATE VIEW OF  
INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 
 
“… lawyers who think in terms of profit-oriented 
organization law are basically not the right people to decide 
what public policies, concepts, and principles should 
undergird nonprofit organization law …   
The principles of nonprofit organizational law should be 
analogized out of the guiding principles of religious, 
fraternal, community-service, charitable, and mutual aid 
groups that have illuminated civilization for many 
centuries.  The fact that the Bronze Age temple or 
agricultural commune also often evolved into the idea of a 
pirate crew should not make us conclude that we must 
make the pirate crew the model of our nonprofit laws.”1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It will be recalled that in chapter 2, I stressed that in law as in any other discipline, 
when seeking to reason by analogy it is essential that a rich source analogue be 
selected.  A known source analogue that shares important structural and internal-
relational similarities with an unknown target analogue will permit the development 
of a sophisticated analogical schema.  A sufficiently sophisticated analogical schema 
can then be utilised to allow cognitive mapping onto the unknown target analogue to 
more accurately provide both insight and predictive capacity.  On the basis that 
alternative analogies might be a way of overcoming the restriction of cognitive hard-
                                                 
1   Oleck, HL, "Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979" (1979) 10 Toledo Law Review 962 
at 975. 
305 wiring that blights the selection of an apt analogy, four alternative legal source 
analogues were introduced and analysed in the same chapter.  A modified version of 
the characteristics listed by Professor Hansmann as being essential to the modern 
corporation was used to facilitate the analysis of alternative potential source 
analogues. 
 
Using a modified list of the characteristics of not-for-profit associations postulated 
by Professor Salomon in his international survey, I analysed incorporated sporting 
associations by reference to the governing legislation in Australia and New Zealand.  
This picture was greatly enhanced by means of an epidemiological investigation of a 
10% sample of all incorporated sporting associations in both countries.  Together 
then, chapters 3, 4 and 5 applied the principles of broadly conceived organic theory 
as it was defined in chapter 1, to incorporated sporting associations in Australia and 
New Zealand.   
 
In this final chapter I will compare the alternative potential legal source analogues 
discussed in chapter 2 to the detailed analysis of incorporated sporting associations in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 in order to determine which source analogue shares the greatest 
degree of internal structural similarity with the target incorporated sporting 
associations.  This will have significant implications for the analogical development 
of a jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
306 CHARACTERISTICS OF INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 
Trading Companies  
It will be recalled from chapter 3 that, as a matter of first principle, it is important to 
account for the domestic nature of voluntary associations that are not formed for 
profit.  However, it must be conceded that the large modern trading company, being 
the archetypal model on which modern corporate law is based, is not formed as a 
domestic enterprise.  On the contrary, such entities are formed precisely to operate in 
the public domain.  As a consequence, the formal relationships that exist within a 
large modern trading corporation are inherently legally enforceable.  This runs 
counter to the ratio decidendi in the case of Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 as 
discussed in chapter 3.2  As a matter of pure logic, one cannot on the one hand, claim 
the domestic nature of an association as the key basis for denying common law 
remedies equivalent to those available in relation to trading companies, while 
discounting it as a distinguishing feature when seeking to apply common law duties 
and obligations derived in the context of trading companies on the other hand. 
 
Unquestioning acceptance of the aptness of the large modern trading company as a 
source analogue for incorporated sporting associations would also require an 
acceptance of a source analogue that has been described in numerous parliamentary 
debates as being patently inappropriate to the needs of voluntary, domestic 
associations as a basis upon which to develop an appropriate jurisprudence.  As I 
have discussed in chapter 3, this view has been expressed in parliamentary debate in 
New South Wales, South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia and New Zealand.  
As far as foundational principles are concerned, any jurisprudential reasoning by 
307 analogy from the law relating to large modern trading corporations must account for 
this essential difference from the outset.  In this regard it is remarkable that the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)3 should fail to address the distinction completely and be 
expected to reconcile the legislative needs of public commercial enterprises and 
private domestic entities under a single corporations measure.4
 
Closely-Held Companies  
In terms of the small closely-held company it should be noted that, by definition, 
there is usually a high degree of mutuality with respect to the small closely-held 
company that could be argued to be analogous to what is observed in incorporated 
sporting associations.  In this regard it is important to recall the one limitation of the 
closely-held company as a source analogue for incorporated sporting associations.  
That is the fact that small closely-held companies, by definition, consist of a small 
shareholder group which typically has a large degree of participation in the 
management of the corporation.  In general, the shareholder group in small closely-
held companies consist of no more than 50 shareholders.  As demonstrated in chapter 
4 the majority of respondents in both Australia and New Zealand reported 
membership levels in excess of 50 members.  This asymmetry between small 
closely-held companies and incorporated sporting associations serves to limit the 
utility of small closely-held companies as a potential source analogue.  In addition, as 
observed in chapter 2, in small closely-held companies shareholders are typically 
bound by enforceable agreements struck between them, governing such matters as 
                                                                                                                                          
2   See McKinnon v Grogan [1974] 1 NSWLR 295 at 298 per Wootten J. 
3   At s 18. 
308 exercising shareholder rights, restrictions on management powers, and transferability 
of shares.  It will be recalled that these agreements often exist outside of the 
corporate constitution.  Such enforceable relationships between shareholders are also 
outside of the orthodox view of shareholders generally under the present corporate 
law regime, in addition to being at odds with the ratio decidendi in Cameron v 
Hogan discussed above.   
 
Charitable Trusts 
As discussed in chapter 2, in New Zealand and a number of Australian jurisdictions,6 
a charitable trust can be formed for sporting purposes given that the definition of 
charitable purposes in these jurisdictions has been extended to specifically include 
bodies that are formed for the promotion of a sport.  When considering the potential 
aptness of the charitable trust as a source analogue for incorporated associations 
generally, the charitable trust is (as discussed in chapter 2) essentially a memberless 
entity.  It is managed by trustees in pursuit of a charitable purpose that is, broadly 
speaking, beneficial to the general community.  As a consequence of this, it will be 
recalled that the terms of a charitable trust are only enforceable by way of an action 
brought by the Attorney General.  The significance of this in the present context is 
that those persons who may benefit from the operation of a charitable trust do not 
                                                                                                                                          
4   A number of the difficulties this creates in the context of the company limited by guarantee 
are addressed in Woodward, S, "Not-for-Profit Companies - Some Implications of Recent 
Corporate Law Reforms" (1999) 17(8) Company & Securities Law Journal 390. 
6   Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (NZ) at s 61A; Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 103; Trustee Act 1936 
(SA) s 69C; Variation of Trusts Act 1994 (Tas) s 4; and Charitable Trusts Act 1962 (WA) s 4.  
See Dal Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, 
Pyrmont, 2004 at 559. 
309 necessarily enjoy a right in the first instance to have the charitable trust enforced.  
They may of course petition the Attorney General to bring an action in the Supreme 
Court of each state and territory and in the High Court of New Zealand to enforce the 
charitable trust deed.  Otherwise, as was demonstrated in chapter 2, such persons 
who may benefit from the operation of a charitable trust generally have no personal 
right to enforce any of the relationships at work in the administration of a charitable 
trust.  This is an important favourable point of comparison between charitable trusts 
and incorporated sporting associations and a point of distinction with the previous 
two potential source analogues discussed above, namely large trading corporations 
and small closely-held companies.  That is to say, there are ambiguities in the extent 
to which the interrelationships at work in the administration of a charitable trust are 
subject to legal enforceability.  This, however, must be read subject to the major 
caveat that there are definite established personal duties that are required of 
charitable trustees in the conduct of their office. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
As discussed in chapter 2, the eleemosynary corporation is an interesting, if 
somewhat arcane sub-genus of charitable trusts which is itself a potential legal 
source analogue for incorporated sporting associations.  It will be remembered that 
members of an eleemosynary corporation do enjoy the benefit of the charitable trust 
formed for an eleemosynary purpose.  Despite the fact that eleemosynary 
corporations are within the general class of charities, members of eleemosynary 
corporations can bring actions to enforce the charter or deed of the eleemosynary 
corporation.  It will be recalled that such actions exist outside of common law, and 
are exercised by way of petition to the Visitor of the eleemosynary corporation.  In 
310 this way an eleemosynary corporation essentially deals with its internal disputes on 
an internal basis.  Further, it is also important for present purposes to note that the 
visitatorial jurisdiction is reviewable by the courts by way of prerogative writ.  This 
is of significance to the possible utility of the eleemosynary corporation as a source 
analogue for incorporated sporting associations.  As indicated in chapter 3, the 
majority judgment of the High Court of Australia in Cameron v Hogan specifically 
considered the intended effect of association rules.  Their Honours7 expressed the 
firm view that: 
Such matters are naturally regarded as of domestic concern.  The rules are intended to be 
enforced by the authorities appointed under them.  In adopting them, the members ought not to 
be presumed to contemplate the creation of enforceable legal rights and duties so that every 
departure exposes the officer or member concerned to a civil sanction. 
 
Clearly in eleemosynary corporations there exist internal mechanisms for ordinary 
members, enjoying benefits under the charter of the eleemosynary corporation, to 
have the charter enforced.  Namely, appeal to the Visitor to hear and settle disputes 
arising out of the administration of the eleemosynary corporation.  As we have seen 
the visitatorial jurisdiction, although subject to the ultimate supervision of the courts, 
operates outside of the civil law.  It should be appreciated that there is a close 
comparison to be made between eleemosynary corporations and incorporated 
sporting associations in this area.  This suggests considerable utility in the 
eleemosynary corporation as a potential source analogue for incorporated sporting 
associations. 
 
                                                 
7   (1934) 51 CLR 358 at 378 per Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. 
311 Raison ďêtre 
As highlighted in chapter 3, associations must meet certain eligibility requirements in 
order to be permitted the legislative facility of incorporated status.  The analysis in 
chapter 3 further highlighted that a number of the purposes for which incorporated 
associations may be formed in a minority of jurisdictions are broadly analogous to 
charitable purposes referred to in the Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth.8  It will 
also be recalled that in the majority of jurisdictions, which do not allow for 
incorporation with reference to specific purposes, associations may become 
incorporated so long as they are not formed for trading purposes. 
 
Trading Companies  
The primacy of corporate purposes is an important point of contrast with the large 
modern trading corporation.  As was discussed at length in chapter 2, the reason why 
a modern trading company exists is to maximise shareholder wealth, or profit 
maximisation in a general sense.  It is of course the case that, under the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth)9 it is possible to incorporate as a company limited by guarantee.  
However as Sievers has noted,10 the company limited by guarantee has never been as 
popular as the incorporated association for the purposes of operating a nonprofit 
entity.  This is reinforced by the results of question 8 of the questionnaire as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5.  Further, as has been demonstrated in chapter 3, while 
it is the case that associations may seek incorporation under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth) or the Companies Act 1993 (NZ), it is not the case that a company 
                                                 
8   Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (UK).   
9   At s 112(1). 
10    Sievers, AS, "Incorporation of Non-Profit Associations: The Way Ahead?" (2000) 18(5) 
Company & Securities Law Journal 311 at 312 and generally. 
312 incorporated in Australia or New Zealand can automatically qualify for incorporation 
under the relevant associations legislation in Australia and New Zealand.   
 
The implications for incorporated sporting association legislation in relation to this 
point of departure are far reaching.  One of the reasons why the doctrine of ultra vires 
was deemed to be inappropriate for modern trading corporations in both Australia 
and New Zealand, as in other jurisdictions, is that the very general purpose for which 
trading companies are incorporated (namely the maximisation of shareholder wealth) 
does not lend itself to restricting the entrepreneurial role of managers in trading 
companies.  However the same logic is not necessarily applicable considering that 
incorporated sporting associations are only eligible for incorporation by reference to 
specific qualifying purposes that restrict the type of activities in which the 
association can engage.  Recall the following comments of Cooke J of the New 
Zealand High Court11 that were emphasized in chapter 2: 
The law or practice relating to limited liability companies is not necessarily a helpful analogy 
in approaching [incorporated society] cases.  The doctrine of ultra vires in company law was 
evolved mainly to protect investors and creditors.  The same considerations are not easily 
transportable to cases where the raison d'être of an organization is not to make profits but to 
promote a certain activity.12  
                                                 
11    Delivering judgment on behalf of the full bench, the other justices being Richardson, 
McMullin and Somers JJ and Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. 
12  Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159 at 178.  On the 
utility of a multi-function Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), see Boland, P, "Enforcement of the 
Principles of Mutuality under the Corporations Act: Is It Possible without Legislative 
Intervention? (Part 2)" (2002) 54(5) Keeping Good Companies Journal of Chartered 
Secretaries Australia Ltd 277tiv.  On the practical difficulties arising from transplanting 
corporate law into the incorporated associations setting, see; McGregor-Lowndes, M, 
National Scheme for Incorporated Associations, Canberra, 1993 at 288-9; and Huntly, C, 
"Dionysius, Damocles and the Unseen Perils of Insolvency for Officers of Incorporated 
Associations" (2000) 18(4) Company & Securities Law Journal 262 especially at 268-9.   
However, see Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-
Profit Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, 
Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 11 for an alternative discussion. 
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It is important to remember that, as was indicated in chapter 3, in South Australia, 
Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory an association must comply 
with specific purposes in order to be eligible to incorporate.  In the remaining 
jurisdictions, it will be recalled that eligible purposes are much less restrictive but 
there is still a prohibition on trading or returning pecuniary profits to members.  It 
would seem to follow therefore, that given the central role of group purposes as a 
criterion for incorporation in all jurisdictions, that the abolition of the doctrine of 
ultra vires with respect to incorporated sporting associations is at least an open 
question from a theoretical perspective.  Whatever the correct view on such a matter 
may be, it is clearly a significant area of asymmetry between large modern trading 
corporations and incorporated sporting associations that restricts the usefulness of the 
former as a potential source analogue for gaining insight or predictive capacity with 
respect to the latter.13
 
Closely-Held Companies  
It is assumed to be the case that small closely-held companies are also formed for the 
purposes of maximising shareholder wealth, or for maximising profits.  As was noted 
in chapter 2, whether or not this is an appropriate assumption is still a point which 
has been inadequately researched in practice.  However, from the point of view of 
purposes, the assumption is made that the comments above dealing with the potential 
aptness of the large trading corporation as a potential source analogue for 
incorporated associations are equally applicable to closely-held companies. 
                                                 
13    Sievers, AS, "Incorporation and Regulation of Non-Profit Associations in Australia and 
Other Common Law Jurisdictions" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124. 
314  
Charitable Trusts 
The charitable trust has already been referred to above as sharing some essential 
structural characteristics with incorporated sporting associations from the point of 
view of the primacy of the purposes for which both are formed.14  As has been 
mentioned already, this is most notable in South Australia, Tasmania, Western 
Australia and the Northern Territory.  However, even in those other jurisdictions 
which refer to eligibility for incorporation from the point of view of non-trading 
purposes, favourable comparison is possible with charitable trusts.  Recall that 
charitable trusts are formed for the public benefit and therefore not necessarily for 
the purpose of benefiting a particular class of society.  Recall further, that when a 
charitable trust is operated in a manner that does not meet its charitable purposes, the 
charitable trust can be put under the administration of the Attorney General.  The 
trustees can be held personally liable for breaching the trust deed.  In extreme cases, 
the court may even order that the charitable trust be wound up, and the assets be 
devolved cy-près to a charity formed for similar purposes.  As will be remembered 
from chapter 3, the strong emphasis on the original purposes for which a charitable 
trust is formed, and the extent to which these purposes circumscribe the way in 
which it may operate, bears close favourable comparison with the situation 
pertaining to incorporated sporting associations.  Even in jurisdictions in which there 
is no statutory list of acceptable purposes, it will be recalled from chapter 3  that once 
                                                 
1414   However, the common law has struggled valiantly to come to terms with dispositions of 
property to non-charitable purposes (see for example Ford, HAJ, "Dispositions of Property to 
Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations I" (1956) 55 Michigan Law Review 67; Ford, HAJ, 
"Dispositions of Property to Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations Ii" (1956) 55 Michigan 
Law Review 235; and Ford, H.A.J., "Dispositions for Purposes" in Finn, PD, (Ed) Essays in 
Equity, The Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1985). 
315 an incorporated association’s purposes are included in its constitution,15 any change 
to those purposes must comply with relevant statutory requirements.  These include 
resolutions reaching statutorily prescribed minimum affirmative percentages before 
being passed by members, and the subsequent notification of the regulator in each 
jurisdiction.16
 
As discussed in chapter 3, it is true that the list of eligible purposes for which a trust 
can be formed for charitable purposes is far more restrictive than anything that is in 
evidence in the relevant legislation in the relevant jurisdictions.  However, as noted 
in chapter 2, in a number of jurisdictions17 trusts formed for the promotion of a sport 
do qualify as charitable trusts.  In other words, a significant number of the 
associations that are been the subject of this thesis would also qualify as charitable 
trusts given the amended common law definitions in a number of jurisdictions.  This 
speaks eloquently to the degree to which charitable trusts are a potentially rich source 
analogue with respect to incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
As was discussed in chapter 2, when one considers the eleemosynary corporation as 
a potential source analogue for incorporated sporting associations, the purposes for 
                                                 
15   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) ss 25-25A; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 
(SA) s 23; Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 17; Associations Incorporation Act 
1987 (WA) s 16; Associations Incorporation Act (NT) s 15; and Incorporated Societies Act 
1908 (NZ) s 6. 
16   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 20; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) 
ss 26A-26D; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 24; Associations Incorporation Act 
1964  (Tas) ss 18-19; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 22; Associations 
Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) ss 17 & 19; Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) ss 30 
& 33; Associations Incorporation Act (NT) s 16; and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 
21. 
17   New Zealand, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. 
316 which an eleemosynary corporation can exist are highly restrictive.  In addition, 
eleemosynary purposes are mutually exclusive of the incorporated sporting 
associations that are the subject of this thesis.  However, as some hospitals, colleges 
and other educational institutions are incorporated associations, there is obviously the 
potential for utilising the law relating to eleemosynary corporations as a source of 
analogy for these entities. 
 
Nevertheless, for present purposes one of the interesting features of eleemosynary 
corporations is the extent to which the internal relations are circumscribed by the 
charter or deed of the eleemosynary corporation, and the restrictions which apply to 
the way in which those documents can be amended.  The charter or deed of an 
eleemosynary corporation will state its charitable raison ďêtre and the corporation is 
not free to depart from those purposes.  This bears close favourable comparison to 
the situation pertaining to incorporated sporting associations, none of which are free 
to depart from their declared purposes.  This further indicates that reasons justifying 
the abolition of the ultra vires doctrine with respect to trading companies do not 
necessarily translate into the incorporated association context.   
 
It is of further interest with respect to eleemosynary corporations, that there are long 
established mechanisms under which the constituent documents of the corporation 
can be enforced without recourse to the courts.  Whether or not there is scope for 
such mechanisms to have general application to incorporated associations is unclear.  
Certainly the decision in Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 currently stands as 
an almost insuperable barrier to direct and ready access by members of incorporated 
317 associations to the courts.18  This barrier has, to some extent, been addressed by 
statute in a number of jurisdictions through a provision that the constitution is 
deemed to have contractual effect between the association and its members.  The 
eleemosynary corporation model does suggest that something of a halfway position 
is achievable existing between the non-intervention policy of Cameron v Hogan on 
the one hand and the radical judicial activism of McKinnon  v Grogan [1974] 1 
NSWLR 295 on the other. 
 
Corporate Size 
As indicated in chapter 1, one of the points of convergence in corporate law theory 
appears to be the significance of corporate size.  Essentially, as suggested in chapter 
1, corporate law theory relating to large bureaucratic organisations can only be 
applied with certainty in the context of large public trading corporations.  The 
specialised literature relating to small closely-held companies that was surveyed in 
chapter 2 is testament to the significance of the small corporation / large corporation 
dichotomy.  Given this background it is important to note as was discussed in chapter 
3, that in a number of jurisdictions a minimum size requirement is stipulated with 
respect to incorporated associations.  These minimum membership requirements 
operate in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia, the 
Australian Capital Territory and in New Zealand.19  The empirical data discussed in 
                                                 
18   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 6 & at 308 describing it as a “continuing 
incubus”; and Sievers, AS, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd 
ed, Federation Press, Annandale, 1996 at 128-9. 
19   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 7 (5 members); Associations Incorporation 
Act 1981 (Qld) s 7 (7 members); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) (no minimum); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) (no minimum); Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Vic) s 3 (5 members); Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 4 (6 members); 
318 chapter 4 also highlights the extent to which minimum memberships are observed 
with respect to incorporated sporting associations.  The inference that was drawn in 
chapter 5 from consideration of the empirical results was that the minimum 
membership restriction is not a particularly significant factor in practice. 
 
Trading Companies  
As was noted in chapter 5, it is significant that incorporated sporting associations 
exhibit a wide range of membership sizes from the very small to the very large.  It 
will also be recalled from the analysis of the empirical data in chapters 4 and 5 that a 
minority of incorporated sporting associations in Australia or New Zealand would 
qualify for incorporation as a proprietary limited company under the provisions of 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).20  All of these groups would be eligible to claim 
“small” status mainly due to the fact that small incorporated sporting associations do 
not employ staff.  Even if one measures corporate size on the basis of that used in 
South Australia (i.e.: $200,000 in total assets),21 or the two-way measure used in 
Victoria (i.e.: $200,000 in gross receipts/ $500,000 in total assets),22 to delineate 
between large and small incorporated associations, the vast majority of incorporated 
sporting associations would still qualify as small. 
 
All of this empirical data suggests that the majority of incorporated sporting 
associations have a large number of members.  Indeed the reported membership 
numbers exceed that which is be permitted for the continuing operation of a 
                                                                                                                                          
Associations Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 14 (5 members); Associations Incorporation 
Act (NT) (no minimum); and Incorporated Societies Act 1908 (NZ) s 4 (15 members). 
20   At s 45A.   
21   Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 3 (“prescribed association”) 
319 partnership in both countries.  Notwithstanding the significant membership numbers 
reported by incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand, from 
an economic perspective the vast majority of these groups are relatively modest.  
This presents something of a problem when seeking to use the jurisprudence 
applicable to large trading corporations in an incorporated sporting association 
context.  Clearly, issues that are of significance to a large economic entity such as the 
typical large public trading company will not resonate in an economically small 
structure.  Once again the suitability of the large trading corporation as a potential 
source analogue for incorporated sporting associations is found to be in doubt.   
 
Closely-Held Companies  
As indicated in chapter 2, small closely-held companies are most commonly defined 
as consisting of fewer than 50 members.  It will also be recalled from chapter 4, that 
the majority of respondents to the questionnaire reported memberships in their 
associations in excess of 50 members.  The utility of using the closely-held company 
as a source analogue of incorporated sporting associations must therefore be open to 
criticism.   
 
Bear in mind also that one of the key elements of small closely-held companies is an 
almost one-to-one correlation between owners and controllers.  As discussed in 
chapter 3 there are two distinct types of voluntary associations, those that are 
membership governed, and those that are controlled by delegates.  Where groups 
indicated that they were controlled by delegates, chapter 4 revealed that in both 
Australia and New Zealand the correlation between member and controller groups 
                                                                                                                                          
22   Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) ss 30B & 3 (“prescribed association”). 
320 was nowhere near 1 to 1.23  However, it must be accepted that there are membership 
governed incorporated sporting associations that may invite resort to small closely-
held companies as a source analogue for such membership governed incorporated 
sporting associations.   
 
Charitable Trusts 
In terms of the charitable trust as a potential source analogue for incorporated 
sporting associations, it needs to be once again stressed that the charitable trust is 
formed for public benefit either in terms of the public generally, or some class of the 
public who would benefit directly from the operation of the charitable trust.  This 
does present some difficulties when considering the charitable trust as a potential 
source analogue for incorporated sporting associations.  This is primarily because, as 
we have seen, trustees are not entitled to benefit from the operation of a charitable 
trust in their capacity as trustees.  Trustees are only in a position to benefit from the 
activities of a charitable trust in their capacity as a member of the general public, or 
as a part of the class for which the charitable trust was established.  In this respect, 
the idea of the size of a charitable trust either in economic terms, or in terms of its 
intended beneficiaries, is not particularly significant.  This being said, it should be 
noted, however, that there is no minimum size requirement with respect to charitable 
trusts in the sense of those persons for whose benefit it may be formed, and certainly 
there is no maximum size limitation.  It is of interest that in all jurisdictions other 
than South Australia and Victoria the issue of corporate size is not a significant issue 
for incorporated sporting associations.  This would seem to indicate a general point 
of favourable comparison with charitable trusts. 
                                                 
23   In Australia the average relationship was 1 to 33 and in New Zealand it was 1 to 45. 
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Eleemosynary Corporations 
While there is no minimum or maximum size requirement for an eleemosynary 
corporation, it is the case that membership of an eleemosynary corporation must be 
provided for in the charter or deed of the eleemosynary corporation.  Where 
eligibility requirements for membership are expressed in those documents they will 
be final.  As to whether or not size requirements have any particular significance to 
eleemosynary corporations, this will be entirely a matter for the individual charter or 
deed.  Once again there is a favourable comparison to be made between 
eleemosynary corporations and the majority of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Mutual vs.  Public Benefit Eligibility 
As was indicated in chapter 3, this characteristic is of no significance to the 
eligibility of an association to incorporate in either Australia or New Zealand.  The 
only caveat that should be added to this is that it is of significance where the 
incorporated sporting association in question might seek to qualify as a charity in 
New Zealand and some Australian jurisdictions.24
 
Organised/Institutionalised 
Trading Companies  
It will be appreciated that large public trading companies that exhibit many of the 
characteristics of typical large bureaucratic organisations embody the idea of an 
                                                 
24   Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (NZ) s 61A; Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) s 103; Trustee Act 1936 (SA) s 
69C; Variation of Trusts Act 1994 (Tas) s 4; and Charitable Trusts Act 1962 (WA) s 4.  See Dal 
Pont, GE & Chalmers, DRC, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 3rd ed, Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, 
2004 at 559. 
322 association that is organised and institutionalised.  This is borne out by the literature 
that was discussed in chapters 1 and 2.  Typically this involves the existence of a 
constitution that is enforceable between corporate constituents at common law and 
also under the relevant governing statutes.25  As was discussed in chapter 3, the 
degree to which the relevant associations’ incorporation legislation in Australia and 
New Zealand mandates the content of organising rules is variable.  However, as was 
discussed in chapter 3, all jurisdictions require that incorporated associations must 
have a constitution setting out certain matters of an organisational nature.  There is a 
lack of uniformity in the extent to which this constitution is legally enforceable on 
members of incorporated associations.26
 
As a consequence, an incorporated sporting association which may have operated 
prior to incorporation on an informal basis is required to formalise the procedures 
under which the association intends to operate into the future.  In some respects this 
may be deleteriously impacted on by the legislative requirements in various 
jurisdictions.  As was noted in chapter 5, the requirements of the measures in 
Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory are the least flexible.  In other 
jurisdictions, as discussed in chapter 3, the legislation in most jurisdictions provides 
for mandatory majorities for resolutions on matters such as changing the 
association’s purposes and appointing committee members.  This is to some extent 
reflective of what pertains to large public trading companies. 
 
                                                 
25   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 117(3) & 140; and Companies Act 1993 (NZ) Pt 5. 
26    For enforceable constitutions, see: Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11(2); 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 41(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 
(SA) s 23; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 14A(1); and Associations 
Incorporation Act 1991 (ACT) s 48. 
323 Closely-Held Companies  
As was discussed in chapter 2, small closely-held companies are typically 
characterised by fairly detailed shareholder agreements that are binding between 
shareholders, directors and the company.  This is a point at which incorporated 
associations depart from trading corporations.  As discussed in chapter 3, and also 
the previous paragraph, the extent to which the constitutions of incorporated 
associations are enforceable as between members is a point about which there is 
considerable ambiguity.  The common law, based as it is on the judgment of 
Cameron v Hogan, would presumably deny the enforceability of the constitution of 
an incorporated sporting association.27  Whether or not this decision might be 
distinguished from one involving an incorporated, as opposed to an unincorporated, 
group has not yet been tested and is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
With respect to charitable trusts, it will be recalled that a charitable trust is created by 
a trust deed which provides for the organisation of relationships within the trust.  As 
discussed in chapter 2 and this chapter, it will be remembered that while the duties, 
responsibilities and powers of trustees are delineated within the trust instrument, that 
instrument is only enforceable by the Attorney General on behalf of the public.   
Recall also that there are negligible rights for beneficiaries of charitable trusts to take 
action to seek such enforcement.  This is very indirect supervision over charitable 
trusts by interested parties when compared to what one would normally expect to 
find with respect to trading companies.  However, it does to some extent mirror the 
                                                 
27   But see Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New 
Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at 77-91. 
324 judicial attitude to the enforcement of the constitution of voluntary associations at 
common law.  This is perhaps a further point of favourable comparison between 
charitable trusts and incorporated sporting associations relevant to assessing the 
suitability of the former as a potential source analogue for the latter. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
With respect to eleemosynary corporations, there is typically a high degree of 
institutionalisation given that the eleemosynary corporation’s founding instrument 
would normally provide details including the preconditions to membership, and the 
governance mechanisms that operate within eleemosynary corporation.  As has been 
observed in chapter 2, eleemosynary corporations are very often characterised by 
varying degrees of membership based governance.  This is reinforced by the usual 
mechanisms permitting the members of eleemosynary corporations to petition the 
Visitor of the eleemosynary corporation to have disputes settled or to seek 
enforcement of the founding instrument of the eleemosynary corporation.  To this 
extent, it could be said that there is a strong alignment between the typical structure 
of eleemosynary corporations and what was observed in chapter 3 with respect to the 
degree of organisation and institutionalisation evident in incorporated associations.  
This suggests that there may be some utility in employing the eleemosynary 
corporation as a source analogue when dealing with incorporated associations. 
 
Private 
Trading Companies  
The private nature of incorporated associations has already been referred to above 
apropos the internal governance of incorporated associations.  It is clear that large 
325 public trading companies do operate in the private sphere, as opposed to the public 
(or government) sphere.  However as I have already discussed, they are subject to the 
supervision of the courts at the instance of shareholders to a degree that one does not 
associate with voluntary associations given the decision in Cameron v Hogan.28
 
It should be noted of course that the so-called “rule in Foss v Harbottle”29 together 
with the related “rule in Turquand’s Case”30 are indicative of a judicial policy of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of trading companies from a common law 
perspective.31  However, it should also be remembered that even at common law, it 
has long been recognised that there are exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle that 
have over time led to the current statutory derivative actions, and actions that are 
open to shareholders per se for breaches of the statutory contract.32
 
A number of jurisdictions have legislated to ensure that the constitutions of 
incorporated associations in those jurisdictions do have the effect of a contract under 
seal.  This opens the possibility of appeal to the various supervising courts where 
there is a breach of the constitution of an incorporated sporting association in those 
jurisdictions.  Nevertheless it still appears to be the case that judicial attitudes 
regarding the private status of incorporated associations are somewhat tivless 
                                                 
28    But note the contra statutory position re. the enforceability of incorporated association 
constitutions, see: Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 11(2); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 (Qld) s 41(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 23; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 14A(1); and Associations Incorporation Act 
1991 (ACT) s 48. 
29   Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461; 67 ER 189. 
30   Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 R&B 327; 119 ER 886. 
31   "Notes: The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations 
for Its Continued Primacy" (2002) 115(5) Harvard Law Review 1480. 
32   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 140; and Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 165(6). 
326 interventionist than one would associate with trading companies.33  This is a 
significant limitation on the utility of the large modern trading company as a 
potential source analogue for incorporated associations. 
 
Closely-Held Companies  
The same principles which apply to large public trading companies relating to private 
status obviously apply to small closely-held companies.  However, despite the small 
closely-held company being more private in its operations than a large public trading 
company, it should be remembered from the discussion in chapter 2, that the closer 
interrelationships between shareholders and directors of closely-held companies 
gives rise a to greater potential for judicial intervention.  This is exacerbated in most 
cases due to the existence of separate shareholder agreements and special restricting 
clauses contained within the constitutions of such companies. 
 
If one accepts the view that the courts are more reluctant to intervene in the internal 
affairs of incorporated associations than is the case with companies, then the 
appropriateness of the small closely-held company as a source analogue for 
incorporated associations must be open to serious question.  In addition to this, as 
discussed in chapter 3, government funding and donations are typically not major 
funding sources for either large public trading companies or small closely-held 
companies.  These sources of funds are however highly significant with respect to 
                                                 
33   Northey, JF, "Intervention in the Affairs of an Incorporated Society" (1964) New Zealand 
Law Journal 29; Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and 
New Zealand, Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapter 6 & at 308; and Sievers, 
AS, Associations and Clubs Law in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed, Federation Press, 
Annandale, 1996 at 128-9. 
327 associations that are formed for sporting and recreation purposes in both Australia 
and New Zealand. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
With respect to charitable trusts, it should be appreciated that the private nature of 
charitable trusts is something of a tautology, given the fact that charitable trusts must 
be formed for purposes that are beneficial to the public, but at the same time are 
nevertheless regarded as private entities.  In other words, charitable trusts are 
privately established but publicly focused, resulting in the somewhat paradoxical 
nature of charitable trusts.  Uniquely among private entities, as has been discussed 
above, they are subject to supervision by the Attorney General.  This is clearly a 
situation that one would normally associate with public institutions.  The close 
connection that charitable trusts enjoy with both the private sphere and the public 
sphere is one of their defining attributes.  As was noted in chapter 5, this has led to 
the development of the literature referring to the so-called third sector. 
 
Further, as was indicated in chapter 2, it is important to bear in mind that the single 
most important source of funds for a charitable trust is the initial settlement of the 
trust corpus by the settlor in the form of a donation.  It will also be recalled from 
chapter 2, that following the settlement of the corpus, the ongoing existence of a 
charitable trust is secured by a combination of investing the trust funds according to 
the trust deed and by obtaining funds in the form of further donations and 
sponsorships.  In this regard, it must be noted that there is a strong similarity between 
charitable trusts and incorporated sporting associations.  This is further indication of 
the potential suitability of the former as a source analogue for the latter. 
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Eleemosynary Corporations 
As has been stressed above, and in chapter 2, eleemosynary corporations are a sub-
genus of charitable trusts.  As such, they share the same paradoxical public/private 
nature exhibited by charitable trusts generally.  However it should be recalled from 
chapter 2, that there is typically an element of internal participatory membership-
governance that to varying degrees will involve management by delegates.  Such 
delegation of management is typically to a group of members of the organisation 
who are not necessarily chosen as expert managers.  It follows therefore that the 
delegates so selected are chosen for more complex reasons that baseline managerial 
efficiency.  It is suggested that such member-managers are selected on the basis of 
such considerations as mutual respect and trust, and superior understanding of the 
ethos and structure of the eleemosynary corporation.  This is a significant point of 
potential similarity within incorporated sporting associations.  As discussed in 
chapter 4, the empirical results of the questionnaire revealed that in incorporated 
sporting associations there is a strong degree of participation by members in the 
management of the group.  In a significant proportion of cases, management is 
conducted by the entire membership body and, in other cases, by representatives 
elected from within the membership body.  As discussed above, the extent to which 
management might actually be shared between management committee and 
members’ meetings requires more careful research.  However, the findings presented 
in chapter 4 indicate clearly that there is potential for eleemosynary corporations to 
serve as a useful source analogue for incorporated sporting associations. 
 
329 NonProfit Distributing/Personal Benefit Restrictions 
Trading Companies  
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, the dominant theoretical school in corporate law 
suggests that shareholders of a large public trading company are most appropriately 
referred to as the owners of the corporation.  It was also discussed in chapter 2, that 
this notion is somewhat problematic given the fairly ambiguous nature of 
shareholding (i.e.  it is not entirely clear what it is that shareholders actually own).  
Certainly it is clear that shareholders have rights that attach to their shares.  In 
exchange for the capital that initial shareholders contribute to the company, they 
obtain a range of transferable rights such as voting rights, rights to participate in the 
distribution of profits from time to time, and a contingent right to receive a share of 
the capital of the corporation on winding-up (should there be any surplus assets to 
distribute).  It was also discussed in chapter 2, that the primary indicium of 
ownership, namely control over the assets, vests in the directors of the large modern 
trading company.  When one compares these trading company characteristics to the 
empirical data in chapter 4 and the legislative framework discussed in chapter 3, 
what one discovers is that the contribution of capital on incorporation will usually be 
from a pre-existing unincorporated sporting association.  It might be argued that the 
members of the pre-existing unincorporated association have contingent interests in 
these assets.  While such a point cannot be settled with a great degree of certainty,34 
once an Australian unincorporated sporting association becomes incorporated, or 
once an incorporated sporting association is vested with assets, these assets belong to 
                                                 
34   Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit Associations in Australia and New Zealand, 
Law Book Company, North Ryde, 1986 at Chapters 5 & 10 
330 the incorporated sporting association itself.35  There is no such statutory vesting in 
New Zealand.  Further, as discussed in chapter 3, in all jurisdictions incorporated 
associations are prohibited from distributing any of the assets or earnings of the 
association to members by way of pecuniary returns to members while the 
association is operational.  There is a clear legislative requirement that the purposes 
for which an association was formed are the only appropriate recipients of the assets 
and earnings of the association while it is a going concern.   
 
Where a large trading company ceases to be a going concern and becomes defunct, 
as was discussed in chapter 2, shareholders retain a residual interest in any surplus 
property of the company that might exist after all of the other claims on those assets 
are satisfied.  However, as it will be recalled from chapter 3, this is not the situation 
with the vast majority of incorporated sporting associations in both Australia and 
New Zealand.   The empirical data reported in chapter 4 revealed that, in the majority 
of cases, the ultimate destination of the surplus assets of an incorporated sporting 
association on dissolution is to an association with similar aims and objectives, or to 
charity.  Even in those jurisdictions (notably New Zealand, Victoria and Queensland) 
that theoretically allow for the distribution of surplus assets on dissolution to 
members, this option is rarely adopted. 
 
The data analysed in chapter 4 conclusively indicates that the majority of 
incorporated sporting associations in all jurisdictions accept the principle that surplus 
                                                 
35   Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) s 15(3) & Sch 2; Associations Incorporation Act 
1981 (Qld) s 22; Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 20(3)(b); Associations 
Incorporation Act 1964 (Tas) s 13; Associations Incorporation Act 1981 (Vic) s 8; 
Associations Incorporation Act 1987 (WA) s 11(1); Associations Incorporation Act 1991 
(ACT) s 23; and Associations Act (NT) s 12. 
331 assets that have been set apart for a particular purpose should be distributed to 
another functioning association with similar purposes, or to charity.  It is in fact only 
the minority of incorporated sporting associations that permit members to retain a 
residual interest in surplus assets on dissolution.  This is a highly significant point of 
structural asymmetry between large modern trading companies and incorporated 
sporting associations.  As before, this lack of structural similarity between the trading 
company model and the typical incorporated sporting association is a significant 
obstacle to the suitability of the former as a potential source analogue for the latter. 
  
Closely-Held Companies  
As identified both above and in chapter 2, small closely-held companies are 
characterised by a homogeneity of shared ownership of shares and management 
participation.  To a significant degree therefore, unlike the situation pertaining to 
large trading companies, ownership and control tend to be held by the same persons 
in small closely-held companies.  This strengthens the case for arguing that 
shareholders are the ultimate owners of the assets of a corporation.  However, the 
basic shareholders-as-owners premise holds for large and small companies alike.  It 
will be recalled from chapter 2 that some shareholders in small closely-held 
companies experience difficulties in participating in profits while the company is 
operational.  However, in the event that there are surplus assets on dissolution, these 
will be distributed between remaining shareholders.  Given these important 
similarities between large trading companies and small closely-held companies, the 
comments above relating to the extent to which incorporated sporting associations 
differ from large companies apply with equal force to the small closely-held 
company.  In other words, on the basis of this structural characteristic, the small 
332 closely-held company is also a problematic potential source analogue for 
incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
It will be recalled from chapter 2 that the purpose of a charitable trust is to realise the 
purposes for which it was formed.  Even where members of the public are 
beneficiaries of the operation of the charitable trust, they have no legal or equitable 
interest in trust property until it has been vested in them by the trustees.36  
Entitlement to trust property is on the basis of a gift in furtherance of the purposes of 
the charitable trust.  When one considers this aspect of charitable trusts and compares 
it with the statutory non-distribution constraints placed on incorporated sporting 
associations, one is immediately struck by the strong similarity that exists between 
charitable trusts and incorporated associations in this respect.  As was also discussed 
in chapter 2, in the event that a charitable trust should fail or be dissolved, any 
remaining trust property must be disposed of cy-près to a charitable trust formed for 
similar purposes.  It will be recalled that chapter 3 demonstrated that the governing 
legislation in most jurisdictions is framed in a similar, although not identical, fashion.  
Further, in chapter 4 the empirical data revealed that incorporated sporting 
associations strongly favour this approach even when it is not the only legislative 
alternative.  This is one of the most significant internal structural similarities that can 
be observed between charitable trusts and incorporated sporting associations.37  This 
                                                 
36   Compare also the situation in Canada (Parks, JM, "Registered Charities: A Primer" (2003) 
17(4) The Philanthropist 4 at 8). 
37   Stevens, D, "Framing an Appropriate Corporate Law" in Phillips, J, et al, (Ed) Between State 
and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, McGill-Queen's University 
Press, Montreal, Canada, 2001 at 582. 
333 similarity further suggests the suitability of the charitable trust as a potential source 
analogue for incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
As discussed in chapter 2, eleemosynary corporations are typically characterised by a 
strong degree of participatory management by their members.  In addition, being a 
sub-genus of charitable trusts, eleemosynary corporations too are bound by the cy-
près doctrine where they are dissolved.  Accordingly any surplus assets on 
dissolution must be transferred to another eleemosynary corporation formed for 
similar purposes, or to the Crown as bona vacantia.  With respect to both 
eleemosynary corporations in particular, and charitable trusts in general, recall also 
that there is a public aspect to charitable trusts and eleemosynary corporations, given 
their supervision by the Attorney General and the overall supervisory role of the 
courts.  So far as eleemosynary corporations are concerned however, as was 
explained in chapter 2, despite having no personal interest in the trust property, 
members do have rights to invoke the intervention of the Visitor in the event that 
there are disputes, allegations of maladministration or departures from the trust deed.  
Public supervision is also enshrined with respect to incorporated associations given 
the scrutiny of government regulators over the affairs of incorporated associations in 
most jurisdictions.  In addition, there is public supervision concerning the 
enforcement of the non-distribution constraint laid down in statutes, both from an 
operational perspective and an income tax perspective, in both Australia and New 
Zealand. 
 
 
334 Delegated Management 
Trading Companies  
As discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2, narrow form organic theory as pertains to 
large modern trading companies is the notion that a company consists of two separate 
organs, namely the board of directors and the general meeting of shareholders.  This 
theory holds that these organs are both of prime importance in their different 
respects.  It was also observed in chapter 1, that where the power of management is 
devolved to a board of directors, it is not open to the shareholders’ meeting to 
interfere with management decisions once they are made by the board.  Rather, the 
shareholders retain the right to change the corporate constitution to remove the 
management power from the board of directors, or even the directors themselves.  
Further, it is accepted that the operations of the large modern trading company are 
based on the principle that shareholders delegate the management function to a 
specially selected group of individuals who may or may not be shareholders or 
members but who have specialist management skills.  The theory goes on to state 
that these corporate controllers are appointed by shareholders with the sole purpose 
of maximising shareholders’ wealth.  In this respect, there is in some sense a 
relationship somewhat analogous to the relationship that exists in a charitable trust in 
which assets are settled under the control of trustees to pursue certain defined 
purposes.  As was noted in chapter 2, the evidence suggests that trust law principles 
exercised a strong degree of influence over the development of modern corporate 
law. 
 
The empirical evidence presented in chapter 4 together with the statutory 
requirements summarised in chapter 3 all demonstrates that the management of the 
335 affairs of incorporated sporting associations are, in the majority of cases, delegated to 
a smaller group of elected members.  However, neither the legislation nor the 
empirical results indicate a preference for appointing specialist managers with 
management skills from outside of the membership body.  Given that the 
overwhelming majority of incorporated sporting associations report that they do not 
employ staff, the strong suggestion is that all or substantially all of the work of 
management committees is carried out by volunteers who are also members.  The 
empirical results also confirm of the proposition put by Professor Salomon (analysed 
in chapter 3) that many not-for-profit associations choose to be membership 
governed.38  That is to say, a significant proportion of respondent incorporated 
sporting associations (some with large membership numbers) reported that they do 
not elect a smaller group of delegated managers from amongst their number.  As 
indicated in chapter 5, one of the limitations of this research is that it did not inquire 
of respondents whether their constitutions granted management power to a 
management committee “between members’ meetings”.  Such “hybrid” governance 
structures are not within the ken of narrow form organic theorists, but they may well 
be adopted by a significant proportion of incorporated associations. 
 
It can be appreciated from the foregoing that the traditional corporate law conception 
of delegated management is not sophisticated enough to accommodate the variety of 
nuanced internal governance structures operating in incorporated sporting 
associations.  In this regard it is interesting to note the highly restrictive internal 
governance requirements in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland in 
particular.  As was discussed in chapter 3, these jurisdictions effectively mandate that 
                                                 
38   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
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applicable to large modern trading companies, whether or not this corresponds with 
the model of internal governance actually operating within incorporated associations.  
Given that the point is yet to be decided by an Australian court, it is not yet clear how 
the internal governance structures of incorporated sporting associations may invite 
jurisprudence by analogy from the large modern trading company, given the highly 
suspect applicability of narrow form organic theory to incorporated sporting 
associations in practice.  As has been demonstrated by reference to the empirical data 
in chapter 4 and even with respect to many of the governing statutes, the narrow 
form organic model does not fit all of the observable internal governance structures 
operating in the incorporated sporting association context.  This is perhaps the most 
compelling reason why the trading company is a highly questionable source analogue 
for incorporated sporting associations.   
 
This point has been addressed by Fisher, who asks whether the paths have diverged 
between the common law duties of incorporated association management committees 
and company directors.39  This is a very involved question.  More so perhaps than 
even Fisher has addressed, given that prior to this thesis there has never been an 
empirical study of the types of internal governance structures operating within 
incorporated associations.  However, on the basis of the findings discussed in chapter 
4, it is appropriate to highlight the limitations of an unquestioning application of 
duties developed in the milieu of large modern trading companies into the context of 
incorporated sporting associations.  Fisher was of course concerned about the 
                                                                                                                                          
USA, 1997 at 21-2. 
337 introduction of the business judgement rule into the Australian companies legislation 
and how that may or may not influence the development of the jurisprudence of 
incorporated associations.40  The larger question of why corporate law should feature 
as the source analogue of choice is not addressed in detail by Fisher.   
 
It will be recalled from chapter 2 that delineation was identified between the duties 
required of company directors and the trustees of charitable trusts.  It was stressed 
that company directors are understood to be entrepreneurial risk takers, motivated by 
the necessity to maximise shareholder wealth and corporate profits.  Such a function 
is of course facilitated via the introduction of the business judgement rule in an 
Australian context.  However, this aspect of trading company directors is at odds 
with the traditional view of trustees of a charitable trust.  As will be recalled from 
chapter 2, trustees of a charitable trust are expected to safeguard trust property and to 
exercise prudence in the operation of the trust.  Entrepreneurial flair is not generally 
regarded as the prime requirement of charitable trustees.  In this regard recall that 
chapter 3 identified that in the majority of jurisdictions, management committees are 
required to exercise duties of a fiduciary nature, however, with the exception of 
South Australia there is a total lack of statutory duties as to a duty of care.  This is in 
direct contradistinction to what was highlighted in chapter 2 relating to trading 
companies both in Australia and New Zealand.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
39    Fisher, AF, "Duties of Company Directors and Committee Members of Incorporated 
Associations: Have the Paths Divided?" (2001) 13(2) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
143. 
40    This concern has recently been addressed specifically by Canadian policy researchers 
(Reform of the Canada Corporations Act:  Draft Framework for a New Not-for-Profit 
Corporations Act, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy Directorate, Policy Sector, 
Montreal, Canada, March, 2002 at 2 & 33-5). 
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significant points of departure between incorporated associations and trading 
companies.  Referring again to the empirical data discussed in chapter 4, it should be 
kept in mind that not only do incorporated sporting associations exhibit a diversity of 
internal governance structures, but there is evidence to suggest that only in the 
minority of cases do incorporated sporting associations endow management 
committees with unfettered management power.  This is substantially at odds with 
the status quo pertaining to large modern trading companies.41  In light of the 
foregoing, it is suggested that the significant structural asymmetry between large 
modern trading corporations and incorporated sporting associations in the area of 
governance structures renders the former as a poor potential source analogue for the 
latter. 
 
Closely-Held Companies  
With respect to small closely-held companies, as has already been discussed in 
chapter 2 and the foregoing, there is often a very high correlation between the 
shareholding of a small closely-held company, and the composition of the 
management group.  From an internal governance perspective it is therefore less 
likely that one would discover a delegated management model operating in a small 
closely-held company than would be the case in a large trading company.  As was 
suggested in chapter 2, this relates to what Professor Hansmann describes as the 
homogeneity of interest requirement of a small closely-held company.  Hansmann 
expresses the view that the strong homogeneity of interest is what holds small 
                                                 
41   Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1946] 1 All ER 512; and John Shaw & Sons (Salford) 
Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113. 
339 closely-held companies together.  In his view this is the key indicator of success or 
failure in small closely-held companies.42  This proposition does have implications 
for incorporated sporting associations that follow a general membership based 
internal governance model in preference to the delegated management model.   
Hansmann’s proposition that the success or failure of an incorporated sporting 
association that is managed by its members collectively will require a very high 
degree of homogeneity of interest is immediately intuitively appealing.  The 
converse is also persuasive, namely that where the interests of the members in such 
incorporated associations become disparate, the group will not be successful.  This 
again emphasises the prime importance of corporate purposes to incorporated 
sporting associations, or at least that sub-genus of incorporated sporting associations, 
embodying the member-managed internal governance model.   
 
Recall also the problems of lock-in and freeze-out that were identified in chapter 2, 
in the context of small closely-held companies.  Given that member contributions to 
an incorporated sporting association are in no sense an investment, it is suggested 
that these issues do not have ready application to incorporated sporting associations.  
However, it is conceivable that such issues may have implications where 
membership of an incorporated association is somehow a precondition to earning a 
livelihood such as in the case of professional sportspersons. 
 
With respect to internal governance structures, one final point of potential 
comparison between small closely-held companies and incorporated sporting 
associations is that of restrictions that may be placed on management decisions.  As 
                                                 
42   Hansmann, H, The Ownership of Enterprise, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
340 was discussed in chapter 2, legally enforceable restrictions on the power of 
management may be contained in the constitution of a small closely-held company, 
or in a separate shareholder agreement.  As discussed in the foregoing, given the 
decision in Cameron v Hogan it is an open question as to whether restrictions on the 
power of management contained in the constitution of an incorporated sporting 
association will be judicially enforced from a common law perspective.  There is 
however a possibility that the small closely-held company could provide important 
insight in the resolution of legal issues arising out of breaches of management 
restrictions contained within the constitutions of incorporated sporting associations.  
However, any such reasoning by analogy must allow for the complicating effect of 
the non-distribution constraints that pertain to incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
When referring to the charitable trust as a potential source analogue for incorporated 
sporting associations in the area of internal governance structures, one must return to 
the relationships between a trustee, trust and beneficiaries that were described in 
chapter 2.  It will be recalled that a form of delegated management applies to 
charitable trusts as between the trustee and the settlor/appointor of the trust.  In 
addition, the trustee of a charitable trust has no pecuniary interest in the trust 
property in their role as a trustee.  Neither does the appointor of the trust (usually the 
settlor of the trust property) retain a pecuniary interest in the trust property after it 
has been settled.  These complex relationships arise out of the notion of gift, as 
opposed to contract or property.  The fiduciary obligations that exist within a trust 
are therefore not enforceable at law, but rather in equity.  In this regard, it is 
                                                                                                                                          
Cambridge, USA, 1996 at 97-8. 
341 interesting to note the extent to which the governing legislation in Australia and New 
Zealand appears to prescribe duties of a fiduciary nature owed by incorporated 
association participants.  On the other hand the broader range of statutory duties 
required of company officers that one normally associates with those arising out of 
contractual relationships are almost entirely overlooked in the governing legislation.  
This appears to be a significant aspect of structural similarity between the charitable 
trust and the incorporated sporting association.  This further recommends the former 
as a potential source analogue for the latter.   
 
As was described in chapter 2, the settlor of a charitable trust may retain the power of 
appointment enabling them to vary the trust deed, or to remove or appoint trustees as 
they see fit.  These powers of appointment may also be vested in another person or 
persons including the trustees themselves.  This issue is related to the notion that the 
settlement of charitable trust property is a donation and the power of appointment is 
also caught within the donative principle.  All of this is a reminder that the 
relationship between the settlor or original appointor of a trust on the one hand, and 
the trustees and objects of the trust on the other hand is more nuanced than where a 
person is a paid agent or a paid employee.  Given that the relationships within a 
charitable trust arise out of a donation, the enforcement principles are very different 
to those pertaining to contract-based relationships.  Common law has traditionally 
found it much easier to enforce duties that exist where there is a commercial 
arrangement between the parties than arrangements that fall outside purely 
342 commercial dealings.43  Equity has developed means of enforcing the non-
commercial obligations established in a charitable trust.   
 
Given that the original donor of charitable trust can settle property on trust in their 
own terms, including arrangements relating to the power of appointment, it can be 
seen that there is a direct analogy with the situation where the members of an 
incorporated sporting association set aside property for purposes on such terms as 
they see fit.  Further, powers of appointment such as the power to appoint and 
remove trustees, the power to vary the trust deed, and the power to determine trust 
objects from time to time can either be provided for in the trust deed, or by analogy 
these powers can be provided for in the constitution of an incorporated sporting 
association.  This is precisely what was found to be the case in chapter 3. 
 
The involvement of the Attorney General in the case of charitable trusts and the 
regulatory framework within which charitable trusts operate, is also significant.  It 
will be recalled from chapter 3 that incorporated sporting associations are required to 
operate under the supervision of the state and comply with various reporting and 
regulatory requirements under the governing legislation in both countries.  Here, as 
with charitable trusts, is this almost incongruous mix of public and private capacities.  
This shared public/private status is one of the factors that results in the literature on 
the “third sector” failing to distinguish adequately between charitable trusts and 
incorporated associations.   
 
                                                 
43   Oleck, HL, "Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979" (1979) 10 Toledo Law Review 962; 
This of issue is admirably analysed in depth by Fletcher, KL, The Law Relating to Non-Profit 
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trust and the incorporated sporting association.  As demonstrated in chapter 3, these 
latter groups clearly operate outside of the commercial sphere, and concepts of 
donation, delegation and the granting or withholding of management powers are, as 
illustrated by the empirical data reported in chapter 4, central to their internal 
structure.  Once again it appears that the charitable trust has the potential to serve as 
a suitable source analogue for incorporated sporting associations. 
 
As was discussed above under the heading “Trading Company”, there is a distinction 
between the way the courts view the duty of care of charitable trustees, and the way 
the courts view the duty of care of company directors.  Without wishing to cover the 
same ground again, it is sufficient for present purposes to note the differing treatment 
and suggest that, if the charitable trust proves to be a superior potential source 
analogue based on an objective evaluation of sufficient attributes, then it would be 
inappropriate to shackle incorporated sporting associations with the jurisprudence of 
a commercial entity. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
Obviously what has been said above relating to the governance of charitable trusts 
has equal force with respect to an eleemosynary corporation.  However, as was 
highlighted in chapter 2, it should be recalled that in the case of the more established 
eleemosynary corporations the internal governance mechanisms tend to be 
participatory membership focussed management structures in which the powers of 
appointment are shared among members.  This is further evidence that the donative 
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344 principle at the heart of charitable trusts is a potentially rich analogical source for 
incorporated sporting associations.   
 
Voluntary Associations 
It is tempting to gloss over the implications of the proposition that incorporated 
associations are by nature voluntary associations of persons.  Indeed, as has been 
mentioned by a number of authors, all associations of persons are to some extent 
voluntary.  However as indicated in chapter 4, it remains the case that incorporated 
sporting associations only exist and function based on the willingness of members to 
voluntarily associate and volunteer their time and abilities in furtherance of the group 
purposes.  It is suggested that this is an important internal structural characteristic of 
incorporated sporting associations which must be fully accounted for in any detailed 
consideration of potential source analogues. 
 
Trading Companies  
The large modern trading company is of course an association of persons formed for 
financial gain and, even though there may be elements of volunteerism present 
within trading companies, the trading company itself is a commercial entity.   The 
relationships within it are essentially commercial, and the extent to which people 
volunteer their time and effort to further the objectives of a trading corporation is not 
central to their operation.  As has already been discussed, the significance of this 
characteristic is that the courts have been far more willing to enforce legal 
obligations where there is a commercial relationship than where the relationships are 
essentially non-commercial.  Having said this, it would be inappropriate to suggest 
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345 that exhibiting a voluntary nature should result in lower legal standards than exist in 
commercial enterprises.  One would not, for example, suggest that the fiduciary 
obligations required of the trustees of a charitable trust are in any sense lower than 
those required of company directors.  However, it may be relevant to consider the 
voluntary status of an entity when one considers the duty of care.  Whether or not 
there may be grounds to argue for a unique standard of care in the context of 
incorporated sporting associations is an open question.  The voluntary or commercial 
nature of the group in question then is a central structural attribute that must be 
accounted for when considering the appropriateness or otherwise of the modern 
trading corporation as a potential source analogue for resolving legal difficulties 
arising in incorporated sporting associations.   
 
Closely-Held Companies  
The same domestic vs. commercial question is relevant to small closely-held 
companies, given that these are also formed for the purposes of securing profit to the 
shareholders, and for maximising shareholder wealth.  It follows therefore that there 
are also significant obstacles to be overcome when seeking to utilise small closely-
held companies as a potential source analogue for incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
A charitable trust is not necessarily assured of administration by volunteer trustees.  
It is possible that trustees may be professional managers appointed to exercise their 
skills with a right to claim normal commercial management fees.  However, it must 
be accepted that the nature of a trustee office is not primarily an office for gain.  It is 
an office of trust and one that is in the first instance discharged for purposes other 
346 than obtaining gain or profit for the person exercising that office.  In this regard, it is 
widely accepted that the trustee of a charitable trust holds their office usually in an 
honorary capacity and most commonly in a voluntary capacity.  So far as this is the 
case, the jurisprudence that relates to the administration of charitable trusts is 
potentially a rich source of analogical inference when dealing with issues 
surrounding the administration of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Eleemosynary Corporations 
As has already been discussed at length above, eleemosynary corporations often 
involve the sharing of powers of appointment among corporate members who then 
have the ability to participate in the governance of the eleemosynary corporation 
based on principles of membership governance.  These members, while not obtaining 
any commercial interest in the trust property, nevertheless collectively exercise 
aspects of the power of appointment.  It is also important to note that most of the 
offices held in large eleemosynary corporations are offices that are held for 
pecuniary profit.  Nevertheless, such rights and powers as may be enjoyed by 
members within eleemosynary corporations are not enforceable under the common 
law on the basis of employment benefits.  Rather, the rights of members are 
circumscribed by the foundation instrument of the eleemosynary corporation and are 
enforceable by means of appeal to the Visitor.  In the event that a Visitor will not act, 
or exceeds jurisdiction, review by the courts by means of a prerogative writ is a 
possibility.  Given the documented reluctance of courts to interfere in the internal 
affairs of voluntary domestic bodies the lack of property rights, the patterns of 
internal governance and the patterns of enforcement that one observes in 
347 eleemosynary corporations as a sub-genus of charities may be a potentially rich 
source of analogy for incorporated associations from a juridical perspective. 
 
Taxation Status of Incorporated Associations 
Trading Companies & Closely-Held Companies 
These entities enjoy no special taxation status when compared to the taxation 
treatment of incorporated sporting associations.  This is therefore a structural 
attribute that does not recommend either as a potentially rich source analogue for 
incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Charitable Trusts & Eleemosynary Corporations 
Charitable trusts are exempt from income tax.  It is also interesting to note in chapter 
3, that favourable taxation treatment is extended both in Australia and New Zealand 
to incorporated sporting associations as long as they have cy-près style distribution 
clauses written into their constitution.  It is also interesting to note that from an 
income tax perspective, the administrative requirements both in Australia and New 
Zealand call for a large degree of participatory management within the eligible tax 
exempt body.  It will be recalled that the principal reason that is given for this is the 
mutuality principle. 
 
When one compares this to the situation pertaining to trading companies, one finds 
perhaps the starkest point of contrast between trading companies and incorporated 
associations.  Incorporated associations qualifying for the income tax benefits in 
Australia and New Zealand must approximate what we have discovered pertains to 
charitable trusts and eleemosynary corporations which is very much at odds with 
348 what one discovers when one considers the internal structural characteristics of a 
trading company.  Trading companies of the large variety, generally speaking, have 
professional managers and very little, if any, involvement by members in the 
management of the corporation.  Profits are generated specifically to be distributed or 
made available to shareholders and at the end of the day there is no cy-près 
requirement for trading companies.  Over and above all of this of course is the 
requirement for companies in both Australia and New Zealand to pay income tax in 
addition to other relevant taxes. 
 
Limited Liability 
Trading Companies & Closely-Held Companies 
As has been identified in chapters 2 and 3, the members of both trading companies 
(large and small) and incorporated associations enjoy limited liability.  From this 
perspective there is no significant difference between the large trading company, 
closely-held company and the incorporated association.  This suggests that legal 
issues surrounding the issue of limited liability in the context of companies may 
permit advantageous resort to these entities as a potential source analogue for 
incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Charitable Trusts 
As was discussed in chapter 2, charitable trusts involve a form of limited liability, 
but not of the same nature that one discovers in modern incorporation by registration 
statutes.  This is a significant point of difference between charitable trusts and 
incorporated associations and one that may limit the usefulness of the charitable trust 
as a potential source analogue for incorporated sporting associations.   
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Eleemosynary Corporations 
Limited liability does inhere to a number of eleemosynary corporations that have 
been incorporated by statute or prescription.  This means that there is a potential 
source analogue for incorporated sporting association outside of the commercial 
sphere. 
 
Separate Legal Personality 
To some extent this characteristic rounds out the discussion in this chapter.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, separate legal personality as a corporate law concept has a 
very different meaning today to that which it denoted centuries ago.  However, the 
modern conception of separate legal entity status that had its origins in trusts is now 
very different to that which pertains to each of the incorporated sporting association, 
the large modern trading company, and the closely-held company.  The 
eleemosynary corporation has long been recognised as a separate legal entity and 
occupies its own peculiar place in the juridical firmament.  On the other hand, when 
one considers the charitable trust, no such entity is recognised at law (these 
arrangements being arrangements of equity).  It must therefore be conceded that the 
charitable trust does not share another important structural similarity with 
incorporated sporting associations.  Having conceded this, however, it should be 
remembered that in many respects members of incorporated sporting associations are 
as removed from ownership of the association as are incidental beneficiaries of a 
charitable trust.  There is therefore some potential for all four alternative source 
analogies to be useful in the context of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
350 SUMMARY  
On the basis of the theoretical framework developed in chapter 2, the foregoing 
discussion in this chapter has compared the key structural relational characteristics of 
incorporated sporting associations with four potential legal source analogues.  It was 
hoped that this comparison would identify which of the four alternatives presents the 
richest, most apt analogical schema from which to develop predictive insights into 
the complexities of incorporated sporting associations.  What emerged in this chapter 
is that incorporated sporting associations are truly sui generis and are significantly 
different to any of the four potential source analogues. 
 
It is true that there are some structural similarities between incorporated sporting 
associations and trading companies.  The separate legal personality and limited 
liability of both is an obvious strong point of similarity between them.  However, it 
does not necessarily follow that because incorporated sporting associations share a 
few structural similarities in common with trading companies that the latter should 
be resorted to as the sole potential source analogue when developing a jurisprudence 
of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
In adopting what is defined in chapter 1 as the narrow form organic approach, 
modern corporate law has moved beyond the traditional agency notions that 
previously viewed the board of directors as an agent of the shareholders’ meeting.  
Whether or not the narrow form organic approach is appropriate to incorporated 
sporting associations has in a sense been the central question raised by this thesis.  
For such an approach to be correct, it would require the existence of strong structural 
similarities between incorporated sporting associations and large trading corporations 
351 in the areas of organisational sophistication and internal governance structure.  This 
chapter does not support such a conclusion.  The organisational sophistication and 
internal governance structures that were reported by respondents to the thesis 
questionnaire and discussed in chapter 4 reveal a more varied and more nuanced 
range of these structural elements than can be accommodated by narrow form 
organic theory.  One is bound to conclude that while there is some scope for utilising 
the large modern trading corporation as a source analogue for incorporated sporting 
associations, the lack of a significant range of internal structural similarities between 
the two renders the trading corporation as an impoverished analogical resource. 
 
On the other hand, some intriguing similarities have emerged from this investigation 
between small closely-held companies and incorporated sporting associations.   
However, one would be well advised to consider carefully the way in which these 
potential commonalities can be utilised given that, as has been stressed, the majority 
of incorporated associations consist of memberships in excess of 50, while the 
literature suggests that the majority of small closely-held companies consist of than 
not more than 50 members.  The high degree of involvement by members in the 
management of small closely-held companies is means that to a limited extent, they 
may be an intriguing potential source analogue for the significant proportion of 
incorporated sporting associations with memberships of less than 50. 
 
The above analysis has also highlighted the many respects in which the internal 
structural characteristics of incorporated sporting associations bear close 
resemblance to charitable trusts, both generally and in the more specific instance of 
eleemosynary corporations.  It should be remembered from chapter 3, that at least in 
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appears to have had its origins, the key motivating factor for introducing the 
associations incorporation legislation in both jurisdictions was the difficulties 
experienced by managing association funds through the aegis of trustees.  This 
suggests very strongly that there has always been a close connection between the law 
relating to trusts, and the jurisprudence of incorporated associations.   
 
When one considers the charitable trust as a potential source analogue for 
incorporated sporting associations in a detailed way as has occurred in this chapter, 
one cannot help but be impressed by the range and extent of the commonalities 
between them.  Perhaps the most important of these is the fundamental role played in 
both by the purposes for which the entity was formed.  But there are many other 
striking similarities between charitable trusts and incorporated sporting associations.  
For instance, when one considers the way in which both are formed, the way in 
which both operate, the public and yet private nature of both, issues surrounding the 
enforceability of relationships arising from the operations of both charitable trusts 
and incorporated sporting associations, the reliance of each on volunteerism, issues 
relating to dissolution and taxation treatment, one is struck profoundly with the 
extent to which the internal structural relationships bear close resemblance.   
 
However, it must also be noted that there are some significant differences between 
the charitable trust and the incorporated association.  These have also been identified 
above and strongly suggest that, while there may be much to recommend the 
charitable trust as a source analogue in the development of a jurisprudence of 
353 incorporated sporting associations, incorporated sporting associations can only be 
appropriately considered sui generis.   
 
Eleemosynary corporations as a sub-genus of charitable corporations also provide an 
intriguing possibility as a source analogue for incorporated sporting associations.  In 
addition to limited liability and separate legal personality, there is a tradition of 
membership involvement in the management of eleemosynary corporation which we 
have also found to be the case in incorporated sporting associations.   
 
The implications of these findings are far reaching and will be considered in the 
conclusion.  However it is important to stress that the current universal acceptance 
within the Australian and New Zealand corporate law scholarship that jurisprudential 
questions relating to incorporated associations should be resolved by reference to the 
modern trading company is not based on sound principles of analogical reasoning.  
When viewed through the lens of broadly conceived organic theory, a theory that 
demands the equal consideration of empirical reality in addition to black letter law, a 
far richer potential source analogue is to be found in the jurisprudence of charitable 
trusts.  This is at the heart of Professor Oleck’s observations at the beginning of this 
chapter that:  
The principles of nonprofit organizational law should be analogized out of the guiding 
principles of religious, fraternal, community-service, charitable, and mutual aid groups that 
have illuminated civilization for many centuries.  The fact that the Bronze Age temple or 
agricultural commune also often evolved into the idea of a pirate crew should not make us 
conclude that we must make the pirate crew the model of our nonprofit laws.”44
 
                                                 
44   Oleck, HL, "Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979" (1979) 10 Toledo Law Review 962 
at 975. 
354 CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction to this thesis I suggested that if one was to exploit analogical 
reasoning in the development of a jurisprudence of novel corporate forms, one must 
articulate why certain source analogues are to be preferred over others.  I also 
indicated that there appeared to be widespread support within the legal profession for 
the adoption of the modern trading company as an appropriate source analogue for 
the resolution of legal problems in the context of incorporated associations.   
Significantly, prior to this thesis, the reasons why such a source analogue should be 
preferred have never been forensically articulated or analysed.   
 
In the introduction I also suggested that, as problem solving via bare analogical 
reasoning is open to criticism, the simultaneous application of a theory-based 
approach might serve to improve the quality of analogical problem solving.  For this 
reason I proposed investigating potential known legal source analogues for 
incorporated associations on the basis of one of the most influential modern theories 
of corporate law, namely the organic theory. 
 
In the subsequent chapters of this thesis I have endeavoured to follow this approach 
as methodically as possible in order to assess the largely unquestioned proposition 
that the modern trading company offers the richest and most apt source analogue for 
the development of a jurisprudence of incorporated associations.  Given the panoply 
of categories of incorporated association, their vast absolute numbers in both 
Australia and New Zealand, and the poverty of published empirical research into this 
355 area, I decided to focus this research effort on incorporated sporting associations in 
both countries.  This was because previous research had indicated that such groups 
were likely to constitute the largest single definable category of incorporated 
associations in both countries.  In this way I hoped to produce results capable of the 
broadest possible application.  However, the conclusions I now outline in the 
following paragraphs can only be stated with any certainty to apply to incorporated 
sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand.  Any broader inferences that are 
drawn from this research, for application to incorporated associations generally, are 
therefore subject to significant limitations.  These are the first of the limitations of 
this research to which I draw the attention of the reader.  The implications of the 
research and its limitations in this respect are therefore clear: more research into 
incorporated associations is required in order to determine if the findings of this 
thesis hold true across the incorporated association spectrum.  In the paragraphs that 
follow I will summarise each chapter of the thesis, discuss the implications and 
limitations of the research and suggest the contributions each has made to knowledge 
in the area. 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Summary  
Chapter 1 began with a general discussion of corporate legal personality.  The 
chapter progressed to briefly discuss the important role of theory in the development 
of the law before indicating that common law lacked a coherent theory of the 
corporation.  The multiplicity of contesting legal theories of the corporation was 
thereafter demonstrated by means of a survey of the central themes of, and 
contributions made by, the more prominent and influential theories of the 
356 corporation.  These theories included; “fiction and concession theories”, “realist 
theory”, “aggregate theory”; “bracket theory”, “economic (‘contractual’) theories, 
“purpose (‘subjectless’ property) theory; “‘common-fund’ theories”, 
“‘communitarian” theory”, “feminist theory”, and, “organisational theory”. 
 
Of the competing theories of the corporation that were analysed in chapter 1, I 
decided to adopt the aspect of the realist school that has come to be known as the 
“organic theory” as the theoretical approach underlying this thesis.  I had 3 reasons 
for adopting this theoretical approach.  First, this approach emphasised facilitating 
corporate groups as they existed and operated in reality.  Obtaining a more detailed 
understanding of actual incorporated associations was a key motivation in 
undertaking the research at the outset.  Second, the organic theory has been, and 
continues to be, one of the most influential theories of the corporation in terms of 
legal practice.  As such, it is a theoretical approach with which legal scholars and 
practitioners have an intuitive affinity – even those who would count themselves as 
“theory-phobic”.  Also, at the end of the project, I wished to present findings that 
would resonate with legal scholars and practitioners.  Finally, the organic approach 
was selected as the theoretical basis of the research because it was one with which I 
was fully familiar at the outset. 
 
Chapter 1 then proceeded to provide some indication of how corporate law theory 
has influenced the development of company law in Australia and New Zealand.   
While a number of theoretical approaches were identified as being influential, the 
particular influence of what I have defined as “narrow form organic theory” was 
particularly highlighted.  Following this discussion, I then highlighted the fact that 
357 the common law has struggled to account for the existence and operation of 
corporate groups, given its tendency towards anthropomorphic reductionism.  The 
benefit of the realist school (notwithstanding its civil law origins) to the common law 
is its insistence on recognising groups as real social phenomena and the requirement 
that the law should facilitate the actual needs of such groups.  Such a pragmatic 
approach immediately appeals to the common law with its incessant resort to what is 
reasonable.  This is the approach that I have adopted throughout the thesis and which 
I have termed broadly conceived organic theory. 
 
chapter 1 concluded with a discussion of what I have observed as convergence in 
diverse schools of corporate law theory.  This convergence was demonstrated by 
reference to the seminal works of Professors Stoltjar, Dan-Cohen, Hansmann, Blair, 
Lahey and Salter.  These scholars from the common fund, organisational, 
contractarian, communitarian and feminist schools respectively provide powerful 
insight into the legal and social nature of corporations.  The areas of convergence 
that I identified in the work of these scholars were with respect to the following 
issues: 
•  Should the dominant world views that find expression in the modern trading 
corporation find full voice in alternative corporate forms based on the 
attainment of non-commercial objectives? 
•  Given that legal entities such as trusts can be rendered in different formats, 
might it not be appropriate to find the corporate form expressed in alternative 
ways in differing contexts? 
•  To what extent should corporate size be a significant factor in the application 
of corporate law theory? 
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“partitioning” of corporate funds in favour of those purposes (even to the 
disenfranchisement of “owner/ shareholder/ member” patrons) as defining 
attributes of a corporation? 
•  Should corporate “managers” be accountable in terms of the purposes of the 
group, or as agents of the “owner/ shareholder/ member” patrons? 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
The major limitation of the theoretical treatment contained in chapter 1 is its brevity.  
Major schools of corporate law theory were summarised in order to sketch out their 
broad themes.  This of necessity required simplification and a loss of expressive 
nuance.  In addition, the focus of the chapter was in developing a broadly conceived 
organic theory that would provide a theoretical framework for the conduct of the 
subsequent research.  In this regard, even the definition of the theoretical framework 
was purpose driven.  Two excellent PhD theses that demonstrate the limitations of 
both aspects of the research in chapter 1 are those by Hemphill1 and Culley.2
 
The major implication of chapter 1 is that corporate law needs legal theory.  In fact, 
corporate law needs legal theories.  Theoretical insight is necessary in order to 
develop and understand the current corporate law, and it is perhaps more essential 
still in order to interrogate the underlying assumptions on which current corporate 
law is based and suggest alternative realities.  Those legal theories, such as feminist 
                                                 
1    Hemphill, PC, "The Corporation Sole and Theories of Legal Personality", PhD thesis, 
University of Sydney, Sydney, 1988. 
2   Culley, JH, "People's Capitalism and Corporate Democracy: An Intellectual History of the 
Corporation", PhD thesis, History, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1986. 
359 theory, that can be characterised as oppositional, offer perhaps the greatest 
opportunity for insight about current and future corporate law.  This opportunity for 
insight is invaluable when considering novel corporate forms such as incorporated 
associations. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
The principal original contribution to knowledge that was achieved in chapter 1 is the 
way I have suggested that major schools of corporate law theory can be seen to be in 
convergence.  The schools of corporate law theory that were interrogated to this end 
include common fund theories, organisational theories, contractarian theories, 
communitarian theories, and feminist theories in addition to that which is advocated 
in the remainder of this thesis, namely broadly conceived organic theory.  I suggest 
that this convergence highlights the central preoccupation of corporate law theory 
with the following three issues: 
1.  Corporate purposes; 
2.  Complexity of corporate relationships; and, 
3.  The impact of corporate size and context on corporate behaviour. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Summary  
chapter 2 began by highlighting the central role played by analogy in legal reasoning.  
In particular the strong reliance placed on analogical reasoning by the common law 
in contrast to the civil law system was emphasised.  Thereafter I carefully defined 
analogy as involving a comparison of the attributes of a known “source analogue” 
with those of an unknown “target analogue” for the purpose of either prediction or 
360 insight.  The term “metaphor” is sometimes used as a loose alternative to the term 
analogy.  For this reason I restricted the term to a meaning aligned with that given in 
the literary sense, namely the comparison of a familiar concept in a semantically 
disparate context, with a novel concept in the immediate context.  I then suggested 
that both terms could be placed at either end of an allegorical continuum, with 
analogy at one end of the continuum (representing the more concrete one-to-one type 
structural comparison) and metaphor at the other end of the allegorical continuum 
(representing the more abstract and figurative comparison). 
 
Chapter 2 then moved on to describe the concept of mapping as utilised in cognitive 
science.  This occurs where a familiar “source analogue” and a novel “target 
analogue” are both analysed with a view to utilising the known (source) as a means 
of understanding the unknown (target).  The relationship between mapping and 
reasoning by analogy was then discussed at considerable length and found to be 
paramount.  It was indicated that the mapping process is beset by a number of 
constraints, namely the purpose constraint, the surface level attribute constraint, and 
the structural constrain.  The influential work of Professor Hunter that informed 
much of this passage of chapter 2 is supportive of the view that mapping is central to 
legal reasoning by analogy, and that the quality of such reasoning is significantly 
impacted by the constraint effects identified above.  Mapping theory suggests that an 
analogy should be recognised as being relatively poor by a decision-maker if it is 
made on the basis of purely attributional similarity.  The “optimal level of 
361 representation will be that which maximises the degree of correspondence between 
causally relevant features of the analogues.”3
 
I then moved on in chapter 2 in considerable depth to illustrate, by reference to the 
allegorical continuum identified above, that the strongest analogy operated 
somewhere between the pure attributional comparisons of mere analogy and the 
complex, multi-layered, potentially contradictory comparisons of pure metaphor.   
What is required of advanced analogical reasoning is a sophisticated comparison 
between source and target analogues on the basis of internal structural and relational 
similarities. 
 
Chapter 2 continued to examine the processes involved in the application of 
analogical mapping to legal problem solving.  I discussed the empirical data which 
reveals that experienced legal problem solvers carry a bank of analogical schemas 
with which they solve novel legal problems as they arise.  This enables experienced 
legal problem solvers to rapidly assess a novel problem and expeditiously map an 
appropriate stored analogical schema to reach a plausible conclusion.  It was 
discussed that the major downfall of this form of mapping is that comparisons are 
more likely to be made on the basis of semantic retrieval cues drawn from surface 
level attributes rather than complex internal structural and relational similarities.  The 
research suggested that this amounted to a form of cognitive hard wiring that was not 
evident in less experienced practitioners.  One way of overcoming some of the 
                                                 
3   Gick, ML & Holyoak, KJ, "Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer" (1983) 15 Cognitive 
Psychology 1 at 6; and Hoffman, RR, "Monster Analogies" (1995) 16(3) AI Magazine 11 at 
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362 limitations of cognitive hard-wiring it was suggested, is to present multiple 
competing analogies from which the most apt source analogue could be selected. 
 
Chapter 2 then discussed the importance of choosing a rich analogical schema with 
which to map an unfamiliar target analogue when seeking to derive both insight and 
predictive capacity.  Following this I surveyed the literature relating to the role of 
analogy in common law legal reasoning, before returning to the observation of 
Cooke J that: “The law or practice relating to limited liability companies is not 
necessarily a helpful analogy in approaching these cases”.4
 
The foregoing discussion of analogical reasoning and its role in legal problem 
solving naturally led on in chapter 2 to the discussion of four known alternative legal 
source analogues of potential utility in the analogical development of a jurisprudence 
of incorporated sporting associations.  These four analogical alternatives were: the 
large modern trading company, the small closely-held company, the charitable trust, 
and the eleemosynary corporation.  Each of these potential source analogues was 
analysed on the basis of the essential features identified by Professor Hansmann as 
follows: 5
                                                 
4   Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc [1985] 2 NZLR 159 at 178. 
5   Hansmann, H & Kraakman, R, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2000) Yale Law 
School Working Paper No 235; and NYU Law and Economics Working Paper No 013 Yale 
Law School Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper 
Series; and New York University Centre for Law and Business Working Paper Series. at 1. 
363 1.  Full legal personality, including well-defined authority to bind the firm to contracts 
and to bond those contracts with assets that are the property of the firm as distinct 
from the firm’s owners, 
2.  Limited liability for owners and managers,  
3.  Shared “ownership” by investors of capital, 
4.  Delegated management under a board structure, and  
5.  Transferable shares. 
 
I chose to modify this classification slightly by adding to it “raison ďêtre” given that 
Cooke J had indicated that it was, in his Honour’s mind, a significant consideration.  
The analysis that followed highlighted the internal structural and relational 
characteristics of each potential source analogue relevant to each of the classifiers 
above.  Chapter 2 concluded once this task was completed. 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
There are a number of limitations to the research contained in chapter 2.  The first of 
these is the confusion created in the literature by a lack of uniformity in the use of 
the terms “analogy” and “metaphor”.  I have attempted to correct for this limitation 
by narrowly defining the terms for the purpose of this research and placing both on 
what I have termed an “allegorical continuum”.  The second major limitation is that, 
aside from the work by Professor Hunter, there is virtually no empirical research 
available that specifically tests cognitive science theory in a legal context.  However, 
given that Hunter’s work tests mainstream cognitive science theory, I have been 
content to rely on both sources in constructing the theoretical framework for this 
thesis.  The third limitation is in the choice of alternative source analogues.  By 
definition, these inclusions have resulted in any number of exclusions.  However, the 
purpose of my investigation was primarily to test the validity of the accepted wisdom 
that the large modern trading company was the most appropriate source analogue for 
364 incorporated associations.  As a consequence, the question of which precise 
alternatives were chosen is therefore less significant as long as at least one of those 
chosen calls the accepted wisdom into question. 
 
The first major implication of chapter 2 is that much more empirical research is 
needed to ascertain if mainstream cognitive theory has application to legal reasoning.  
Flowing from this, it would obviously be beneficial if the loose terminology 
surrounding the use of the terms “analogy” and “metaphor” in legal theory was 
tightened up.  The second major implication of chapter 2 follows on from the fact 
that I have demonstrated an empirically tested methodology for challenging the 
cognitive hard wiring of experienced legal problem solvers by analysing the internal 
structural and relational characteristics of alternative legal source analogues.  It is 
surely now no longer appropriate to rely on untested analogy as a basis for the 
development of jurisprudence in corporate law generally and the law relating to 
incorporated associations in particular.   
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
The first major contribution to knowledge made in chapter 2 was that the lack of 
precision in the use of the terms “analogy” and “metaphor” in legal theory was 
highlighted and, by reference to cognitive theory, a workable definition of both was 
developed that I have chosen to refer to as the “allegorical continuum”.  As a matter 
of first principle, poor use of terminology is an unnecessary retardant to clear 
thinking.  The second major contribution to knowledge made in chapter 2 was that it 
has modelled how cognitive theory can be used to resolve an intensely practical legal 
problem, namely, is the large modern trading company the most apt legal source 
365 analogue for incorporated sporting associations?  All of this of course has built on 
the research of others however, by applying the theory, and by doing so within a 
unique context and in a unique manner, it is an original contribution to knowledge. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Summary  
In order to assess the relative merits of each of the potential source analogues 
analysed in chapter 2, it was necessary to develop a similarly structured analysis of 
incorporated associations in chapter 3.  This was achieved primarily by reference to 
the relevant legislation and records of parliamentary debate.  The origins of the 
associations incorporation legislation in Australia, and its equivalent in New 
Zealand, were traced, and the intriguing possibility of what I termed “trans-Tasman 
legislative plagiarism” on the part of the New Zealand Parliament was highlighted.  
Significantly, the legislative innovation appears to have been motivated in both 
South Australia and New Zealand owing to the practical difficulties associated with 
managing the property of voluntary associations through the aegis of trusts.  chapter 
3 then considered the High Court decision in Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 
before surveying relevant passages of parliamentary debate before concluding that 
incorporated associations generally were a sui generis corporate form. 
 
Given the scepticism over the suitability of the trading company as a potential source 
analogue for incorporated associations, the analysis of incorporated associations 
proceeded in chapter 3 on the basis of a catalogue of essential characteristics of 
366 voluntary not-for-profit associations throughout the world suggested by Professor 
Salamon. 6  These characteristics were: 
1.  Organised, that is institutionalized to some extent. 
2.  Private, that is, institutionally separate from government, even if they receive 
governmental support. 
3.  Nonprofit-distributing, that is, not returning any profits they may generate to their 
owners or directors. 
4.  Self-governing, that is, controlled according to their own internal procedures and not 
operated from outside. 
5.  Voluntary, that is, non-compulsory and involving some meaningful degree of 
voluntary participation. 
 
To this list, I added “eligibility for incorporation” and “taxation treatment of 
incorporated associations” on the basis that Professor Salamon’s research did not 
discriminate between incorporated and unincorporated entities. 
 
Under eligibility criteria, I identified three potential bases for determining eligibility 
for incorporation that were potentially of relevance to incorporated associations, 
namely, eligible purposes, minimum size and mutual vs. public benefit eligibility.  
The subsequent analysis revealed that association purposes or objects were the only 
significant eligibility criterion required in both Australia and New Zealand.  The 
requirement was either for purposes broadly in keeping with the Preamble to the 
Statute of Elizabeth, or non-trading purposes.  In a number of jurisdictions minimum 
size was a prerequisite to incorporation, however, the quantum was variable.  There 
                                                 
6   Salamon, L.M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
USA, 1997 at 4. 
367 was no restriction on eligibility for incorporation on the basis of either mutual or 
public benefit in any jurisdiction. 
 
Chapter 3 continued to reveal that there were significant statutory requirements that 
an incorporated association was an organised entity in all jurisdictions.  The private 
status of incorporated associations was found to be something of an oxymoron given 
that they must comply with various statutory requirements, and to varying degrees 
tend to be dependant on a combination of donations, sponsorships and government 
grants in addition to membership subscriptions.  There was clear evidence that strong 
non-distribution constraints operated in all jurisdictions preventing the funds of an 
operational incorporated association from being disbursed to members in their 
capacity as members.  The non-distribution constraint appears to be slightly less rigid  
in New Zealand, Victoria and Queensland in the event of a surplus of assets on the 
dissolution of an incorporated association in those jurisdictions.  In all other 
jurisdictions, the non-distribution constraint continues to apply on dissolution of the 
incorporated association and it was seen that a version of the cy-près doctrine is 
mandated. 
 
Chapter 3 then considered the issue of internal governance mechanisms in 
incorporated associations.  Professor Salamon’s research suggested that some 
voluntary associations adopt a delegated management model of internal governance 
similar to what is observed in large modern trading companies and that other groups 
adopt what he termed as a “member-governed” model of internal governance.  As I 
discussed in chapter 3, the assumption of the legislation in all jurisdictions appears to 
be that the delegated management model is universally applicable to incorporated 
368 associations.  It was found that this is most rigidly applied in Queensland and the 
Australian Capital Territory.  The statutory duties that apply to the “committee” of 
incorporated associations were also considered and I suggested that these could be 
classified as technical (preparing reports and accounts, reporting to the regulator, 
paying fees etc), qualitative (skill, care and diligence) or fiduciary (fidelity, honesty 
etc).  The analysis revealed that statutory duties of a technical and fiduciary nature 
were universal, but that only South Australia had adopted qualitative duties, and that 
these only applied to the more economically significant incorporated associations. 
 
The extensive statutory decision making procedures were then considered with 
respect to incorporated associations and it was again observed that the various 
measures appear to have been written on the basis that all incorporated associations 
adopt a delegated management model of internal governance.  Following this, the 
voluntary nature of incorporated associations was analysed and, particularly with 
respect to sporting groups, the empirical evidence suggested that voluntary 
participation was fundamental to the operation of incorporated associations.   
Remarkably, the issue of volunteerism is addressed in none of the governing statutes.  
I also related the issue of volunteering to the general absence of qualitative statutory 
duties. 
 
Chapter 3 concluded with special consideration of the taxation status of incorporated 
associations.  It was revealed that incorporated sporting associations were eligible for 
income tax exemption in both Australia and New Zealand as a result of the mutuality 
principle.  Where the constitution of an association contains a non-distribution 
constraint that applies while the association is operational and when it is dissolved it 
369 can qualify for income tax exemption.  This is provided the association has 
participation in its management by members and the ultimate destination of 
association funds on dissolution is cy-près or to charity. 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
The major limitation of the research documented in chapter 3 is that in many 
instances it was impossible to reduce the findings down to readily comprehensible 
generalisations.  This is a consequence of the disparate nature of the governing 
statutes, which itself is a cause of growing frustration among scholars, legal 
practitioners and incorporated association members throughout Australia and New 
Zealand.  To some extent, the adoption of Salamon’s catalogue of characteristics as 
the basis of the analysis has minimised the devaluing effect of the legislative 
cacophony. 
 
The first major implication flowing from the research in chapter 3 is that there is 
considerable support for the proposition that incorporated associations are sui generis 
corporate forms.  The second major implication of the research is that there appear to 
be a number of potential points of comparison between incorporated associations and 
trusts.  The third major implication of the research in chapter 3 is that the governing 
legislation in all jurisdictions seems to be failing to account for the possibility of 
internal governance structures other that the delegated management model observed 
in large modern trading corporations.  A fourth major implication from this research 
is that the non-distribution constraint on incorporated sporting associations is not 
uniform in all jurisdictions.   
 
370 Contribution to Knowledge  
The first major contribution to knowledge made in chapter 3, was that the 
proposition I first raised in a Master of Commerce thesis in 1999 (that incorporated 
associations in Western Australia are a sui generis corporate form), has been shown 
to hold true throughout Australia and New Zealand (with reference to the governing 
legislation and records of parliamentary debate).  The second major contribution to 
knowledge made in chapter 3 was the modification of Professor Salamon’s catalogue 
of characteristics of voluntary associations for use in the specific context of 
incorporated sporting associations.  The third major contribution to knowledge made 
in chapter 3 was the identification of the failure of the governing legislation in all 
jurisdictions to account for the possibility that incorporated associations might be 
member-governed.7  The fourth major contribution to knowledge in chapter 3 was 
that I have highlighted a complete absence of statutory cognisance of the central role 
played in incorporated associations by volunteers.  The final contribution to 
knowledge made in chapter 3 is that I have provided a rationale as to why 
incorporated sporting associations in New Zealand, Queensland and Victoria might 
chose to adopt a cy-près-style dissolution clause in their constitution rather than 
direct surplus on dissolution to members personally. 
 
                                                 
7   A minor contribution to knowledge in this respect was the identification of the founding 
fathers of the associations incorporation legislation in Australia, namely, Captain Charles 
Bagot and George Randell, as members of the Congregationalist Church, a religious 
denomination founded on the basis of membership-governance.   
371 CHAPTER 4 
Summary  
The broadly conceived organic theory that I defined in chapter 1 requires that 
legislation be structured to facilitate corporate entities in their structure and 
operations rather than regulate and restrict them in an inappropriate manner.  It 
follows then that my theoretical commitment required an empirical investigation into 
incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand.  This was done by 
means of a questionnaire sent to a 10% sample of the 37,620 incorporated sporting 
associations registered in Australia and New Zealand as at 30
th June 2002.  Other 
than 279 return to sender questionnaires, the final positive response rate was 22%.  
Once the results of the questionnaire had been analysed, I reported the key findings 
in chapter 4.   
 
Chapter 4 outlined the survey methodology and then explained the difficulties that 
were met and overcome in order to generate a target sample and mailing list.  The 
key findings of the epidemiological investigation were than presented.  It was 
revealed that the majority of incorporated sporting associations in both countries 
were operational prior to incorporation.  Chapter 4 also revealed that the majority of 
respondents viewed the companies’ legislation in each country as singularly 
inappropriate to their needs.  Interestingly, owing to significant membership 
numbers, the majority of respondent groups would not qualify to incorporate as 
proprietary companies in Australia.  Of further interest was the extent to which 
respondent groups were not employers.   
 
372 Chapter 4 also revealed that while membership numbers were often significant, 
respondents indicated that the majority of incorporated sporting associations were 
relatively modest from an economic perspective.  Another interesting finding 
reported in chapter 4 was that more than 5% of respondents in both countries 
operated without an elected management committee, one such group reporting 1,500 
members.  Of those groups with a management committee, it was reported that the 
vast majority of committee members are paid nothing for their services. 
 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, respondents from both countries reported in the 
minority of cases that members meet only annually.  The vast majority of 
respondents reported that management committees met monthly.  When management 
committees made decisions, respondents indicated that the main consideration was 
the objects for which the association was formed.  Significantly, over 10% of 
respondents from both countries indicated that management decisions had been 
overturned by members’ meetings, although this was extremely rare.  Around a third 
of respondents from both countries reported that there were restrictions on the power 
of management committees to spend the funds of the association.  Over a range of 
management type powers (including the power to hire and fire employees, take out 
loans, execute contracts, initiate legal action in the group name, grant or refuse 
membership, and set subscription rates) significant proportions of respondents 
indicated that the final say rested with the members’ meeting. 
 
On the issue of determining the association, chapter 4 disclosed that less than 20% of 
incorporated sporting associations in both countries directed surplus assets on 
dissolution into the hands of the members.  The most common response was the cy-
373 près approach.  Finally, the vast majority of respondents reported that the 
incorporated sporting association existed for the benefit of the members. 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
The principal limitation of the research presented in chapter 4 was the significant 
reply to sender rate.  This indicates a concerning degree of unreliability in the 
various official registers held by the regulator in each jurisdiction. 
 
The first major implication of this research is that the administrative obstacles to 
obtaining access to data in the official registers in each jurisdiction could 
conceivably mean that this is the first and last empirical investigation of incorporated 
associations in Australia and New Zealand.  The second major implication of the 
research documented in chapter 4, is that the official registers, particularly that in 
Western Australia, are not 100% accurate.  This has considerable enforcement 
implications.  The third major implication of this research is that there is 
considerable membership involvement in the management of incorporated sporting 
associations.  The fourth major implication of this research is that incorporated 
sporting associations are heavily reliant on volunteerism.  The fifth major implication 
of the research documented in chapter 4, is that group objects and purposes are of 
prime importance in the operations of incorporated sporting associations.  The final 
major implication of this research is that there is widespread acceptance of the 
suitability of a cy-près-style distribution methodology on dissolution of an 
incorporated association 
 
374 Contribution to Knowledge  
For the first time there has been a targeted empirical study of incorporated 
associations in Australia and New Zealand.  As a result, the key findings disclosed in 
chapter 4, and the full statistical data in appendix B to this thesis, represent a major 
original contribution to knowledge. 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Summary  
Chapter 5 applied the broadly conceived corporate law organic theory as defined in 
chapter 2, to incorporated sporting associations in Australia and New Zealand.  This 
involved a comparison of the statutory framework for incorporated associations and 
the empirical data reported in chapter 4 in order to determine the closeness of fit 
between the nature of both the legislation and its user-groups.  The analysis in 
chapter 5 followed the eight part classification that was developed in chapter 3.  
 
It was demonstrated that the legislative view of incorporated associations as a sui 
generis corporate form was strongly endorsed by the perception of sporting user 
groups themselves.  Interestingly, both employment on the one hand, and 
economically significant size on the other were both shown to be relatively minor 
phenomena with respect to incorporated sporting associations.  On the issue of 
eligibility for incorporation, in all jurisdictions there was uniformity of emphasis on 
the purposes for which an association was formed and continued to operate.  This is 
expressed positively or negatively depending on the jurisdiction in question, 
however, it is always expressed in both emphatic and restrictive terms.  The 
emphasis placed by a number of jurisdictions on the issue of minimum membership 
375 was not shown to be significant to incorporated sporting associations in practice, 
given both the incidence of pre-incorporation formation and the significant 
membership numbers in practice.  The issue of public vs. mutual benefit is relevant 
to the potential charitable status of incorporated associations.  The research 
demonstrated that the great majority of incorporated sporting associations are not 
formed primarily for public benefit. 
 
Incorporated sporting associations were thereafter typically shown to be 
characterised by a degree of organisational sophistication, given that two-thirds of 
such groups in New Zealand, and more than 80% of those in Australia, reported 
varying pre-incorporation histories.  Chapter 5 then revealed that there was 
symmetry between the legislation and the perceptions of the great majority of 
incorporated sporting associations on Salamon’s proposition that incorporated 
sporting associations are private entities.  The central defining characteristic of 
incorporated sporting associations, being entities that respect a non-distribution 
constraint, was considered in detail in chapter 5 and it was revealed, that from a 
legislative perspective, this constraint was universal while associations were in 
operation but variable when associations cease to operate.  The empirical data 
revealed, however, that even in the absence of legislative fiat, there was majority 
voluntary acceptance by incorporated sporting associations of the non-distribution 
constraint in dissolution circumstances.  Most significantly, the most common 
distribution on dissolution provision in practice was shown to be a type of cy-près 
arrangement. 
 
376 Chapter 5 further demonstrated that one of the most significant areas of legislative 
non-facilitation for incorporated sporting associations was in the area of internal 
governance.  While there are a range of internal governance methodologies in 
evidence in incorporated sporting associations, the flavour of the legislation in all 
jurisdictions was that to varying degrees, the narrow form organic model identified 
in chapter 1 applied equally to all groups.  While chapters 5 and 6 acknowledged the 
limitations of empirical research in this area, it did demonstrate clearly that the 
narrow form organic model is not universally relevant to incorporated sporting 
associations.   
 
Chapter 5 also indicated an additional lack of legislative facilitation of incorporated 
sporting associations on the issue of their voluntary nature.  While this can be 
demonstrated to be a further defining feature of incorporated sporting associations, 
the legislative silence on this issue was shown to be deafening.  Finally, the taxation 
status of incorporated sporting associations was considered in chapter 5 to be entirely 
in accordance with the empirical analysis of the majority of these groups in both 
Australia and New Zealand.  This was a prime example of the principles of broadly 
conceived organic theory and reinforced those characteristics identified previously as 
defining the majority of incorporated sporting associations. 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
The principal limitation of the research that was presented in chapter 5 was failure of 
the thesis questionnaire to determine the full spectrum of internal governance 
structures operating in incorporated sporting associations in practice.  This retards 
the extent to which one can generalise from this research about the extent of the 
377 observed lack of legislative facilitation of the internal governance of incorporated 
sporting associations, which is itself a key objective of the theoretical approach of 
the thesis.  However, it must be recalled that there is an almost universal legislative 
assumption of the applicability of a narrow form organic model to incorporated 
associations on the one hand, and the scholarly acceptance of this married with the 
lack of empirical data on the other.  In these circumstances, it is fortunate that the 
thesis questionnaire was at least able to provide clear evidence that the status quo is 
inappropriate.  The trading company has been clearly shown to be an impoverished 
source analogue for incorporated associations when compared to other respectable 
potential legal source analogues. 
 
A secondary limitation of this research is that, while it can be shown that cy-près 
style distribution methodologies are common in those jurisdictions where they are 
not statutorily mandated,8 the only readily ascertainable reason for this is the 
favourable taxation treatment that it can deliver.  The research does not confirm that 
the taxation benefits are the only reason for these methodologies, or even whether 
they were persuasive.  Likewise, the research does not reveal why those groups that 
did not choose to avail themselves of the taxation benefits of cy-près distribution 
methodologies did so.  Clearly, much further research is called for before 
conclusions can be drawn from these findings. 
 
In a general sense chapter 5 revealed that, while the governing legislation is 
respectful of the requirements of broadly conceived organic theory across a number 
of areas, there are significant points of divergence between the legislative framework 
                                                 
8   Namely, New Zealand, Victoria and Queensland. 
378 and the empirical data.  In this respect, the first major implication of this research is 
that there is now significant evidence in support of the proposition that incorporated 
associations are a sui generis corporate form.  This requires that any future legislative 
development, whether in a unified manner or otherwise, must be sympathetic to the 
corporate form as it is currently expressed. 
 
The second major implication of this research is that the legislation is universally 
based on a flawed assumption about the internal governance structures in evidence in 
incorporated sporting associations as reported in chapter 4.  The narrow form organic 
model of internal governance is inadequate to account for the degree of nuanced 
variability in these mechanisms as they have evolved in these groups.  Given that this 
research has not revealed the full range of membership involvement in internal 
governance, more research is necessary in order to bring the legislation in line with 
the needs of actual user groups. 
 
A further implication of this research is that the voluntary nature of incorporated 
sporting associations is deserving of at least some form of express legislative 
recognition.  Finally, at least in New Zealand, Victoria and Queensland, the 
legislation does not fully enshrine the non-distribution principle so far as the 
dissolution of incorporated associations is concerned.  As indicated in chapters 3, 4 
and 5, this is significantly at odds with the general nature of incorporated sporting 
associations.  This is particularly significant with respect to the potential income tax 
status of incorporated sporting associations.  Greater legislative harmony between 
the governing legislation and the income tax legislation in both Australia and New 
Zealand appears to be appropriate. 
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Contribution to Knowledge  
One of the most potentially controversial contributions of chapter 5 is that it casts 
doubt on the claim of those scholars who advocate for an abolition of the governing 
legislation in favour of an expanded Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) regime.  While this 
view can best be described as the accepted orthodoxy, it has been conclusively 
demonstrated in this thesis to be legislatively and empirically unsound.  Chapter 5 
demonstrated in practical terms how black letter corporate law can be critically 
analysed on a sound theoretical basis.  While this in itself is not unique, it is an 
innovation with respect to incorporated associations.  Further, by comparative 
analysis, specific aspects of the governing legislation in Australia and New Zealand 
have been shown to be out of step with the needs of users.  This has only been 
possible as a result of the empirical data presented in chapter 4. 
 
Finally, chapter 5 answers the central thesis question about the applicability of 
corporate law organic theory to incorporated sporting associations in Australia and 
New Zealand.  Corporate law organic theory broadly conceived on the basis of realist 
principles as defined in chapter 2 is largely, with a few significant exceptions, at 
home in the incorporated sporting association context.  Narrow form organic theory 
is likewise an inappropriate model of internal governance on which to base the 
legislative framework. 
 
380 CHAPTER 6 
Summary  
The empirically tested nature of incorporated sporting associations that had been 
developed in chapters 3, 4 & 5 by means of the theoretical model defined in chapter 
1, was compared in chapter 6 to the alternative source analogues presented 
previously in chapter 2.  Primarily this was done in order to ascertain if the large 
modern trading company was the most superior available source analogue on which 
to base a jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations.  This forensic 
comparison, based on a modified classification suggested by Professor Hansmann, 
revealed that it was an impoverished source analogue. The general trading purpose of 
all companies was shown to be inherently contradictory to the non-trading purpose 
constraint required of incorporated sporting associations.  The delineation between 
trading companies on the basis of economic size was also not relevant to 
incorporated sporting associations.  These groups were shown to be potentially 
significant in terms of membership numbers while simultaneously lacking economic 
significance.  While large trading companies operate in the public sphere, 
incorporated sporting associations, were found to be focussed on internal matters 
such as narrow corporate purposes and the needs of members.  Incorporated sporting 
associations were however, demonstrated to exhibit a significant degree of 
organisational sophistication such as one would expect of a large trading company.  
The non-distribution constraint of incorporated sporting associations was highlighted 
as one of the clearest points of asymmetry with trading companies.  While it was true 
that a majority of incorporated sporting associations reported having a delegated 
management structure, the empirical evidence suggested that the internal governance 
of incorporated sporting associations was significantly different to that pertaining to 
381 large modern trading companies.  The reliance of incorporated sporting associations 
on the volunteerism of its corporate constituents is a further significant point of 
dissimilarity with trading companies.  Finally, the taxation treatment of incorporated 
sporting associations is also a crucial point of distinction between these groups and 
trading companies.  While the small closely-held trading company was found to bear 
some structural alignment with the smaller incorporated sporting associations 
responding to the questionnaire, this group was the minority of respondents and 
therefore these observations were of limited utility.  The only structural relational 
similarities of any significance between trading companies and incorporated sporting 
associations were those pertaining to limited liability and separate legal personality.  
In the context of such a wide-ranging analysis, this appears to be a rather small peg 
on which to hang such a large hat. 
 
In chapter 6, in almost every instance, the most significant structural similarities 
were demonstrated to exist between the incorporated associations and charitable 
trusts.  The extent to which both were shown to be primarily formed for limited 
purposes, to the exclusion of delivering pecuniary benefits to members, was striking.  
The same was shown to be true of the fact that both are institutionalised by reference 
to a foundation instrument which, again in both cases, is crucial to circumscribing 
their everyday operations.  Intriguingly, both the charitable trust and incorporated 
sporting associations were found to have an almost identical mixed private/public 
character.  In terms of non-distribution constraints, there is virtually no difference 
between incorporated sporting associations and charitable trusts up to and including 
the cy-près principle.  Volunteerism was also found to be as important in the context 
of charitable trusts as it is in the context of incorporated sporting associations.   
382 Finally, while the requirements relating to charitable trusts are somewhat more 
exhaustive than those for incorporated sporting associations, the difference was 
demonstrated to be one of degree and not nature.  Effectively both are eligible for 
income tax exemption.  It is however true that the charitable trust was shown to be a 
problematic source analogue for incorporated sporting associations on the basis of 
limited liability.  The eleemosynary corporation was introduced as a recognised sub-
genus of charitable trust with this characteristic in addition to significant similarities 
regarding internal governance methodologies of relevance to incorporated sporting 
associations.  Finally, separate legal personality was highlighted as a reasonably 
weak point of difference between incorporated sporting associations and charitable 
trusts. 
 
Implications and Limitations of the Research  
The first principal limitation of the research presented in chapter 6 was in the limited 
range of alternative source analogues for incorporated sporting associations that were 
considered.  Nevertheless enough such analogical alternatives were presented to 
highlight the impecuniosity of the favoured source analogue, namely the large 
modern trading company.  
 
The second major limitation of this research is that only one class of incorporated 
associations was empirically investigated, namely sporting entities.  The inferences 
that may be drawn from this research with respect to incorporated associations in 
Australia and New Zealand generally remain uncertain.  This requires future research 
to consider the findings presented in chapter 6 and test their potential applicability 
across a wider user group spectrum. 
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The major implication from this research is that current corporate law scholarship 
with respect to the suitability of the large modern trading company as a source 
analogue for the development of a jurisprudence of incorporated sporting 
associations appears to be based on flawed assumptions.  Any such jurisprudence 
must therefore be open to criticism. 
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
The research presented in chapter 6 combines the utilisation of multiple analogies, 
recommended by Professor Dan-Cohen, with models of the corporation, suggested 
by Professor Hansmann, that were informed by a model of the voluntary not-for-
profit association, suggested by Professor Salamon, to present appropriately 
structured potential source analogues for incorporated associations.  The structure 
that was developed for this purpose was drawn from cognitive science as 
recommended by Professor Hunter.  The work of all of these scholars was 
implemented in one investigation for the first time in this chapter. 
 
As a result of the research presented in chapter 6, it is now apparent that incorporated 
sporting associations should not be analogised with the modern trading company 
without significant qualification. 
 
OVERALL CONCLUSION 
This investigation clearly indicates that, of the alternatives presented, the charitable 
trust offers the richest source analogue schema for the analogical development of a 
jurisprudence of incorporated sporting associations.  Certainly, it offers a far superior 
384 analogical schema to that provided by the large modern trading company.  This 
finding supports the views Professor Oleck, expressed in 1979, about the inapt 
utilisation of company law as an analogical resource for resolving jurisprudential 
problems pertaining to incorporated nonprofit entities.  As a consequence of these 
findings, it would be more correct to suggest that the management committee of an 
incorporated association (where there is one) stands in a position most closely 
analogous to the trustees of a charitable trust.  What this suggests is that management 
committee members of such entities owe duties of a fiduciary nature to the 
incorporated sporting association.  Any articulation of the potential duty of care of 
such individuals should develop from the principles surrounding such duties in the 
context of the charitable trust.  There are further implications concerning the 
appropriateness of abolishing the doctrine of ultra vires as has been necessary in the 
context of trading companies.  Is it compatible with the nature of a corporate body 
formed for limited purposes to be free to act beyond those purposes?  If it is so 
compatible, then why the peculiar and somewhat problematic requirement in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) for no-liability companies to honour trading restrictions 
contained within their objects clause? 
 
The proposition that the charitable trust is the most appropriate source analogue for 
incorporated sporting associations also suggests that members of such an entity have 
no standing to enforce the association’s constitution on the basis of either contract, or 
in equity in a position analogous to beneficiaries of a private trust.  However, such 
members may nevertheless enjoy standing on the basis of holding an interest that is 
in many respects analogous to the power of appointment over a charitable trust, such 
as is exercised by the members of an eleemosynary corporation.   
385  
Having arrived at this proposition, however, it remains to be seen whether the 
findings of this thesis as articulated above have broader application to incorporated 
associations generally. 
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